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ABSTRACT 
Three basic objectives are pursued in this thesis: (a) the development of a 
theory of secular government that is appropriate in conditions of religious pluralism; 
(b) the elaboration of the primary legal institutions that organise relations between 
government and religion; and (c) the reform and adjustment of these instimtions in 
light of the proposed theory of secular government. The thesis is developed through 
three parts. Part 1 deals with the philosophical basis of secular government and its 
historical development in common law countries through disestablishment, toleration 
and "the separation of church and state". Part 2 relates to the constitutional law in 
Australia, especially section 116 of the Commonwealth Constimtion. Part 3 relates to 
other aspects of the law: the use of religious and secular reasons in adjudication, the 
legal autonomy of religious groups, religious discrimination laws and blasphemy laws. 
IV 
PREFACE 
The ideas for this thesis germinated when, as an undergraduate law student, I 
made mental notes of the many and various contacts that existed between the law and 
religion in different subjects studied in the curriculum, but especially in associations, 
constimtional and criminal law. However, leaving the occasional constimtional smdies 
to one side, there seemed to be no published research specifically on this material in 
Australia, and there has certainly been no integrated smdy on how the different aspects 
of the law converge on the one topic of religion. This thesis has provided that 
oppormnity, and as it has developed two basic themes in the relations between 
government and religion have become increasingly evident to me. The first is that, in 
Australia and other common law countries, the most important issues addressed by the 
modem law seem to be rooted in the problems and experiences of a multi-religious 
people. The second is that the methods that have been adopted to manage this pluralism 
are intimately related to the origins and development of constimtional government. It 
is this second theme - religious pluralism and constimtional government - that I have 
pursued. In doing so, I hope to have added to some important research on 
constimtionalism which has been undertaken at the University of Queensland Law 
School in the last decade. I also hope that the results of this thesis will illuminate how 
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men and women can still enjoy the benefits of living under the government of laws, but 
with the freedom to be both inspired and moved by faith. 
There are four people I would like to thank especially for their support. 
Professor Gabriel Moens, my supervisor, has seen it grow over the last five years. He 
has let me learn from my own mistakes and, throughout, has provided thoughtful and 
helpful guidance. Kim, my wife, has lived with and tolerated my preoccupation with 
this project without complaint. My brother Neil has helped me with the computer 
technology. Andrew Ross has read drafts of the thesis, and offered helpful comments 
about style and content. The University of Queensland Law School has also provided 
a supportive scholarly atmosphere for research and writing in, I believe, the best 
traditions of the academy. I have always been able to find people who can discuss the 
relevant and the obscure, and who can disagree with civility. 
I should clarify some points about terminology. Throughout this thesis, the term 
"Protestant" is used to include most of the Christian churches not in communion with 
Rome or the Eastern Orthodox churches: whether those churches be denominational 
or independent; or theologically conservative, liberal, evangelical, charismatic or 
Pentecostal. In accordance with the usual Australian practice, "Protestant" is also used 
to include churches in the Anglican Communion, even though many High Church or 
catholic Anglicans would deny being Protestant. It is also more common now to use 
the term "Catholic" instead of "Roman Catholic", and I do not think this unduly blurs 
the distinction between the Church of Rome and catholic churchmanship in the Anglican 
Church. The term "Commonwealth" usually means the central or, less precisely, the 
"Federal" level of government in Australia. If the context suggests, it can also mean 
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the Commonwealth of Nations. Finally, when it appears in connection with political 
instimtions, the term "liberal" is used in the broad but technical sense of a philosophy 
which holds that the primary role of government is the protection of the pre-existing 
rights of citizens. 
To emphasise that, in their judgments, judges have an impact on the system of 
government generally, I have "demythologised" some legal conventions and have not 
used abbreviations like "J" for "Justice" or "Mr" or "Madame Justice", or "CJ" for 
"Chief Justice" etc. I have also tried not to give any linguistic or grammatical 
preference to one gender over another. However, in the use of personal pronouns I 
have accepted the advice of the Oxford English Dictionary (1989) and have used "he", 
"him" or "his" when a personal pronoun in the singular is required, on the 
understanding that the term includes people of both sexes. Unless the context suggests 
otherwise, I do not intend the use of these pronouns to be understood as having any 
implications as to gender. 
I have based the thesis on the law as available to me at Brisbane on 30 June 
1995. 
Reid Mortensen 
St Lucia, Queensland 
7 September 1995 
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L THE CHALLENGE OF 
RELIGIOUS PLURALISM 
§ 1: Objectives of Thesis 
In the common law tradition, the modem era began with relations between 
government and religion being dealt with almost exclusively by the specialist advocates 
and proctors of Doctors' Commons in St Paul's Churchyard, Ix)ndon. But over the last 
three cenmries and with the export of that tradition beyond Ix)ndon to the Empire, the 
Commonwealth and the United States, those relations have also become more 
complicated, and are determined in more general and less conversant arenas: mainly 
parliaments and the ordinary courts of judicature. There are countless reasons for this, 
including profound changes in both government and religion. However, increasing 
religious pluralism is probably the most important. For, where the practice of law in 
Doctors' Commons was limited to the concerns of the English religious establishment, 
in Australia and other common law countries it can now potentially involve hundreds 
of different religious groups and conceptions, including, as we will see in this chapter, 
the most primeval and modem. 
The contest in 1994 and 1995 between the Commonwealth and State 
Governments and private property developers over the building of a bridge to 
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Hindmarsh (Kumarangk) Island in South Australia shows how unexpectedly religious 
issues can arise in litigation, and how complex they can be. Having received the 
approval of successive State Governments in South Australia, Binalong Pty Ltd, a 
development company, spent approximately $12.5 million on the construction of the 
bridge. However, a report commissioned by the Commonwealth Government revealed 
that there were ancient aboriginal campsites and burial grounds on Hindmarsh Island, 
and that the women of the local Ngarrendjeri people believed that the construction of 
the bridge would desecrate an area which was spirimally significant to the tribe's 
reproduction. The content of these beliefs could not, according to Ngarrendjeri 
tradition, be disclosed to men or, though this is not as clear on the evidence, non-
aborigines. This is a reasonably common religious obligation amongst aboriginal 
women, but it meant that neither South Australian Premier Dean Brown nor 
Commonwealth Aboriginal Affairs Minister Robert Tickner knew what the tribe's 
beliefs were. They were reluctantly disclosed to Professor Cheryl Saunders, who 
prepared the report for the Commonwealth Government, but details were only handed 
to Mr Tickner in two sealed envelopes he was told not to open. He nevertheless issued 
a ban on the building of the bridge, and intervened specifically to protect aboriginal 
spirimal beliefs. In response. Premier Brown criticised the Commonwealth's 
intervention, complaining that economic development was being frustrated on the basis 
of an "as yet untested mythological claim". Adelaide's Advertiser also lamented the 
Ngarrendjeri's "argument for theocracy" and Mr Tickner's "approach to government, 
[which] stripped to its essentials, is no different from the ayatoUahs of Iran".' 
' The ban was issued under the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage 
Protection Act 1984 (Cth), s 10. See C James, "Secrets of the Bridge to Nowhere"; 
"Something We'll Never Know"; C James, A Tumer and D Penberthy, "State May Sue 
Commonwealth"; "The Sacred and the Insane" (editorial) ^^vem^^r, 11 July 1994 pp 
1, 2 and 16; A Harvey, "Tickner Bans Bridge to Protect Sacred Sites" Sydney Morning 
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The religious element of the case was overlooked in the ensuing litigation in the 
Federal Court, Chapman v Minister for Aboriginal Affairs,'^ where the developer 
obtained judicial review of Mr Tickner's decision.^  However, it raises numerous 
questions about the possible role of government in the dispute. Were the Ngarrendjeri's 
beliefs religious? If so, would the tribe's own claim that the beliefs were religious be 
conclusive or, despite the Ngarrendjeri women's objections to disclosing them to men 
or non-aborigines, would evidence on the acmal content of the beliefs be necessary? 
Would the religious element then shape the legitimate or appropriate governmental 
response to the case? Was a government (like the South Australian) able to encroach 
upon the practice of the tribe's religious conceptions, or to allow a private citizen (like 
the developer) to do so? Was a government (like the Commonwealth) able to protect 
the practice of the tribe's religioiis conceptions and, if so, would it then be required or 
be able to protect the practice of non-tribal religious conceptions? Would race be 
relevant? For example, even if evidence of the acmal content of beliefs would usually 
be necessary to prove that they were religious, could a special exception be made for 
tribal aboriginal beliefs? Or, even if government could not usually protect the practice 
of religious conceptions, could it do so if they were tribal? 
In this thesis, I explore how in Australia the constimtion, government and law 
Herald, 11 July 1994, p 3; J Kerin, "Bridge Banned over Women's Family Beliefs" 
Australian, 12 July 1994 p 3; see also CH Bemdt, "Women and the 'Secret Life'" in 
M Charlesworth, H Morphy, D Bell and K Maddock, Religion in Aboriginal Australia: 
An Anthology (Brisbane 1984) pp 315-34. 
^ Chapman v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs and Saunders, 
Unreported, Federal Court of Australia, 15 February 1995 {"Chapman"). 
^ C James, "Court Begins Island Bridge Ban Scrutiny" Advertiser, 6 December 1994, 
p 8; P Lawnham and L Mclean "Judge Overmms Tickner Ban on Building Bridge" 
Australian, 16 February 1995, p 2. 
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respond to questions like these, and how they should respond to them. In particular, 
I have three objectives. First, I aim to develop a theoretical basis for a political 
constimtion (setting the basic rules for the organisation of government) which is both 
just and, to the extent it can be judged, practicable in existing conditions of religious 
pluralism. Secondly, I elaborate the primary constimtional and legal institutions which 
organise relations between government and religion. Thirdly, I aim to highlight how 
these instimtions should be adjusted or reformed if a just and practicable political 
constimtion is to be realised. 
Theoretical and practical approaches to the relationship of government and 
religion have previously been too reliant on concepts like "neutrality" and "the 
separation of church and state". This has been especially so in the United States, but 
there have been notable scholarly and legal attempts to import them into Australia. 
Though these concepts are important symbols, as legal principles or rules they have 
proved imprecise and, at times, inadvertently hostile to the practice of religion. In this 
thesis, I submit that it is better to concentrate on a more basic political objective which, 
arguably, underlies these concepts. I call this "the secular commonwealth": 
government in which, as nearly as practicable, religion is regarded as irrelevant to a 
citizen's political, legal, social and economic stams. In the next section (§ 2), I 
summarise how this argument is developed in the rest of this thesis. Then, because the 
need for a secular commonwealth is most evident in conditions of religious pluralism, 
I clarify what is meant by "religion" (§§ 3 and 4) and consider the existing social 
patterns of religious pluralism in Australia (§ 5). 
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§ 2: Scope and Outline of Thesis 
In this thesis, I consider philosophical, sociological, historical and, above all, 
legal materials which relate to religion. In part 1, I develop the theoretical basis of a 
secular commonwealth and discuss the primary constitutional instimtions English-
speaking countries have used to organise relations between government and religion. 
The theoretical principles of the secular commonwealth developed in chapter II 
especially set the normative parameters for the rest of the thesis. Here, I clarify the 
meaning of secular government and outline its origins in religious and liberal political 
philosophy. John Rawls' philosophy of political justice is then used to provide the 
theoretical basis of the idea of a secular commonwealth.'* In contrast to some of the 
older liberal and religious theories of secular government, Rawlsian philosophy is more 
generally acceptable: significandy, it does not depend on a religious conception of the 
good. It is also more comprehensive. Rawls' theory of justice has on the one hand 
civil and political, and on the other social and economic implications. The latter add 
a new dimension of equal opportunity to theories of secular government, but Rawls also 
provides a means for prioritising this against political liberties. The publication of 
Political Liberalism in 1993 has enhanced the relevance of Rawlsian philosophy to 
issues of constimtional government, law and religion, because in that work Rawls tried 
to oudine how, when they hold profoundly different religious, philosophical and moral 
conceptions of the good, citizens can live together under politically just constimtional 
government.^ Taking up recent liberal theories of the use of public reason, it also 
"* This thesis is primarily about law, not political philosophy, so it is outside its scope 
to undertake extensive criticism of Rawlsian philosophy. I do note and account for 
criticisms where appropriate, but otherwise Rawlsian philosophy is treated as the 
theoretical source of the constimtional and legal analysis. 
^ See J Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York 1993) pp xviii, xxv and 47. 
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deals with the role of religion in decisions made by parliaments, executive governments 
and judicamres. 
The idea of the secular commonwealth then helps to evaluate the instimtions 
historically used in English-speaking countries to realise secular government. In this 
thesis, I am primarily concemed with the constimtion and law in Australia and so refer 
in detail to Commonwealth, State and Territory constimtions, legislation and 
adjudication. However, this investigation is helped (and becomes more sophisticated) 
by placing it within the wider international context of the common law tradition, and 
therefore, at times, I also refer to the law in England, Scotland, Ireland, New Zealand, 
Papua New Guinea, India, South Africa, Canada and the United States. The common 
base-lines of the secularisation of government for most of these countries are the 
religious establishments in Great Britain, so in chapter III I examine the religious 
establishments in that country and in colonial New South Wales. The unplanned, 
irrational mix of instimtions which, we will see, now underlies secular government in 
Australia descends more directly from British and American instimtions of secular 
government. I examine these in the rest of part 1, continuing chapter III by considering 
the secularisation of government through disestablishment and then, in chapter IV, by 
mapping the process of religious toleration in Great Britain. In chapter V, the 
separation of church and state is discussed. This concept has had immense symbolic 
importance as a basic instimtion of secular government. However, especially in the 
way it has been expounded by the United States Supreme Court in decisions on the First 
Amendment's establishment clause, I argue that the concept of separation seriously 
undermines basic principles of a secular commonwealth and, in application, has not 
served capably as a practicable means for organising relations between government and 
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religion. To date, Australian criticisms of the Supreme Court's separatist theory have 
mostly expressed misgivings about extreme consequences like the ban on public Nativity 
displays, but have never detailed reasons.^ There remains a need in Australia to 
evaluate the concept in terms of substantive theoretical principle. 
Part 2 concerns the position of religion in Australian constimtional law. I 
concentrate particularly on the religion clauses of section 116 of the Commonwealth 
Constimtion: the liberties of section 116 are amongst the few which upset the utilitarian 
theory of government which normally underlies Australian constimtions. In chapter VI, 
I outline that section's origins, its general scope and its limitations. The 1944 and 1988 
referenda, in which it was proposed (unsuccessfully) to extend section 116 to the States, 
are discussed, but much attention is also paid to the limitations imposed on the religion 
clauses by High Court interpretation. From the perspective of a secular commonwealth, 
this began at a high point in Chief Justice Sir John Latham's judgment in Adelaide 
Company of Jehovah's Witnesses Inc v Commonwealth,^ which I believe is arguably 
one of the most principled exposition of religion clauses made in the common law 
tradition and, though deliberately based on Millian philosophy, pre-empts aspects of 
Rawls' theory of basic liberties. But the Court's interpretation of the religion clauses 
degenerated through a clutch of decisions it made in the late 1970s and early 1980s.* 
^ Eg Note, "Decision of the United States Supreme Court in the Pawmcket Case" 
(1984) 58 A U 363. 
^ (1943) 67 CLR 116 {"Jehovah's Witnesses"). 
^ Church of Scientology Inc v Woodward (1979) 154 CLR 79 {"Scientology I"); Church 
of Scientology Inc v Woodward (1979) 154 CLR 25 {"Scientology IF); Attorney-General 
(Vic) (ex rel Black) v Commonwealth (1981) 146 CLR 559; New v New, Unreported, 
High Court of Australia, 5 March 1982; Church of the New Faith v Commissioner of 
Pay-roll Tax (Vic) (1983) 154 CLR 120 {"Scientology III"). 
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Therefore in chapter VII, which deals with section 116's establishment clause, and 
chapter VIII, which deals with its other clauses, I discuss how a secular commonwealth 
might be better realised by revising religion clause interpretation. To a large extent, 
the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the First Amendment's free exercise 
clause and the Canadian Supreme Court's interpretation of the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms help to show how the interpretation of section 116 might be revised. 
The theory of a secular commonwealth in part 1 and my proposed revisions of 
section 116 in part 2 help to advance the discussion of the law in part 3. In chapter IX, 
I discuss how the common law courts have progressively eliminated the use of religious 
reasons in the course of making decisions. This tradition builds on my discussion in 
chapter II of the obligation imposed on all branches of government to use public reason; 
an obligation which remains an important guarantor of secular government in Australia 
until a revision of section 116 is achieved. The other chapters in part 3 involve the 
most topical issues of the relationship between government and religion in Australia. 
In chapter X, I investigate the legal independence of religious groups in Australia, an 
issue which bears directly on the extent to which the judicamre can determine a 
religious group's internal disputes for it. This has been important in the 1990s: 
members of both the Anglican Church and the Presbyterian Church have brought 
internal disputes on the ordination of women into die State Supreme Courts.^ The 
ordination cases confirm that there are serious problems in the extent to which the law 
^ Scandrett v Carnley, Unreported, Supreme Court of Westem Australia, 6 March 1992; 
Scandrett v Carnley, Unreported, Supreme Court of New South Wales, 28 April 1992; 
Scandrett v Bowling, Umeported, Supreme Court of New South Wales, 28 January 
1992; Scandrett v Bowling, Unreported, Supreme Court of New South Wales, 30 
January 1992; Scandrett v Bowling (1992) 27 NSWLR 483; Bartholomew v Ramage, 
Umeported, Supreme Court of New South Wales, 4 September 1992. 
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allows a religious group voluntarily to alienate its independence to government, and 
which could be prohibited if a secular commonwealth were better realised in the 
constimtion. 
The ordination of women cases also touch on the position of religion in 
discrimination law, which I discuss in chapter XL Here, a deeper dimension of the 
secular commonwealth arises: its impact on social and economic relationships. I draw 
on Rawls' principle of fair equality of oppormnity to support laws which, in the 
tradition of the United States Civil Rights Act, prohibit discrimination on the ground of 
religion and, once more, his theory of basic liberties in discussing whether a citizen's 
religious conception of the good could allow him, lawfully, to discriminate on the 
grounds of race, sex and, of course, religion. This too is currently a topical issue in 
Australia, as law reform agencies have recommended that religious schools not be 
allowed to discriminate on the grounds of sex, marital stams and pregnancy.'° The 
recommendations are strongly opposed by the churches but, as I discuss, their position 
is complicated by governmental funding of religious schools which, in general, the 
churches are reluctant to refuse. 
In chapter XII, I examine the validity of blasphemy, profanity and other 
religious vilification laws, which are currendy in operation in some States and 
Territories. Through the 1980s and 1990s, law reform agencies have also 
'° Sex Discrimination Commissioner, Report on Review of Permanent Exemptions Under 
the Sex Biscrimination Act 1984 (Canberra 1992); Law Reform Commission, Equality 
Before the Law: Justice for Women (Canberra 1994). 
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recommended that they be abolished," and in general I support those 
recommendations. However, I argue that those reforms must be considered in the 
broader context of vilification laws regulating heterodox speech which, in New South 
Wales especially, are multiplying and which, in practice, make a compelling case for 
the abolition of blasphemy laws harder to argue.'^ The main conclusions of the thesis 
are summarised in chapter XIII. 
§ 3: The Legal Meaning of Religion 
The one concept basic to this thesis which must be discussed before proceeding 
further is "religion". It is true that an uncontroversial definition of religion is unlikely 
to be found,'^  but this need not overly concern us. In some cases involving the most 
serious constimtional and legal questions, the judicamre has tried to delimit the bounds 
of the concept. In doing so, it has drawn on anthropology, history, sociology and 
smdies in comparative religion and theology: the resulting legal interpretations 
therefore approximate the social, and leave us better equipped to make interdisciplinary 
comparisons between legal and other research throughout this thesis. 
" Law Commission, Offences Against Religion and Public Worship (London 1985); 
Law Reform Commission, Multiculturalism and the Law (Sydney 1992); New South 
Wales Law Reform Commission, Blasphemy (Sydney 1992). 
'^  I limit the discussion of these aspects of the law, which deal with the basic 
instimtions of just political government and issues of current interest or debate. The 
impact of the law of trusts on religion is only considered in passim, but see M 
Blakeney, "Sequestered Piety and Charity - A Comparative Analysis" (1992) 12 Anglo-
American Law Rev 207 and CEF Rickert, "An Anti-Roman Catholic Bias in the Law 
of Charity" [1990] Conv 34. For the interrelationship of law, morality and religion, 
see K Mason, Constancy & Change (Sydney 1990). 
'3 For example, c/W Sadurski, "On Legal Definitions of Religion" (1989) 63 AU 834 
and B Kaye, "An Australian Definition of Religion" (1991) 14 UNSWU 332. 
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However, as I foreshadowed earlier. Chapman v Minister for Aboriginal 
Affairs^^ raises one question traditional common law categories have not yet 
confronted. The Ngarrendjeri women believed that they could not disclose the content 
of their beliefs about the island to men or non-aborigines, and (if the Ngarrendjeri's 
beliefs are strumred similarly to other aboriginal beliefs) possibly that disclosure could 
cause illness or death.'^ Therefore, to require the Ngarrendjeri to prove in a public 
arena that those conceptions are religious would itself, if they were then acmally held 
to be religious, burden the practice of the tribe's religion by demanding that they violate 
a most sacred tabu. The conundrum is that the only means the Ngarrendjeri have to 
enforce any rights they have to religious liberty denies that same liberty. 
The problem can be solved, presumably, by abjuring all attempts to classify 
beliefs as religious by objective means, accepting as conclusive any citizen's subjective 
claim that his beliefs and practices are religious and assigning to that conclusion the 
appropriate legal benefits and burdens. But as a general principle this would be naive, 
and possibly dangerous. There can obviously be extreme cases where one's claim to 
exercise a religion is merely a colourable pretence: as where Haruhisa Handa, a 
Japanese businessman and spirimal leader of "Powerful Cosmomate", claimed that 
sailing on the Swan River was a religious practice and exempt from taxation;'^ or 
where a plaintiff in Florida claimed that his gastronomical preference for Kosy Kitten 
'"* Chapman note 2 supra. 
'^  § 1 supra; CH Bemdt note 1 supra at 321. 
'^  J Walker, "Council Assured Cultist's "Religious Facility" is Strictly Business" 
Australian, 11 November 1994 p 3. 
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Cat Food was a protected religious practice under the Civil Rights Actl" The abuses 
attending to too inclusive an approach should, if possible, be avoided. Equally a 
subjective approach to religion could, in other cases, have the opposite effect of being 
too exclusive. There are theist groups, like the Jehovah's Witnesses and some popular 
expressions of conservative Protestantism, which sometimes deny being religious. 
Usually, this is really a mission strategy the group uses to distinguish itself from the 
larger instimtional churches, or to escape some stigma it believes that the community 
attaches to "religion". However this too could be exploited, especially if to avoid 
burdens or responsibilities government legitimately imposes on religion.'* 
In general, a classification of conceptions or practices as religious by objective 
means is therefore preferable. But the question remains whether, to avoid restrictions 
on the tribe's religious practice, an exception could be made in unusual cases like the 
Ngarrendjeri's. Since, strucmrally, tribal aboriginal culmre is an almost completely 
undifferentiated blend of (what Europeans call) tradition, custom, law, morality and 
religion, the evidential burden of proving that the particular beliefs are religious would 
be light.'^ However, an opposing lidgant (like the developer) still might not be 
convinced that these beliefs, which affect its economic interests, are bona fides and 
relate to the dispute. He might insist on his equal rights to due process. Indeed, 
doubts about the validity of the Ngarrendjeri women's beliefs continue to fuel intense 
'^  Brown v Pena 441 Fed Supp 1382 (1977). 
'* J Barr, Fundamentalism 2nd ed (London 1981) p 4; but cf Appeal of Frank Grundy 
(1944) 61 WN (NSW) 102, and Church of Christ (Nan Benominational) Inc v Minister 
for Territories and Local Government (1986) 10 FCR 152, where the group claimed to 
be "non-denominational", but a "denomination" for die purposes of property law. 
•5 See I Breward, A History of the Australian Churches (Sydney 1993) p 1. 
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political debate on the question, and Commonwealth and State commissions of inquiry 
have been established to investigate anomalies in the Ngarrendjeri's claims.^° 
Possibly, there are special or exceptional procedures available to accommodate both the 
tribal tabu on disclosing the beliefs to men and the other litigant's due process rights,^' 
but as I show in chapter II, a basic liberty (like religious liberty) can be legitimately 
limited in the interests of another liberty (like rights of due process). So, it would not 
be unjust to require the Ngarrendjeri women to disclose their beliefs in the ordinary 
courts of judicamre if they are to base a claim of constimtional or legal privilege on 
them.^-
The use of an objecdve approach to the concept of religion also minimises the 
possibility that government might disqualify obscure and novel minorities as religious, 
on the ground they do not meet, possibly, an ethnocentric interpretation of the 
^'^ See C Pearson, "Hindmarsh Debacle Pushes the Envelope of Credibility" Australian, 
14 March 1995, p 15; "No Sense in Secrets" Australian, 16 March 1995, p 10; J Kerin 
and L McLean, "Two Inquiries Ordered into Bridge Row" Australian, 9 June 1995, p 
3. In June 1991, the Commonwealth Government banned mining at Coronation Hill 
in the Kakadu National Park, Northern Territory, because the local Jawoyn people 
believed that it would unleash the wrath of an apocalyptic spirit called Bulardemo. 
There are some who thought that the Jawoyn's claims about Bula were politically 
coloured and, therefore, not entirely sincere: see R Brunton, "Controversy in the 
Sickness Country: the Batde over Coronation Hih" (1991) 35: 9 Quadrant 16, but cf 
F Merlan, "The Limits of Culmral Constructionism: the Case of Coronadon Hill" 
(1991) 61 Oceania 344. Whatever the truth about Bula, the incident warns that litigants 
will sometimes want to test the namre and sincerity of tribal aboriginal beliefs. 
'^ Eg interlocutory proceedings in camera before a female jusdce, conducted exclusively 
by female lawyers, and with appropriate certification to the trial court that the 
conceptions are or are not religious, bona fides and relevant. This will not help if the 
tribe insists that the beliefs not be disclosed to non-aborigines: cf Aboriginal Sacred 
Site Protection Authority v Maurice; re The Waramungu Land Claim (1986) 10 FCR 
104 at 107. 
22 Cf ibid at 114. 
14 I: § 3 
concept.^^ This, as we see in the High Court's decision in Krygger v Williamsr^ in 
1912, can constimte a sophisticated means of using religious reasons to decide public 
questions which, again as I discuss in chapter 11, is inappropriate in a secular 
commonwealth. In 1911, the Commonwealth Befence Act was amended to require most 
Australian men to attend compulsory military training.^^ The appellant, a devout 
teenager, refused to attend drill, because on his reading of the Sermon on the Mount 
he believed it was a sin for him to prepare for war, and "God makes no allowance for 
sin". He claimed that the religious liberty secured by section 116 of the 
Commonwealth Constimtion exempted him from any obligation to attend drill, but the 
High Court rejected the claim. I do not question the result in Krygger v Williams, 
which as we will see in chapter VIII is at least legitimate in a secular 
commonwealth.^^ The reasoning which led to the result is what is unacceptable. In 
effect, two Founding Fathers, Chief Justice Sir Samuel Griffith and Justice Sir Edmund 
Barton, held that the appellant's objection to military drill was not religious. "To 
require a man to do a thing which has nothing at all to do with religion is not 
prohibiting him from a free exercise of religion",-^ said Chief Justice Griffith. The 
contendon that compulsory drill restricted the practice of the appellant's religion was, 
according to Justice Barton, "absurd".^* But surely (on any non-denominational 
definition of religion) this conclusion is incorrect. Uncontested evidence proved that 
^^ Cf Jehovah's Witnesses note 8 supra at 124. 
^^  (1912) 15 CLR 366 {"Krygger"); and see also "The 'Conscience Plea' Overruled by 
the High Court" The Age, 16 October 1912, p 8. 
2^  Befence Act 1903 (Cth), ss 125 and 135. 
2^  VIII: § 4 infra. 
^^  Krygger note 24 supra at 369 (emphasis added). 
2« Ibid at 372. 
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the appellant based his pacifism exclusively on the words of Christ and, as a result, that 
he believed it was God's immutable moral requirement of Christians. His particular 
denominational adherence was not disclosed, but even in 1912 it would have been 
obvious that his pacifism and its source were indistinguishable from those of primitive 
Christians, Quakers and other radical Protestants.'^^ For mainstream Protestants like 
Chief Justice Griffith and Justice Barton,^° drill was probably not something which 
even touched the sphere of their own religious conceptions. However, that should be 
irrelevant if citizens who hold other religious conceptions are also to enjoy the benefits 
and bear the burdens that government can legitimately attach to religion. The problem 
could have been cured had the justices opted for any more objective interpretation of 
religion than the completely personal interpretation which implicitly conditioned the 
reasoning in Krygger v Williams?^ 
So objecdvely considered, what is "religion"? In English law, religion has been 
consistendy equated with theism.^' Jusdce Sir George Dillon most recently and 
bluntly stated this approach in In re South Place Ethical Society: "[rjeligion ... is 
^^  See JD Douglas (ed). The New International Bictionary of the Christian Church 
(Exeter 1974) pp 741-2; also like Quakers, the appellant refused to take an oath: 
(1912) 15 CLR 366 at 367. 
°^ See RC Thompson, Religion in Australia: A History (Melbourne 1994) p 43; RB 
Joyce, Samuel Walker Griffith (St Lucia Qld 1984) pp 1-5, 8, 21, 63, 71-2 and 400. 
'^ See also text in IX: § 5 infra. 
32 Baxter v Langley (1868) 38 U MC 1 at 5; Bowman v Secular Society Limited [1917] 
AC 406 at 449; United Grand Lodge of Ancient Free and Accepted Masons of England 
V Holborn Borough Council [1957] 1 WLR 1080 at 1090; R v Registrar-General; ex 
parte Segerdal [1970] 2 QB 697 at 707. 
16 I: § 3 
concemed with man's relations with God".^ ^ The problem is that this does not even 
accommodate the great world religions: the Hlnayana Buddhism of Sri Lanka and 
South-East Asia tends to be non-theistic. For this reason, in England an express 
excepdon has been stated for Buddhism,-''* but here, I believe, the exception proves 
that the rule is too narrow. The extent of religious pluralism in the United States is 
much more pronounced, and accordingly the courts there have been more prepared to 
define religion broadly. In particular, though it is probably unusable as a legal 
category, liberal Protestant theologian Paul Tillich's idea of religion as an "ultimate 
concem" has been influential in setting comprehensive and inclusive parameters for 
interpreting the concept of religion.-'^ Thus, in the words of United States Supreme 
Court Justice William Douglas, religion includes:^^ 
a sincere belief, which in [a person's] life fills the same place as a belief 
in God fills in the life of an orthodox religionist ... 
This definition is broad enough to include as religions groups clearly excluded by 
English law: ethical societies and, possibly, secular humanists." In Australia, the 
33 In re South Place Ethical Society; Barralet v Attorney-General [1980] 1 WLR 1565 
at 1571. 
34 Ibid at 1571; see also Jehovah's Witnesses note 7 supra at 124. 
3^  "Ultimate concem" means, tautologically, "concem about what is experienced as 
ultimate": P Tillich, Bynamics of Faith (London 1957) pp 1-4 and 9-12; see United 
States V Seeger 380 US 163 at 180 and 187 (1965); Malnak v Yogi 592 F 2d 197 at 208 
(1979). 
36 United States v Seeger 380 US 163 at 192 (1965); see also at 176. 
3^  Washington Ethical Society v Bistrict of Columbia 249 F 2d 127 (1957); Torcaso v 
Watkins 361 US 488 at 495 (1961); but see Smith v Board of Commissioners 655 F 
Supp 939, 827 F 2d 684 (1987); Mozert v Hawkins County Public Schools 647 F Supp 
1194 (1986); Mozert v Hawkins County Board of Education 827 F 2d 1058 (1987); and 
CA Mason, "'Secular Humanism' and the Definition of Religion" (1988) 63 Washington 
Law Rev 445. 
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courts have also resisted the temptation to limit the concept of religion to theism.3^ 
Until 1983, there was nevertheless little guidance beyond Chief Jusdce Latham's 
waming in Jehovah's Witnesses that "[it was] not for a court, upon some a priori basis, 
to disqualify certain beliefs as incapable of being religious in character".3^ Then, in 
the Third Scientology Case, the High Court took the opportunity to decide what should, 
for the purposes of Australian law, constimte "religion". 
§ 4: The Third Scientology Case 
L Ron Hubbard founded the Church of Scientology in California in 1954. The 
Church bases its teaching on Hubbard's principles of Dianetics, which themselves 
centre on his conception of an "engram": "a mental image picmre which is a recording 
of a time of physical pain and unconsciousness". These engrams react to "dynamics" -
life's drives and impulses -'^ and thereby store these experiences in a person's 
subconscious "reactive mind". Hubbard held that engrams "inhibit, stop or block a 
person's namral abilities", but could be brought to one's consciousness and exorcised 
through the process of "auditing". This "clears" the person, who can then identify with 
his soul or "thetan", and is therefore unconstrained by the limits of the physical 
universe. 
Scientology owes much in its underlying philosophy to Indian religions, although 
3« Appeal of Frank Grundy (1944) 61 WN (NSW) 102 at 103. 
3^  Jehovah's Witnesses note 7 supra at 124. 
°^ le (i) self; (ii) sex and reproduction; (iii) the group; (iv) all humanity; (v) other life 
forms; (vi) the universe, and matter, energy, space and time; (vii) spirit, including 
"thetans"; and (viii) a supreme being or "infinity": Church of Scientology of 
California, What is Scientology? (Los Angeles 1978) pp 334, 339 and 340. 
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it has also adopted limrgical patterns based on Christian worship. It also claims to be 
inclusive, in that a person could be a Scientologist and remain a Chrisdan, Muslim, 
Buddhist or other religionist at the same time. But it does have some unique methods 
developed by Hubbard, and since the inception of Scientology these have caused serious 
public concem. The process of auditing has, on occasion, been accompanied by 
psychological, economic and political intimidation. In early stages of auditing, an 
instrument called an E-meter is used to register a person's electrical resistance to the 
process. The process might also require a Scientologist to "disconnect" - cease contact 
- with his spouse, parents or children. Together, these methods have opened 
Scientology to accusations of mind control. In addition the Church has tended to treat 
its critics as enemies, and has been dogged by allegations that it has harassed critics by 
blackmail, theft and even assault. However, the Church's most problematic tenet was 
its notorious "Fair Game Law", intended for those who actively sought to suppress or 
to damage Scientology. Under this "Law", which Hubbard removed from the 1970 
edition of his Scientology Ethics, Scientologists could, in good conscience and with 
complete impunity before the Church's committees, undertake campaigns of 
intimidation against a person declared to be "fair game". The Church has added to 
controversy by charging fees for auditing and other Scientological services, and 
otherwise by its overt commercialism. Whereas before 1961 Hubbard claimed that 
Scientology was "non-religious", there is evidence that he then intentionally recast it as 
a religion to secure the taxation benefits and legal protection conceded to religious 
groups throughout the world."^ ^ 
•*' See ibid at 197-220, 331-2, 334 and 338; E Barker, New Religious Movements 
(London 1989) pp 173-4; R Humphreys and R Ward, Religious Bodies in Australia 2nd 
ed (Melbourne 1988) pp 285-6; JG Melton and RL Moore, The Cult Experience: 
Responding to the New Religious Pluralism (New York 1982) pp 132-4; and Church of 
the New Faith v Commissioner of Pay-roll Tax (Vic) (1983) 154 CLR 120 at 140-1, 147 
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The relationship between Scientology and government has mostly been a 
troubled one in common law countries:'*2 but it has been at its worst in Australia. In 
1965 in Victoria, Kevin Anderson QC led a Board of Inquiry which issued a scathing 
report on Scientology, unconditionally denouncing it as "evil" and "its practice as a 
serious threat to the community, medically, morally and socially".^3 Parliament 
responded by making it an offence to hold oneself out as being willing to teach 
Scientology, or to be paid to teach or pracdse Scientology, and a $200 fine for a first 
conviction and a $500 fine for a subsequent conviction were imposed. It also prohibited 
anyone but a registered psychologist from using an E-meter.'*'* The Church was 
banned outright in Westem Australia in 1968.^ ^ South Australia replicated the 
Victorian legislation in 1969.'*^ These laws were repealed in 1973 and 1974, but the 
and 169-171. 
'*2 The litigation is extensive. In England, the Church has partially been denied equal 
rights before the law. The Court of Appeal has held that the - otherwise unlawful -
publication of confidential information about Scientology's courses could, given its 
dangers, be in the public interest: Hubbard v Vosper [1972] 2 QB 84 at 96; Church of 
Scientology of California v Kaufman [1973] RPC 635. It has also limited the Church's 
normal procedural rights to discover information in libel proceedings, given the risk that 
the information could be used to harass its critics: Church of Scientology of California 
V Bepartment of Health and Social Security [1979] 1 WLR 723. The Bridsh 
Government even prohibited the entry to the United Kingdom of Scientologists whom 
the Church planned to employ: Van Buyn v Home Office [1975] 1 CMLR 1. In 
Califomia the Court of Appeal has held that fair game campaigns designed to bankrupt 
lapsed Scientologists are unlawful, as are auditing procedures and disconnection when 
conducted in an atmosphere of psychological coercion: Wollersheim v Church of 
Scientology of California 260 Cal Rptr 331 (1989). 
3^ Report of the Board of Inquiry into Scientology (Melbourne 1965) p 1. 
'*'* Psychological Practices Act 1965 (Vic), ss 30 and 31. It did not apply to anything 
done by priests and ministers of recognised religions in accordance with that religion's 
usual practices: s 2. 
'*^  "A person shall not practise Scientology": Scientology Act 1968 (WA), s 3. 
^^  Scientology (Prohibition) Act 1969 (SA). 
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Victorian legislation was not repealed until 1982.'*'' Thus, it is in a context of prima 
facie illegality that the Church of the New Faith Incorporated (the registered name of 
Scientology in Victoria) claimed in the late 1970s to be "a religious insdmtion", and 
therefore exempt from paying pay-roll tax in that State .'*^  
Taking the English posidon that only a theism can be a religion. Lord Denning 
had earlier held that Scientology was not a religion.'*^ The same conclusion was 
reached in holding that the Church was not exempt from paying pay-roll tax in Victoria 
at trial and, with hesitations about equating religion with theism, on appeal in the State 
Supreme Court.^ "^  In the 1970s, the Church had been before the High Court twice to 
stop surveillance of Scientologists by the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation 
(ASIO),^^ and it now appealed to the Court a third time to secure the exemption from 
Victorian pay-roll tax. 
The High Court upheld the appeal, the justices ruling unanimously that the 
^^  Scientology Act Repeal Act 1973 (WA); Scientology (Prohibition) Act 1968 Repeal 
Act 1914 (SA); Psychological Practices (Scientology) Act 1982 (Vic). 
48 See Pay-roll Tax Act 1971 (Vic), s 10. 
^^ R V Registrar-General; ex parte Segerdal [1970] 2 QB 697 at 707; cf Church of 
Scientology of California v Kaufman [1973] RPC 635 at 648; Founding Church of 
Scientology v United States 409 F 2d 1146 at 1160-1 (1969); Missouri Church of 
Scientology v State Tax Commission 560 SW 2d 837 at 842-4 (1977); Founding Church 
of Scientology v Webster 802 F 2d 1448 at 1451 (1986); and Wollersheim v Church of 
Scientology of California 260 Cal Rptr 331 at 341 (1989). 
°^ Church of the New Faith v Commissioner of Pay-roll Tax [1983] VR 97 at 111 and 
130, cf at 121-2 and 139. The Court refused to apply Church of Scientology v 
Anderson [1980] WAR 71, in which Scientology was held to be a religion. 
'^ Scientology I note 8 supra; Scientology II note 8 supra. 
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Church of Scientology was a religious insdmdon.^' However, the most important 
aspect of Scientology III is the statement of what, in Australian law, constimtes religion 
because, helped by the illegality, marginality, recent origins, invention, novelty and 
possible charlatanism of Scientology, all three interpretations of the concept the justices 
took in Scientology III were broad. 
Justices Sir Anthony Mason and Sir Gerard Brennan took the narrowest 
approach to religion, and were not prepared to embrace anything close to Tillich's 
"ultimate concem". They held that, for legal purposes, religion had two elements:^3 
... first, belief in a supemamral Being, Thing or Principle; and second, 
the acceptance of canons of conduct in order to give effect to that belief. 
Justices Sir Ronald Wilson and Sir William Deane partially accepted the interpretations 
developed in the United States. Instead of trying to encapsulate the concept of religion 
in a definition or formula, they held that it was better to observe what, historically, had 
been accepted as a religion, and to draw from that the more important indicia or 
guidelines which would help to identify a religion. '^* These were that: (i) most 
miportandy, there is belief in the supemamral, a reality beyond sensory perception; (ii) 
the relevant conceptions or practices relate to the person's "namre and place in the 
universe" and his relation to the supemamral; (iii) the adherents accept that these 
conceptions or practices require or encourage them to keep certain moral standards or 
to participate in certain observances of supemamral significance; (iv) the adherents 
constimte identifiable groups, even if the groups are incohesive or heterogeneous; and 
^^  Scientology III note 8 supra. 
" Ibid at 136. 
^' IbiddX 173. 
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(v) most controversially, the adherents themselves believe that these conceptions or 
practices constimte a religion.^^ Justice Lionel Murphy adopted the broadest 
interpretadon. In his opinion, a religious group was one which claimed to be a religion 
and which: (i) had conceptions or practices which revived or resembled those of earlier 
cults; (ii) believed in a supemamral being; or (iii) claimed to provide a meaning or 
purpose to life.^^ 
Scientology was, on all interpretations, regarded as a religion, although Justices 
Mason and Brennan had some problems in identifying a connection between Hubbard's 
teaching about the supemamral (such as thetans) and practices like auditing.^^ 
However, since their approach is the narrowest, it must be regarded as having majority 
support and as being the controlling interpretation for other Australian courts. It is this 
approach which I take to define the concept of religion for the purposes of this thesis. 
Together with Justices Wilson and Deane's, their approach also has two important 
differences to Justice Murphy's.^^ First, though Justice Murphy did not claim that his 
interpretation was exhaustive,^^ as it stands it demands a subjective claim by the group 
'' Cf ibid at 174. 
^^  Cf ibid at 151. 
" Ibid at 146-8. 
^^  Justices Mason and Brennan had a more positive opinion about the social role of 
religion in Australia than Justice Murphy, whose judgment is distincdy anti-religious 
in tone and emphasises the citizen's liberties/roAn religion. In contrast, the former two 
justices thought religious liberty "the essence of a free society". Undoubtedly, these 
social attimdes affected both approaches to the concept of religion: Justices Mason and 
Brennan holding that too inclusive an interpretation would undermine public confidence 
in the practicability of religious liberty, and Justice Murphy implicidy hoping that it 
would lead to public pressure to have legal privileges for religion removed: ibid at 
130, 132, 149 and 162; B Kaye note 13 supra at 348-50 and 351. 
^^  Scientology III note 8 supra at 151. 
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to be a religion. This, as we have seen,^ excludes groups which, despite their own 
theologies, should clearly be regarded as religious. More pmdently. Justices Wilson 
and Deane regarded a subjective claim to be religious as merely a possible indicium of 
a religion.^' Justices Mason and Brennan eschewed its relevance altogether." 
Secondly, they derived the separate approaches from different sources. Justices Mason, 
Brennan, Wilson and Deane stated a posteriori interpretations, referring to what, 
historically, had been regarded as a religion in theology and in empirical disciplines like 
anthropology, history, sociology and comparadve religion, and noting how legal 
interpretations of the concepts had drawn on themes from these approaches.^3 This, 
again as I have mentioned, is more helpful to interdisciplinary research as it relies on 
a common understanding of the concept.^ Justice Murphy had no empirical source 
for his interpretation. It is pure reason, stated ex nihilo, and thereby violates Chief 
Justice Latham's demand that a court not state an a priori definition of religion.^^ It 
is also less useful for the purposes of this thesis because, especially to the extent it 
includes as a religion any belief which claims to provide meaning or purpose to life, 
it is more comprehensive than what is understood as the scope of the religious in the 
social disciplines, which normally require reference to the supemamral. The other 
justices' approaches to the concept do require reference to the supemamral, and are 
sufficiendy broad to comprehend most religions practised in Australia today. 
^ § 3 supra. 
'^ Scientology III note 8 supra at 174. 
" Ibid at 132. 
^^ Ibid at 132-40 and 172-5. 
^ § 3 supra. 
" Jehovah's Witnesses note 7 supra at 124. 
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§ 5: Sitz im Leben: Religion in Australia - The 1991 Census 
In 1988, two Presbyterian observers listed 237 organised religions practising in 
Australia. They admitted the list was not exhaustive. Within the larger Protestant 
churches, like the Anglican and Uniting, a number of different "churchmanships" are 
practised and comprehended. There is a burgeoning plethora of independent pentecostal 
churches which could not be counted.^ However the data are arranged, they 
demonstrate extensive religious pluralism in Australia, that the pluralism is increasing, 
and that the 1980s and 1990s have been the most profound period of change in the 
country's religious patterns since British setdement.^' 
The extent of pluralism can be overstated. The 1991 Commonwealth Census 
revealed that 74% of Australians identified themselves as belonging to a Christian 
church. This does not mean they all hold church membership or attend services 
regularly. Though it seems that nominalism is decreasing, it is sdll high in the larger 
Protestant churches, and census identification may have little relationship to 
involvement in a church. Indeed, identification with a religious group is probably akin 
to ethnic or political identification, and is therefore more likely to denote culmral 
considerations than personal convictions. However, even as a culmral indicator. Census 
religious identification probably can help to determine a person's "meaning system" and 
to show its particular religious origins. On this basis, there is obviously an 
66 R Humphreys and R Ward note 41 supra at v-x, 36-7, 48-9 and 134-52. 
'^ For the 1981 to 1991 Census data which follow, see GD Bouma, "Religious 
Identification in Australia: 1981 to 1991" (1993) 1 People and Place 13-17. For earlier 
Census data, see R Humphreys and R Ward note 41 supra at xi. 
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overwhelmingly Christian culmral predominance in Australia.*^* 
Immigration, Catholic cohesion and secularisation have changed intemal pattems 
of Australian Christianity since the Second World War.^ ^ The 1986 Census revealed 
that the Catholic Church had eclipsed the Anglican Church as the largest religious 
denomination in Australia (26.1%), and the 1991 Census confirmed it had strengthened 
this position (27.3%). Traditionally, Catholicism in Australia has been closely 
associated with the large proportion of the population of Irish descent, but immigration 
from Southem Europe, South America, the Philippines and Vietnam has undermined 
this exclusive identification. In 1986, those bom in non-English speaking countries 
were much more likely to identify themselves as Catholic (42.9%) than those bom in 
Australia (25.3%) or in other English speaking countries (13.8%). The cormection 
between the increase in Catholicism and immigration is substantiated by the high 
proportion of people in Westem Melboume (39.8%) and Westem Sydney (40.8%) -
where there are concentrations of Italian and Spanish speakers - who in 1986 identified 
themselves as Catholics.™ 
Undl the 1980s, the Anglican Church was the largest religious denomination in 
^^ Cf GD Bouma, Religion: Meaning, transcendence and community in Australia 
(Melboume 1992) pp 88-90, 94, 106, 108 and 110; Office of Multiculmral Affairs, 
National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia ... Sharing our Future (Canberra 1989) 
p 5 . 
69 GD Bouma Religion note 68 supra at 88. 
70 Bureau of Immigration Research, Birthplace, Language, Religion 1971-86 (Canberra 
1991) vol 3 pp 247, 289 and 339; Bureau of Immigration Research, Community Profiles 
- Australia Born (Canberra 1991) p 23; Bureau of Immigration Research, Community 
Profiles - English Speaking Born (Canberra 1991) p 31; Bureau of Immigration 
Research, Community Profiles - Non-English Speaking Born (Canberra 1991) p 37. 
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Australia. In legal terms, it could have the unique distinction of being disestablished 
twice: once in 1842, when probably the process of disestablishing the Church in New 
South Wales was completed; and again in 1962, when legally it ceased to be part of the 
English religious establishment.^' The proportion of Australians identifying 
themselves with the Anglican Church consistently declined between 1921 (43.66%) and 
1986 (23.9%) as, unlike the Catholic Church, it has not benefited from immigration 
from non-English-speaking countries, and, like other Protestant churches, it has lost 
people to the "no religion" category. However, the 1991 Census showed that the 
Anglican Church had - at least momentarily - arrested this decline. About 40% of 
Anglicans in Australia live in New South Wales: a disproportionate number, and given 
the reformed evangelical churchmanship which predominates in the archdiocese of 
Sydney, a significant stadstic for its intemal tensions and outside contacts with the law. 
The Church remains the largest in the Anglican Communion outside England.^^ 
The Uniting Church was established in 1977 through an organic union of the 
Congregadonal, Methodist and Presbyterian Churches. It is estimated that about 10% 
of Congregationalists and 30% of Presbyterians did not unite and, in general, these 
were the more theologically conservative. There were legal consequences to the union, 
its aftermath and the resulting internal changes it brought. For the union and divisions 
realigned expressions of Protestantism in Australia: the Uniting Church becoming more 
comprehensive and, in general, more liberal; and the condnuing Presbyterian Church 
' ' III: § 7 infra and R Humphreys and R Ward note 43 supra at 39. 
2^ Bureau of Immigration Research, Birthplace, Language, Religion note 70 supra at 
333; R Humphreys and R Ward note 41 supra at 39-41; RC Thompson note 30 supra 
at 136. 
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more confessional and conservadve.^3 There was a significant decline in the 
proportion of Australians identifying with these churches between 1911 (27.2%) and 
1976 (14.3%), and this continued for the Uniting and Presbyterian Churches until 1986 
(7.6% and 3.6%). These losses were primarily to the "no religion" category. The 
1991 Census showed that both Churches had reversed the decline (8.2% and 4.3%). 
The larger of the other Protestant groups include the Lutheran and Baptist 
Churches (1.5% and 1.7%), Churches of Christ (0.5%), the Salvation Army (0.4%) 
and various charismatic and pentecostal churches (0.9%). Ethnically, these all tend to 
be the Northem European majority. Those identifying with Eastem Orthodox churches 
comprise 2.8% of the population, and about 80% of diese live in New South Wales and 
Victoria. There are concentrations of Orthodox in Central Melboume and Canterbury-
Bankstown, regions which have high proportions of Greek speakers. Jehovah's 
Witnesses comprise 0.4% of the population. 2.0% of Australians identify themselves 
as "Other Christians".'^ 
There are significant religious minorities. In Australia, Islam is now the largest 
(0.9%). It seems to cause more anxiety in the population generally than any other 
religion, probably because of a misconceived identification of Islam and Arabic culmre. 
This has even led, especially during the Gulf War, to overt antagonism towards 
Muslims. In fact, immigration from Turkey is now the most significant source of 
Muslims in Australia. The next largest non-Christian religion is Buddhism (0.8%), 
'31 Breward note 19 supra at 180-3; R Humphreys and R Ward note 41 supra at 46-9. 
'''* Bureau of Immigration Research Birthplace Language Religion note 70 supra at 239 
and 353. 
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followed by Judaism (0.4%).'^ 
Sir James Frazer regarded the beliefs of Australian aborigines as "magic", a pre-
religious development. They are now regarded as complex religions: the oldest in the 
country and possibly the world, and the primordial source of all aboriginal culmre. In 
1991, only 4330 aborigines claimed to practise tribal religions: most aborigines now 
identify with a Christian church.'^ 
The most significant non-Christian minority, according to the 1991 Census, is 
the 12.9% of Australians who declared they had no religion. This category has 
increased consistendy since 1954 (.26%). The largest proportionate increase occurred 
between 1966 (.81%) and 1911'{6.1 %), when there was an associated large decline in 
identification with Protestant churches. The reasons for this secularisation are unclear. 
It could have represented a "one period shake-out" of nominal adherents in Protestant 
churches. It could be due to the poorer organisational cohesion of Protestant churches 
as compared to Catholicism or, in part, to low birth rates among Protestants. Or, it 
could be an accelerated part of the epochal secularisation which has taken place in all 
westem countries since the Reformation." 
'^  RC Thompson note 30 supra at 96 and 133-4; A Jamrozik, C Boland and R 
Urquhart, Social Change and Cultural Transformation in Australia (Melbourne 1995) 
pp 148 and 151-2. 
'^  See ibid at 295; I Breward note 19 supra at 1; ^^ J Frazer, The Golden Bough: A 
Study in Magic and Religion (London 1911) i p 62; M Charlesworth et al note 1 supra 
at 4. 
" PJ Hughes, "Types of Faith and the Decline of Mainline Churches" in AW Black 
(ed), Religion in Australia - Sociological Perspectives (Sydney 1991) p 104; J 
McCallum, "Secularisation in Australia Between 1966 and 1985" (1987) 23 ANZJS 407 
at 420. 
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The Commonwealth Census is directed towards the collection of data about 
identification with an organised religion, and there will be those who declared "no 
religion" in the Census who, objectively considered, do hold religious conceptions in 
the form of a New Ageism, a personal spirimality, or an astrological, folk or occult 
belief. The size of the "no religion" category is not a true indicadon of the proportion 
of secularists in the country. But the consistent increase in the "no religion" category 
since 1954 probably can be assumed to reflect progressive secularisation. However, 
on this basis the 1991 Census also shows some polarisation in religious and secularising 
trends, as it also showed that most Christian churches had grown faster than the 
population (+7.9%) and the "no-religion" category (+9.1%) between 1986 and 1991. 
This was evident, as we have seen, with Catholics ( + 13.3%). Eastem Orthodox 
churches increased by 11.1%. In the 1980s and early 1990s, there also seems to have 
been a religious revival amongst conservative Protestants. Bapdsts increased by 42.3% 
and pentecostal churches by 40.8%. The increase in identificadon with the Unidng 
Church ( + 17.4%) is also mainly due to growth in its charismatic congregadons.'^ 
Indeed, only the Salvation Army (-7.4%) and Churches of Christ (-11.8%) continued 
to decline. 
Thus, because 26% of Australians do not identify with a Christian church, it 
would now be unsafe to call Australians "a Christian people", as Henry Parkes did in 
1880. Sdll less could it now be maintained, as it once was, that Australia was "a 
Protestant country".'^ In the 1980s, some Christian observers were prepared to claim 
'* RC Thompson note 30 supra at 136. 
'^  See RC Thompson note 30 supra at 22 and 69. 
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that Australia was a "secular society".^° The observadon seems correct, provided it 
means that Australia is a multi-religious society, with the result that political and social 
relations largely have to be conducted without reference to any generally accepted 
religious assumptions. Otherwise, in an important culmral sense the country is 
religious, and more Christian than not.^' The Census data also show that the national 
religious composition is somewhat different from those of other English-speaking 
countries. They are all, of course, overwhelmingly Christian. However, Australia is 
more Catholic and more extensively pluralised than either England, where despite 
higher degrees of nominalism most people identify with the religious establishment, or 
New Zealand, where most again identify with the Anglican Church. Australia is less 
pluralised, less Protestant and rnore Anglican than both the United States and Canada. 
In both countries the Catholic Church is also the largest denomination. But in the 
United States Episcopalians (Anglicans) comprise about 3% of the population, even 
though Protestants together constimte about 65%. In Canada, only about one-third of 
mainstream Protestants are Anglicans. Australia is significantly less Catholic and more 
pluralised than Ireland.*^ The comparisons suggest that, uniquely, Australia is 
dominated by a broad and tolerant coalition of Catholic, Anglican and, to less extent, 
Unidng leaders who are increasingly prepared, through ecumenical bodies like the 
National Council of Churches in Australia (NCCA), to combine their political and 
°^ D Millikan, The Sunburnt Soul (Sydney 1981) pp 84-6, 87 and 90; but cf at 83 and 
89; D Wilson, Can God Survive in Australia (Sydney 1983) p 26. 
'^ This assessment is confirmed by empirical smdies of national pattems of belief in 
God, church attendance, prayer and other marks of "religiosity": see GD Bouma 
Religion note 68 supra; GD Bouma and BR Dixon, The Religious Factor in Australian 
Life (Melbourne 1986). 
«^  GD Bouma Religion note 68 supra at 87-8; GD Bouma and BR Dixon note 80 supra 
at 170-1; V: ^2 infra. 
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social efforts.*3 i^  jg ^ pattem which is reflected in consdmtional and legal 
instimtions. 
Immigration pattems would suggest that the Christian dominance will continue, but 
that Catholicism would become more influential, that non-Christian minorities would 
increase and that the national religious composition generally would continue to 
pluralise.^'* In truth, religious conceptions are widespread in every society, and on the 
basis of the Census data and foreseeable developments there is no cogent reason to 
expect Australia to be an exception. ^ ^ It is a basic premise of this thesis that religion 
and religious pluralism are permanent feamres of the culmral landscape, and therefore 
conditions which the constimtion, government and the law must accommodate. Indeed, 
how increasing religious pluralism is to be accommodated is possibly one of the most 
important issues to confront government in Australia in the near fumre.^ ^ 
83 CfGD Bouma note 68 supra at 110. 
'^* C/J Baldock, "Religious and Culmral Diversity in Victoria: Issues for Health Care", 
Unpublished Paper, Religious Pluralism in a Liberal Society Conference, Brisbane, 2 
June 1994. 
^^  GD Bouma note 68 supra at 169. 
^^  See the assessment of A Jamrozik et al note 68 supra at 140. 
PARTI: 
THEORETICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
/ 
II. SECULAR GOVERNIMENT: 
IMEANING, SOURCE AND PRINCIPLES 
§ 1: The Secular, Secularism and Secularisation 
The term "secular" and its derivatives "secularism" and "secularisation" all 
represent concepts which in some sense stand in contrast to religion. However, they 
do not necessarily bear the sarhe normative relation to the religious. In particular, 
secularism is commonly regarded as a sceptical philosophy, ideology or programme 
opposed to religion, but the merely secular or secularisation should not be similarly 
conceived. In sociology, secularisation is treated as an historical process in which, in 
different ways, the impact of religion (on social instimtions especially) declines or 
diminishes.^  It describes what happens, whether or not that was intended or should be 
commended.^  Tme, the secularist does intend to accelerate the process of 
' Eg P Berger, The Sacred Canopy (New York 1969) p 107; K Dobbelaere, 
Secularisation: A Multi-Bimensional Concept (London 1981) p 5; M Hill, A Sociology 
of Religion (Aldershot 1973) pp 229-30; A Maclntyre, Secularization and Moral 
Change (London 1967) p 63; D Martin, The Religious and the Secular (New York 
1969) pp 48-50; BE Meland, The Secularization of Modern Cultures (New York 1966) 
p 3; R Robertson, The Sociological Interpretation of Religion (Oxford 1970) p 235; B 
Wilson, "Secularizadon: The Inherited Model" in PE Hammond (ed). The Sacred in 
a Secular Age (Berkeley 1985) pp 11-12; B Wilson, Religion in Sociological Perspective 
(Oxford 1982) p 149; c / 0 Chadwick, The Secularization of the European Mind in the 
Nineteenth Century (Cambridge 1975) p 264. 
2 See P Berger note 1 supra at 110; K Dobbelaere note 1 supra at 5; BE Meland note 
1 supra at 5; B Wilson, "Secularisation" note 1 supra at 11. 
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secularisation, and supports it. But, on the other hand, the Protestant Reformers 
certainly did not intend to initiate any secularisation, even though the Reformation is 
probably the most important event in the continuing secularisation of the west. 
Furthermore, even where secularisation has been intended, it has not necessarily been 
motivated by the "positive atheism" generally associated with secularism: the likes of 
Kierkegaard and Tolstoy urged programmes of secularisation to purge religion of its 
social compromise.3 
In the same way, then, that in sociology the concept of secularisation is 
normadvely neutral towards religion, in political philosophy the idea of secular 
government need not be based on secularism. It is true, once more, that the secularist 
normally does hold to some historical model of secular government. But sometimes this 
is more apparent than real. In Australia, the person most closely associated with the 
general idea of secular government through the 1970s and 1980s was Commonwealth 
Attorney-General and High Court Justice Lionel Murphy, who acmally was a classical 
secularist in the mould of Charles Bradlaugh."* Of all the justices of the period. Justice 
Murphy was the most zealous champion of broad interpretations of section 116 of the 
Commonwealth Constimtion. However, as I will discuss in chapters V and VII, in his 
3 0 Chadwick note 1 supra at 247; S Kierkegaard, Attack Upon "Christendom" 1854-
1855 (IjDndon 1946); D Martin, A General Theory of Secularization (Oxford 1978) pp 
4, 50 and 55; R Robertson note 1 supra at 237; E Troeltsch, The Social Teaching of 
the Christian Churches, O Wyon trans (London 1931) pp 728-9. 
^ Manning Clark's description of Murphy was "a child of the Enlightenment": see the 
Foreword to J Ely and R Ely (eds), Lionel Murphy: The Rule of Law (Sydney 1986). 
This is most evident in Murphy's judgment in Scientology III, which he began with a 
sympathetic discussion of scepticism, and in which he trivialised religion generally and 
cautioned about the tax concessions available to religious groups: Church of the New 
Faith V Commissioner of Pay-roll Tax (1983) 154 CLR 120 at 149-63 {"Scientology 
III"): see I: § 4. 
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attempt to import the United States Supreme Court's establishment clause interpretation 
into Australia, Justice Murphy's principles are probably better classed as secularist.^ 
On some occasions, his more religious peers acmally delivered better interpretations of 
secular government.^ Indeed, even though it was the Freethinker Henry Boumes 
Higgins who sponsored the inclusion of section 116 in the Constimtion, public support 
for secdon 116 was nurtured and consolidated by the political campaigning of colonial 
Seventh-Day Adventists.' 
Principles of secular government certainly also, somewhat paradoxically, originated 
in religious theories of government, and I discuss these origins in this chapter (§§ 2 to 
4). But where, as in Australia, citizens hold profoundly different religious conceptions, 
I argue that it is more unportant to base principles of government on a theory which is 
neither religious nor secularist. The challenge is therefore to elaborate a secular theory 
of secular government, which simultaneously holds the support of the religionist and 
the secularist. It is here that John Rawls' political conception of justice helps to 
establish an appropriate theoretical basis for the idea of a secular commonwealth. In 
the rest of this chapter, I therefore discuss how it generates principles of secular 
government that are (in Rawlsian terms) just and, at least arguably, pracdcable in 
conditions of religious pluralism (§§ 5 to 9). 
^ Eg Attorney-General (Vic) (ex rel Black) v Commonwealth (1981) 146 CLR 559 at 
619-34; R v Winneke; ex parte Gallagher (1982) 152 CLR 211 at 227-30. 
^ Eg Justice Sir Gerard Brennan: see Scientology III note 4 supra at 130 and 132; 
Street v Queensland Bar Association (1989) 168 CLR 461 at 527. 
' VI: § 3 infra. 
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§ 2: Theological Origins 
It is one of the ironies of the Chrisdan church's history that its own theology is 
thought to be central in inidating secularisation in westem countries. In this respect the 
church has been, in the words of one sociologist, "its own gravedigger".^ This aspect 
of Christian thought was partially inherited from ancient Israelite religion, and is sdll 
shared with Judaism and Islam.^ There is much in Hebrew theology which denies the 
existence of the sacred in the world: monotheism (as opposed to belief in namre spirits 
and localised deities); the transcendence of God; human history (and not the heavens) 
as the arena of divine actions; and religious obligation increasingly expressed as moral 
obedience and not cultic rimal. In the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incamation, 
primitive Chrisdans did compromise Hebrew monotheism and the extent of God's 
transcendence. On the other hand, primitive Christians also added a unique secularising 
idea in the church, an instimtion specifically set apart for the regular assembly of 
believers, worship, teaching and the administration of the sacraments.'° The mere 
existence of the instimtional church created the perspective that religion was its 
exclusive concern, and of no concern of other social instimtions." 
The secularising aspect of Christian theology has also been more pronounced in 
those Christian traditions which have emphasised the theology of that "Hebrew of 
Hebrews", Saint Paul, and especially the strucmral and functional differentiation he 
* M Hill note 1 supra at 240. 
^ For the following, see P Berger note 1 supra at 113 and 115-20; c /L Shiner, The 
Secularization of History (New York 1966) pp 26 and 46; D Lloyd, The Idea of Law 
(Harmondsworth 1964) p 51. 
'° See St John xviii 36: Romans xiv 17; Hebrews xi 13, xiii 14; I Peter i 17, ii 9-11. 
" P Berger note 1 supra at 123. 
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made between the church and civil government.'^ Thus, in part Saint Augustine's 
powerful metaphors of die heavenly city {civitas Bei) and the earthly city {civitas 
terrena) "represented", respectively, the instimtional church and the government of 
Imperial states {regna) like Rome. Augustine also deepened the abyss between church 
and regna by modelling them as social manifestations, respectively, of the etemal 
destinies of heaven and hell.'3 However, it was a second "Pauline remm" in the 
Protestant Reformation that consolidated the distinction between church and civil 
government generally and, augmented by other aspects of Protestant theology, elevated 
its social importance.''* The development of secular government between the 
Reformation and 1789, when the First Amendment was adopted in the United States, 
can largely be seen as the realisadon of Protestant ecclesiology and political philosophy. 
'' Romans xii 17-xiii 7; Philippians iii v. 
'3 I should add that, to Augustine, it was regna which were evil incamations and "but 
great robberies", not governments per se. In Augustine's political philosophy just 
government is by common agreement: ie under a commonwealth {res publica), but a 
Chrisdan commonwealth dedicated to serve an "image of [God's] justice" as "a higher 
interest": St Augusdne, The City of God, H Bettenson trans (Harmondsworth 1972) iv 
4, viii 24, xiii 16, xv 1, xvii 4 and xviii 29. For this interpretation of the two cities, 
see R Martin, "The Two Cities in Augustine's Political Philosophy" (1972) 33 Jnl Hist 
Ideas 195 at 202-3 and 210-16. 
'"* S Stromholm, "Luther and the Law of Namre" in Five Essays in Historical 
Jurisprudence (Stockholm 1989) p 29. The pattem of social secularisation probably 
began in the Investimre Contest, when in 1075 Pope Gregory VII simultaneously 
declared clerical immunity from civil political control and jurisdiction and papal 
supremacy over church and state. It seems a clearer distinction between ecclesiastical 
and royal power - and spirimal and secular law - emerged after the consequent struggle 
between Pope and princes: see HJ Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation ofther 
Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge, Mass 1983) pp 86-8, but c/MR Damaska, "How 
Did It All Begin?" (1985) 94 Yale U 1807 at 1815; E Peters, "The Origins of the 
Western Legal Tradition" (1985) 98 Harvard L Rev 686 at 689. However, the 
Reformation is probably the more important catalyst - "the crucial event" - in the 
secularisadon of westem culmre: see D Martin note 3 supra at 4; RG Mortensen, "The 
Theory Behind Legal Secularisation" (1993) 18 Bulledn Aust Soc Legal Philosophy 19 
at 39-40. 
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1. Two Kingdoms. The most important Protestant doctrine relating to civil 
government was the idea of two kingdoms. Like two-city theology, two-kingdoms 
theology was multi-dimensional. In its most general expression it divided everyone's 
namral or physical existence from the Christian's spirimal and eternal existence. Thus, 
applied to social instimtions it enabled the Reformers to separate two regimes 
{Regimente): the visible "secular" or "temporal" political power, and the church's 
invisible spirimal power. However, both are ordained by God and serve as delegates 
of his world-mle (to Luther, his Weltregiment): civil government, to maintain political 
and social stability; the church, to produce Christians and train them in piety.'^ 
2. Justification by Faith. Two-kingdoms theology was basically an elaboration 
of the Reformers' original disdnction between law and gospel. In protest against the 
prevailing Catholic theology, the Reformers rejected law as an element by which 
individuals could be reconciled to God. Thus, the essence of Protestantism is still 
Luther's doctrine of justification by faith: salvation can never be eamed, whether by 
compliance with the divine law or otherwise. It comes by faith alone {sola fides), and 
that is exclusively the gift of a gracious God. The impact of this doctrine in 
ecclesiology, political philosophy and jurisprudence (as elsewhere) is most profound. 
For the idea that the church's spirimal power was not expressed through law led in 
practice to the "dejuridification" of Protestant churches and religion, and the 
reallocation of legal duties previously exercised by the ecclesiastical courts and the 
canon law to civil government. To the Lutherans, the first use even of divine laws like 
'^  J Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion (Grand Rapids 1981) III xix 15; M 
Luther, "Temporal Authority: To What Extent It Should Be Obeyed" in Works 
(Philadelphia 1962) xxxv pp 75-129; see also H Bomkamm, Luther's Boctrine of the 
Two Kingdoms in the Context of his Theology, KH Hertz trans (Philadelphia 1966). 
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the Ten Commandments (the primus usus legis) was always civil and political: the 
maintenance of political and social stability.'^ 
3. The Governmental Monopoly on Coercion. Equally as important, the 
Reformers allocated to civil government a monopoly on the use of coercive power. 
This marked a break with medieval Catholic theology, which had stressed a "two-
swords" theory under which the Church had the power to use coercion in its jurisdiction 
over clerics and, over all Christians, in a range of criminal, tortious, commercial and 
testamentary causes. In contrast, the Reformers stressed that the church was a servant, 
limited to securing its purposes by peaceful means, persuasion and teaching.'^ 
In § 3, we will see how the philosophical origins of secular government lie in 
these ideas. But the Reformers were not thereby early political liberals and, holding 
in two-kingdoms theology that civil government had a divine purpose, maintained a 
theocratic idea of a Christian commonwealth. They reinforced this theologically in 
several ways, including the Protestant idea of vocation.'^ This emerged from the 
doctrine of the priesthood of all believers, which had removed all distinctions of 
theological significance between clergy and laity. So, where Catholicism had limited 
"^  The secundus usus was pedagogical, and directed the individual in how to live a 
better life. Luther mentioned but never expounded a tertius usus legis. His 
contemporary Philip Melanchthon held that it was didactic: Christians could implement 
the law without extemal coercion under the motivation of the gospel: HJ Berman and 
J Witte, "The Transformation of Western I^gal Philosophy in Lutheran Germany" 
(1989) 62 S Calif L Rev 1575 at 1583-4, 1587, 1589, 1607-8 and 1621; P Lehmann, 
"Law as a Function of Forgiveness" (1959) 12 Oklahoma L Rev 102 at 108; S 
Stromholm note 14 supra at 29. 
'^  J Calvin note 15 supra at IV x 27-31; M Luther note 15 supra at 117. 
'^  So persuasively shown by Max Weber to have also helped generate rational economic 
systems in the west: The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (London 1985). 
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the idea of a divine calling to those in clerical positions. Protestantism extended it to 
all occupations in which a Christian could engage. In the political sphere, the 
Reformers taught that the Christian prince was called to be instmcted by God, and to 
devote his attention to goveming his people honestly, decendy and in accordance with 
God's will. He was not, like Machiavelli's prince, to be interested in the selfish 
exercise of power nor, like Bodin's, an absolute monarch. He was to act justly: to the 
extent he refused to do so, his people could legitimately disobey him.'^ In the second 
place, the Reformers reinforced the idea of a Christian commonwealth in the primus 
usus legis. Specifically, they set the Ten Commandments as principles of justice for 
civil government although, in general, it was left to the prince to detail how the 
Commandments were to be applied.-° 
In the third place, the "dejuridification" of Protestant churches did not immunise 
them from civil government's control. This is especially pronounced in the Lutheran 
Philip Melanchthon's belief that "[t]he prince is God's chief bishop", with power to 
organise, endow and regulate the ecclesiastical order. Melanchthon also accepted the 
principle of the Peace of Augsburg in 1555 (reiterated in the Peace of Westphalia in 
1648) that each prince could dictate the religion of his territory: cuius regio eius 
religio. The result (mostly in the German states) was a monopoly religious 
establishment in each territory, physically boundmg the medieval idea of a united 
'^  "[F]or it is no one's duty to do wrong; we must obey God (who desires the right) 
rather than men": M Luther note 15 supra at 119-26; HJ Berman and J Witte note 16 
supra at 1594-6. 
20 C/J Calvin note 15 supra at IV xx 9 and 16. 
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Christendom within the more limited and rigid borders of the nascent nation state.^' 
However, once it became evident, especially in seventeenth cenmry England, 
that the religious pluralism between European countries was also becoming a serious 
source of social tension within the one country, political philosophers could still draw 
on Protestant theology to develop principles that responded to the problem.^^ For, as 
we see in the thought of John Locke, there were latent conceptions in Protestant 
theology that could be mrned powerfully to state the earliest liberal principles of secular 
government. 
§ 3: Locke I: The Theory of Toleration 
John Locke is one of the most important philosophers in the development of 
secular government. However, this is not because he was an original theorist on the 
question: aspects of Locke's theory of toleration are similar to those expounded by 
earlier seventeenth cenmry commentators, including the Puritan poet John Milton and 
the colonial Puritan Roger Williams.'3 Locke is the pivotal theorist in the emergence 
of secular government in two other senses. First, he has had profound and widespread 
political impact. The publication of Locke's First Letter Concerning Toleration''^ in 
2' HJ Berman and J Witte note 16 supra at 1597-8 and 1631-2; J Calvin note 15 supra 
at IV XX 2. 
2^ P Berger note 1 supra at 123; HJ Berman note 16 supra at 29; HJ Berman, "The 
Influence of Christianity upon the Development of Law" (1959) 12 Oklahoma L Rev 
86 at 94-5. 
3^ TL Hall, "Roger Williams and the Foundations of Religious Liberty" (1991) 71 
Boston Univ L Rev 455; U Henriques, Religious Toleration in England 1787-1833 
(London 1961) p 19; J Milton, "Treatise of Civil Power in Ecclesiastical Causes" in 
Works (New York 1932) vi pp 4-41. 
2^  Works (London 1823) pp 5-58. 
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English coincided with the passage of the Toleration Aci^^ in 1689, and helped to 
provide a theoretical defence for both that legislation and the emerging liberal political 
order. Through the mediation of James Madison, Locke's political philosophy also set 
the basic parameters of the religion clauses in the First Amendment to the United States 
Constimtion. Even more specifically, Thomas Jefferson probably used passages from 
the First Letter in planning the text of the Virginia Religious Freedom Act of 1787, 
which in the nineteenth and twentieth cenmries the Supreme Court has used as a lens 
for focusing its particular perspecdve on the First Amendment.^^ 
Secondly, Locke's theory of toleration, as it developed through the late 
seventeenth cenmry, also represents a tentative bridging of Protestant and secular 
theories of secular government. In the First Letter, Locke sought to settle a principle 
of justice that properly divided the concems of civil government and those of 
religion." The conclusions he reached had implications for political relations between 
government and the citizen and, a consideration which is usually overlooked, social 
relations between citizens. Thus, government only has legitimate interests in "life, 
liberty, health, and indolence of body ... and the possession of outward things", wrote 
Locke, and accordingly "civil power ... neither can nor ought in any manner to be 
25 1 Will and Mar c 18; see IV: § 2 infra. 
^^ E Carpenter, "Toleration and Establishment: 2" in GF Nuttall and O Chadwick 
(eds). From Uniformity to Unity 1662-1962 (London 1962) p 292; SG Sandler, 
"Lockean Ideas in Thomas Jefferson's Bill For Establishing Religious Freedom" (1960) 
21 Jnl Hist Ideas 110; and see Reynolds v United States 98 US 145 (1878); Everson v 
Board of Education of the Township ofEwing 330 US 1 at 12-13 (1947); School Bistrict 
of the Township of Abington v Schempp 374 US 203 at 231 (1962). 
^^  J Locke note 24 supra at 9. 
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extended to the salvation of souls".^* "[T]he power of civil government relates only 
to men's civil interests, is confined to the care of the things of this world, and hath 
nothing to do with the world to come".^^ However, this leads not only to limitations 
on governmental power, it is equally a limitation on how citizens can treat each other: 
"[n]o private person has any right in any manner to prejudice another person in his civil 
enjoyments, because he is of another church or religion. "3° 
From close examination of the reasons Locke marshalled throughout his writings 
on toleration to support these conclusions, it seems they largely originated in a 
Protestant mindset but, as I discuss in § 4, at the same time challenged the prevailing 
Protestant epistemology and drifted towards scepticism. The primary reason he gave 
in the First Letter for a right to toleration is the individual's spirimal independence. It 
is axiomatic to the Protestant that the individual and the individual alone is responsible 
for his own salvation. In Locke as in Milton, this is the basis of the individual's 
political and legal responsibility for his own religious choices, and creates the associated 
right to make those choices. It also means that these rights and responsibilities are 
inalienable, for the individual cannot transform them into a marketable commodity and 
transfer them to others: "no man can so far abandon the care of his own salvadon as 
blindly to leave it to the choice of any other, whether prince or subject, to prescribe to 
him what faith or worship he shall embrace."3' The right to religious liberty is thus 
centred on each individual's spirimal responsibility. 
2^  Ibid at 9-10. 
^^ Ibid at 12-13. 
30 Ibid at 11. 
3' Ibid at 10; see also J Milton note 23 supra at 6, 9, 12 and 14-20. 
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However, there are other aspects of Protestant thought that support this liberty. 
The first is the doctrine of justification by faith. Since the individual's position before 
God depends on the existence of faith alone {sola fides), "tme and saving religion 
consists in the inward persuasion of the mind".3^ This is inherendy beyond the reach 
of the coercive powers of government, and any attempt to coerce the citizen to secure 
his compliance with government's religious programme is, accordingly, futile. The 
second is the related monopoly government has in the use of the coercion. "[T]hat the 
church of Christ should persecute others, and force others by fire and sword to embrace 
her faith and doctrine, I could never yet find in any of the pages of the New 
Testament", wrote Locke.33 This principle he also extended, for unlike the Reformers 
Locke was not prepared to hold that civil government was to use coercion on behalf of 
the church. Thus, he expressly rejected the cuius regio principle, and its monopoly 
religious establishments. To Locke, a church was a voluntary association regulated 
exclusively by consensual agreement. Individuals who accepted a religious group's 
constimtion and law were at liberty to join it, and those who could no longer do so 
could leave. The group itself could exercise discipline over a member by persuasion, 
censure or, ultimately, expulsion (excommunication). However, its powers were purely 
consensual and dissolved once the individual relinquished his membership. This, in any 
case, constimtes voluntary exconimunication3'* 
The right to religious liberty, to Locke, was primarily based on Christian 
3^  J Locke note 24 supra at 11. Locke assumes elsewhere that a true Christian will 
"show his faith by his works": "Mr Locke's Reply to the Bishop of Worcester's 
Answer to his Second Letter" note 24 supra at iv 299. 
33 J Locke "First letter" note 24 supra at 15. 
3" Ibid at 12, 15-17 and 25; U Henriques note 23 supra at 26. 
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obligation, and therefore, as he reiterated throughout his writings, is only possible in 
a society in which every person believes in God.3^ He thus expressly denied that 
atheists had a right to toleration: to Locke, religious liberty is a citizen's right to 
choose between theisms. This qualification is based on the assumption that the moral 
hold of political, legal and social obligations on the citizen depended on his recognising 
the existence of God, and so "[t]he taking away of God, though but even in thought, 
dissolves all. "3^  There is also some suggestion that the atheist, not having a 
"religion", has no basis on which to build a political right to liberty:3'' a position 
consistent with Locke's reliance on Protestant sources for the theory of toleration. 
However, the qualification sits less comfortably with another reason Locke raised to 
support the right to religious liberty, elaborated especially in the Third Letter 
Concerning Toleration?^ 
I 4; Locke II: Towards the Idea of Agnostic Government 
To follow the reasoning in the Third Letter, we need first to understand the 
distinction in Locke's epistemology between knowledge and opinion. In the term 
"knowledge", Locke is usually referring to that which is absolutely certain. It is 
especially the product of the inmition of simple ideas, but can also be based on 
3^  J Locke "First Letter" note 24 supra at 4, 9 and 47; Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding (Oxford 1975) p 78; "Third letter Concerning Toleradon" note 24 supra 
at 165; and see generally, R Ashcraft, "Faith and Knowledge in Locke's Philosophy" 
in JW Yolton (ed), John Locke: Problems and Perspectives (Cambridge 1969) pp 203-
5. 
3^  J Locke "First Letter" note 24 supra at 47. 
3^  I base this on Locke's (admittedly vague) claim that "those that by their atheism 
undermine and destroy all religion, can have no pretence of religion whereupon to 
challenge the privilege of a toleration": ibid. 
3^  Note 35 supra at 141-546. 
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demonstration by "pains" and "intricate proofs". In either case, the ultimate criterion 
of "knowledge" is certainty.3^ This definition severely lunits what the individual can 
truly "know", and in most cases he must give his assent to propositions on the basis of 
probabilities ("opinion"). Then, a second distinction is made between reason and faith. 
The former is the means by which the individual obtains knowledge and opinion: 
sensory perception and reflection. In contrast, where the individual assents to a 
proposition because of divine revelation, it is called "faith".'*° Thus, "knowledge" of 
propositions and "faith" in them could differ in the degrees of certainty by which they 
were held, and did differ in the means by which they were acquired. This explains 
how, in the Third Letter, Locke could say that he believed the Christian religion to be 
true but did not know it to be tme, and no agent of government could make any 
y 
stronger claim."*' The room that "faith" leaves for error in the conceptions held 
means, of course, that coercion could not be properly used to compel people to hold 
propositions assented to by faith. Once more, Locke suggested that this required a right 
to religious liberty in political relations between government and citizen and in social 
relations between citizens.'*^ 
There is, in I>ocke's epistemology and its application to the political stams of 
religion, the seed of the idea of agnostic ("unknowing") government: diat government 
39 J Locke Essay note 35 supra at 525, 536-7 and 546. 
°^ "[T]he assent to any proposition not thus made out by the deductions of reason, but 
upon the credit of the proposer, as coming from God, in some extraordinary way of 
communicadon. This way of discovering tmths to men we call revelation": ibid at 
689; and see also R Ashcraft note 35 supra at 215-16. 
•*' J Locke "Third Letter" note 35 supra at 144-5. 
•^2 Cfibid at 143; J Locke Essay note 35 supra at 559-61. 
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has no knowledge or opinion about religious conceptions, and therefore that one who 
holds a public office or tmst must not, in that capacity, support religious conceptions 
generally or one religious conception instead of another. Throughout the common law 
tradition the idea has had inmitive appeal to judges and, as I discuss in chapter IX, has 
been used by them to state principles of secular government in adjudication.'*3 But, 
except possibly in the United States where the political constimtion is substantially 
Lockean, judicial use of the idea of agnostic government has litde direct reliance on 
Locke's epistemology. 
Locke's attempt to delimit the boundaries of knowledge and faith was a serious 
criticism of the theory of "innate ideas" - that God implanted religious knowledge in 
individuals' hearts - then held almost universally by English churchmen. He regarded 
"innate ideas" as a poor defence of Christianity, and he acmally constmcted his 
epistemology to reinforce the intellecmal basis of Christian theology. However, 
Locke's epistemology is also the beginning of empiricism and, as David Hume later 
showed, introduced new reasons to reject religious conceptions.'*'* Indeed, his theory 
of toleradon also assumed, accommodated and (when implemented) accelerated a 
religious pluralism which helped lead to substantial public rejection of the same religion 
he sought to defend, and on which the theory was largely based.''^ That pluralism 
probably suggests that, of all Locke's reasons for a right to religious liberty, the idea 
43 See especially IX: § 4. 
^ Eg in Hume's Bialogues Concerning Natural Religion (Oxford 1993) pp 43-53, it is 
argued that a priori reasoning can only prove the being of God. The namre of God 
(such as whether he is the Christian god of love) can only be established a posteriori, 
and then is only a probability (opinion). 
^^  R Ashcraft note 35 supra at 194-9; M Cranston, John Locke: A Biography (London 
1957) p 66; J Dunn, Locke (Oxford 1984) p 17. 
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of agnostic government is the more accessible to citizens generally. In any case it does 
suggest that some secular theory of secular government is needed, and so to develop 
that I mm to recent contributions in the liberal philosophical tradition. 
§ 5: Rawls: Basic Ideas 
The discussion in §§ 2 and 3 underlines how, throughout the common law 
tradition, the theoretical origins of secular government are acmally religious, and mostly 
Christian.'*^ India provides the exception because, though basing them in part on 
Australian and American models, its insdmdons of secular government are also 
influenced by the comprehensive Hinduism of Mohandas Gandhi.'*^ 
These origins are important because, on the one hand, some like I^rd Devlin 
have suggested that a political constimtion bom in the Christian tradition can only be 
maintained if it condnues consciously to rely on Christian principles. It does not extend 
the logic to suggest that, since secular government in most English-speaking countries 
originated in the theology of Christian traditions, it might only be possible to sustain 
a model of secular government that largely implemented, once more. Christian 
'*^  It could even be suggested diat Christianity has been the most important social agent 
in die promotion of liberty: GE Tinder, The Political Meaning of Christianity: The 
Prophetic Stance (San Francisco 1989) p 104. 
'^ DD Basu, Commentary on the Constitution of India, 5th ed (Calcutta 1965) ii p 153. 
Gandhi's secular principles were based on the Bhagavad-Gita's teaching that all 
religions are different paths to the one goal, from which he elaborated a personal 
principle of religious equality {sarvadharma-samanatva): JB Kripalani, Gandhi: His 
Life and Thought (New Delhi 1970) pp 337-9; see also M Gandhi, "Religion of 
Volunteers" in The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi (New Delhi 1969) xxxi pp 
441-2. 
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principles.'*^ I do not intend to address this point directly, but it should caudon us 
that, in developing a theoretical basis for a political consdmtion, the stability of the 
constimtion should be considered if it is to be practicable. The issue is also inevitably 
of paramount interest in legal scholarship, concemed as it should be with the practical 
question of public peace, order and good government: salus populi est suprema lex. 
On the other hand, the Christian origins of secular government also mean that 
we should be reluctant to support principles that are acmally hostile to the Christian 
tradition. If aspects of Christianity have enabled it to generate some model of secular 
government, then the stability of principles of secular government should be reinforced 
if they do not practically disadvantage the Christian churches. Therefore, in conditions 
of religious pluralism, the need is to develop secular principles of secular government 
that still have the support of existing religious and, it follows, secularist sources. John 
Rawls' political conception of justice is specially mned to this purpose. 
Immanuel Kant posited generally whether it is possible to constmct a just 
political constimdon, and Rawls, Professor of Philosophy at Harvard, has endeavoured 
to answer this in two primary works: A Theory of Justice, published in 1972; and 
Political Liberalism, published in 1993.'*^ Kant's general problem raises three more 
specific issues: the theoretical basis of a just political constimtion, its principles and. 
^^  P Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (Oxford 1965) pp 1-25; B Mitchell, Law, 
Morality, and Religion in a Secular Society (IjDndon 1967) pp 103-6. 
'*^  I Kant, "Idea for a Universal History" in G Rabel, Kant (Oxford 1963) pp 136-9; A 
Theory of Justice (Oxford 1972) {"ATJ"); Political Liberalism (New York 1993) {"PL"). 
For the most important criticisms of ^77, see N Daniels, Reading Rawls (Oxford 1975); 
R Martin, Rawls and Rights (Kansas 1975). For criticism of PL, see "Symposium on 
John Rawls's Political Liberalism" (1994) 69 Chi-Kent L Rev 548-842. 
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to make it possible, its political and social stability.^ "^ Importandy, in developing his 
response to these issues Rawls has taken religious pluralism into account. In Theory, 
the theoretical basis of Rawls' conception of justice (called "justice as faimess") 
recognises that religion is "a contingency" that generates social tension, and his 
conception of justice itself includes principles specifically designed to minimise that 
tension.^' However, a fundamental inconsistency then enters Theory, because in his 
discussion about stability Rawls then assumes that all people hold to only one moral 
conception that supports his conception of justice. 
Political and social stability exists when people largely, regularly and willingly 
observe basic social mles, and when, nevertheless, people offend these mles, stabilising 
instimtions act to prevent further offences and restore the pre-existing order.^- To 
Rawls, a political constimtion has this stability when it comprises principles that 
i 
encourage the psychological motivation needed to observe basic social mles. He 
suggests that the individual will only be sufficiently modvated to observe social mles 
if the constimtion promotes his own conception of the good, and thus makes it rational 
to observe them because his own preferences are thereby maximised." However, the 
Sitz im Leben in most English-speaking countries shows that this assumption of moral 
homogeneity is an anachronism. For example, a Catholic might support the 
consdmtion, not because it is rational to do so, but because, consistently with the 
°^ For this analysis and the following, see S Freeman, "Political Liberalism and the 
PossibUity of a Just Democratic Constimtion" (1994) 69 Chi-Kent L Rev 619 at 622-33. 
'^ ATJ note 49 supra at 19 and 205-11. 
^^  ATJ note 49 supra at 6. For the following on stability, see S Freeman note 50 supra 
at 622-33. 
53 ATJ note 49 supra at 395-452. 
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Vatican II declaration Bignitatis Humanae, it promotes "the very dignity of the human 
person as known through the revealed word of God and by reason itself".^ "* So, in 
Political Liberalism Rawls addressed the issue of stability in conditions of pluralism. 
This corrects the fundamental inconsistency of Theory, and Rawls' conception of justice 
is now a more complete attempt to outline how, when they hold profoundly different 
religious, philosophical and moral conceptions of the good, citizens can live together 
under politically just constimtional government." For this reason, it is well adapted 
to provide a basis for developing a theory of secular government. However, before I 
direct Rawlsian theory into that specific direction, two basic concepts should be 
explained. 
1. The Original Position. The idea of justice as faimess is that, provided a fair 
procedure is used in selecting principles for the organisation of political and social 
instimtions, any principles selected will be just. In continuing the liberal social contract 
tradition of Locke, Jean-Jaques Rousseau, Hume and especially Kant,^ ^ Rawls 
constmcts an impartial procedure that, based on the democratic ideal of equal 
citizenship, requires free and equal representatives to select these principles. This is 
what Rawls calls "the original position", which as in Kant's social contract is an 
hypothetical arena, and one in which the theorist removes any contingency which is a 
^^  See A Flannery (ed), Vatican Council II: The Conciliar and Post Conciliar 
Bocuments (Collegeville, Minn 1975) p 800; S Freeman note 50 supra at 632. 
55 PL note 49 supra at xviii, xxv and 47. 
^^  D Hume, "Of the Original Contract" in Selected Essays (Oxford 1993) pp 274-92; 
J Locke, Two Treatises of Government (London 1924) pp 118-24; I Kant, "On Theory 
and Practice" in G Rabel note 49 supra at 254-6; J-J Rousseau, The Social Contract 
(Harmondsworth 1968) pp 58-62; H Williams, Kant's Political Philosophy (New York 
1983) pp 182-4. 
52 II: § 5 
source of social contention, or which an individual can use to improve his own social 
position." The representatives therefore make their selection behind "a veil of 
ignorance". This ensures their equality, as personal considerations relating to namral 
endowment, social position and mere chance (including religion) are made irrelevant. 
The selection made in this arena is also regulated by certain controls. For example, it 
must be a rational and conservative selection.^* The method is fair, says Rawls, 
because equal citizens are equally represented in the selection of principles that are to 
organise their political and social life together. Thus, the selected principles are also 
just.^^ 
This procedure removes religious conceptions as a basis for selecting principles 
of justice: as required, it is a secular theory.^ In recognising this, nevertheless, I 
still acknowledge that the procedure is based on some conception of the good, although 
57 ATJ note 49 supra at 136. 
^^  It is rational in that each individual is assumed to prefer more primary social goods 
to fewer, and therefore the principle selected must enable him to maximise his 
oppormnities to pursue them. It must also be conservative in that, if the representadves 
have to choose between a number of different principles, that which provides the best 
outcome in the worst possible circumstances should be selected: ie "the maximin 
{maximum minimorum) mle". The selected principle must also be: (a) general; (b) 
universal; (c) publicly known; (d) able to order competing claims; and (e) final, in the 
sense that there is no higher standard to which an appeal can be made: ATJ note 49 
supra at 130-6, 142 and 152-6. 
^^  ATJ note 49 supra at 17-22 and 136-42; PL note 49 supra at 79. This account of the 
original position is necessarily brief For example, it excludes the idea of "reflective 
equilibrium". For the full account, see ATJ note 49 supra at 19-21 and 118-92 and PL 
note 49 supra at 22-8. Furthermore, I cannot here discuss criticisms of the concept, 
but do note that its "social contract" credentials are in doubt since the same result might 
be achieved by using only one (also hypothetical) impartial observer: see B Barry, The 
Liberal Theory of Justice: A Critical Examination of the Principal Boctrines of A 
Theory of Justice by John Rawls (Oxford 1973) pp 12-14. 
60 See also TL Hall note 23 supra at 516-17. 
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to state the precise content of that particular conception would be a difficult exercise. 
Rawls consciously assumes that citizens are free and equal, and have the moral powers 
to hold a sense of justice and a conception of the good. Their representatives in the 
original position seek primary social goods: rights and liberties (including religious 
liberty), powers, oppormnities, income, wealth and self-respect.^' The procedure also 
has an in-built preference for an individualism which holds that limits on the protection 
of each individual's religious, philosophical or moral conceptions or practices should 
be minimised.^^ That is not surprising: I doubt that any political philosophy will ever 
be independent of some conception of the good." For this thesis, the critical point 
is that, even if moral assumptions do underlie this impartial procedure, they are neither 
religious nor secularist. 
2. The Two Principles of Justice. The complete political conception of justice. 
'^ ATJnott 49 supra at 62 and 504-12; PL note 49 supra at 18-19, 76 and 181. Rawls 
also states that the original position is used "to model both freedom and equality and 
restrictions on reasons in such a way that it becomes perfectly evident which agreement 
would be made by the parties": PL note 49 supra at 26. However, Ronald Dworkin 
sees that the more basic concept in the original position is individuals' "right to equal 
concem and respect in the design and administration of the political instimtions that 
govern them". Liberty does also underlie the constmction of the original posidon but 
is considered less basic: "The Original Position" in N Daniels note 49 supra at 48-50. 
For what is meant by "freedom" and "equality" here, see R Martin, Rawls and Rights 
note 49 supra at 17. 
^^  Here there is a serious problem in Rawls' method because, as Thomas Nagel rightly 
points out, this is supposed to be one of Rawls' conclusions, not one of his 
presuppositions. Nagel admits that some such assumption must be made, but to him 
that only indicates that a social contract method is never going to provide the necessary 
support for principles of political and social organisation: "Rawls on Justice" in N 
Daniels note 49 supra at 7-12. 
" Not even the liberal tradition claims to be without a conception of the good: instead, 
it generally claims that the individual's practice of his conception of the good is only 
to be limited to the extent it prevents another's practising his conception: see NE 
Simmonds, Central Issues in Jurisprudence: Justice, Law and Rights (London 1986) 
pp 47-8. 
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in Rawlsian theory, comprises principles of justice that prescribe how political and 
social instimdons are to be organised, and public reason to guide how these principles 
should be interpreted and applied.^ To the extent, then, that they are relevant to 
questions of constimtional government, law and religion, the two principles of justice 
that Rawls states would be selected are: (i) liberties are to be arranged to achieve an 
adequate scheme of equal basic liberties for all citizens; and (ii) social and economic 
inequalities must attach to positions and offices open to all citizens under conditions of 
fair equality of opportunity.^^ These are assumed to hold permanently once a country 
reaches a minimum level of economic development.^ The two principles are also 
stated in serial (or "lexical") order of importance: the first principle of justice (relating 
to civil and political rights) always has priority over the second (relating to social and 
64 PL note 49 supra at 223-4. 
^^  C^R Martin Rawls and Rights note 49 supra at 15. The two principles of justice are 
variously expressed throughout Rawls' works: see ATJ note 49 supra at 60-1 and 302-
3; PL note 49 supra at 5-6 and 291. The most detailed statement of the two principles 
is in ibid at 5-6: 
a. Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal 
basic rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same 
scheme for all; and in this scheme the equal political liberties, and only 
those liberties, are to be guaranteed their fair value. 
b. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, 
they are to be attached to positions and offices open to all under 
condidons of fair equality of oppormnity; and second, they are to be to 
the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society. 
Despite its importance to Rawls' philosophy of the welfare state, I do not discuss the 
second part of the second principle of justice ("the difference principle"), because it 
involves questions of die redistribution of property which are not immediately relevant 
to this thesis. For the difference principle, see ATJ note 49 supra at 75-82 and 258-
332. 
^ ATJ note 49 supra at 151-2 and 542; PL note 49 supra at 7. I assume that all 
countries discussed in diis thesis, except India and South Africa, have achieved the 
necessary level of economic development for the two principles of justice to hold: cf 
B Barry note 59 supra at 62. 
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economic rights).^' 
Inidally, the two principles of justice are only concemed with "the basic 
stmcmre of society", or "the way in which the major social instimtions distribute 
fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social 
cooperation."^^ But these principles are also meant to be realised in the acmal 
political, legal, social and economic order. Thus, in the second stage delegates to a 
consdmdonal convention apply the principles in selecting a political constimtion, and 
settle its terms to "insure" that the constimtion is most appropriately adapted to the 
passage of legislation which is also just. Then, in the third stage members of a 
parliament pass legislation consistent with the principles of justice and the constimtion. 
In both stages, any adjustments in political arrangements are made from the standpoint 
of a representative citizen. In the fourth stage, the executive government and judicamre 
administer and enforce legislation.^^ This sequential implementation of the principles 
of justice is pattemed on the origins and processes of the United States Constimtion 
and, as I discuss in §§ 6 and 7, has implications for the constimtional and legal stams 
of principles of secular government.^° 
The second aspect of a political conception of justice is the idea of public 
^^  ATJ note 49 supra at 302-3. 
^^  Ibid at 7. 
^^  Ibid at 195-201 and 204. There is no mention of common law adjudication which, 
of course, makes and applies law at the same time. It would seem that common law 
adjudication really witnesses the simultaneous implementation of the parliamentary and 
adjudicative stages: see LB Solum, "Simating Political Liberalism" (1994) 69 Chi-Kent 
L Rev 549 at 556n. 
70 ATJ note 49 supra at 196n. 
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reason. Following the lead of other liberal political philosophers, Rawls introduced this 
idea to his conception of justice in Political Liberalism.'^^ Public reason guides the 
content of civil and political discussion and, though applicable to all citizens, has special 
relevance to those holding a public office or tmst and, above all, the justices of a 
supreme court. It enriches contemporary philosophy on the political stams of religion, 
and is especially important in securing respect for the spirit of principles of secular 
government. I discuss public reason in § 8. 
§ 6: Equal Religious Liberty 
In political and social terms, religious pluralism is almost the archetypical 
problem Rawlsian theory is intended to address.'^ Indeed, it is relatively simple to 
model an impartial procedure that enables the selection of an appropriate principle to 
organise religious pluralism. It is assumed that the parties do not know whether the 
people they represent hold a religion or, if so, its particular conceptions and practices 
and whether it is culmrally and socially dominant, marginal or even deviant. They only 
know that the people they represent have personal obligations that are religious, or that 
parallel the religious.^ 3 
In these conditions the selection is likely to be the principle of equal religious 
liberty: that citizens "are free to pursue their moral, philosophical, or religious interests 
71 PL note 49 supra at 212-54. 
^^  Rawls' claim is that the reasoning he develops in response to this problem can be 
generalised to other social problems, like racial and gender equality: ATJ note 49 supra 
at 206, 209 and 220; PL note 49 supra at xxviii-xxix. But c/B Barry note 59 supra 
at 38. 
3^ This is how I interpret ATJ note 49 supra at 206. 
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without legal restricdons requiring them to engage or not to engage in any particular 
form of religious or other practice, and [that] ... other men have a legal duty not to 
interfere." '^* Three reasons lead to this principle and, as a limitation on governmental 
power, support its priority over other governmental programmes.^^ 
1. The namre of religion generally is the primary reason for this principle, and 
its priority. Religion (as defined in chapter I) necessarily imports obligations to believe 
and act that are thought to be of supemamral origin, and therefore it can exercise the 
most profound control over all aspects of an individual's life. This also means that a 
religious citizen could be totally unprepared to exchange the practice of his religious 
conceptions for, say, any political and social benefits. Thus, seen through the controls 
y 
of the original position, it is realised that religion can be "non-negotiable" to the citizen 
and, having to make the most conservative selection, the appropriate principle must 
secure the citizen's maxunum equal liberty, with the fewest possible limitations.^^ 
'^* ATJ note 49 supra at 202-3 and 207; PL note 49 supra at 310-15. I prefer the term 
"equal religious liberty" as more descriptive than Rawls' "liberty of conscience". 
'^  These respond to HLA Hart's criticisms of Rawls' theory of the priority of liberty 
mATJ: see "Rawls on Liberty and its Priority" in N Daniels note 49 supra at 249-52. 
Rawls also offers the promodon of the cidzen's self respect as a fourth reason 
supporting die priority (but not the selection) of all basic liberties: PL note 49 supra 
at 319-20. 
*^ See I: § 4; cf PL note 49 supra at 310-12. I note that, if this principle rests on the 
peculiar namre of religion, it might, contrary to Rawls' own claim, be difficult to 
analogise its selection to principles organising other contingencies, like race and gender: 
see B Barry note 59 supra at 37-9; R Martin, Rawls and Rights note 49 supra at 51. 
The reasoning in this case is not unrealistic. In India, it has been held that "the deep 
attachment the vast masses ... had towards religion, the sway it had on their minds and 
the significant role it played in their lives" led to the inclusion of the principle of equal 
religious liberty in articles 25 to 30 of the national Constimtion: St Xavier's College 
V State ofGujurat AIR 1974 SC 1389 at 1414. 
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2. The namre of religion also provides the second reason for the selection of this 
principle. Inherent in the individual's capacity to hold religious concepdons is his 
moral power to revise them or, in effect, to experiment with religion. Equal religious 
liberty secures the civil and political immunity needed to exercise this power. It is thus 
given priority because the moral power to experiment is an intrinsic part of the practice 
of any religious conception.^ ^ 
3. The means by which the individual can even hold religious conceptions is the 
third reason. The same moral power that enables an individual to revise his religious 
concepdons is also the source of his ability to hold them in the first place. To the 
extent, then, that the principle of equal religious liberty secures the exercise of this 
moral power, it is also a necessary instimtional pre-requisite, in modem pluralised 
societies, to the origin and development of any religious concepdon.'* 
Since in the model of the original posidon used here each party contemplates the 
possibility that he represents, say, a socially deviant religious minority, no principle that 
requires or allows a lesser or unequal liberty could be the most rational choice. In 
particular, the procedure will not allow the selection of some utilitarian principle that 
vests a legislative majority in parliament with the power to limit the liberty of a 
religious minority on the basis that such a limitation maximises the net sum of social 
happiness.'^ The principle of equal religious liberty is probably the inevitable choice. 
" PL note 49 supra at 313-15, as interpreted in JW Nickel, "Rethinking Rawls's 
Theory of Liberty and Rights" (1994) 69 Chi-Kent L Rev 763 at 776. 
^^  PL note 49 supra at 312-13, as interpreted in JW Nickel note 77 supra at 776. 
^^  The only other principle Rawls discusses is a monopoly religious establishment, but 
analogous reasoning applies to other principles that allow religious inequality: ATJ note 
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It is also the central political principle of secular government: as we will see, others 
merely reinforce it or represent its application to more specific problems. The principle 
necessarily limits government to the use of secular means and the pursuit of secular 
objectives. In conditions of religious pluralism, government's sponsorship of one 
religious group's programme constimtes less than equal treatment of others and is, 
therefore, unjust. Even promoting religion generally fails to treat the secularist citizen 
as an equal, and promoting secularism creates the opposite imbalance. 
In developing his theory of basic liberties in Political Liberalism, Rawls 
suggested that the citizen's right to basic liberties is inalienable. For the principle of 
equal religious liberty this is not, as in Locke, based on the Protestant theology of 
personal spirimal independence but on the namre of religion and, as I have discussed, 
its inherent non-negotiable character. Indeed, as the principle limits the coercive 
powers of government, as a branch of government the judicamre is powerless to enforce 
a citizen's attempt to negotiate and exchange his religious liberty by contracmal 
agreement. So, if the principle is also included in the political constimtion, the 
alienation of one's religious liberty is presumably impossible to achieve legally.*° 
But, if the principle of equal religious liberty denies government the power to 
enforce a citizen's agreement to limit his religious liberty, government is equally 
powerless to prohibit his limiting his religious liberty by some (legally unenforceable) 
consensual agreement.^' This brings us to the principle of voluntary association. 
49 supra at 207. 
*° PL note 49 supra at 311 and 365-7. 
*' CfPL note 49 supra at 366-7. 
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Equal religious liberty is primarily an individual liberty, but it must necessarily include 
the citizen's right to belong to groups of people holding to the same (or similar) 
religious conceptions.^^ Since government cannot require the citizen to engage or not 
to engage in religious practice, it cannot prescribe the conditions on which he joins, 
maintains membership in and leaves a religious group. However, these condidons must 
always be accepted by the citizen voluntarily. To the extent that a religious group has 
its own constimtion and laws and then applies them to a member in its own courts, it 
does so in die exercise of a consensual jurisdiction with the continuing approval of the 
member (and usually as a condition of his membership). The individual who 
relinquishes membership of the religious group also dissolves the consensual jurisdiction 
its courts had over him. In neither case is there a role for government. "Instead, 
y 
particular associations may be freely organized as their members wish, and they may 
have their own intemal life and discipline subject to the restriction that their members 
have a real choice of whether to continue their affiliation." "The law protects the right 
of sancmary in the sense that apostasy is not recognised much less penalised as a legal 
offense"." 
I contend also that the power to limit one's religious liberty by the principle of 
voluntary association suggests that the citizen (or more probably the religious group) 
has some power to lunit his (or its) religious liberty by the principle of voluntary 
engagement. Here, care must be taken to understand the namre of permissible 
^^  This is also condidoned by a related liberty of association: PL note 49 supra at 313. 
I accept that, to the extent that citizens unite to practise their religion together, it is 
possible to refer to the group's rights to equal religious liberty. This makes it 
unnecessary to discuss whether, independendy of its members, the group holds its own 
civil and polidcal rights. 
83 ATJ note 49 supra at 212. 
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limitations on the group's religious liberty, because this refers to a religious group's 
engagement with government. The creation of relations between a religious group and 
government that limit the group's religious liberty must obviously be by some (legally 
unenforceable) consensual agreement. The religious group will certainly be able to 
enter enforceable contracts with government and private corporations and citizens in 
commercial transactions which have no bearing on the practice of religion. But where 
the group acmally does limit its own religious liberty by agreement, it can never, 
consistently with the inalienability of equal religious liberty, be contracmal because the 
judicamre is powerless to enforce it. Sdll, this only brings us to a more basic question: 
is it permissible to create any relations between government and a religious group which 
limit the group's religious liberty? The answer is of extreme unportance, because the 
y 
question directly addresses "the separation of church and state" which partially denies 
all relations between government and religious groups on the ground that such relations 
present a threat to a group's religious liberty. However, where those relations only 
exist by consensual agreement there is no possibility that the judicamre can enforce 
those limits on the group's religious liberty. In addition, if rights to religious liberty 
are tmly to be equal, then governmental benefits and privileges generally available to 
non-religious groups should not be denied to a group just because it is religious. "The 
state can favor no particular religion and no penalties or disabilities may be attached to 
any religious affiliation or lack thereof. "^ ^ Thus, one can envisage that government 
might be prepared to provide financial assistance to religious schools but, as is required 
by the second principle of justice, on the condition that the schools comply with equal 
oppormnity policies in employing teachers in the positions and offices that government 
supports. If, say, the school objects on religious grounds to the employment of 
84 ATJ note 49 supra at 212. 
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unmarried mothers as teachers, it can either accept the assistance and voluntarily 
compromise the practice of its religion, or reject the assistance. In either case, the 
principle of equal religious liberty is satisfied. It would not be satisfied if government 
required the school to accept assistance or, perhaps, to apply similar equal opportunity 
policies in employing teachers in positions and offices the school supported 
independently. It would also not be satisfied if the agreement to provide assistance on 
equal opportunity terms was contracmal.*^ The principle of voluntary engagement 
therefore serves to demarcate the complex (but largely voluntary) educational, health 
and welfare relations which now exist between government and religious groups in 
Australia, from the legal relations which characterise, say, a privileged religious 
establishment and which (in Rawlsian theory) are only possible under an unjust political 
constimtion. 
The principles of voluntary association and engagement are merely specific 
applications of the central principle of equal religious liberty. By rejecting any 
altemative principle that would allow a legislative majority in parliament to strike a 
utilitarian balance of religious liberties and equalities, it seems that it is best to include 
the principle of equal religious liberty in the political constimtion, where it can 
effectively limit parliamentary power. The constimtion must, as I discussed in § 5, 
"insure" that legislation intra vires the power of parliament also be just, and so the 
principle of equal religious liberty should, as Rawls states, "be incorporated and 
protected by the consdmdon."*^ This also better recognises the inalienability of the 
citizen's equal religious liberty because, as long as the constimtion is effective, the 
*^  The issue is discussed in detail in XI: §§ 6-10 infra. 
*^  ATJ note 49 supra at 197; PL note 49 supra at 229 and 337-8. 
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practice of his religious conceptions is not open to negotiation or exchange in any of 
the branches of government.*'^  In this thesis, it is not necessary to pursue in depth 
how the effectiveness of religion clauses in a constimtion could be ensured and, in 
particular, whether judicial review of legislation and administration should be available. 
Certainly, there are reasons to suggest that the judicamre is better positioned than the 
other branches of government to enforce religion clauses. It does not, like a parliament 
or execudve government, represent the electoral majority that is the most likely source 
of, say, unequal treatment of a religious minority. In addition, as we will see in § 8, 
the judicamre is the political and social insdmtion most obliged to use public reason 
and, therefore, to honour the spirit of secular government. But, irrespective of how the 
effectiveness of religion clauses is ensured, we can conclude that a just political 
constitution must include an effective guarantee of equal religious liberty. Those 
constimtions which fail to include such a guarantee are, at least potentially, unjust. 
Having then outlined the principle of equal religious liberty and at what level it 
is initially to be implemented, I am better able to state something generally about its 
limits. The basic principle inherent in the priority of all basic liberties is that one 
liberty can only be legitimately limited in the interests of liberty or, to be more precise, 
by some other basic liberty.** In the case of equal religious liberty, there are two 
*^  Of course, if equal religious liberty is inalienable it cannot even be limited by the 
special majorities that normally have power to amend the political constimtion. This 
raises the question whether, in Rawlsian theory, section 116 of the Commonwealth 
Constimtion could ever be repealed by a referendum passed in accordance with section 
128: cf PL notQ 49 supra 238-9. 
** ATJ note 49 supra at 203, 229, 244, 250 and 302; PL note 49 supra at 295. The list 
of basic liberties is limited, but includes: (i) liberty of thought and conscience; (ii) 
liberty of association; (iii) the political liberties; (iv) the liberty and integrity of the 
person; (v) rights and liberties covered by the mle of law (including rights of due 
process): cf ATJ note 49 supra at 61; PL note 49 supra at 291. Rawls seems to 
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straightforward cases. The first is "the state's interest in public order and security": 
as in John Smart Mill's Utilitarianism, the effective enforcement of security rights is 
recognised as the basis of an organised political society which makes the exercise of 
other liberties possible.*^ The second is the related issue of the intolerance of 
intolerance. Because the principle of equal religious liberty can be limited in the 
interests of maintaining public peace and order, it could be possible to deny equal 
liberty to an intolerant religious group which, contrary to its own practice, could be 
compelled (even by physical coercion) to respect others' liberties. The question 
becomes more difficult where the practice of religion collides with other basic liberties, 
a collision which is almost inevitable.^ In this case, how should the competing basic 
liberties be prioritised? In Political Liberalism, Rawls suggested that, so long as "a 
y 
central range of application" for each liberty was secured, adjustments between basic 
liberties should be made at the constimtional or parliamentary stage by considering the 
reladve importance of each basic liberty involved in the collision. To some extent, the 
relative importance of a liberty depends on how necessary it is to the development of 
a sense of justice or a conception of the good.^' This criterion is vague, and I doubt 
assume (but does not expressly list) "security rights", which protect individuals from 
killing, torture, assault, sexual violation, theft etc and are embodied in the ordinary 
criminal law: see JW Nickel note 77 supra at 767-70. 
*M77note 49 supra at 211-13; JS Mill, Utilitarianism (Harmondsworth 1987) pp 333-
4. 
90 ATJ note 49 supra at 203. 
'^ Rawls also refined this aspect of his theory in response to HLA Hart: note 75 supra 
at 322-47; and see PL note 49 supra at 295-6. The complete principle is stated in ibid 
at 335: 
... a liberty is more or less significant depending on whether it is more 
or less essendally involved in, or is a more or less necessary instimtional 
means to protect, the full and informed and effective exercise of the 
moral powers [to develop a capacity for a sense of justice and a 
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diat it is intended to dictate outcomes in particular cases. It is possible that it is only 
meant to set the parameters of a legitimate adjustment.^ I will illustrate how diese 
limitadons on the protection of religion might be decided in adjudication in chapter 
VIII.^ 3 
In addidon, the unqualified priority of equal religious liberty over requirements 
of the second principle of justice does not necessarily allow Rawls' complete political 
conception of justice to be realised. It is conceivable that the social and economic 
concerns of the second principle might be so frequently displaced by the principle of 
equal religious liberty that, in practicality, the second principle remains unrealised. In 
chapter XI, I therefore suggest that a further legitimate limitation on the protection of 
religion is measures needed to realise the minimum demands of the second principle of 
justice, and in particular its requirements of fair equality of opportunity.^ '* 
conception of the good] in one (or both) of the two fundamental cases. 
The "two fundamental cases" are stated in ibid at 332: 
The first ... is connected with the capacity for a sense of justice and 
concems the application of the principles of justice to the basic stmcmre 
of society and its social policies ... The second ... is connected with the 
capacity for a conception of the good and concems the application of the 
principles of deliberative reason in guiding our conduct over a complete 
life. 
^ This follows from James Nickel's understanding that the principle concentrates on 
collisions involving "the core of the core" of a liberty. It is therefore less determinative 
in collisions involving more marginal operations of die relevant liberties: note 77 supra 
at 781-2. 
'3 VIII: § 4 infra. 
'^ XI: § 6 infra. 
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I 7: Fair Equality of Opportunity 
The model of secular government being developed here is deepened when, 
through the same impartial procedure used above, it is recognised that the parties will 
be as concemed about equality in social and economic relations between citizens as they 
are about equal citizenship in civil and political relations with government. Here they 
select the second principle of justice, including its requirement that social and economic 
inequalities attach to positions and offices open to all citizens under conditions of fair 
equality of oppormnity: the principle affair equality of opportunity. This proceeds on 
the assumption that, though permissible, social and economic inequalities should not be 
determined by considerations which are, in a political sense, morally arbitrary. The 
consequence is that, in private and governmental employment ("positions and offices") 
especially, it is unjust that (as in a laissez-faire labour market) social and economic 
benefits only be allocated on the basis of an individual's namral endowments and 
abilities. For these are also affected by his inherited social and economic stams, which 
means the range of oppormnities presented to him is also related to "chance and good 
fortune". So, to eliminate the possibility that the people they represent could be 
disadvantaged by these contingencies, the parties in the original position select the 
principle of fair equality of opportunity: that "those who are at the same level of talent 
and ability, and have the same willingness to use them, should have the same prospects 
of success regardless of their inidal place in the social system. "^ ^ This principle is 
less suitable than equal religious equality to being included in the political constimtion 
and, to Rawls, is best implemented by legislation in the parliamentary stage. The 
^^  ATJ note 49 supra at 72-3. Rawls does not state why differences due to namral 
endowment are not also considered morally arbitrary. However, in practice differences 
due to social contingencies are more amenable to cortection by government than those 
due to namral endowment: R Martin, Rawls and Rights note 49 supra at 72-3. 
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reason is that diere is less public agreement on the implications of fair equality of 
oppormnity, and the most appropriate method of addressing social and economic 
inequalities rests on more complex and volatile social and economic considerations. 
One traditional means by which the principle is acmally implemented is by 
discrimination laws (with and without affirmative action laws) and, even within 
Australia, these vary significantly in the grounds on which the legislation specifies it 
is unlawful to discriminate.''^ There is no agreed list of contingencies that a 
parliament must remove as, in a political sense, morally arbitrary to the citizen's access 
to positions and offices and, therefore, specified as grounds of unlawful discrimination. 
In most cases, race and sex are included. The oldest legislation in the genre, the 
United States Civil Rights Act, also includes religion. Here, I suggest that it is likely 
to be considered a morally arbitrary contingency in the social and economic sphere to 
a representative citizen in the parliamentary stage, if it was considered a contingency 
in the civil and political sphere in the original position. Hence, one would expect a 
parliament to pass religious discrimination laws to implement, in part, the principle of 
fair equality of opportunity and these, I submit, acmally draw the principle of equal 
religious liberty into social and economic relations. The idea of secular government is 
thereby deepened although, as we will see in chapter XI, the principle of fair equality 
of oppormnity on grounds of race, sex and, of course, religion, also bring it new 
intemal tensions.^^ 
'^  PL note 49 supra at 227-8; see also XI: § 2 infra. 
'^ XI: §§ 7-10 infra. 
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§ 8: Public Reason 
These principles of secular government, detailed in accordance with Rawlsian 
criteria, address the same political and social relations in which Locke, with less 
precision, diought a right to religious liberty should be secured. However, Locke also 
thought that secular government should only be realised through the constimtion and 
laws, and conceded that government could use religious reasons to persuade citizens of 
religious tmth.'* But in the idea of public reason, Rawls and other contemporary 
liberal philosophers have assumed that the distinction between physical coercion and 
persuasion is too specious to allow government to use religious reasons when 
legitimately pursuing its objectives. This idea is that there is an obligation of 
citizenship which dictates the content of reasons the citizen can use in making decisions 
on public questions and, in particular, which limits the extent to which he can rely on 
his own religious reasons in deciding when and how to apply principles of justice to 
public questions.^ The source of this civic obligation in the classical Kantian idea of 
public reason is the imperative that each person should treat others as ends in 
themselves and so, when making decisions in the course of intellecmal debate, should 
{inter alia) "think from the standpoint of everyone else"."^ The individual who uses 
this as a principle of reasoning detaches himself from his personal religious, moral and 
philosophical conceptions and, instead, adopts a "universal standpoint" which responds 
*^ J Locke "First Letter" note 24 supra at 11. 
^^  For our purposes, questions involving the public role of religion are paramount 
concems in public reason and can be assumed to be public questions. To Rawls, they 
are quesdons of constimtional essentials and, therefore, undoubtedly attract the use of 
public reason: PL note 49 supra at 227-8. 
'°°/e "the maxim of enlarged thought": see I Kant, Critique of Judgement (1952) p 152 
and Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Ethics (1925) p 56. For a more 
complete discussion of Kant's idea of public reason, see O O'Neill, Constructions of 
Reason (1989) pp 28-50. 
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to the different concepdons held by others. Thus, the reason he uses does not 
presuppose some authority which other people reject, and it is therefore a reason which 
is more available to others generally. In our more specific concern with secular 
government, this civic obligadon responds more directly to the equal citizenship of 
others in conditions of religious pluralism.'°' In the course of debate about a public 
question, the citizen only respects others' equal citizenship by explaining his response 
to the question by reference to some reason which, it is expected, they can endorse, or 
at least regard as legitimate or understand. So, in his response to public quesdons, the 
citizen can only appeal to the values and principles of a political conception of justice, 
the constimtion, generally accepted beliefs and, when its conclusions are 
uncontroversial, science.'°^ He cannot use a reason based on, say, his own religious 
y 
conceptions because he thereby presupposes an authority which others reject. 
Evidently, since it limits any appeal to religious conceptions public reason is 
secular. It must not have any necessary reference to a supemamral idea or being, or 
be based exclusively on some other religious presupposition.'°3 
In fact, public reason has acmally become secular largely out of practical and 
social necessity. Since the Reformation, the absence of any generally shared religious 
conception has simply meant that a religious reason can rarely be used successfully to 
'°' Cf PL note 49 supra at 212-54. Here, I also follow Audi's account in "The 
Separadon of Church and State and the Obligations of Citizenship" (1989) 18 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 259. 
'°^  PL note 49 supra at 224-5; c/SL Carter, The Culture of Bisbelief {1993) pp 21, 51-6 
and 213-32. 
103 C/R Audi note 101 supra at 278. 
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solve shared social problems."^ This has also meant that religious groups have often 
found it a more effective strategy to present a (religion-based) case on a public question 
by using secular reasons. But, regardless of historical development, the civic obligation 
to decide public questions using only public reason is imposed once an equal citizenship 
is recognised. In our model of the original position, no party will accept that the 
content of civil and political discussion be guided by particular religious reasons 
because he does not know whether the people he represents are even religious, let alone 
whether they belong to the particular religion concemed. In this light, only guidelines 
of public discussion that exclude religious reasons would be selected.'°^ 
Though some distinction has been made between the use of public reason by 
agents of government and by other citizens, a theoretical source for the distinction has 
not yet been stated.'°^ However, members of parliament, the executive government 
and the judicamre could be seen to have a special obligation to use public reason 
because they occupy positions of public office or tmst. For, unlike other citizens, these 
people constimte a secular government organised to serve an equal citizenship. 
Together with the fact that they assume these positions voluntarily, this makes it more 
necessary and more legitimate that, in exercising governmental funcdons, they be 
expected to use public reason. To Rawls, this is especially required of the judicamre 
and, above all, of a supreme court like the High Court. Unlike members of the 
parliament or the execudve government, judges are traditionally expected to explain 
"^  JM Yinger, "Pluralism, Religion and Secularism" (1967) 6 Jnl Sc St Rel 17 at 27; 
K Dobbelaere note 1 supra at 109-12. 
'°^  PL note 49 supra at 225. 
'°^  PL note 49 supra at 215-16 and 252; c/R Audi note 101 supra at 289-90. 
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publicly why they made a particular decision. Public reason is therefore more 
immediately suited to the judicial role and, conversely, the judicamre is arguably best 
placed to promote the use of public reason through its public decision-making.'°^ I 
contend, therefore, that because this is an obligation of public office or tmst as well as 
of citizenship, it can also be considered an official and, since judges can be corrected 
on appeal for using the wrong reasons for making a decision, even a legal obligation 
to use public reason. 
This then allows us to elaborate in more detail how a judge's reason should be 
secular. In the first place, it allows him when deciding questions to rely on the 
principles of secular government and, where appropriate, religion clauses (included in 
the constimtion) and legislation which secure those principles. In the second place, it 
requires the judge to provide a secular rationale for his response to the question. This 
means that he cannot rely on a religious reason to support his response. It does not 
necessarily prevent the judge's having a religious reason as well as a secular reason for 
his response, but it does require him to rely on a secular reason to ensure that it is the 
decisive rationale for his response. The necessary consequence of this obligation of 
secular rationale is an obligation of secular resolution. Not only is a secular reason to 
support the judge's response to any question, it must, in one sense, be the ratio 
decidendi of the decision.'°* 
Indeed, the judge who does appeal to his own religious concepdons could fail 
in at least two ways to discharge his legal obligations. He fails to respect the opinions 
107 CfPL note 49 supra at 216 and 231-40. 
'°* C/R Audi note 101 supra at 278-80. 
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of others who reject his religious conceptions, and who could include the litigants 
before him. Worse sdll, even in suggesting that a quesdon be resolved by his own 
religious reasons, he is trying to appropriate government's coercive power to advance 
his own religious conception of the good. I have argued that the principle of equal 
religious liberty makes this an illegitimate object for secular government. 
The obligation of secular rationale does not necessarily require the judge to have 
a secular motivation for his decision: there is often agreement between secular and 
religious reasons, and the secular reason might be helpful to secure a religious end. 
However, I believe that the obligation to use public reason does acmally have a third 
level, and does oblige the judge to have a secular modvation for his response to a 
y 
particular question. The suggestion is that he "should not advocate or promote any 
legal or public policy restrictions on human conduct unless [he] .. is .. motivated by .. 
adequate secular reason."'^ It does not mean that there cannot be any religious 
motivation to a secular rationale. But it does mean that the secular motivation must, 
if held without the religious motivation, be enough to support the judge's secular 
rationale."° If it were regarded as a moral obligation on all citizens, the need for 
secular motivation might be hard to reconcile with the principle of equal religious 
liberty because, here, it is possible that public reason could reduce the cidzen's liberty: 
he could not legitimately participate in debate on public questions because he is moved 
to act on them by his own religious conceptions.'" But as a judge is also required 
'°^ Ibid at 284. 
"° Ibid at 284. 
' " Cf ibid at 281-6; PJ Weithman, "The Separation of Church and State: Some 
Questions for Professor Audi" (1991) 20 Philosophy and Public Affairs 52 at 58-65; R 
Audi, "Religious Commitment and Secular Reason: A Reply to Professor Weithman" 
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to use public reason as an obligation of public office or tmst, the argument that he must 
have a secular motivation is more compelling. 
In part, the suggestion that a secular motivadon should underlie a secular 
rationale springs from a concem that public questions tmly be decided on secular 
grounds. If what acmally moves the judge to hold a particular secular rationale is his 
own religious concepdons, then is it not possible that, in making his decision, he is -
consciously or unconsciously - appropriating the judicial power to advance his own 
concepdon of the good?"^ In the worst case, there is a risk that the secular might 
merely be a colourable reason: one which consciously disguises the tme religious 
reason for his decision. "3 
This is a principle of some subdety, and inherently impossible to police. In 
most cases, a judge's real motivation for making a particular decision will be unstated. 
In addition, the conditions which create and refine his moral inmitions, capacities and 
processes are innumerable and extremely complex, and in many cases he might not 
even be able to know whether he is moved by a secular or religious reason when 
making a particular decision (let alone to isolate one or the other as the determining 
motivadon in that matter). Therefore, the principle of secular motivation is best 
regarded as a personal moral obligation for the judge, and not open to legal review or 
(1991) 20 Philosophy and Public Affairs 66 at 67-74. It would certainly preclude the 
churches from commenting on public questions. However secular the reasons they give 
on questions of taxation, welfare, education, peace and public morality, one cannot 
doubt that, at root, the churches' political and social action springs from theological 
understandings of their mission in the world. 
"^ R Audi note 101 supra at 283. 
"3 Ibid. 
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appeal. It is not, for that reason, any less important. 
Secondly, because this moral obligation is voluntarily assumed, there is probably 
no legitimate question here of unequal treatment of any personal religious conceptions 
the judge might hold. If a candidate for a judicial position is not prepared to disregard 
his own religious motivations when deciding quesdons, he is best not to accept public 
office. This does effect a civic discriminadon against any religions which do not accept 
the principles of secular government or, more specifically, which deny that there is any 
civic or official obligation to use public reason. It also limits the principle of fair 
equality of opportunity."'* However, this is arguably an example of the citizen's right 
to religious equality being limited in the interests of equal religious liberty itself: an 
y 
intolerance of intolerance. This model of secular government is best realised when its 
agents are prepared to respect the official obligations of public reason. It is inevitable 
that this can require a judge, when acting in a judicial capacity, to limit his own 
practice of his religious conception of the good. 
§ 9: The Idea of a Secular Commonwealth 
The unstated objective of Rawlsian theory, as specifically addressed to the 
problem of religious pluralism, is to make religion irrelevant to the citizen's political, 
legal, social and economic stams. In modelling an impartial procedure on which to 
base a conception of justice, religion is classed as a contingency in the civil and 
political sphere and, by analogy, the social and economic."^ In the first place, the 
'"* C/SL Carter, "The Religiously Devout Judge" (1989) 64 Notre Dame L Rev 932, 
where this discrimination is considered illegitimate if the same principle does not apply 
to other philosophical and moral conceptions of the good. 
" M r / note 49 supra at 12 and 72-3. 
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basic principles selected when using this method - equal religious liberty and fair 
equality of opportunity - are directed towards making religion irrelevant in the 
organisation of political and social instimtions. In the second, a basic purpose of public 
reason is to empty civil and political discussion of any religious content."^ So, 
consistently with the source of this theory in an equal citizenship, I call the model of 
government that, as nearly as practicable, realises this objective "a secular 
commonwealth". Inmitively, some who have considered questions of constimtional 
government, law and religion have recognised this as the primordial idea of secular 
government. For instance, in Jehovah's Witnesses Chief Justice Sir John Latham said 
that "[sjection 116 .. is based upon the principle that religion should, for political 
purposes, be regarded as irrelevant"."'' In this thesis, the secular commonwealth and 
its principles are considered the basis of a just political constimtion, to the extent that 
the constimtion must address the problem of religious pluralism. 
The question remains: is a secular commonwealth also practicable? In 
particular, can it acmally be sustained in conditions of religious pluralism? 
In philosophical terms, one response to this issue of stability is Rawls' 
"overlapping consensus", an idea that employs pluralism positively to promote political 
116 See PL note 49 supra at 224-5. 
^^^ Adelaide Company of Jehovah's Witnesses Inc v Commonwealth (1943) 67 CLR 116 
at 126. Indian Supreme Court Justice Khanna also said that "the secular character of 
the state ... eliminates God from the matters of the state": St Xavier's College v State 
of Gujurat AIR 1974 SC 1389 at 1414. United States Supreme Court Justice Sandra 
Day O'Connor expressed the same idea: "The Establishment Clause prohibits 
government from making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's 
standing in the political community": Lynch v Bonnelly 465 US 668 at 687 (1984). 
See also Justice David Souter in Lee v Weisman 120 L Ed 2d 467 at 506 (1992). 
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and social stability. Here, principles of government acquire stability if they are 
endorsed by all the reasonable religious, philosophical and moral conceptions that, in 
the one society, have some longevity and significant public support."* This does not 
mean that the principles are constmcted from these conceptions. For example, the 
principles of a secular commonwealth have been selected by using the secular, liberal 
and impartial procedure of the original position. However, though these principles have 
a liberal source, the citizen who rejects liberalism might still support them for his own 
unique reasons. Thus, the principles stand independently of any of the different 
conceptions of the good held in this society, but can still be endorsed by them. For this 
reason, principles that attract an overlapping consensus have stability, and have 
ingeniously hamessed pluralism to secure the stability it so often dismrbs."^ 
,y 
In one sense, an overlapping consensus is a modus vivendi. It represents the 
terms on which, in conditions of pluralism, people are prepared to live together under 
organised government. But, as Rawls emphasises, it is not merely of this namre. The 
principles that attract an overlapping consensus can have a sound theoretical basis and, 
therefore, can stand as principles independently of the policy compromise (or peace 
treaty) usually implied by the notion of a modus vivendi. ^ ^° 
It is possible that some principles of a secular commonwealth could serve as an 
object of an overlapping consensus. This is especially so for equal religious 
"* PL note 49 supra at 15, 39-40 and 133-72. 
" ' Ibid at 144-50. 
'2° Ibid at 145-9. 
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liberty.'^' The Catholic Church, as it now teaches in Bignitatis Humanae, rejects the 
use of governmental coercion to promote religion and demands respect for equal 
religious liberty. However, this is based, not on the hypothetical arena of the original 
posidon, but on human dignity as revealed by God and reason.'^ ^ Similarly, some 
Protestants (like Locke) might base the principle of equal religious liberty on individual 
spirimal independence, some Hindus on a comprehensive understanding of religious 
tmth and others on philosophical scepticism.'^ 3 Despite this, the consensus is unlikely 
to be comprehensive. For equal religious liberty and its implementation in religion 
clauses that limit parliamentary power are difficult to reconcile with utilitarianism (a 
philosophical conception of the good), and the associated political doctrine of 
parliamentary supremacy it requires to allow the passage of legislation that can 
,y 
maximise the net sum of social happiness.'^ "* It seems that only a partial overlapping 
consensus is possible. Even this level of consensus would seem unlikely as we plumb 
deeper into the principle of fair equality of oppormnity and the idea of public reason. 
Still, the idea of a secular commonwealth is not wnstable just because, at best. 
'^ ' C/TL Hall note 23 supra at 517. 
'^ ^ A Flannery note 54 supra at 800 and 804. 
'^ 3 ATJ note 49 supra at 214; PL note 49 supra at 145. Of course, this also means that 
die practice of those religions that are doctrinally congment with a secular 
commonwealth will also be easier and, in a practical sense, advantaged relative to 
others. There is a hint that this could have been die case in United States Supreme 
Court Justice William Douglas' dissent in Wisconsin v Yoder, where his highly 
individualist approach to religious liberty is probably matched by his liberal 
Presbyterian concepdons: 406 US 205 at 246 (1972). 
'2^  See R Martin, "Rawls's New Theory of Justice" (1994) 69 Chi-Kent L Rev 737 at 
756-61. 
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it is supported by only a partial overlapping consensus. If at all, ultimately its stability 
can only be measured once the idea is implemented and its operation observed 
empirically over a long period of time. This is not impossible, especially as principles 
of a secular commonwealth parallel constimtional and legal instimtions which have been 
used historically to organise relations between government and religion. Indeed, I 
believe that a better case for the practicability of a secular commonwealth develops as, 
in the rest of this thesis, constimdons, legislation and adjudication are measured against 
its principles. 
III. ESTABLISHVIENT 
AND DISESTABLISHME]\T 
§ 1: Establishment: The British Base-line of Secular Government 
The last serious attempts made in the British Isles to resist the need for secular 
government were the monopoly religious establishments of Episcopal Protestantism 
(Anglicanism), imposed by the f)arliaments of the Restoration period between 1660 and 
1689. These mark the point from which, in common law countries, the secularisation 
of government continues inexorably to evolve, even if in England the religious 
establishment still occupies a privileged position under the political constimtion. In this 
chapter, I discuss how the parliaments made this last attempt to implement the principle 
cuius regio eius religio, and how unstable this monopoly religious establishment was 
when imposed on even a small (but significant) number of dissenters (§§2 and 3). This 
monopoly ended when, by legislation, parliaments first conceded to minority Protestant 
groups a limited liberty to assemble for worship, an issue discussed in chapter IV. 
However, despite the development of the principle of toleration, the religious 
establishments condnued to enjoy political and social privileges. These privileges were 
mirrored by constimtional and legal limitations on the establishments' independence, 
and so I also discuss how, even in the twentieth cenmry, this "exchange" of liberty for 
political and social benefits can prove to be a Faustian bargain, demonstrating it to be 
an unjust arrangement (§ 4 to 6). Then, to set the background to relations between 
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government and religion in Australia, I discuss the religious establishment in colonial 
New South Wales and how it was ^/^established (§ 7). 
§ 2: The Monopoly Establishment in England: 1660-1689 
The Restoration of Charles II in 1660 resurrected the doctrinal and political life 
of Episcopal Protestandsm in England, and launched a monopoly religious establishment 
that saw it develop into Anglicanism. Forced during the Interregnum to replace its 
Episcopal government with an inexact Presbyterianism, the Church of England still 
generally comprehended most of the Protestant parties that had multiplied under 
Cromwell's laissez-faire policy on religion: Puritans, Baptists, Congregationalists 
(Independents).' In his Declaration of Breda, Charles had promised (subject to 
parliamentary approval) religious liberty to people of "tender consciences".^ However 
the complete opposite soon resulted: doctrinal and political developments led 
parliaments to narrow the confessional and limrgical bases of the Church of England. 
In Anglican theology, Episcopal government was increasingly regarded as a necessary 
part {esse and not only de bene esse) of tme religion and, since early in the Restoration 
the bishops were restored to the House of Lords and Anglicans improved their hold on 
both Houses of Parliament, Episcopal Protestantism was made the focus of the cuius 
regio principle in England.3 This was largely achieved through the Uniformity Act of 
' A Whiteman, "The Church of England Restored" in GF Nuttall and O Chadwick 
(eds). From Uniformity to Unity 1662-1962 (London 1962) pp 26-9. 
^ DC Douglas (ed), English Historical Bocuments (London 1953) viii pp 57-8 {"EHB"). 
3 LF Brown, "The Religious Factors In the Convention Parliament" (1907) 22 Eng Hist 
Rev 51 at 63; GF Trevallyn Jones, "The Composition and Leadership of the 
Presbyterian Party in the Convention" (1964) 79 Eng Hist Rev 307 at 317; A Whiteman 
note 1 supra at 39; cfC Hill, The Century of Revolution 1604-1714 (London 1974) p 
108; see also 13 Ch 2 st 1 c 2 (repealing 16 Ch 1 c 27). 
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1662.-* 
The earlier Uniformity Acts had been the primary legislative means of bringing 
the Reformation to England, but had carefully accommodated the different Protestant 
parties in the kingdom.^  Three aspects of the 1662 legislation rejected this 
comprehension, and required the expulsion of significant minorities from the 
establishment. It provided that every clergyman was to assent publicly to the revised 
Book of Common Prayer (including ceremonial prescriptions Presbyterians and others 
found offensive), or be ejected.^ Secondly, after Saint Bartholomew's Day (24 August) 
1662, to be entitled to hold a benefice (an ecclesiastical living) a clergyman had to be 
episcopally ordained.^ Thirdly, every clergyman had to reject publicly the Solemn 
League and Covenant (a pledge for uniting England, Scotland and Ireland under a 
Presbyterian establishment).* 760 clergy had already been ejected since the 
Restoration, and by Saint Bartholomew's Day possibly another 2000 Presbyterians, 
Puritans and Congregationalists had surrendered their pulpits.^ 
The differences between Protestant parties in England can be traced to the 
"* 14 Ch 2 c 4. 
^ Uniformity Act 1548 (2 & 3 Edw 6 c 1); Uniformity Act 1551 (5 & 6 Edw 6 c 1); 
Uniformity Act 1558 (1 Eliz 1 c 2); A Whiteman note 1 supra at 39. 
^ Uniformity Act 1662, ss 1-3. 
^ Uniformity Act 1662, s 9. 
* Uniformity Act 1662, s 6. 
^ GR Abemathy, "Clarendon and the Declaradon of Indulgence" (1960) 11 Jnl Eccl Hist 
55 at 63; D Ogg, England in the Reign of Charles II 2nd ed (Oxford 1956) p 202; cf 
H Horwitz, "Protestant Reconciliation and the Exclusion Crisis" (1968) 15 Jnl Eccl Hist 
201. The duty to assent to the limrgy was extended to vestrymen in 1663: Vestries Act 
1663 (15 Ch 2 c 5), s 1; see also 15 Ch 2 c 6. 
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Reformation, but the Uniformity Act of 1662 ensured that this religious pluralism was 
expressed in separate denominations, rather than in an inclusive establishment.'" Still, 
despite the large numbers of clergy ejected the complete extent of dissent might have 
been small. The best evidence available (though possibly exaggerated) is the 
establishment census of 1676, which reported that fewer than 1% of freeholders were 
Protestant dissenters or Catholics." This only shows how unstable monopoly religious 
establishment is as a principle of government, because throughout this period dissent 
was considered sufficiently serious to reinforce the Uniformity Act with legislative 
schemes imposing political, legal, social and, in consequence, economic disadvantages 
on Protestant dissenters and Catholics. 
Until the 1670s the most important of these schemes was the Clarendon Code, 
inappropriately named after the Lord Chancellor who, like Charles, supported a more 
compromising policy on religious quesdons.'^ Intended specifically to marginalise and 
suppress Protestant dissent, the Clarendon Code addressed it in three different ways. 
1. Prohibition on Worship, Practice and Association. The most direct attempt 
to suppress Protestant dissent came by Parliament's removing dissenters' basic liberties 
of expression, association and movement. English ecclesiastical law already supported 
causes in the ecclesiastical courts against dissenters' meedngs and schools and, under 
'° D Ogg note 9 supra at 202; A Whiteman note 1 supra at 21-2. 
" JP Kenyon, The Stuart Constitution 1603-1688 (Cambridge 1966) p 451. 
'^  GR Abemathy note 9 supra at 64; R Ollard, Clarendon and His Friends (London 
1987) pp 213 and 215; c/D Ogg note 9 supra at 206-7. 
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the Uniformity Act, a schoolteacher, mtor or lecmrer required a bishop's licence.'3 
However, the Five Mile Act of 1665 placed a total ban on dissenters' conducting or 
teaching in schools.'^ It also required a dissenting preacher to swear that it was 
unlawful to change the religious establishment before he was entitled to be within five 
miles of a corporate town, or of a parish where he had been incumbent before the 1662 
ejecdons.'^ The Conventicle Act of 1664 was even more severe.'^ It made it an 
offence to attend any meeting of five or more persons "under colour or pretence of any 
Exercise of Religion in other manner then is allowed by die Limrgy or practise of the 
Church of England".'^ This provision was the Clarendon Code's worst violation of 
religious liberty, and since the Conventicle Act included a sunset-clause this seemed 
evident even to the Parliament which passed it.'* The 1664 legislation was 
nevertheless re-enacted in 1670, and it was then made an additional offence to preach 
or teach at a meeting.'^ Tme, the Conventicle Acts were intended to meet the 
perceived political threat of subversive dissenting groups, like the millenialist Fifth 
Monarchists, and to that extent therefore pursued the legitimate governmental object of 
'3 See Grove v Elliot (1670) 2 Vent 41; Cory v Pepper (1678) 2 Lev 222; cf Chedwick 
V Hughes (1698) Garth 464; Oldfield v Raines (1698) 12 Mod 192; Uniformity Act 
1662, ss 7 and 15. 
" Five Mile Act 1665 (17 Ch 2 c 2), s 3. 
^^ Five Mile Act 1665, s 2. 
'^  16 Ch 2 c 4. 
'^  Conventicle Act 1664, s 1. This offence was punishable on a third conviction by 
transportation for seven years or a fine of £100: Conventicle Act 1664, ss 3 and 5; eg 
Anonymous (1664) Kel 38. 
'* Conventicle Act 1664, s 20; JP Kenyon note 11 supra at 364. 
'9 Conventicle Act 1670 (22 Ch 2 c 1), s 3. 
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protecting security rights.^° However, they imposed the same restrictions on the 
ejected Presbyterians and Congregationalists. The 1670 legisladon was also followed 
by a vicious campaign to suppress dissenters' meetings, of which the City of London's 
prosecution of the Quaker William Perm is the most notorious example.^' 
2. Unequal Political Status. The Clarendon Code also aimed to reduce 
dissenters' rights to participate in local government, as the boroughs had been centres 
of radical Protestantism and its associated republicanism. However Parliament also 
passed the first part of this scheme, the Corporation Act of 1661, to secure royal (and 
Anglican) control over the boroughs and the election of borough members to the 
Commons.^ ^ The Corporation^ Act included the usual requirement that officers of 
cities, boroughs and corporations forswear armed rebellion and the Solenrn League and 
Covenant,^ 3 but also set a legislative precedent by introducing a sacramental test. This 
was probably included at the behest of the establishment bishops in the Lords, and 
excluded from office in any city, borough or corporation any person who, within one 
year before election, had not taken the eucharist according to the rites of the Church 
-^ Eg Rv James (1661) 6 St Tr 67; W Holdsworth, A History of English Law 2nd ed 
(London 1938) vi pp 197-8; D Ogg note 9 supra at 209. 
'^ /? V Penn & Mead (1670) 6 St Tr 954. Otherwise, it is difficult to assess how 
stringently the Conventicle Acts were applied. Sir Matthew Hale was reported to have 
acquitted Quakers charged with holding an unlawful meeting on the ground that it was 
not sedidous, and secdon 10 of the Conventicle Act of 1670 suggests that local 
governments were reluctant to enforce the 1664 legislation. It could nevertheless be 
enforced maliciously, and dissenters were often left to die in prison: E Heward, 
Matthew Hale (London 1972) p 68; W Holdsworth note 20 supra at 198-9; D Ogg note 
9 supra at 207. 
^M3 Ch 2 St 2 c 1; JH Sacret, "The Restoration Government and the Municipal 
Corporations" (1930) 45 Eng Hist Rev 232 at 232-3. 
23 Corporation Act 1661, s 3. 
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of England.^ "* The sacramental test was sometimes used as a pretext by recalcitrant 
citizens to avoid the responsibilities attached to governmental office.^ ^ On the other 
hand, as I discuss in chapter IV, it was also exploited by local governments which 
imposed fines on dissenters who refused, consistently with the Corporation Act but 
inconsistently with local regulations, to accept a public office.^ ^ 
3. Quakers. There was special legislation addressed to Quakers, who refused 
to swear oaths because, on their reading of the Sermon on the Mount, they believed it 
was a sin. This excited deep suspicion, because since the Reformation parliaments had 
used the oath to identify an individual's religious conceptions and his related political 
allegiance. The Quakers' refusal to take oaths undermined this process, and traditional 
procedure in the ordinary courts of judicamre. So, under the Quaker Act of 1662 it 
became an offence to refuse to swear an oath." In any case, Quakers were convicted 
under recusancy legislation (directed at Catholics) for refusing to swear oaths of 
allegiance, even when they volunteered instead to affirm loyalty to the King.^ * These 
provisions offered litde disincentive to a people used to worse persecution, and so the 
sanctions for refusing to swear an oath were raised. In the 1664 Conventicle Act it was 
made equivalent to a conviction under the legislation, and was punishable by 
24 Corporation Act 1661, s 9; JH Sacret note 22 supra at 251. 
^ JH Sacret note 22 supra at 255. The Test Act of 1673 was also used for this purpose: 
eg Attorney-General v Read (1676) 2 Mod 299. 
^MV § 2 infra. 
2' 1 4 C h 2 c 1. 
28 3^as\c4,s9;egRv Crook & Ors (1662) 6 St Tr 201; /? v Fell & Fox (1662) 6 
St Tr 629, esp at 635; c//? v Marriot (1664) Kel 38. 
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7Q 
transportation. 
The Clarendon Code was specially adapted to meet parliamentary concems about 
Protestant dissent.3° The focus of these concems mmed towards Catholics in the 
1670s and 1680s and, especially after the Popish Plot of 1678, at times they became 
hysterical. Like the Clarendon Code, the legislation addressed to Catholics removed 
rights of expression, association and participadon in government although, in general, 
the sanctions were more severe. Furthermore, government's relations with Catholics 
were complicated by Charles II's Catholic sympathies, the accession of the Catholic 
James II in 1685, and the tensions and unsettled constimtional relations between 
Parliament, King and courts. 
1. Prohibitions on Worship, Practice and Association. The recusancy legislation 
of the sixteenth and early seventeenth cenmries already provided a comprehensive 
scheme of penalties for Catholicism, and the sanctions it imposed progressively became 
more severe as the public practice of an individual's religion became more Catholic.3' 
It began with the offence of recusancy (not attending the parish church); if absent on 
a Sunday or a holy day, the recusant to pay a fine of 12d,3^  and if absent for a month, 
to pay a fine of £20 or else forfeit all goods and two-thirds of all lands or be exiled.33 
^^  Conventicle Act 1664, s 16; cf Quaker Act 1662, s 1. 
3° Indeed, the Commons declared in 1668 that the Conventicle Act should not be applied 
against Catholics: JA Williams, "English Catholicism under Charles II: The L^gal 
Position" (1963) 7 Recusancy Hist 123 at 131. 
3' J Miller, Popery and Politics in England 1660-1688 (Cambridge 1973) pp 51-5; JA 
Williams note 30 supra at 123-31. 
32 Uniformity Act 155S, s 3; eg Britton v Standish (1705) 6 Mod 188; 3 Jas 1 c 4, s 18. 
33 23 Eliz 1 c 1, s 4; 29 Eliz 1 c 6, s 4; 35 Eliz 1 c 1, s 2; 3 Jas 1 c 4, ss 5 and 6. 
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To reinforce this, it was also an offence to hold or attend mass.3'' It was illegal for 
a recusant to be a schoolmaster.3^ In addidon, he could not practise law or medicine, 
hold a commission or hold a public office.3^ To be a priest, proselytise for 
Catholicism or convert to Catholicism was a capital offence.3'^  Until the Popish Plot 
it seems this dangerous legislation was only enforced sparingly. But between 1678 and 
1681, 18 priests were executed and others, in the same period, died in prison.3* 
2. Unequal Political Status. In 1672 Charles had attempted to suspend the 
Clarendon Code and the recusancy legislation.3^ Parliament forced him to cancel the 
Indulgence in 1673, and countered with the first Test Act.'^'^ This legislation, dubbed 
by Lord Macaulay as "absurd ^nd odious", included three tests to exclude Catholics 
from positions in the executive government.'*' To hold a public office, a person had 
to swear the oath of allegiance in the 1606 recusancy legislation; (as in the Corporation 
Act) to take the eucharist according to the rites of the Church of England; and publicly 
to deny belief in the Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation (that the elements of the 
34 23 Eliz 1 c 1, s2 . 
3^  23 Eliz 1 c 1, s 5. In response. Catholics sent children to school on the continent, 
but this also was an offence; the parent could forfeit all property, and the child could 
be disqualified from any inheritance: 27 Eliz l c l , s 5 ; l J a s l c 4 , s 5 ; 3 J a s l c 5 , 
s 11; 3 Ch 1 c 2, s 1; JA Williams note 30 supra at 128. 
3^  3 Jas 1 c 5, ss 6 and 7. 
3^  23 Eliz 1 c 1, s 1; 27 Eliz 1 c 2, s 2; 3 Jas 1 c 4, s 14. 
3* J Miller note 31 supra at 168; JA Williams, "Some Sidelines on Recusancy Finance 
under Charles II" [1959] Dublin Rev 245 at 245-54. 
3^  Beclaration of Indulgence 1672, EHB note 2 supra at viii 387-8. 
0^ 25 Ch 2 c 2. 
'^ TB Macaulay, The History of England (Harmondsworth 1979) p 547. 
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eucharist mm into the body and blood of Christ).'*2 Following the Popish Plot in 
1678, a second Test Act was passed.'*3 This excluded Catholics from parliaments, 
requiring any member of Parliament publicly to deny the doctrine of transubstantiation, 
the adoration of Mary and the saints and the sacrifice of the mass.'*^  
However, the monopoly religious establishment reinforced by this legisladon 
became hardest to maintain when, in James II, the King himself was Catholic and tried, 
on three occasions between 1685 and 1688, to suspend the operation of the Clarendon 
Code, the recusancy legislation and the Test Acts by executive action. This forged a 
political alliance between the religious establishment and Protestant dissenters: united 
in the suspicion that James was conspiring to secure a Catholic establishment and in 
holding to the constimtional impropriety of executive suspension of legislation."*^ The 
result was the Glorious Revolution of 1688, by which Parliament had James expelled. 
It then, as we will see in §§ 4 and 5, settled a principle of Protestant succession and, 
by restoring a limited religious liberty to most Protestant dissenters in the Toleration 
Act of 1689, broke the monopoly religious establishment.'*^ This last measure is so 
2^ Test Act 1673, ss 1 and 8. 
'3 30 Ch 2 c 1; see W Holdsworth note 20 supra at 183-5. 
'*'* Test Act 1678, s 1. James, Duke of York (to accede as James II), was expressly 
exempted, but even this concession only passed the Commons by a majority of two 
votes: Test Act 1678, s 11; JP Kenyon note 11 supra at 452. 
'*^  This was an impropriety famously resisted by the Archbishop of Canterbury, William 
Sancroft, and six other bishops whom James prosecuted for sedition. See IV § 1 infra; 
JP Kenyon note 11 supra at 453; Beclaration of Indulgence 1687, EHB note 2 supra 
at viii 84 and 395-7; R Thomas, "The Seven Bishops and their Pedtion" (1961) 12 Jnl 
Eccl Hist 86 at 87-8, 92 and 94-5; R v Sancroft & Ors {Trial of the Seven Bishops) 
(1688) 3 Mod 212, 12 St Tr 188. 
"* 1 Will and Mar c 18. 
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important to the development of secular government, I consider it separately and in 
detail in chapter IV."*^  
§ 3: The Monopoly Establishment in Scotland: 1660-1689 
Under pressure from the English Parliament, the Scottish Parliament also 
imposed a monopoly establishment of Episcopal Protestantism once Charles was 
restored as King in 1660. However in Scodand's case this was even more disastrous, 
and caused enormous political and social instability. The Reformation had been both 
more radical and more complete in Scotland than in England. The religious 
establishment was reorganised, under the Confession of Faith accepted by Parliament 
in 1560, with Calvinist doctrine and, under the legislation of 1579, with Presbyterian 
government: a hierarchy of sessions, presbyteries, synods and, at the apex, the General 
Assembly.*** Charles I had introduced episcopal government to the Church of 
Scodand, and in 1661 Parliament allowed this to be revived, but in both periods it 
created an establishment that was, in a basic sense, alien to the popular religion of the 
kingdom.'*^ The Act of Restitution passed in 1661 empowered the King to settle the 
terms of the religious establishment, and he subsequently ordered bishops to be restored 
to the Church of Scotland.^ " 
47 IV: § 2 infra. 
"** Confession of Faith Ratification Act 1560; Papal Jurisdiction Act 1560; Act Anent 
Church Jurisdiction 1567; Church Act 1579; Church Jurisdiction Act 1579. 
^^ Act Rescissory 1661. This rendered all legislation passed from 1640 void: EHB note 
2 supra at viii 606; D Daiches, Scotland and the Union (London 1977) p 32; WL 
Mathieson, Politics and Religion in Scotland 1550 to 1695 (Glasgow 1902) ii p 181; D 
Ogg note 9 supra at 176. 
°^ Order of Council for the Restoration of Episcopacy 1661, EHB note 2 supra at viii 
608; D Daiches note 49 supra at 32; D Ogg note 9 supra at 411. 
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Episcopal Protestandsm was also reinforced by legislation paralleling the 
Clarendon Code although, as the establishment lacked the popular support it had in 
England, it imposed more severe sancdons. Thus, the Test Act of 1662 required any 
person (including an establishment minister) who held a public office to forswear the 
National Covenant (a pledge to resist Episcopal government) and the Solemn League 
and Covenant.^' In the same year, the Patronage Act required any minister not 
collated by the relevant bishop to resign.^" This policy was confirmed in 1663 and so 
in Scotland also the ejecdons took place: 270 ministers (about one-third of the clergy) 
left the religious establishment." 
In the second place. Parliament denied dissenters' rights of associadon and, 
concemed as in England that some dissenting assemblies were seditious, imposed the 
stemest sanctions for illegal meetings. These concerns were realistic, especially as 
between 1666 and the Glorious Revolution Presbyterian Covenanters periodically raised 
armed rebellion. Indeed, the Covenanters were the particular target of the 1670 
legislation which made field preaching a capital offence.^ "* Following the accession 
of James VII (II), even to attend a dissenters' meeting in a field or house became a 
capital offence. These penalties were mthlessly enforced. In Scodand, the 1680s were 
called "the killing time".^^ 
'^ EHB note 2 supra at viii 609; D Ogg note 9 supra at 411. 
" EHB note 2 supra at viii 612. 
" Act Enforcing the Ecclesiastical Settlement 1663; EHB note 2 supra at viii 613; 
Order of Council Against Ejected Ministers 1663, ibid at 614: D Daiches, note49^w;7ra 
at 33; c /D Ogg note 9 supra at 177. 
'^* WL Mathieson note 49 supra at ii 251. 
"/Z?/^ at ii 314-5. 
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But the alternating political formnes of the different Protestant parties in Britain 
never reached a more absurd legal position as they did in the Scottish Test Act of 
1681.^ ^ The royal supremacy in religion had been setded by the Parliament in 
1669.^ ^ The Test Act required any person who held a public office (except the King 
and the royal family) to subscribe to the royal supremacy. However, as a result of a 
misconceived Presbyterian stratagem in Parliament, it also required holders of public 
office to subscribe to the Confession of Faith (which rejected royal supremacy, and 
stated that Christ was the only head of the Church of Scotland).^ * The Test Act caused 
new ejections: somewhere between 17 and 80 ministers.^ ^ Its intemal contradictions, 
nevertheless, might still seem comical had they not provided a legal ground for the 
execution of the Earl of Argyll, who was convicted of leasing-making 
y 
(misrepresentation of the King and Parliament) and treason for being prepared to 
comply with the Test Act, "to the extent it was consistent with itself".^ 
The Scottish Test Act of 1681 patendy reflects the disintegradon of British 
religious conditions which undermined the practicability of any monopoly religious 
establishment. English and Scottish legislation in the Restoration period was certainly 
designed to reinforce Episcopal Protestantism's constitutional identification with civil 
^^  EHB note 2 supra at viii 631; D Daiches note 49 supra at 36; WL Mathieson note 
49 supra at ii 295. 
^^  Assertory Act 1669; EHB note 2 supra at viii 611. 
*^ Confession of Faith ell; WL Mathieson note 49 supra at ii 296-7; c/D Daiches note 
49 supra at 36. 
^^  WL Mathieson note supra at ii 299. 
^ He was initially exiled, but in 1685 remmed to support Monmouth's rebellion, and 
was summarily executed on the basis of the eariier convicdon: Earl of Argyll (1681) 
8 St Tr 843; D Daiches note 50 supra at 36; WL Mathieson note 50 supra at ii 300. 
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government, but in both countries that same legislation, especially in the penalties it 
imposed on Protestant dissenters and Catholics, recognised that it did not have the same 
social identification with the people generally. The hold that the "non-negotiable" 
religious part of life had on many dissenters meant that a monopoly establishment was 
most conscientiously resisted and, in Scotland especially, cost the kingdom profound 
social upset. James' expulsion came, in part, because principles of government did not 
respond to even the small extent of religious pluralism then obtaining. In contrast, the 
reladons between government and religion settled in both kingdoms after the Glorious 
Revoludon did represent some response to pluralism, and in these are the origins of 
secular government. 
§ 4: The Glorious Revolution Settlement 
The primary constimtional and legal instimtions which organise relations 
between government and religion in Great Britain were settled between the Glorious 
Revolution in 1688 and the polidcal union of England and Scodand in 1707. There 
have been significant adjustments in these instimtions since then, mainly in securing a 
general religious toleration in the nineteenth cenmry and the independence of the 
Scottish establishment in the twentieth. However, I believe that these adjustments 
merely realised the "inner logic" of the instimtions that parliaments and executive 
governments negotiated as the constimtional settlement in this period. The Revolution 
settlement did retain the religious establishments. However in Scotland it restored, 
once more, a Presbyterian establishment that has been less amenable than the English 
to "Erastianism" (or governmental control of confessional and limrgical practice). In 
the second place, it introduced the legislative toleration of Protestant dissenters. 
Macaulay regarded these as the two most important contributions of the Revolution, and 
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together they dislodged the Episcopal Protestant monopoly in Great Britain.^' But 
toleradon also secularised government profoundly as it was extended to other religious 
groups. Indeed it evenmally undermined a third aspect of the Revolution settlement, 
the reinforcing of Protestant control over all branches of government. King James' 
religion was the most important reason for his expulsion, and afterwards Catholicism 
became even more closely associated with seditious Jacobite intentions.^ ^ The 
Revoludon parliaments therefore condnued to pass legislation intended to marginalise 
Catholics.^ 3 gut niost importantly they also secured the Protestant succession, and 
even though the legislative toleration of religious groups has gradually dismantled most 
other aspects of the Protestant monopoly on government, this is one inheritance of the 
Glorious Revolution which persists. It continues to lie close to the centre of the 
,y 
privileged religious establishment in England. 
§ 5: The Privileged Establishment in England 
Irrespective of the changes the Glorious Revolution made in relations between 
parliament, the executive government and the judicamre, all branches of government 
continued to exercise some control over the religious establishment. The principle of 
parliamentary supremacy, a namral consequence of the Parliament's expulsion of the 
King, theoredcally placed unlimited legislative power in Parliament. Thus, Blackstone 
could describe its power as "transcendent and absolute" and included the power to "alter 
'^ TB Macaulay note 41 supra at 546-7; c/E Carpenter, "Toleration and Establishment: 
2" in GF Nuttall and O Chadwick note 1 supra at 301-2. 
62 W Holdsworth note 20 supra at vi 201. 
3^ 1 Will and Mar c 9; 1 Will and Mar c 15; 11 Will 3 c 4. The continuing 
disqualificadon from public office also meant that it was slanderous to call an official 
a Catholic: Roe v Clargis (1684) 3 Mod 26; How v Prin (1702) 7 Mod 107. 
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the established religion of the land."^ The 1533 Statute of Appeals sdll had operadon, 
and recognised the royal supremacy in ecclesiastical matters.^ ^ The ordinary courts 
of judicamre ultimately had power to control the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts, 
whether by issuing a writ of prohibition at common law or an injunction in equity.^ 
These instimtions largely remain in place, and as I discussed in chapter II highlight a 
potendally unjust political constimtion diat allows a legisladve majority in the 
parliaments to trade citizens' religious liberties and equalities. '^' Indeed, even in the 
late twentieth cenmry the religious liberties of the English establishment have been 
commodified in parliaments and executive governments, and exchanged for its 
privileges. Obviously, as the Church of England is the insdmdonal conservator of a 
folk religion intricately enmeshed in national culmre, it has intangible (but powerful) 
y 
social advantages over other religious groups. But there are two concrete political 
privileges the Church holds under the constimtion that reinforce its limited 
independence from governmental control. 
The first is based on the close relations between the monarch and the Church. 
The Queen is, by the Reformadon legislation and at common law, Supreme Head on 
earth of the Church of England.^ * This position was rationalised by parliaments 
between 1689 and 1711 to ensure that the Head of a Protestant establishment herself be 
^ W Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 14th ed (London 1803) I 2 iii. 
^' 24 Hen 8 c 12. 
^^  W Holdsworth note 20 supra at v 429-32 and xii 695-702. 
^Ml: § 6 supra. 
*^ Supremacy of the Crown Act 1534 (26 Hen 8 c 1); House of Lords Precedence Act 
1539 (31 Hen 8 c 10), s 2; cf See of Rome Act 1554 (1 & 2 Phil and Mar c 8), s 4; Act 
of Supremacy 1558 (1 Eliz 1 c 1), s 4; cf Statute Laws (Repeal) Act 1969, s 1; and see 
Caudrey's Case (1591) 5 Co Rep la at 8a. 
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a Protestant. The Protestant succession was therefore settled, legislation providing that 
Protestantism was a precondition to the right of accession and, on the extinction of the 
Protestant Smarts, the right of accession to bypass the Catholic Jacobite Smarts and to 
pass to Princess Sophia of Hanover and her Protestant heirs.^ ^ The English Act of 
Settlement of 1700 even more specifically provided that the monarch join in communion 
with the Church of England.^ ° Historically this is an understandable development, but 
equally it is the most extraordinary privilege for the English religious establishment 
since it affects the succession in the other parts of the United Kingdom and 
Commonwealth where Anglicanism is not established. Thus, for Australia 
Commonwealth Attomey-General Michael Lavarch has correcdy argued that "[t]he mles 
for succession to the position of head of state ... discriminate on the ground[] of 
y 
religion ...", a position which is primarily inconsistent with the principle of equal 
religious liberty, but which has secondary implicadons for the Church's own 
independence. '^ 
The second concrete political privilege the Church of England has under the 
British constimtion is the right (without popular election) that its bishops have to sit in 
Parliament. This right was bom in the origins of the English Parliament (when abbots 
^^  Coronation Oath Act 1689 (1 Will and Mar c 6), s 3; Bill of Rights 1689 (1 Will and 
Mar sess 2 c 2); (Scots) Claim of Right 1689, EHB note 2 supra at viii 635; Act of 
Settlement 1700 (12 & 13 Will 3 c 2), ss 1 and 2; Treason Act 1702 (1 Anne st 2 c 21), 
s 3; Union With Scotland Act 1706 (6 Anne c 11), art 2; Princess Sophia of Hanover's 
Precedence Act 1711 (10 Anne c 4). 
70 Act of Settlement 1700, s 3. 
'^ "Royal Rules Biased" Courier Mail, 14 April 1994, p 1. In this case the injustice of 
the Protestant succession was used an argument for republicanism and not, say, 
republicanism as a means of equalising the religious inequality of the Protestant 
succession. 
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and priors were also summoned) and has been confirmed by legislation.^ ^ The 
archbishops of Canterbury and York, the bishops of London, Durham and Winchester, 
and the next 21 most senior diocesan bishops comprise the Ix)rds Spirimal, with 
complete rights to sit and vote in the House of Lords while they remain establishment 
bishops. There are more than 1100 Lords Temporal entitled to sit in the House, which 
means that the proportion of votes the establishment bishops exercise is small. It is still, 
undoubtedly, a disproportionate representation in British government. 
These privileges have also carried costs, and all relate to the Church of 
England's independence to determine its own doctrine, limrgy, organisation and 
mission. The monarch (as Supreme Head) has legal powers of control within the 
y 
Church of England. There are some establishment assemblies, like its supreme internal 
legislamre the General Synod (called before 1970 the Church Assembly), that can only 
be convened and dissolved lawfully by the Queen, and her assent is necessary before 
canons passed by establishment legislamres can even have operation as intemal 
ecclesiastical law.^ 3 gu^ j-j^ g more serious control is exercised through the Queen's 
exclusive power to appoint establishment bishops, whether diocesan or suffragan.^ '* 
In practice these powers are modified by convention and, since 1977, a procedure 
^^  Eg Bishoprics Act 1878, s 5. 
3^ The provincial convocations of Canterbury and York must be convened and dissolved 
by the Queen, and the General Synod's sessions are tied to those of the convocations: 
see Submission of the Clergy Act 1533 (25 Hen 8 c 19), s 1; Church of England 
Convocations Act 1966, s 1; Synodical Government Measure 1969, s 1; Case of 
Convocations (1611) 12 Co Rep 72. 
'^* Appointment of Bishops Act 1533 (25 Hen 8 c 20), ss 3-5; Suffragan Bishops Act 
1534 (26 Hen 8 c 14), s 1; Cathedrals Measure 1931, s 23. The term "suffragan" 
refers to a bishop who "helps" or "assists" a diocesan bishop: see R Bum, The 
Ecclesiastical Law 8th ed (London 1824) I pp 245-6. 
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designed to involve Church representatives in appointments. Under principles of 
responsible government, the Queen as a constimtional monarch only acts on the advice 
of ministers responsible to Parliament. In effect therefore, the Queen's decisions (even 
as Supreme Head of the Church of England) are made by the executive government 
and, in particular, those relating to episcopal appointments by the Prime Minister. 
Having received a report on the relevant diocese from a Vacancy-in-See Committee, the 
Crown Appointments Commission (which comprises Church and governmental 
representatives) recommends two candidates to the Prime Minister, although the first 
listed person is the Commission's preferred nominee. The Prime Minister then advises 
the Queen as to whom should she should appoint, or if both candidates are unacceptable 
to the Prime Minister he can request two new names. Once the Queen receives the 
y 
Prime Minister's advice on the appointment, the sole requirement of the Appointment 
of Bishops Act is that she directs the relevant cathedral chapter to elect that person 
bishop." 
The bishops, according to the Book of Common Prayer, are the pastors of God's 
church. High Church or catholic Anglicans especially would see them as being in 
succession to Christ's apostles. Thus, governmental involvement in the appointment 
of bishops is a serious violation of the Church of England's religious liberty. It cannot 
be dismissed either as merely a formal involvement. In 1987, Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher refused to accept the Crown Appointments Commission's recommendation to 
have the (suffragan) Bishop of Stepney translated as (diocesan) Bishop of Birmingham. 
Prime Minister John Major has also advised the Queen to appoint the second of the 
Commission's nominees. In no case is it possible to mle out political motivations for 
" For this process, see M De-la-Noy, The Church of England (London 1993) pp 64-70. 
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the decision. Through 1975 and 1976, the Archbishop of Canterbury, Donald Coggan, 
tried to negotiate arrangements that would remove the Prime Minister from the 
appointment process. This was rejected by Harold Wilson's Government on the ground 
that the appointment of a diocesan bishop was a political appointment, as the bishop 
was evenmally endded to sit in the House of Ix)rds. Still, consistently with this 
position a General Synod working party recommended in 1992 that the Prime Minister 
be removed from the process of appointing a suffragan bishop (who has no right to sit 
in Parliament), and instead that the Queen appoint the suffragan directly in accordance 
with the relevant diocesan bishop's advice. This time the proposal was immediately 
rejected by the two archbishops, on the ground that it was inconsistent with the 
principle of responsible government that the Queen act only on the advice of ministers 
responsible to Parliament.^^ In these circumstances, the only means the Church of 
England has to secure the independence of the episcopacy is to have its parliamentary 
privileges and the monarchical appointment of bishops removed by legislation. 
However, even this would not solve all the problems the Church has with governmental 
control. 
The most important internal ecclesiastical law in the Church of England is a 
"measure", passed by both the General Synod and, as required by legislation, the 
British Parliament.''^ The Church can enact canons that bind the clergy without 
pariiamentary consent, provided the canons are not inconsistent with the Queen's 
^^  C Buchanan, Cut the Connection: Bisestablishment and the Church of England 
(London 1994) pp 96-7 and 114-17; M De-la-Noy note 75 supra at 56-7. 
" Church of England Assembly (Powers) ^cr l919, ss 3 and 4; Synodical Government 
Measure 1969, s 2. 
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prerogadve, parliamentary legisladon, the common law or custom.^ * However, die 
English religious establishment is based on an extensive scheme of parliamentary 
legislation, and a measure is often needed to make any change to doctrine, limrgy, 
organisation or practice effective. Ultimately this subordinates the Church of England 
to the control of members of Parliament (including those who are neither Anglican nor 
even English), and once more these governmental powers are not merely formal. For, 
as three collisions between the Church Assembly and British parliaments in the late 
1920s show, the Parliament can render the Church of England powerless to order its 
limrgy and intemal organisation. 
1. The See of Shrewsbury Proposal. In 1926, a measure to reorganise the sees 
of Lichfield and Hereford and, out of the reorganisation, to create a new diocesan see 
of Shrewsbury was placed before the Parliament. It had already been a controversial 
point in the Church Assembly, but the Bishop of Durham took a second oppormnity to 
argue against the measure in the House of Lords. The Archbishop of Canterbury 
pleaded that the Church committees that had examined the proposal were more 
competent than Parliament to evaluate its merits, but despite this the measure was 
defeated by one vote.^ ^ 
2. The Prayer Book Controversy. The most serious defeat the Church received 
in Parliament was in the celebrated attempt to introduce the Revised Prayer Book. 
From the Oxford Movement in the 1830s and 1840s and through the nineteenth cenmry, 
'* Case of Convocations (1611) 12 Co Rep 72; Cox's Case (1700) 1 P Wms 29 at 32; 
Middleton v Crofts (1736) 2 Adc 650; More v More (1741) 2 Atk 157 at 159. 
'5 Parliamentary Bebates (Official Report) (House of Lords) (London 1926) Ixiii pp 450-
6 and 470-6. 
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the Church of England had seen the emergence of a more catholic and rimalised 
churchmanship. These more catholic practices were often illegal under ecclesiastical 
law but, despite a rash of "rimal prosecutions" in the 1870s, the bishops had been 
unable to contain their growth.*° In 1906, a Royal Commission on Ecclesiastical 
Discipline recommended a revision of the Church's limrgy to accommodate the 
catholics. Therefore, between 1920 and 1927, the Church Assembly developed the 
Revised Prayer Book, which allowed more rimalised worship and made provision for 
reservation of the sacrament. Since the use of the Revised Prayer Book was also 
inconsistent with the 1662 Uniformity Act, it had to be approved by measure. The 
Prayer Book Measure passed through the Church Assembly comfortably, and only 
received serious opposition from extreme catholics (who thought it not catholic enough) 
y 
and evangelicals (who sdll preferred the Book of Common Prayer). It also passed 
safely through the House of Lords. In the House of Commons, strong opposition to the 
measure was led by Home Secretary Sir William Joynson-Hicks, an evangelical, and 
Rosslyn Mitchell, a Scotdsh Presbyterian, both of whom argued that the Revised Prayer 
Book would undo the English Reformation. There was some support for the Church's 
liberty to determine its own limrgy, but the measure was roundly defeated.*' In 1928 
the Church tried again. To allay parliamentary trepidations about creeping Roman 
influence in the Church, it removed the provision for reservation of the sacrament. 
Still, this second measure was even more decisively rejected by the House of 
*° J Bentley, Ritualism and Politics in Victorian Britain: The Attempt to Legislate for 
Belief {Oxford 1978). 
*' Parliamentary Bebates (Official Report) (House of Commons) (London 1928) ccxi pp 
2540-50, 2560-67 and 2625-8. 
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Commons.*^ 
It is hard to exaggerate how deeply the two collisions with Parliament in 1927 
and 1928 dismrbed the English religious establishment. Intemally, some clergy agitated 
for civil disobedience to Parliament and to use the revised Prayer Book. The bishops 
unanimously regarded the collisions as an "emergency" but chose a mediating policy. 
Through the convocadons of Canterbury and York they declared that, in the exercise 
of the episcopal discretion to prosecute offences against ecclesiastical law, they would 
allow any deviations from the Book of Common Prayer that were, nevertheless, 
consistent with the 1928 Revised Prayer Book.*3 The policy was lawful, but a polite 
challenge to parliamentary control. The "emergency" continued until 1965, when 
y 
Parliament allowed the convocations of Canterbury and York to prescribe altemative 
limrgies.*'* However, it was under the 1974 Church of England (Worship and 
Boctrine) Measure that the General Synod was delegated more liberal powers to control 
and regulate worship in the Church, but parliamentary action is still needed if there is 
to be any change to the Book of Common Prayer (which must still be available for 
worship in the Church of England).*^ Indeed, the "emergency" was almost revived 
in 1981 and 1984 when Prayer Book Protection Bills (requiring at least monthly use of 
the Book of Common Prayer where there was sufficient demand within a parish) were 
*^  Parliamentary Bebates (Official Report) (House of Commons) (IjDndon 1928) ccxviii 
pp 1319-24. 
*3 RP Flindall (ed). The Church of England 1815-1948: A Bocumentary History 
(London 1972) pp 397-401. 
*^  Prayer Book (Alternative Services) Measure 1965, s 1. 
*^  Church of England (Worship and Boctrine) Measure 1974, s 1. 
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introduced to the House of Lords.** 
The extent to which governmental control of the Church of England is both 
possible and pracdsed is unparalleled elsewhere in the English-speaking world, and is 
patently offensive to the idea of a secular commonwealth. It is obvious that the Church 
could only realise the liberty other religious groups enjoy if it were prepared to sever 
its relations with both Queen and Parliament: in short, to be disestablished. Indeed, 
the possibility of disestablishment has often been mooted in the nineteenth and twentieth 
cenmries, even by archbishops of Canterbury.*^ The Church has already been 
disestablished in part. In 1801, the English religious establishment was united with die 
Irish but, given the predominantly Catholic population in Ireland, was disestablished (or 
made equal to other religious groups) there in 1871.** Then again, in 1920, the 
Church of England was disestablished in Wales and Monmouthshire, a recognition of 
the high proportion of Protestant dissent in Wales.*^ Both occasions namrally raised 
the question of disestablishment in England, but on both occasions also the Church's 
political stams in England was publicly justified by its social stams as the country's 
majoritarian religious group.^ But the political legitimacy of a privileged religious 
establishment is not, once there is any degree of religious pluralism, a question of 
numbers. It is, regardless of population, an obvious violation of the principle of equal 
religious liberty and, therefore, offensive to the idea of a secular commonwealth. To 
** C Buchanan note 76 supra at 96-7. 
*^  Ibid. 
** Union with Ireland Act 1800 (39 & 40 Geo 3 c 67), art 5; Irish Church Act 1869, s 
2. 
*^  Welsh Church Act 1914, si; Welsh Church (temporalities) Act 1919, s 2. 
^ C Buchanan note 76 supra at 59. 
103 III: § 5 
this, if any further practical reason for disestablishment were needed, the collisions 
between the Church of England and Pariiament also suggest that the Church's privileged 
established stams is not even necessarily in its own radonal interest. 
§ 6: The Privileged Establishment in Scotland: Disruption to Disestablishment 
John Knox's plan for a Christian commonwealth in Scodand was based securely 
on two-kingdoms theology: the civil government and the church were to be equals.^' 
This model underpinned the Presbyterian establishment developed by parliamentary 
legislation between 1560 and 1592 and which, after the Glorious Revolution, was 
revived by the Act Establishing Presbytery ."^^ This legislation ratified the Westminster 
Confession (the definitive statement of British Calvinism), and reconstimted the 
Presbyterian organisation of the religious establishment in the terms of the original 
legislation of 1579. The Presbyterian reforms continued under the Patronage Abolition 
Act, by which Parliament abolished lay patronage and transferred advowsons (rights to 
present ministers to a benefice) to heritors (proprietors liable for public burdens) and 
to the lowest church courts, the kirk sessions.^ 3 j^g Scottish Parliament even defeated 
the new King William's attempt to retain the royal supremacy and the comprehension 
of Episcopal ministers. To retain ministry in the Church of Scotland, clergy had to 
subscribe to the Westminster Confession of Faith.'^ Furthermore, the retention of 
these arrangements was made a basic condition of Scodand's political union with 
'^ RG Kyle, "The Christian Commonwealth: John Knox's Vision for Scodand" (1991) 
16 Jnl Rel Hist 247 at 257. 
^^  EHB note 2 supra at viii 640. 
3^ Ibid at 642. 
'^* J Halliday, "The Club and the Revolution in Scotland 1689-90" (1966) 45 Scot Hist 
Rev 143 at 153-4; WL Mathieson note 49 supra at ii 367-71. 
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England in 1707 although, oddly, it would then be governed by parliaments which 
included the bishops of the English religious establishment.^ ^ 
This proved to confuse the autochthonous arrangements of the Scottish religious 
establishment. In 1712, contrary to popular sentiment in Scodand, the British 
Parliament restored patronage to the Church of Scotland. The Patronage Act provided 
for advowsons to be remmed to the old patrons.^ '^  The Queen was granted any 
advowsons previously possessed by a Scottish bishop, any person unwilling to swear 
the oath of allegiance or any Catholic.^ In the short term, the Patronage and, as I 
discuss in chapter IV, the Scottish Episcopalian Acts provoked local outrage and serious 
moves to dissolve the union.^ * In the long term, it acmally helped to encourage 
y 
further religious pluralism. The General Assembly of the Church of Scotland initially 
lobbied to have patronage abolished, but the moderate party in the Church soon found 
it a useful means of securing pulpits for ministers of liberal persuasions. In 1732, the 
General Assembly passed intemal legislation strengthening patron's rights and 
precipitated years of secessions from the Church.^ But the seceders also disagreed 
amongst themselves on the extent to which they believed civil government could control 
religious matters, and divided progressively into burghers and anti-burghers, auld lichts 
^^  Union With Scotland Act 1707, art 25. 
*^ Patronage Act 1712 (10 Anne c 12), s 1. 
"^^  Patronage Act 1712, ss 4 and 6-7. 
*^ D Daiches note 49 supra at 170-1; see IV: § 3 infra. 
"^ Acts of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland (Edinburgh 1843) pp 620-1 
{"GACS"). 
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and new lichts, lifters and anti-lifters, and so on.'°° 
However, the early nineteenth cenmry witnessed the rise of the evangelical party 
in the Church of Scodand and a remarkable period of growth and reorganisation in the 
Church. In relation to patronage, congregations had been trying to mitigate its impact 
by the issue of a "call" to the patron's presentee (or at least to indicate consent to the 
presentadon), a process that largely coincided with the development of popular 
democracy.'°' In 1834 the General Assembly, under evangelical control, aimed to 
formalise the "call" under its Veto Act. This provided that a Presbytery should not 
accept the patron's presentation of a minister who had been rejected by a majority of 
male heads of families in the parish.'°^ Inevitably, the operation of the Veto Act and 
the Patronage Act collided. But unlike the English religious establishment in the 
"emergency" of the Revised Prayer Book crisis, the Scottish establishment was 
prepared, for a time, to pursue a policy of civil disobedience. This shifted the arena 
for the collision from Parliament to the judicamre: the resulting decisions made by the 
Court of Session and the House of Lords led to the most serious contest between civil 
government and a religious group in the English-speaking world since the Reformation. 
In the Auchterarder Case^'^^ in 1838, 287 out of 330 heads of families rejected 
the minister presented by the patron. Following the Veto Act, the Presbytery refused 
'°° GR Cragg, The Church & the Age of Reason (Harmondsworth 1960) p 89. 
Craigdallie v Aickman (1813) 1 Dow 1 contains one record of these divisions. 
'°' TM Taylor, "Church and State in Scodand" [1957] Jur Rev 121 at 124-5. 
"^ GACS note 99 supra at 1037-40. 
'°3 Earl ofKinnoull v Presbytery of Auchterarder (1838) 16 S 661. 
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to admit the minister. The minister therefore appealed to the General Assembly but 
was unsuccessful, so he and his patron brought proceedings in the Court of Session to 
have the refusal declared unlawful. By a majority, the Court held that it had 
jurisdiction to determine the question and, accepting the principle of parliamentary 
supremacy, that the ecclesiastical process of the Veto Act violated the right of 
presentadon restored to the patron by parliamentary legislation. Thus, Ix)rd President 
Hope said "it was an error to hold that the Church of Scodand, as a National Church, 
was without a temporal Head, which Head was Parliament.""^ In dissent. Lord 
Fullerton rejected the principle of parliamentary supremacy in favour of a two-kingdoms 
jurispmdence. He admitted that under parliamentary legislation patronage was a civil 
right, but added that the exercise of patronage also gave rise to spirimal rights (such as 
y 
presentation) that were the concem of ecclesiastical legislation. In effect Lord Fullerton 
held that, under the British political constimtion, there was an implied limitadon on 
civil government's power in questions of religion. He was therefore only prepared to 
recognise the supremacy and independence of the civil and religious legislamres in their 
respective spheres.'°^ 
The majority's decision 'm. Auchterarder was confirmed on appeal to the House 
of Lords."^ Hopes were expressed in the Lords that the Church would accept the 
decision, but Lord Cockbum's comment in the Court of Session that the decision placed 
"^  Ibid at 736. See also Clark v Stirling (1839) 1 D 955 at 986; Earl ofKinnoull v 
Ferguson (1841) 3 D 778 at 793; Middleton v Anderson (1842) 4 D 957 at 982-8; 
Ferguson v Earl ofKinnoull (1842) 9 CI & F 251 at 295. 
'°^  (1838) 16 S 661 at 770-1; also Middleton v Anderson (1842) 4 D 957 at 1029; cf 
Cruickshank v Gordon (1843) 5 D 909 at 969, 970-4 and 1007. 
'°^ Ferguson v Earl ofKinnoull (1839) 6 CI & F 646. 
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civd government and the Church "in a state of legal collision" proved to be both more 
accurate, and more prophetic.'°^ In the Bunkeld Case in 1839, the Court of Session 
ordered a Presbytery by interdict not to induct a minister after another had been rejected 
in accordance with the Veto Act. On the advice of the General Assembly, the 
Presbytery proceeded to ordain the minister and was censured by the Court for breach 
of the interdict.'°* The Presbytery of Auchterarder also disobeyed the House of 
Lords, and later suffered a judgment for damages. "^ These decisions also placed the 
parties within the Church in theological collision."° The non-intmsionist 
(evangelical) party insisted on the policy of civil disobedience to the civil courts and, 
through its majority in the General Assembly, continued to apply the Veto Act. On the 
other hand, the moderate party continued to support patronage as consistent with the 
Church of Scotland's "recognised principles and ... general practice".'" The legal 
and theological collisions converged in the extraordinary Strathbogie Case, initially 
decided by the Court of Session in 1839."^ 
In Strathbogie I most male heads of families disapproved of the patron's 
presentee, but a majority of the Presbytery, in light of Auchterarder, still decided to 
'°' Ibid at 720, 744-5 and 809. See Middleton v Anderson (1842) 4 D 957 at 1002. 
'°* Clark V Stirling (1839) 1 D 955. 
'°^  Earl of Kinnoull v Ferguson (1842-3) 3 D 778; 5 D 1010; Ferguson v Earl of 
Kinnoull (1842) 9 CI & F 251; Earl ofKinnoull v Gordon (1842) 5 D 12. 
"° GIT Machin, "The Dismpdon and British Politics" (1972) 51 Scot Hist Rev 20 at 
25; Ferguson v Earl ofKinnoull (1842) 9 CI & F 251 at 326. 
'" RW Vaudrey, "The Constimtional Party in the Church of Scodand" (1983) 62 Scot 
Hist Rev 35 at 40-1 and 45. 
"^  Presbytery of Strathbogie v Cruickshank (1839-40) 2 D 258 and 585; Cruickshank 
& Ors (1840) 2 D 1047 and 1380; Edwards v Cruickshank (1840) 3 D 282; 
Cruickshank v Gordon (1843) 5 D 909. 
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admit him. The General Assembly therefore suspended them from the ministry for 
ecclesiastical disobedience. This question also came before the Court of Session, which 
held by a majority that the General Assembly could not suspend a minister acting in 
obedience to parliamentary legislation (even if in disobedience to ecclesiastical 
legislation). The indignant tone of the judgments in Strathbogie I also betray how 
serious the collision between the Church and the Court had become. In approving 
Blackstone's principle of parliamentary supremacy. Lord Gillies equated the Church of 
Scotland's pretence to religious liberty with the claims of the Church of Rome during 
the Reformation. "3 From there the intmsion became more severe, but it reached its 
worst in the "extended interdict" granted by the Court in Strathbogie 11.^^'^ Here, the 
Court of Session prohibited any minister of the Church of Scotland from preaching in 
a parish where one of the suspended ministers was incumbent. This was only intended 
to give effect to the Court's decision in Strathbogie I. But it also amounted to a ban 
on the religious establishment's having the gospel preached in those parishes of 
Scotland. In the English-speaking world, there is arguably no judicial decision since 
the Reformation that invoked governmental power in religious questions so absolutely 
as did Strathbogie II. It was only made possible by the Court's earlier acceptance of 
the principle of parliamentary supremacy in Auchterarder. 
The collision over patronage had been accompanied by another collision between 
the Church and the Court over the religious establishment's power to reorganise its 
113 (1840) 2 D 585 at 594: see also at 606-7. 
" ' (1840) 2 D 585; see also Edwards v Cruickshank (1840) 3 D 282 at 307; cf Clark 
V Stirling (1839) 1 D 955 at 985, 993, 997 and 1011. 
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parishes and courts to meet Scodand's changing demography."^ These two issues 
proved the Court's commitment to the principle of parliamentary supremacy, so the 
non-intmsionists' only remedy was for Parliament itself to abolish patronage. This too 
failed, so the only option the non-intmsionists had was to dissent."^ The Dismption 
occurred on 18 May 1843: 451 ministers left the establishment to form the Free 
Church of Scotland."^ But the non-intmsionist leader, Dr Chalmers, carefully 
declared that it was not establishment per se to which the Free Church objected. He 
said the Free Church would support an establishment which had the religious liberty to 
determine its own doctrine and practice."* In chapter X, we will see that Chalmers' 
declaration haunted the Free Church 60 years later when it sought organic union with 
other Presbyterian dissenters."^ Still, the Dismption did have a most profound 
impact on the fumre of the Scottish religious establishment. For members of the 
Church of Scodand, the Free Church and other Presbyterian dissenters then began to 
consider how relations between civil government and the Church of Scotland could be 
adjusted to allow most Scottish Presbyterians to remm to the establishment. The 
"^ Gordon v Heritors of Parish of Monquhitter (1839) 1 D 789; Fleming v Heritors of 
Neilston Parish (1839) 1 D 1257; Lord Panmure v Sharpe (1839) 1 D 840; Livingstone 
(1841) 3 D 1278; Wilson v Presbytery of Stranraer (1842) 4 D 1294; Smith v 
Presbytery of Abertarff {1S42) 4 D 1476; Cunninghame v Presbytery of Irvine (the 
Stewarton Case) (1843) 5 D 427: Majority of Presbytery of Strathbogie v Minority of 
Presbytery of Strathbogie (1842) 4 D 1298; cf Brewster v Marquis ofAbercorn (1837) 
15 S 991; Gardner v Heritors of Parish of Rathven (1838) 1 D 158. 
"* GIT Machin note 110 supra at 48-9. 
' " Ibid at 49. 
"* "... though we quit the Establishment, we go out on the Establishment principle: we 
quit a vitiated Establishment, but would rejoice in remming to a pure one": SJ Brown, 
Thomas Chalmers and the Godly Commonwealth in Scotland (Oxford 1982) p 337. 
" ' General Assembly of the Free Church of Scotland v Lord Overtoun [1904] AC 515; 
see X: § 6 infra. 
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process of Presbyterian reconciliation was simplified as most of these churches 
liberalised doctrinally through the nineteenth cenmry and as patronage was abolished 
in the establishment in 1874.'^ ° The Free Church and the United Presbyterian Church 
united in 1900, and this group completed its reunion with the Church of Scotland in the 
1920s. The Church of Scotland Act of 1921, which was the legal basis of reunion, 
provided that "no limitation of the liberty, rights and powers in matters spirimal ... 
shall be derived from any stamte or law affecting the Church of Scodand".'^' This 
was precisely the principle of religious independence that the Church sought in the 
Court of Session before the Dismption and that the Church of England still seeks for 
its General Synod. Indeed, it is arguable that the Church of Scotland has been merely 
a nominal religious establishment since 1921 and that, in a legal sense, it was then 
y 
(iwestablished. It exercises no political privileges under the Bridsh constimtion and is, 
by the Church of Scotland Act, as independent as other religious groups from 
governmental control. It only bears governmental endorsement in its name. In this 
respect, the inherent injustice in the British political constimtion which was made patent 
by the decisions pre-empting the Dismption has been more sensitively rectified in 
Scodand than in England.'^' 
§ 7: Establishment and Disestablishment in New South Wales 
The idea of establishment, monopoly and privileged, was often carried to Bridsh 
colonies. In North America, Congregationalism was long established in the New 
120 Church Patronage (Scotland) Act 1874, s 3. 
'^ ' Church of Scotland Act 1921, s 1. Property arrangements were not finalised until 
1925: Church of Scotland (Property and Endowments) Act 1925. 
122 ^ j ^ vidler, The Church in an Age of Revolution (Harmondsworth 1961) p 178. 
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England colonies and States and, at tunes, the Church of England was established in 
Virginia, the Carolinas, Maryland, Georgia, New Bmnswick, Nova Scotia, Prince 
Edward Island, Upper Canada and even Lower Canada (Quebec). New York (including 
those parts that became New Jersey and Delaware) had an unusual pattem of "multiple 
establishments", by which all Protestant churches in the colony were sponsored, 
endowed and controlled by government.'^ 3 jt was less common for the later colonies 
to receive a religious establishment and, in Australia, the judicamre has generally 
adopted the position that no religious establishment was ever received.'^ "* This is 
largely consonant with the likely position that English ecclesiastical law was not 
received in the Australian colonies.'^ ^ This may well be the case for all die 
Australian colonies except the ^oldest. New South Wales (including those parts that 
_y 
became Queensland and Victoria), where the evidence more forcefully suggests that 
until, at latest, 1842 the Church of England was established in the colony. In the 
leading decision on the stams of the Church of England in New South Wales, the Red 
Book Case, Justice Emest Roper in the State Supreme Court and Justice Sir Owen 
Dixon in the High Court held that a privileged religious establishment was received in 
New South Wales but that it was gradually (i/j'established, the process of 
'^ 3 L Pfeffer, Church State and Freedom (Boston 1967) pp 74-5, 77 and 79-80; MH 
Ogilvie, "What is a Church by Law Esatblished?" (1990) 28 Osgoode Hall U 179 at 
183, 291, 227-8 and 234. 
^^' Ex parte Ryan (1855) 2 Legge 876 at 877 and 878-9; In the Will of Purcell (1895) 
21 VLR 249 at 252-3; Re Harnett: Condon v Harnett (1907) 7 SR (NSW) 463 at 465; 
Fielding v Houison (1908) 7 CLR 393 at 402, 406, 419 and 423; Wylde v Attomey-
General (NSW) (ex rel Ashelford) (1948) 78 CLR 224 at 275; Gent v Robin [1958] 
SASR 328 at 347; Canterbury Municipal Council v Moslem Alawy Society (1985) 1 
NSWLR 525 at 543; Glebe Administration Board v Commissioner of Pay-roll Tax 
(1987) 10 NSWLR 352 at 357. The attimde is the same in New Zealand: Baldwin v 
Pascoe (1889) 7 NZLR 759 at 769-70; Gregory v Bishop ofWaiapu [1975] 1 NZLR 
705 at 708. 
125 X: § 3 infra. 
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disestablishment being completed on the grant of responsible government in 1842.'^ ^ 
There are several aspects of governmental arrangements in colonial New South Wales 
which support this assessment. In the first place, as the ordinary responsible for the 
colony the Bishop of Calcutta could, under Bridsh legislation, exercise coercive 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction in New South Wales.'" In the second place, the 
ecclesiastical court administered by the Archdeacon of Sydney and, later, the Bishop 
of Australia was, under colonial legislation, responsible for registering births, marriages 
and deaths in the colony.'-* In the third place, colonial legislation acmally provided 
special and exclusive protection for the Church of England. Thus, the Blasphemous 
and Seditious Libels Act of 1827 made it an offence "to excite His Majesty's subjects 
to attempt the alteration of any matter in Church or State as by law established 
y' 
otherwise than by lawful means".'^ ^ But, most importandy, the British Colonial 
Office and the colonial governments simply treated the Church of England as if it were 
established. The Church provided the chaplains to the penal settlement, and its colonial 
clergy were always appointed magistrates until 1827. It also monopolised education in 
New South Wales and was, until 1837, the only religious group endowed by 
government.'3° There have been Catholic complaints that the Church of England had 
'^ ^ Attorney-General v Wylde (1948) 48 SR (NSW) 366 at 380-2; Wylde v Attomey-
General (NSW) (ex rel Ashelford) (1948) 78 CLR 224 at 284-5; see also Beard v 
Baulkham Hills (1986) 7 NSWLR 273 at 277; K Mason, Constancy & Change (Sydney 
1990) p 95; R Border, Church and State in Australia (London 1962) pp 51-62. 
127 East India Company Act 1813 (UK) (53 Geo 3 c 155), ss 49-52. 
'^ * Parish Registers Act 1825 (NSW) (6 Geo 4 no 21), s 5; Licensing Act 1836 (NSW) 
(7 Will 4 no 6), ss 3 and 4; Parish Registers Act 1839 (NSW) (3 Vic no 23). 
'2^  Blasphemous and Seditious Libels Act 1827 (NSW) (8 Geo 4 no 2), s 20. For the 
blasphemy law generally, see XII infra. 
'301 Breward, A History of the Australian Churches (Sydney 1993) pp 19 and 22; RC 
Thompson, Religion in Australia: A History (Melboume 1994) pp 1 and 5. 
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these privileges illegitimately, because it was not established in the colony.'3' 
However, this confuses the point. The Church was established because it had those 
privileges. Nevertheless, through the 1820s and 1830s the stams of other religious 
groups in the colony was equalised with that of the Church of England, and two factors 
in particular led to this development. 
1. The Church of Scotland also received some governmental assistance after Dr 
John Dunmore Lang arrived in Sydney in 1823. Lang, as did Scottish clergy in Upper 
Canada, demanded privileges equal to those of the the Anglican clergy, including a 
government supported stipend. The colonial Govemor, Sir Thomas Brisbane, refused 
but I^ng appealed to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Earl Bathurst, who 
granted him an annual stipend of £300 and rebuked Brisbane.'3^ 
2. The Church Acts were even more cmcial to the evenmal disestablishment of 
the Church of England. These were the initiative of the whig Govemor, Richard 
Bourke, who as early as 1833 wamed the Colonial Office that the exclusive endowment 
of the Church of England in New South Wales was antagonising other religious groups. 
Bourke's proposal, based on a Canadian model, was to provide governmental support 
to each major religious group in the colony in proportion to the number of its 
adherents. This met strong opposition from the Bishop of Australia, William 
Broughton, who aimed to preserve the Church of England's privilege and its monopoly 
on public education. Bourke nevertheless secured the Colonial Office's support for the 
'3' R Border note 126 supra at 51. 
'32 I Breward note 130 supra at 19-20; MH Ogilvie note 123 supra at 230. 
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proposal in 1835 and the Legislative Council passed the resulting Church Acts in 
1837.'33 These comprised three different stamtes, one for each of the Churches of 
England and Scodand and the third for the other main religious groups, namely 
Catholics and Methodists.'3"* To some extent, the Church Acts paralleled New York's 
"multiple establishments", but without the governmental control of the religious group's 
doctrine and practice. They allowed government assistance to be used to pay stipends 
and to constmct church buildings and manses. In general it proved a practicable 
arrangement. The different religious groups in the colony were satisfied with the 
scheme.'3^ Five years later the endowed churches had trebled the number of clergy 
in New South Wales: the Church of England, despite losing its privileges, acmally 
benefited the most.'3^ 
§ 8: Conclusion 
It should be apparent from the discussion in this chapter that, where there has 
been a religious establishment, disestablishment (or as in Scodand a nominal religious 
establishment) is an essential historical pre-requisite to the realisation of a just political 
constimtion. The current imbalance between the English establishment's privileges and 
'33 I Breward note 130 supra at 30-1 and 32; H King, Richard Bourke (Melboume 
1971) pp 226-8; RC Thompson note 130 supra at 8-9. 
'34 Church Building Act 1837 (NSW) (7 Will 4 no 3); English Church Temporalities Act 
1837 (NSW) (8 Will 4 no 5); Scottish Church Temporalities Act 1837 (NSW) (8 Will 
4 no 7). 
'3^ However, Lang called the Presbytery of Sydney a "synagogue of Satan - a mere 
society of woridlings or hirelings" for accepting governmental assistance when Catholics 
were included in the scheme. For scandalising the Presbytery, he was later deposed in 
Scodand: Colonial Observer, 9 Febmary 1842, p 146; Lang v Presbytery of Irvine 
(1864) 2 M 823. 
136 H King note 133 supra at 228. 
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the serious governmental limits on its religious liberty only suggest that a religious 
establishment might pay an unacceptable price for its privileges. Indeed, under the 
principle of equal religious liberty that price cannot be paid. In terms of liberal 
political philosophy, the Church's liberty to determine its doctrine and practice is 
inalienable, and all attempts to exchange it for privileges like disproportionate 
representation in Parliament are illegitimate. Of course, it is fictional to refer to a 
religious group like the Church of England as "exchanging" its liberty for political 
privileges when, in tmth, these arrangements have evolved gradually with the 
development of the Church and civil government in England over, probably, 1400 
years. The fiction nevertheless helps to prove the illegitimacy of a religious 
establishment in conditions of religious pluralism, no matter how the arrangements 
y 
acmally developed. 
Even under Justices Roper and Dixon's theory of the Red Book Case, the grant 
of responsible government in 1842 achieved the Church of England's disestablishment 
in New South Wales, although it is arguable that the equalising legislation of the 
Church Acts might also be an appropriate date. However, the important point for 
secular government in Australia is that, historically, disestablishment occurred in New 
South Wales and that, at least in part, this resulted from contentions caused by the 
Church's privileges. That has left reladons between government and religion in 
Australia to be organised largely by another principle inherited from Great Britain: 
toleration. 
IV. THE PRINCIPLE OF TOLERATION 
§ 1: Executive Indulgence: An Experiment in Toleration 
Even in the period of the monopoly religious establishment constmcted by the 
Restoration parliaments, there were some attempts to secure religious liberty for 
Protestant dissenters and Catholics in England. However, the interest in toleration 
principally rested with the King and his ministers and, therefore, the means used to 
secure any religious liberty was executive indulgence: either a general suspension of 
the monopoly religious establishment or the grant of a dispensation to individuals from 
the penalties it imposed. In 1662, clergy to be ejected under the Uniformity Act 
negotiated (unsuccessfully) with Charles II for indulgences from the legislation and, in 
1672, he tried (again unsuccessfully) to suspend the operation of the Clarendon Code 
and the recusancy legislation. These attempts to use the executive suspending and 
dispensing powers were highly controversial, notably because they renewed the contest 
for constimtional supremacy between King and Parliament. Following his accession, 
James II nevertheless used them less scmpulously. In 1685 he issued a general 
indulgence to English Catholics, and in 1686 he dispensed with the operation of the Test 
Acts for a Catholic army officer and had the legality of the dispensation approved by 
a compliant judicamre.' Then in 1687 and 1688 James issued general indulgences for 
' Beclaration of Indulgence 1672 in DC Douglas (ed), English Historical Bocuments 
(London 1953) viii pp 387-8 {"EHB"); GR Abemathy, "Clarendon and the Declaration 
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both Protestant dissenters and Catholics.^ The 1688 indulgence, as I discussed in 
chapter III, precipitated the Glorious Revolution.3 But most importandy, for 
supporting the Revolution despite the benefits the indulgence purported to give them, 
Protestant dissenters were rewarded with a more durable legislative basis for their 
religious liberties: the Toleration Act.'^ Since it partially recognised the legality of 
religious pluralism, the Toleration Act of 1689 reduced the monopoly religious 
establishment in England to a privileged establishment.^ In § 2, I will discuss how the 
legislation also made the idea of toleration increasingly important through the eighteenth 
and early nineteenth cenmries as it became evident that the Toleration Act was not 
merely a temporary suspension of the monopoly establishment. In §§ 3 to 6, we will 
see how by the 1790s the idea of toleration had sufficient support to extend a legislative 
toleration to other religious groups and, in § 7, how it appeared in the 1850s as an 
unwritten general principle of the British political constimtion. This chapter shows that 
the Toleration Act may have begun as a mere concession to Protestant dissenters, but 
that in retrospect it can be understood as the origin of secular government in the 
English-speaking world.^ 
of Indulgence" (1960) 11 Jnl Eccl Hist 55 at 63; JP Kenyon, The Stuart Constitution 
1603-1688 (Cambridge 1966) p 453; Godden v Hales (1686) 2 Show KB 475. 
^ EHB note 1 supra at viii 84. 
3 III: § 2 supra. 
' 1 Will and Mar c 18. 
^ ( / W Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 14th ed (London 1803) iv 
4 iii 2. 
^ BE Meland, The Secularization of Modern Cultures (New York 1966) p 15. 
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§ 2: The Toleration Act 
In strict terms, the Toleration Act only provided a conditional suspension of the 
penal laws attaching to Protestant dissent.^ It exempted any dissenters who made the 
required declarations from penaldes prescribed in recusancy legislation, prescribed in 
all legislation comprising the Clarendon Code except the Corporation Act, and arising 
under ecclesiastical law.* The required declarations were an oath of allegiance and the 
declaration against transubstantiation.^ Quakers were permitted to make an affirmation 
to the same effect.'° Preachers and teachers were also to subscribe to the Thirty-Nine 
Articles (the doctrinal standards of the religious establishment), except those relating 
to Episcopal government." Baptist preachers and teachers did not have to subscribe 
to the article on infant baptisrn.'- Once these conditions were satisfied, liberties of 
worship, practice and association could be exercised. It became lawful to meet for 
worship (provided the meetings was not conducted behind closed doors and the meeting-
place was certified by the local bishop, archdeacon or justices of the peace).'3 These 
meetings were then legally protected, and it became an offence to dismrb them.'"* 
Initially, the legislation only benefited Bapdsts, Congregadonalists, Presbyterians 
' W Blackstone note 5 supra. 
* Toleration Act 1689, ss 1, 3 and 6. 
^See 1 Will and Mar c 1. 
'° Toleration /Icr 1689, s 10. 
" Toleration Act 1689, s 6. 
'2 Toleration Act 1689, s 7. 
'3 Toleration Act 1689, ss 4 and 16. 
"* Toleration Act 16^9, s 15: eg R v Wroughton (1765) 3 Burr 1683; i? v Hube (1792) 
Peake 179, (1794) 5 Term R 543. 
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and Quakers. However, as other Protestant groups professing Trinitarian beliefs 
multiplied, they also enjoyed its protection.'^ The Toleration Act also confirmed that 
Catholicism and Unitarianism (which contrary to die Thirty-Nine Articles denied the 
doctrine of the Trinity) remained illegal, the latter provision making the progressive 
infiltration of Unitarianism in Presbyterian churches throughout the eighteenth cenmry 
problematical.'* Ironically, it remained unclear whether the most significant 
movement in English Protestantism during the eighteenth cenmry - Methodism - could 
claim the protection of the legislation because, until 1795, Methodists generally 
continued to remain in the religious establishment.'^ In the same manner, 
establishment clergy could not rely on the Toleration Act to avoid more exacting 
obligations imposed on them under ecclesiastical law.'* 
In 1696, Quakers received an added concession in being allowed to make an 
affirmation instead of swearing an oath in civil proceedings.'^ They were still unable 
to affirm in criminal trials or in making the declarations needed before assuming a 
public office or tmst.^° 
'^  Eg Lutherans: R v Hube (1792) Peake 179. 
'* Toleration Act 1689, s 14: eg Shore v Wilson (1839-42) 9 CI & F 355; cf Attorney-
General V Pearson (1817) 3 Mer 353. 
'^  i? V Justices ofBerbyshire (1766) 4 Burr 1991; cf R v Moreley (1760) 2 Burr 1040; 
R V Wroughton (1765) 3 Burr 1683. 
'* Trebec v Keith (1742) 2 Adc 498. 
'^  7 & 8 Will 3 c 34, s 1: also 13 & 14 Will 3 c 4; 1 Geo 1 st 2 c 6; 8 Geo 1 c 6; 22 
Geo 2 c 46, ss 36 and 37. 
2° 7 & 8 Will 3 c 34, s 5: eg Hilton v Byron (1699) 3 Salk 133; cf R v Mayor of 
Lincoln; ex parte Morrice (1699) 12 Mod 190; Rv March (1760) 2 Burr 1000. 
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The decisions in Attomey-General v Baxter^^ in 1684 and Attorney-General v 
Hughes^^ in 1689 clearly show how this partial recognidon of dissenters' political 
liberties also brought social and economic benefits. In Baxter a bequest of £600 was 
left to die Puritan Richard Baxter, who led the surrender of pulpits before the 1662 
ejecdons, to distribute amongst 60 ejected and dissenting ministers. Lord Guilford 
decreed that, as the supposed tmst was for the benefit of dissenting ministers, it was 
an invalid and unlawful purpose. However, in Hughes the Lords Commissioners 
reversed Lord Guilford's decree and ordered the remaining monies to be paid according 
to the original bequest. Ix)rd Hardwicke later explained the decree in Baxter as a 
misinterpretation of the tmsts, but it is more likely that the decree was simply reversed 
in recognition of dissenters' religious liberties under the Toleration Act.^^ 
The reported decisions nevertheless demonstrate that, until the 1750s, the 
judicamre hesitated to constme the Toleration Act liberally and that the dissenters' 
limited rights of religious liberty were considered experimental. Thus, as High 
churchman Thomas Sherlock expressed it, "[t]he Act of Toleration was designed with 
no other view than to ease the conscience of those who could not conform".'^ It 
seems that local government also only adjusted to the change reluctantly, and sometimes 
" (1684) 1 Vem 248. 
' ' (1689) 1 Vern 105. 
3^ Be Costa v Be Paz (1744) 2 Swanst 487n. Hardwicke constmed the bequest as a 
tmst for the benefit of the poor, although he also suggested that cases before the 
Toleration Act should be treated differently to those after it: cfMoggridge v Thackwell 
(1803) 7 Ves 36 at 76; Be Garcin v Lawson (1798) 4 Ves Jun 433n; Corbyn v French 
(1799) 4 Ves Jun 418 at 433n. 
24 E Carpenter, "Toleration and Establishment: 2" in GF Nuttall and O Chadwick 
(eds). From Uniformity to Unity 1662-1962 (London 1962) p 304. 
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had to be compelled to comply with the legislation. For example, in Green v Pope^^ 
Protestant dissenters had to secure a writ of mandamus from the Common Pleas to 
require the Bishop of Chester's registrar to license their meeting place. In Peat's 
Case,^^ a dissenting preacher had to obtain mandamus from the King's Bench simply 
to be allowed to take the oath of allegiance and the doctrinal subscription before the 
justices of Warwickshire. However, despite these interventions, the judicamre showed 
a similar reluctance to interpret the legislation in favour of dissenters. In 1705, the 
Court of King's Bench held that a dissenting preacher registered in one county could 
not preach in another county without registering there.^^ Lord Harcourt, in Attomey-
General V Eades,^^ was inclined to treat a tmst for the benefit of Baptists as invalid 
because it might encourage people to dissent from the religious establishment. In his 
y 
opinion, under the legislation dissent was only to be tolerated, not encouraged. 
Lord Harcourt's decision in Fades pointed in the same direction as legislation 
after the union of England and Scodand. The Parliament of 1714, controlled by 
conservatives, passed the Schism Act which required mtors and school teachers to 
conform to the Church of England.^^ It had already, in 1712, tried to restore some 
lost Anglican privileges by revising relations between government and religion in 
^^  (1696) 1 Ld Raym 127: see also R v Justices ofBerbyshire (1766) 4 Burr 1991, 1 
Black W 607. 
26 (1705) 6 Mod 310. 
" i? V Peat (1705) 2 Salk 572, 6 Mod 228. The Occasional Conformity Act 1712 (10 
Anne c 2), s 9 cured this limitation. 
2* (1713) 2 Ves Sen 274. 
^^  12 Anne c 7: eg Bavis' Case (1718) 2 Atk 666. 
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Scotland and by the Occasional Conformity Act.^^ The latter confirmed the toleration, 
but reinforced the establishment disqualification of Protestant dissenters from positions 
of public office or tmst.3' In occasionally taking the eucharist according to the rites 
of the Church of England, a dissenter could not be barred by the Corporation Act from 
assuming public office. To prevent this, the 1712 legislation provided that a person in 
public office could be disqualified if he later attended a dissenters' meeting.3^ 
Together with the Schism Act, it was repealed in 1719.33 However, the Corporation 
Act sdll disadvantaged Protestant dissenters and it is that legislation's interaction with 
the Toleration Act that best marks the developing permanence of secular government. 
In 1690, the Court of Common Pleas held that a dissenter could validly refuse 
y-' 
a public office or tmst because he was disqualified by the Corporation Act.'^^ This 
approach was narrowed by die Court of King's Bench in 1694, \VLR & R v Larwood?^ 
There, a Protestant dissenter was convicted for refusing to become Sheriff of Norwich. 
He pleaded the Corporation Act in defence, but the Court would not let him rely on his 
own disability. The result: a dissenter could be punished for refusing a public office 
he could not (in the absence of occasional conformity) legally assume.3* In the 1740s 
3° 10 Anne c 2. See also Scottish Episcopalians y4cr 1712 (10 Anne c 7); Patronage Act 
1712 (10 Anne c 12); Yuletide Vacation Act (10 Anne c 13); III: § 6 supra; and § 3 
infra. 
3' Occasional Conformity Act 1712, s 7. 
3^  Occasional Conformity Act 1112, ss 1 and 2. 
33 5 Geo 1 c 4. 
3^  Guildford v Clarke (1690) 2 Vent 247. 
35 (1694) 1 Salk 168, 1 Ld Raym 29, 4 Mod 269. 
^^ Eg Rv Shackleton (1735) Andr 200n. 
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the City of London unscmpulously exploited this conundmm, and raised revenue by 
appointing dissenters as sheriffs and then fining them when they refused office.3"^  It 
was not untU 1767 that Lord Mansfield resolved the dilemma. 
In the mid-eighteenth cenmry the judicamre began to interpret the Toleration Act 
more liberally. The Court of Chancery settled the propriety of tmsts for the benefit of 
Protestant dissenters in Attomey-General v Cock.^^ In 1734 Lord Talbot enforced a 
tmst for the benefit of Presbyterian ministers,3^ and in 1749 Lord Hardwicke enforced 
a tmst for the benefit of Quakers."**^  It was nevertheless argued before Lord 
Hardwicke in Cock, relying on Fades, that the Toleration Act could not allow a tmst 
for the benefit of Baptists.'*' 
y 
It is not an act of encouragement, but of toleration, temporarily to 
exempt persons then in being from the penalty of the law, not for the 
benefit of scmpulous consciences forever ... 
Lord Hardwicke rejected such a narrow interpretation and upheld the tmst.'*^ 
Following Cock, the lawfulness of settling tmsts for the benefit of tolerated dissenters 
could not be questioned.'*3 
3^  EA Payne, "Toleration and Establishment: 1" in GF Nuttall and O Chadwick note 
24 supra at 262: see R v Grosvenor (1741) 2 Stra 1193. 
3* (1751) 2 Ves Sen 273. 
3^  Lloyd V Spillet (1734) 3 P Wms 344, (1740) 2 Atk 148. 
^"^ Attorney-General v Andrews (1748-9) 1 Ves Sen 225, Ves Sen Supp 116. 
'^ (1751)2 Ves Sen 273 at 274. 
'^ Ibid at 276. 
'*3 Eg Attorney-General v Fowler (1808) 15 Ves Jun 85; Attorney-General v Wansay 
(1808) 15 Ves Jun 231; Bavis v Jenkins (1814) 3 V & B 151; Attorney-General v Lord 
Budley (1815) G Coop 146; Attorney-General v Pearson (1817) 3 Mer 353; Foley v 
Wotner (1820) 2 Jac & W 245; cf Attorney-General v Bean of Christ Church (1822) 
Jacob 474. 
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In the same period, the Court of King's Bench also liberalised its interpretadon 
of the legislation. In R v Barker,"^ Lord Mansfield and Justice Sir Michael Foster 
ordered mandamus to issue to compel the admission of a dissendng minister to his 
pulpit.'*5 Justice Foster explained the right to admission as "established" and I^rd 
Mansfield thought that denying the writ would put dissenters outside the protection of 
the legislation."** It was precisely on these two grounds that the Corporation Act 
question was later resolved. In 1767 in Evans v Chamberlain of London,*^ a 
Protestant dissenter was fined £600 for refusing to accept the office of Sheriff of 
London and Middlesex. He pleaded the Corporation Act and, despite the decision in 
Larwood, ultimately succeeded in the House of Lords. Lord Mansfield, in terms 
reminiscent of Barker, is reported to have said that the provisions of the Toleration Act 
y 
put Protestant dissent "not merely under the connivance, but under the protection of the 
law - have established it" .^^ The decision makes it apparent that the Toleration Act 
had permanently changed the legislative relations between civil government and 
religion, and that the British political constimtion would continue the progression away 
from the cuius regio principle and towards more regular secular government.'*^ 
Evans v Chamberlain of London also marks the limit to which, consistently with 
44 (1762) 3 Burr 1265. 
5^ See also R v Jotham (1790) 3 Term R 575; i? v Bagger Lane Chapel Trustees (1804) 
2 Smith 20, noted in The Bigest (London 1981) xix p 477. 
46 (1762) 3 Burr 1265 at 1268 and 1269. 
^^  (1767) 3 Mer 375n, 1 Cowp 393n, 1 Salk 169n, 4 Mod 274n and Harrison v Evans 
(1767) 3 Bro PC 465. 
48 (1767) 3 Mer 375n. 
^^  Q" R Ely, "The View from the Stamte: Stamtory Establishments of Religion in 
England Ca. 1300 to Ca. 1900" (1986) 8 Univ Tas Law Rev 225 at 258-62. 
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the language of the Toleration Act, the judicamre could enlarge religious liberty. In the 
eighteenth cenmry, Pariiament's only revision of the legislation occurred in 1779 when 
the doctrinal subscription to die Thirty-Nine Articles was relaxed, being replaced by the 
requirement that dissenting preachers and teachers swear an oath (or make an 
affirmation) confirming their Protestantism.^^ 
In the eighteenth cenmry the Toleration Act was acmally accompanied by a 
decline in Protestant dissent, both numerical, and in religious life where it had a 
tendency to embrace rationalism. The evangelical resurgence late in the cenmry which, 
largely through Methodism, unsettled the religious establishment, had also found the 
dissenting churches namral bastions of support and the numbers and proportions of 
y 
Protestant dissenters then increased dramatically. It is estimated that there were 
approxunately two million Protestant dissenters out of a total population of ten million 
people in the early nineteenth cenmry.5' In addition, the legislation made it difficult 
for churchwardens to police the recusancy (church attendance) laws applicable to 
everyone else." Itself a result of the disintegration of English religious life, the 
Toleration Act seems to have had some relation to the acceleration of religious pluralism 
and the decline in religious involvement in the kingdom. But, even as the judicamre's 
interpretation of the legislation shows, the Toleration Act also lent support to the 
political idea of toleration because, once religious liberty was conceded to most 
Protestants, it became more difficult to resist its extension to Catholics and non-
50 19 Geo 3 c 44. 
'^ RE Richey, "Effects of Toleradon on Eighteenth-Cenmry Dissent" (1974) 8 Jnl Rel 
Hist 350 at 354-5 and 359; EA Payne note 37 supra at 273. 
52 EA Payne note 37 supra at 262; E Carpenter note 24 supra at 293. 
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Chrisdans.^3 However, the process of the extension of toleration was inevitably 
complicated by a religious group's political associadons. No group shows that 
complication more clearly than Scottish Episcopalians. 
§ 3: Scottish Episcopalians 
In marked contrast to England, there was no legislation expressly tolerating 
dissent in Scotland after the Revolution restored the Presbyterian establishment. 
Specifically, even though the Toleration Act conceded some religious liberty to English 
Presbyterians a reciprocal liberty for Scottish Episcopalians remained precarious.^ "* 
In 1712, a Parliament dominated by High Church and conservative parties balanced the 
position in the Scottish Episcopalians Act.^^ However, even this legislation reflected 
the ambiguous position Scottish Episcopalians occupied: closely related to the English 
religious establishment but suspected of Jacobitism and dissenting. It provided that 
Episcopalians could meet for divine service conducted by ordained ministers and use 
the limrgy of the Church of England.^ ^ Episcopalian ministers were also to swear 
allegiance to Queen Anne and forswear allegiance to James Edward Smart.^ ^ But, 
throughout the eighteenth cenmry, the Episcopalian association with the Jacobite cause 
led Parliament, on occasions, to limit these liberties again. 
3^ 0 Chadwick, The Secularization of the European Mind in the Nineteenth Century 
(Cambridge 1975) p 21. 
'^* Cf Greenshields v Edinburgh Magistrates (1710) Coll 427; an see RS Tompson, 
"James Greenshields and the House of Lx)rds: A Reappraisal" in WM Gordon and TD 
Fergus (eds). Legal History in the Making (London 1991) pp 110-15. 
^^  10 Anne c 7. 
^^  Scottish Episcopalians Act 1712, s 1. 
" Scottish Episcopalians Act 1112, s 3. 
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The 158 year history of the Snell tmsts illustrates the Episcopal Church's 
uncertain position. John Snell made his will and died in the 1670s, when there was an 
Episcopal establishment in Scotland. He gave the residue of his estate to tmstees for 
the maintenance and advancement of Scots smdents at Oxford who had also smdied at 
Glasgow College, but required each such smdent to execute a bond to pay £500 to 
Glasgow College if he did not enter holy orders, or if he accepted a benefice in England 
or Wales. Snell expressly intended to encourage smdents to take up holy orders in 
Scodand.^ * In Attorney-General v Guise^^ in 1690, Snell's heiress at law alleged the 
tmsts became void on the restoration of the Presbyterian establishment, as this had 
fmstrated the intention to advance Episcopal Protestantism. The Lords Commissioners 
apparently considered the tmsts to be unlawful or even (surprisingly) a superstitious 
use. However the gift remained valid, and was applied cy pres (allowing a lawful 
charity as near as possible to the illegal purpose to take its place) according to a 
decreed scheme. Still, the Ix)rds Commissioners' decision in Guise is difficult to 
reconcile with their earlier decision in Attorney-General v Hughes.^ It is possible to 
argue that the positive treatment of dissenters in Hughes resulted from the express 
toleration of dissenters under the Toleration Act, where the opposite treatment of 
Episcopalian dissenters in Guise resulted from the absence of equivalent legislation in 
Scotland. '^ But even after the Scottish Episcopalians Act of 1712, the Court of 
Chancery still looked on the incentive to enter the Episcopalian ministry in the Snell 
*^ See Attorney-General v Glasgow College (1846) 2 Coll 665 at 665-9; Glasgow 
College V Attorney-General (1848) 1 HLC 800 at 802-4. 
'^  (1692) 2 Vem 266. 
^ § 2 supra. 
'^ Cf Glasgow College v Attorney-General (1848) 1 HLC 800 at 816 and 828. 
128 IV: § 3 
tmsts with suspicion. Glasgow College challenged the scheme in 1738 and the matter 
came before Lord Hardwicke in 1744.^ ^ He also expressed doubts on whether the will 
could be executed properly after the remm of the Presbyterian establishment, but noted 
that this had been dealt with in Guise.^^ Lord Hardwicke nonetheless ordered a new 
scheme which (when finally settled in 1759) sdll contained no incentive for a smdent 
to enter Episcopalian orders. 
In the years around the Jacobite rebellions of 1715 and 1745, Scotdsh 
Episcopalians were closely monitored through requirements for ministers to swear oaths 
of allegiance.^ The Scottish Episcopalians Act of 1746 made it an offence for an 
Episcopalian minister to hold divine service without having taken the oaths or without 
having received orders from a bishop of the Church of England or Ireland; on a second 
conviction the minister could be transported for life and a member of his congregation 
imprisoned for two years.^ In consequence, Samuel Johnson's claim that Anglicans 
in Scodand were "as Christians in Turkey" seems quite accurate.^ It is strange that, 
on the one hand, Anglicans in England were the most privileged but, on the other, that 
Episcopalians (Anglicans) in Scotland were the most disadvantaged Protestant group in 
Great Britain. In this case, it was clearly the political allegiance that explained the 
difference. 
^^  Attorney-General v Baliol College (1744) 9 Mod 407. 
3^ Ibid at 709. 
^ Security Act 1714 (1 Geo st 2 c 13), s 3; 5 Geo 1 c 29, s 3; Scottish Episcopalians 
Act 1746 (19 Geo 2 c 38), ss 2 and 3. 
^^  Scottish Episcopalians Act 1746 (19 Geo 2 c 38), ss 5, 8 and 9; Bisarming Act 1746 
(19 Geo 2 c 39), ss 23-5; Bisarming Act Amendment Act 1748 (21 Geo 2 c 34), ss 11 
and 13. 
^^  J Bos well. Journal of a Tour to the Hebrides (Harmondsworth 1984) p 196. 
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Soon after the Jacobite cause died with Charles Edward Smart in 1788, the 
restraints were eased by the Scottish Episcopalian Relief Act of 1792.^ ^ This 
legislation still required Episcopalian ministers to swear allegiance to the King, as well 
as to subscribe to the Thirty-Nine Articles. However, it did reduce the penalties for 
breach of these requirements.^* It also reinforced the Episcopal Church's dissenting 
stams by requiring its ministers to be ordained by a bishop of the Church of England 
or Ireland before assuming a position in the English religious establishment.^^ This 
limitadon was not removed until 1840.'° 
The legacy of Scottish Episcopalians' inequalities was still felt in 1844 when the 
scheme settled for the administration of the Snell tmsts in 1759 was challenged. 
y 
Episcopalians argued that, since the Scottish Episcopalian Relief Act, it was lawful to 
administer the tmsts for the benefit of the Episcopal Church in accordance with the 
terms of the original will.'' Vice-Chancellor Sir James Knight Bmce agreed, but his 
decision was reversed by the House of I^rds.'^ Lord Cottenham regarded the earlier 
unfavourable decisions to the Church as based on its disestablishment in 1690 and not 
on its tolerated stams.'3 However, that distinction seems to be mere sophistry: the 
House of Lords' decision was still inconsistent with many decisions the Court of 
'^ 32 Geo 3 c 63. 
*^ Scottish Episcopalian Relief Act 1792, ss 2 and 5. 
^' Scottish Episcopalian Relief Act 1792, s 9. 
' °3 & 4 Vice 33, ss 1 and 2. 
" Attorney-General v Glasgow College (1846) 2 Coll 665 at 676-7. 
'^  Glasgow College v Attomey-General (1848) 1 HLC 800. 
'3 Ibid at 828-9. 
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Chancery had made upholding tmsts for English dissenters, not to mention the 
Episcopal Church's equal religious liberty.''* 
§ 4: Unitarians 
The English Parliament of 1698 passed the Blasphemy Act specifically to 
disqualify any person denying the doctrine of the Trinity from a public office or tmst, 
unless he recanted his Unitarianism soon after convicdon. On a subsequent conviction 
he would be liable to three years imprisonment.'^ This was strictly unnecessary 
legislation. The Toleration Act required dissenting preachers and teachers to subscribe 
to the establishment doctrine of the Trinity, and provided that Unitarians remained 
under the penalties of the Clarendon Code.^^ In any case denial of the doctrine of the 
y 
Trinity probably constimted blasphemy at common law. For example, in 7? v Half^ 
in 1721 the defendant was indicted for publishing A Sober Reply to the Merry 
Arguments about the Trinity. He was convicted and sdll in prison six years later.'* 
Prosecutions for blasphemy probably always proceeded on common law indictment, and 
perhaps this was because the Blasphemy Act prescribed a comparatively light 
punishment for a first offence.'^ 
'^  Eg Attorney-General v Hughes (1689) 1 Vem 105; Lloyd v Spillet (1734) 3 P Wms 
344; Attorney-General vAndreyvs (1748-9) 1 Ves Sen 225, Ves Sen Supp 116; Attorney-
General V Cock (1751) 2 Ves Sen 273; Attorney-General v Fowler (1808) 15 Ves Jun 
85; Attorney-General v Wansay (1808) 15 Ves Jun 231; Bavis v Jenkins (1814) 3 V & 
B 151; Attorney-General v Lord Budley (1815) G Coop 146; Attorney-General v 
Pearson (1817) 3 Mer 353; Foley v Wotner (1820) 2 Jac & W 245. 
'^  Blasphemy Act 1698 (9 & 10 Will 3 c 32), ss 1 and 3. 
'^  Toleration Act 1689, ss 6, 7 and 14. 
" (1721) 1 Stra 416. 
'* i? V Curl (1727) 1 Stra 790. 
'^  CfR V Eaton (1812) 31 St Tr 927 at 950; and see generally XII infra. 
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These restraints were removed one by one. The 1779 legislation substimting a 
declaration of Protestandsm for subscripdon to the Thirty-Nine Articles was the first.*° 
In 1812 the Five Mile and Conventicle Acts were repealed.*' There had been a 
remarkable increase in the number and influence of Unitarians in dissenting churches 
by this period, and in 1813 Parliament passed the so-called Trinity Act to extend to 
them the concessions of the Toleration Act.^^ The provisions of the Blasphemy Act 
prohibiting denial of the doctrine of the Trinity were also repealed.*3 Jeremy Bentham 
criticised the Trinity Act because its concision exposed it to distorted reinterpretations 
in the judicamre.*^ This proved to be accurate, because lawyers continued to.argue 
in the courts that Unitarianism offended the maxim "Christianity is part and parcel of 
y 
the law of England". In Attomey-General v Pearson^^ I^rd Eldon held that the 
Trinity Act made no change to the common law, although he did not decide whether at 
common law denial of the doctrine of the Trinity amounted to blasphemy.*^ In R v 
Waddington^^ Justice Sir William Best also considered that, if it had been an offence 
at common law to deny the divinity of Christ before the Trinity Act, it continued to be 
*° Cf Shore v Wilson (1839-42) 9 CI & F 355 at 440-1 and 459-60. 
*' 52 Geo 3 c 155. 
*' Trinity Act 1813 (53 Geo 3 c 160), s 1. 
*3 Trinity Act 1813, s 2. 
^ U Henriques, Religious Toleration in England 1787-1833 (London 1961) p 209. 
*^  (1817) 3 Mer 353. 
*^  Ibid at 406-8. 
*' (1823) 1 B & C 26, 1 St Tr (NS) 1339. 
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an offence afterwards.** 
In 1842, the House of I^rds finally brought Unitarians the equal religious liberty 
intended by the Trinity Act in Shore v Wilson.^'^ Lady Hewley had made generous 
financial provision for Protestant dissenters in 1704 and 1707 and, in the course of the 
eighteenth and early nineteenth cenmries, the tmstees had used these monies in 
extending assistance to Unitarian Presbyterians. In 1833 Vice-Chancellor Sir Lancelot 
Shadwell decreed that the monies could not be applied to Unitarians because it was 
Lady Hewley's intention to benefit Trinitarians,^ and the decree was upheld on appeal 
to Lord Lyndhurst and the House of Lords. However, even more importantly for 
Unitarian liberties generally, the judges advising the Ix)rds made it clear in obiter dicta 
y 
that it was, despite the acmal outcome in Shore v Wilson, completely lawful to settle 
tmsts for the benefit of Unitarians.^' In Shore v Wilson, the idea of toleration had 
finally been extended to all English Protestants. 
§ 5: Catholics 
The Catholic Church attracted more penalties than any other religious group in 
the eighteenth cenmry, although political and social conditions prevented the 
legislation's being enforced.^ Blackstone recognised that the recusancy legislation 
could not be excused if "executed to [its] utmost vigour", and also thought that its mere 
** Ibid at 28; see IX: § 3 infra. 
*^  (1839-42) 9 CI & F 355, 4 St Tr (NS) 1370. 
^ (1839-42) 9 CI & F 355 at 372-81. 
'^ Ibid at 509, 524-5, 539, 544-5, 554, 565 and 578. The first time such tmsts were 
upheld was in Shrewsbury v Hornby (1846) 5 Hare 406. 
92 Cf\] Henriques note 84 supra at 137. 
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existence largely depended on Catholic Jacobite political associations." Therefore, 
like Scotdsh Episcopalians, Cadiolics received some legal concessions after Charles 
Edward Smart died. However, the question of larger Catholic liberties was always 
more complicated, because it was affected by greater doctrinal differences with 
Protestants and it was intricately entwined with the Irish question. 
In the Catholic Relief Act of 1778, Parliament dispensed with the operation of 
aspects of the recusancy legislation on condition that a Catholic took an oath of 
allegiance and rejected the political authority of the Pope.^ '* That concession prompted 
the Gordon Riots. However, more comprehensive legislation was still passed in 1791, 
and diis proceeded more closely on the lines of the Toleration Act. It provided diat any 
y 
Catholic who swore an oath of allegiance was exempted from the operation of the 
recusancy legislation.^ ^ It allowed any such Catholic to meet with others for worship 
(again provided the meeting was not conducted behind closed doors and the meeting 
place was registered at the General or Quarter Sessions) and made it an offence to 
dismrb such meetings.^ ^ Three important disabilities remained: the Test Acts, the 
prohibition on religious orders, and the unlawfulness of tmsts for the advancement of 
Catholicism.^' The inequality in the law of tmsts partially originated in principles of 
equity and legislation direcdy relating to tmsts, but legislation relating to Catholic 
" W Blackstone note 5 supra at iv 4 iii 2. 
^' Catholic Relief Act 1778 (18 Geo 3 c 60), s 1. 
^^  Catholic Relief Act 1791 (31 Geo 3 c 32), ss 1, 3 and 4. 
^^  Catholic Relief Act 1791, ss 5, 6 and 10. 
' ' Catholic Relief Act 1791, ss 17 and 20. 
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political liberties also made tmsts for the advancement of Catholicism unlawful.^ * 
Even as late as 1828, the Master of the Rolls, Sir John Leach, held that the Bishop of 
Blois could not lawfully setde a tmst to publish a book on Catholic doctrine.^ 
In Ireland four-fifths of the population was Catholic, and so the country's 
political union with Great Britain in 1801 made the Catholic question a central political 
issue in Bridsh government until the 1830s.'^ The impact of union on the timing of 
Catholic emancipation is nevertheless hard to evaluate. In the short term, it seems to 
have delayed emancipation. The Irish religious establishment was united with the 
English on union, and the threat Catholicism presented to the Irish establishment could 
therefore be interpreted as a threat to the Church of England itself.'°' In the long 
y 
term. Catholic emancipation was realised because the British executive government 
could not solve Irish political and social instability without conceding Catholic religious 
liberties. In 1828 Parliament repealed the Corporation Act and the Test Act of 1673, 
and in 1829 passed another Catholic Relief Act.^'^ The latter repealed the Test Act 
of 1678, and set out a special oath of allegiance for Catholics sitting as members of 
*^ RvLady Partington (1693) 1 Salk 162; Be Garcin v Lawson (1798) 4 Ves Jun 433n; 
Smart v Prujean (1801) 6 Ves Jun 560; Gary v Abbot (1802) 7 Ves Jun 490; cf 
Attorney-General v Bay (1749) 1 Ves Sen 218 at 223; Burour v Motteux (1749) 1 Ves 
Sen 320 at 321; C Stebbings, "Charity Land: A Mortmain Confusion" (1991) 12 Jnl 
Legal Hist 7 at 12. 
'^ Be Themmines v Be Bonneval (1828) 5 Russ 288. 
'°° C/U Henriques note 84 supra at 136. 
'°' Union With Ireland Act 1800 (39 & 40 Geo 3 c 67), art 5; U Henriques note 84 
supra at 146. 
'°2 Corporation and Test Acts Repeal Act 1828 (9 Geo 4 c 17), s 1; Catholic Relief Act 
1829 (10 Geo 4 c 7). 
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Parliament or holding a public office or tmst.'°3 There were still limitations. 
Catholics could not hold some public offices, such as that of Lord Chancellor and those 
relating to the religious establishments, and Jesuits and other members of male religious 
orders were barred from entering the kingdom.'*^ However, the Catholic Charities 
Act passed in 1830 did equalise tmsts for the advancement of Catholicism with those 
of Protestant dissenters.'°^ It is therefore possible to argue that, despite the small 
limitations that continued to relate to British Catholics, substantial toleration for all 
English Christians had been reached by the 1830s. 
§ 6: Jews 
The unequal political and social posidon of Jews partially resulted from 
uncertainties in their legal stams, which themselves were based on percepdons that 
unbelievers could not completely participate in a Christian commonwealth or even enjoy 
basic rights of due process. In 1608, Chief Justice Sir Edward Coke held that only 
Christians could be permitted access to the courts, and relied partially on Pauline 
sources for his opinion.'°^ But even in the early seventeenth cenmry a mle like this 
was questionable, and it was criticised in the courts through the next two cenmries.'°' 
In any case, it was established by 1698 that a Jew was able to bring legal 
'°3 Catholic Relief Act 1829, ss 1, 2, 4, 10 and 14. 
'°^  Catholic Relief Act 1829, ss 12, 18 and 28-37. 
'°^  Catholic Charities Act 1830 (2 & 3 Will 4 c 115), s 1; e^ Bradshaw v Tasker (1834) 
2 My &K 221. 
"^ Calvin's Case (1608) 7 Co Rep la at 17a; see II Cor vi 15. 
'°' 1 Salk 46; East India Company v Sandys (1683-5) 10 St Tr 371 at 391-2; Omichund 
V Barker (1744) Willes 538; Campbell v Hall (1774) 20 St Tr 239 at 294 and 323; cf 
W Holdswordi, A History of English Law 2nd ed (London 1938) vi p 409n. 
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proceedings.'°* 
There were other inequalities imposed on Jews simply because they were not 
Chrisdans. For example, a Jew could not hold any public office or tmst because the 
oath of allegiance prescribed in the Security Act of 1701 had to be made "upon the tme 
Faith of a Christian".'°^ In the early nineteenth cenmry opponents to Jewish 
emancipation consistently raised the maxim "Christianity is part and parcel of the law 
of England" to argue that Jews should remain excluded from civil and political 
liberties."° The Court of Chancery had already applied that maxim to expropriate 
economic benefits from Jews in Be Costa v Be Paz.^^^ There, Elias de Paz had left 
£1200 to his executors for the maintenance of a jesiba and the advancement of Judaism. 
Lord Hardwicke held the bequest to be invalid. He said that "the intent of this bequest 
must be taken to be in contradiction to the Christian religion, which is a part of the law 
of the land"."^ It was therefore available to be applied cy pres, and the King directed 
most of the bequest to the Foundling Hospital for the support of a preacher to instmct 
the children in the Christian religion. "3 The most favourable explanation of Be Costa 
V Be Paz is that Ix)rd Hardwicke thought the testator's charitable intention to be more 
general than merely to advance Judaism alone. Lord Eldon later explained the decision 
108 Wells V Williams (1698) 1 Ld Raym 282 at 282-3. 
'°^ Security Act 1701 (13 & 14 Will 3 c 6), s 1; W Holdsworth note 107 supra at vi 
245. 
"° U Henriques note supra at 195. 
' " (1744) 2 Swanst 487n, (1754) Amb 228. 
"2 (1744) 2 Swanst 487n. 
"3 (1754) Amb 228n. 
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in these terms, but it seems to be a doubtful rationalisation."'* Even Lord Eldon 
could not escape the likelihood that a Jewish testator would be repelled by the idea that 
his bequest be used to advance the Christian religion."^ Indeed, it is arguable that 
Be Costa v Be Paz acmally demonstrates that the idea of a Christian commonwealth 
embodied in the operation of the "part and parcel" maxim excluded Jews from equal 
access to social and economic benefits."^ 
In the second place, political and social inequalities were imposed on Jews 
because they seemed foreign. "The Jewish nadon", it was sometimes argued, could not 
be considered loyal subjects of the King. Jewish eschatology only fuelled the argument: 
the doctrine of the Remm suggested that a Jew's ultimate loyalty belonged to a fumre 
y 
state in Palestine.'" The speedy demise of the Jewish Naturalisation Act, passed in 
1753 and repealed the next year following public uproar, shows how deeply embedded 
this attimde could be, and these persisting allegations of divided loyalties readily 
enabled the unequal treatment of the Jews to be justified."* Only in 1845 did 
Parliament pass the Jewish Relief Act to enable Jews to hold a public office or tmst."^ 
It could be suggested that the legislation merely recognised directly the political 
"^  Cf Mills V Farmer (1815) 19 Ves Jun 483 at 487: see U Henriques note 84 supra at 
146. 
115 Attomey-General v Mayor of Bristol (1820) 2 Jac & W 294 at 308. 
"^ Bedford Charities Case (1819) 2 Swanst 471 at 524-32. On the "part and parcel" 
maxim, see IX: § 3 infra. 
117 U Henriques note 84 supra at 193-4. 
"* Jewish Naturalisation Act 1753 (26 Geo 2 c 26); Jewish Naturalisation Act Repeal 
Act 1754 (27 Geo 2 c 1); U Henriques note 84 supra at 175 and 193. 
"^ Jewish Relief Act 1845 (8 & 9 Vic c 52), s 1; see also 21 & 22 Vic c 48. 
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influence already exercised indirecdy by the wealthy Jewish community.'^ "^ But, I 
believe, recognidon should also be given to the progress of the idea of toleration. 
§ 7: Toleration: Liberal or Counterfeit Justice 
By the time rights to participate in government were being peacefully extended 
to non-Christians, it is arguable that the very idea of toleration itself was being regarded 
politically and socially as having merit, and that the extension of rights of religious 
liberty did not depend solely on the merits of the particular religious concepdons and 
practices, or of the religious group in quesdon. In Edmund Burke's words, though in 
religious quesdons individuals have "a just ground of preference", "[tjhey tolerate, not 
because they despise opinions, but because they respect justice".'^' From the 1850s 
it is possible to regard toleration as more than a philosophical idea, and to argue that 
it had been realised as an unwritten principle of the British political consdmtion. The 
discussion in this chapter shows that, in England, the extension of toleration had been 
piecemeal, and it had only progressed as the political need to accommodate a particular 
religious group emerged. This changed in 1855, when Parliament passed the Places 
of Worship Registration Act.^" Though superficially it is merely regulatory 
legislation, the Places of Worship Registration Act consolidated the purposes of most 
of the ad hoc legisladon reladng to toleration since 1689, and extended it to all religious 
groups in general. It allowed the registration of meeting places for the religious 
worship of Protestant dissenters. Catholics, Jews "and any other body or denomination 
'^ ° U Henriques note 84 supra at 199-200. 
'2' E Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France ((Hannondsworth 1968) pp 214-15. 
'^ 2 18 & 19 Vice 81. 
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of persons", and from 1860 it has been illegal to dismrb worship in any such place.'"3 
The only requirement is that the worship be religious, and so the 1855 legislation can 
be seen as bringing the idea of toleration to its complete legislative expression. 
Toleradon has been the primary moderating principle of relations between civil 
government and religion in the United Kingdom, although there it is now to be adjusted 
by Great Britain's obligations under the European Convention for the Protection of 
Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. In most other parts of the Commonwealth it has 
been replaced by religion clauses entrenched in a constimtion. The most notable 
exceptions are the mainland States of Australia, where toleration remains the primary 
unwritten principle of relations between civil government and religion. This delivers 
y 
some model of secular government, but an inadequate one which, in chapter II, I 
argued is potentially unjust.'-'* For the principle of toleration still allocates the 
question of civil government's relations with religion to a branch of government itself: 
the parliament. It is possible then that the practice of the citizen's religious conceptions 
is open to negotiation and exchange in the parliament, a basic denial that the citizen's 
equal religious liberty is inalienable. Thomas Paine saw this philosophical problem 
with the idea of toleration when he declared that "[tjoleration is not the opposite of 
Intolerance, but is the counterfeit of it ... The one assumes to itself the right of 
withholding Liberty of Conscience, and the other of granting it".'^ ^ Paine's language 
is perhaps emotive, but his assessment of the imperfection in the principle of toleration 
'^ 3 Places of Religious Worship Act 1855, s 2; Ecclesiastical Courts Jurisdiction Act 
1860, s 2 (emphasis added). 
'^ '* II: § 6 supra. 
' " T Paine, Rights of Man (Harmondsworth 1969) p 85. 
140 IV: § 7 
is incisive. The source of toleration since 1689 has been parliamentary legislation, a 
better basis for secular government than the executive indulgence that Protestant 
dissenters refused to regard as sufficient. It continues however to be inadequate and 
potentially unjust, for the individual's right to equal religious liberty is still regarded 
as having its source in the powers of a branch of government. But, to the contrary, in 
a just political constimtion government is rather to be constimtionally limited by the 
individual's inalienable right. 
V. THE SEPARATION OF 
CHURCH AND STATE 
§ 1: Introduction 
The idea of "the separation of church and state" has deep roots in the Puritan 
origins of the United States, and longstanding importance there. In the 1830s, the 
clergy whom Alexis de Tocqueville asked about the surprising "religious aspect" of the 
country unanimously attributed it to "the separation of church and state".' However, 
that was more than a cenmr>' before the Supreme Court's decision in Everson v Board 
of Education,^ when it first embodied the idea of separation into constimtional 
principle. The Court held that separation was required by the establishment clause of 
the First Amendment to the United States Constimtion which, together with the free 
exercise clause, states: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof... 
Having also held that (by reason of the due process clause in the Fourteenth 
Amendment) the religion clauses apply to the States, the Supreme Court made 
separation the primary instimtion for organising relations between government and 
religion in the United States.3 The religion clauses certainly seem to require some 
' A de Tocqueville, Bemocracy in America (New York 1990) i p 305. 
^ Everson v Board of Education of the Township of Ewing 330 US 1 (1947) 
{"Everson"). 
3 Hamilton v Regents of the University of Califomia 293 US 245 at 262 (1934); 
Cantwell v Connecticut 310 US 296 at 303 (1939); Everson note 2 supra at 15. 
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model of secular government but, as is evident by the language of the establishment 
clause, this does not necessarily require separation, or even its slightly less ambitious 
descendant "nonentanglement".'' In this chapter therefore, I examine the concept of 
separation. This requires some discussion of the origins of secular government in the 
United States, and of the idea of separation itself (§§3 and 4). Then, I review the 
development of the concept of separation by the Supreme Court between its decision 
in Everson in 1947 and Lemon v Kurtzman^ in 1971 (§ 5). In theory, Lemon could still 
set the basic principles for application of the establishment clause. But its operation has 
been controversial, inconsistent and open to serious challenge by Supreme Court justices 
themselves, and it is possible to suggest that the Court displaced or reduced the primacy 
of Lemon and the concept of separation in its 1992 decision in Lee v Weisman:^ 
although any definite conclusion to that effect must, in light of existing adjudication, 
be postponed (§§6 and 7). It is an important theme of this chapter that, measured 
against the idea of a secular commonwealth, the concept of separation is stcnlarist, 
unjust and impracticable. Indeed, this is best shown by the experience of its use in the 
United States. On the one hand, since it originated there, the concept of separation 
continues to have more symbolic significance in the United States than in other English-
speaking countries.' On the other hand, the United States also provide the most 
demanding political and social conditions for testing the practicability of principles of 
"* L Tribe, American Constitutional Law 2nd ed (Mineola NY 1988) p 1161. 
' 403 US 602 (1971) {"Lemon"). 
' 120 L Ed 2d 467 (1992) {"Lee"). 
' CfMF Bednarowski, American Religion: A Cultural Perspective (New Jersey 1984) 
p 4; RN Bellah, "Religion and Legitimadon in die American Republic" in T Robbins 
and D Anthony (eds). In Gods We Trust: New Patterns of Religious Pluralism in 
America 2d ed (New Jersey 1993) p 414. 
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secular government. For, as I now discuss in § 2, religious pluralism is more extensive 
diere than in any other country but, at the same time, political and social life is 
permeated by a civil religion that transcends that pluralism and places unique pressure 
on principles of secular government. 
§ 2: Religion in America 
In 1989, there were probably more than 1500 organised religions practising in 
the United States, and namrally these do not include individual religious conceptions not 
practised in an organised setting.* However this pluralism, as in Australia, can be 
exaggerated because most of these groups are Protestant churches. There are no 
national census statistics on religious identification in the United States, and in some 
respects the private polls show different results. In 1985, it could be said that the 
single largest religious group was the Catholic Church, one poll having it comprise 25 % 
of the population. Together, Protestants seem to have comprised 65% of the 
population: including Baptists (21%), Methodists (11%), Lutherans (8%), Presbyterians 
(5%), Episcopalians (3%) and others (17%). Jews comprised 2% of the population, 
and those with no religion 7%. The empirical evidence suggests that, as for Australia 
until 1986, there has been a significant increase in the number of Catholics and, 
probably, secularists in the United States between the 1940s and 1980s, widi a decline 
in Protestant identificadon.^ 
* JG Melton (ed). The Encyclopedia of American Religions 3rd ed (Detroit 1989) pp xv 
and xix. 
^ See AM Greeley, Religious Change in America (Cambridge Mass 1989) pp 21-8. The 
empirical evidence is primarily that of the General Social Surveys (GSS). Cf the 
position in Australia: I: § 5 supra. 
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Then, countering this pluralism is what sociologists have dubbed "the civil 
religion": the recognition of transcendent religious expression and symbolism in 
American political and social life.'° Congress and the Supreme Court open daily 
business in prayer. Chaplains are appointed to legislamres and the armed forces. The 
Pledge of Allegiance, "The Star-Spangled Banner" and the national motto all invoke 
God. The civil religion undoubtedly includes other insdmtions and practices, but its 
amorphous evolving quality does not open it to specific definition." However, the 
civil religion is, in the main, a monotheism, and obviously rooted in New England 
Calvinism (even if it has developed a more ecumenical appeal).'^ To some extent, this 
civil religion could help to integrate a highly pluralised nation. It possibly provides 
powerful religious legitimation to political and legal instimtions and processes and, by 
defining the nadonal mission ("manifest destiny"), places these instimdons under moral 
constraint and invites political and social criticism when government departs from the 
civil religion's accepted ideals.'3 It provides national cohesion: "One Nadon under 
God". Undoubtedly, if ever used to support governmental decisions on public questions 
incidents of the civil religion could offend principles of public reason. But more 
immediately for present purposes, they have been recognised repeatedly by the Supreme 
Court and, through occasional connections with government, have long compromised 
'° RN Bellah, "Civil Religion in America" (1967) 96 Daedalus 1. 
" Even the Constimtion and the Supreme Court diemselves could be regarded as 
secularised projections of biblical virtues like hope, authority and protection: M 
Lemer, "Constimtion and Court as Symbols" (1937) 46 Yale U 1290 at 1294-5, 1306-
7, 1311-12 and 1318. 
^'^ CfC Dawson, Christianity and the New Age (London 1934) p 23; AP Stokes and L 
Pfeffer, Church and State in the United States (New York 1964) p 3. 
'3 ME Marty, "Two Kinds of Two Kinds of Civil Religion" in RE Richey and DG 
Jones (eds), American Civil Religion (New York 1974) pp 144-51; RN Bellah "Civil 
Religion" note 10 supra at 13-14 and 16-19. 
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the secularism inhering in the Court's use of the concept of separation.'^ 
§ 3: Secular Government in the Colonial Period: 1607-1776 
The plantation of English colonies in North America had intimate connections 
with the rise of English religious pluralism after the Reformation. The settlements in 
New England, Maryland and Pennsylvania were either made or promoted by 
(respectively) Congregationalists, Catholics and Quakers seeking refuge from 
persecution: often governmental persecution supported by the Clarendon Code and the 
recusancy legislation. Consequently, in the American colonies experiments in secular 
government emerged much earlier than in the British Isles. Tme, there were monopoly 
Congregationalist establishments (possibly even theocracies) in New England and, in 
the early seventeenth cenmry, a monopoly Anglican establishment in Virginia.'^ 
However, in other colonies the cuius regio principle was undermined in different 
degrees. There were privileged Anglican establishments only in the Carolinas, and later 
in Maryland and Georgia.'^ In Maryland, the Toleration Act of 1649 extended some 
"* See II: § 8 supra; cf Illinois (ex rel McCollum) v Board of Education of School 
Bistrict No 71, Champaign County 333 US 203 at 253-4 (1948); Zorach v Clauson 343 
US 306 at 313 (1952); Engel v Vitale 370 US 421 at 439-41 and 446-50 (1962); School 
Bistrict of Abington Township v Schempp 374 US 203 at 213, 299-300, 303-4 and 306 
(1963); Walz v Tax Commission of the City of New York 397 US 664 at 672 (1970); 
Lemon note 5 supra at 623; Marsh v Chambers 463 US 783 at 786-90 and 818 (1983); 
Lynch V Bonnelly 465 US 668 at 674-8, 692-3 and 716-17 (1984); County of Allegheny 
V American Civil Liberties Union 492 US 573 at 602-3, 625, 630-1, 665 and 671-3 
(1989); Lee note 6 supra at 482, 508-9, 514 and 518; c/RN Bellah "Religion and 
Legitimation" note 7 supra at 418. 
'^  EB Greene, Religion and the State (Ithaca 1959) p 40; L Pfeffer, Church State and 
Freedom (Boston 1967) pp 74-5 and 77; AP Stokes and L Pfeffer note 12 supra at 6; 
see Lawes Bivine, Moral and Martial 1612 (Va), ss 1-3 and 5-6; JF Wilson and DL 
Drakeman, Church and State in American History 2nd ed (Boston 1987) pp 11-12. 
'^  EB Greene note 15 supra at 64; L Pfeffer note 15 supra at 77-80 and 84; AP Stokes 
and L Pfeffer note 12 supra at 7. 
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religious liberty to all Chrisdans 180 years before England did." In New York, as 
I mendoned in chapter III, there was a pattem of "multiple establishments" involving 
governmental sponsorship, endowment and control of all Protestant churches.'* The 
leading colonies in developing secular government were, however, Rhode Island and 
Pennsylvania. Charles II (with more direct power in colonial than domestic 
government) granted Rhode Island a charter in 1663, confirming the colony's "lively 
experiment that a flourishing civil state may best be maintained ... with full religious 
liberty".'^ In Pennsylvania, the Great Law of 1682 extended religious liberty to all 
monotheists.^ ° 
The Glorious Revolution rationalised the colonial arrangements with the English 
y 
constimtional settlement. In 1691, Massachusetts received a new charter granting 
religious liberty to all Protestants. In 1690 a more comprehensive toleration granted 
in Virguiia in 1685 was revised to exclude Catholics, and in 1699 a Toleration Act 
modelled on the English legislation was passed. In Maryland the Church of England 
became established, Protestant dissenters were tolerated and Catholicism was made 
illegal. Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Delaware and New Jersey still resisted religious 
establishments.^' 
" JF Wilson and DL Drakeman note 15 supra at 14-15; L Pfeffer note 15 supra at 83-
4. 
'* III: § 6 supra; L Pfeffer note 18 supra at 79-80. 
'^  Charter of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations 1663; JF Wilson and DL 
Drakeman note 15 supra at 16. 
°^ EB Greene note 15 supra at 57. 
'^ Ibid at 64 and 67-8; L Pfeffer note 15 supra at 77-8. 
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In the early stages of die American Revoludon in 1775 and 1776, the Carolinas, 
Georgia, New York, Maryland and Virginia disestablished the Church of England. The 
New England Congregadonalist establishments persisted: Connecticut did not 
disestablish undl 1833.^ ^ However, the secularising pressures which led to 
disestablishment indicate generally that the revolutionary vision included important ideas 
of religious liberty, and these received permanent recognition in the religion clauses of 
the First Amendment, passed in 1791. 
In its original form, the only provision in the Constimtion relating to religion 
was the test clause: "no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any 
office or public tmst under the United States".'3 No delegate at the Federal 
Convention in 1787 seems to have thought that Congress would have any power to 
legislate on religion. Still, the States demanded that limitations on congressional power 
be stated explicidy. Federalists had argued that congressional powers were lunited to 
those expressly enumerated in die Constimtion, and that these did not include religion. 
However, the anti-federalist concem was that Congress could upset the relations 
between government and religion in the individual States, including the remaining 
religious establishments in New England. The religion clauses (and the Bill of Rights 
generally) were a compromise, satisfying anti-federalist concems and helping to resolve 
the national constimtional settlement.^ "* 
^^  JK Wilson, "Religion Under the State Consdmtions, 1776-1800" (1990) 32 Jnl 
Church and State 753. 
3^ Constimtion (US), art VI s 3. 
'^* DL Drakeman, Church-State Constitutional Issues (Westport Conn 1991) pp 59-65; 
EB Green note 15 supra at 84. 
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The federal concems diat helped lead to the adopdon of the religion clauses do 
not diminish the idea that, together, the establishment and free exercise clauses had 
some common purpose of protecting religious liberty, and so embody the earliest 
aspiradons of English setdement in North America and of the revolutionary vision.^ ^ 
However, beyond these general themes the original purpose of the religion clauses is 
unclear and, as conclusive interpretation of the Constimtion has been entmsted to the 
Supreme Court, the meaning of the clauses is, to a large extent, left to adjudication.-^ 
It is therefore not surprising that, given its history in the United States, the Court 
should have held the concept of separation to be a central theme of the establishment 
clause. 
§ 4: The Origins of the Concept of Separation 
Roger Williams, a Puritan minister, founded the colony of Rhode Island in 1635 
and 1636. He had been expelled from Massachusetts for objecting to its theocratic 
political constimtion, and so in Rhode Island he sought to limit the role of religion in 
government.^' This reflected his theory of separation, based on a two-kingdoms 
theology. Williams stressed that the Christian was limited to using the peaceful means 
of persuasion and teaching to advance his purposes, that the coercive powers of 
government were ineffective against the mind, and (a more appealing argument 
generally in North America) that persecution was invariably directed at tme believers. 
He also emphasised that independence from governmental control was beneficial to 
^^  See eg Engel v Vitale 370 US 421 at 430 (1962); Wallace v Jaffree 472 US 38 at 68 
(1985); Lee note supra at 492 and 493. 
'^^ CfL Tribe note 4 supra at 1158 and 1161. 
'^ EB Greene note 15 supra at 47-50; AP Stokes and L Pfeffer note 12 supra at 13. 
149 V: § 4 
religion. To Williams, this required "a wall of Separation between the Garden of the 
Church and the Wildemess of the worid".^* 
Therefore, like principles of secular government generally the concept of 
separation had theoretical origins in Protestant thought. Furthermore, the pre-
revolutionary colonies were distinctly Protestant societies, and these carried Williams' 
general conceptions of religious liberty and separation into the late eighteenth 
cenmry.^^ These religious conceptions undoubtedly helped to secure the constimtional 
settlement of 1789 to 1791. In light of the federal concems leading to the adopdon of 
the religion clauses it might overstate the position to see religious conceptions as 
dominant sources of the religion clauses, but they are still significant.3° Indeed the 
support of the religious conceptions, the federal concerns and, as we will see, the early 
liberalism of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison means there was some overlapping 
consensus for the religion clauses, and explains the stability of the religion clauses as 
part of the political constimtion settled in the United States in the late eighteenth 
cenmry. 
Williams' metaphor, the "wall of separation", was also used by Jefferson to 
*^ TL Hall, "Roger Williams and the Foundations of Religious Liberty" (1991) 71 
Boston Univ L Rev 458 at 474 and 481-2. 
^^  Indeed, only 17 years before the religion clauses were adopted the American colonies 
had censured the British Government's concessions to Catholics in the Quebec Act of 
1774 (14 Geo 3 c 83): EB Greene note 15 supra at 74-5. 
3° RM Cover, "Nomos and Narradve" (1983) 97 Harv L Rev 4 at 18; TL Hall note 28 
supra at 457-8; MA Noll, One Nation Under God? (San Francisco 1988) pp 64-5; L 
Pfeffer, "The Deity in American Constimtional History" (1981) 23 Jnl Church and State 
215 at 216; L Tribe note 4 supra at 1158; E Troeltsch, Protestantism and Progress 
(Philadelphia 1986) p 66. 
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explain the purpose of the religion clauses. Three short documents produced by 
Jefferson and Madison (who penned the initial draft of the First Amendment) are 
acmally the primary sources the Supreme Court has used to read the concept of 
separadon into the establishment clause. In 1786 and 1787, Jefferson and Madison 
campaigned successfully against a proposal to levy a general assessment in Virginia to 
endow all churches in the State.3' Madison produced the Memorial and 
Remonstrance, a model rationalist argument that government has no power in religious 
questions. This too was based on the inalienability of the individual's religious 
responsibilities: government therefore could not "be suffered to overlap the great 
barrier which defends the rights of the people".3- The Virginia Assembly signalled 
the complete success of the Memorial by passing Jefferson's Religious Freedom Act, 
which provided that an individual's religious conceptions should not "diminish, enlarge, 
or affect" his political and legal stams. However, the legislation also set limits on 
religious practice:33 
... it is time enough for the rightful purpose of civil government for its 
officers to interfere when principles break out into overt acts against 
peace and order. 
In chapter VIII, I discuss how this distinction between religious conceptions and 
practices (opinions and actions) has been significant in the judicamre's decisions on the 
limits of religious liberty but, more immediately, these documents do not state a 
comprehensive theory of relations between government and religion, and their 
importance to secular government is largely symbolic. 
3' C/Constimtion 1777 (Ga), art 56; Beclaration of Rights 1776 (Md), art 33; JK 
Wilson note 22 supra at 756. 
3^  JF Wilson and DL Drakeman note 15 supra at 68-72; see II: § 3 supra. 
33 Religious Freedom Act 1786 (Va), s 2; see ibid at 73-4. 
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Jefferson's Letter to the Banbury Baptist Association, which he published in 
1802, is of even greater symbolic importance than the Memorial and Remonstrance and 
the Religious Freedom Act but is even less complete.3^* Borrowing from Williams, 
Jefferson told the Danbury Baptists that the religion clauses created "a wall of 
separation between Church and State". The concept also seems to have been based on 
Jefferson's assumption that religious and social obligations could never be in collision 
and, thus, were inherently separate, because he added that the individual "has no namral 
right in opposition to his social duties".3^ However, this is based on Jefferson's own 
understanding of "religion" and it differs from the more expansive interpretation of that 
concept taken in twentieth cenmry courts and throughout this thesis.3^ But even on 
a narrow instimtional definition of religion, this concept of separation has proved 
y 
difficult to implement. 
§ 5: The Supreme Court and Separation: 1947 to 1971 
The Supreme Court hinted that the concept of separation might organise relations 
between government and religion, relying on the Memorial, the Virginia Religious 
Freedom Act and the Letter to the Banbury Baptist Association, as early as 1878.3' 
However the decision concemed the free exercise clause, and it has since been 
recognised that the free exercise clause has undermined separation because it demands 
3^  Ibid at 78-9. 
3^  Ibid. 
3^  I: § 4 supra. 
Reynolds v United States 98 US 145 at 162-4 (1878). 37 
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some governmental accomodation of religious practice.3* The concept of separation 
has, instead, been read into the establishment clause and, indeed, the Supreme Court 
erected Jefferson's wall of separation between government and religion in the one of 
the earliest decisions it ever made on the establishment clause: Everson v Board of 
Education.^'^ In that case, Justice Hugo Black deduced a number of specific limitations 
on governmental power from the establishment clause:"**^  
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither 
can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one 
religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to 
or to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess 
a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for 
entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church 
attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can 
be levied to support any religious activities or instimtions, whatever they 
may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice 
religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or 
secredy, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or 
groups or vice versa. 
Here, Justice Black included considerations of religious liberty now attributed to the 
free exercise clause. However, he did also include the accepted establishment clause 
concems of instimtional relations between government and religious groups which have 
been central to the Supreme Court's concept of separation. There is nevertheless a 
latent inconsistency in Justice Black's judgment in Everson, because he also alluded to 
another concept the Court has since used in decisions on the legitimate relations 
between government and religion: "neutrality". He said "the First Amendment ... 
requires the state to be neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and 
3* School Bistrict of the Township of Abington v Schempp 374 US 203 at 247-8, 296-9 
and 309 (1962); Walz v Tax Commission of the City of New York 397 US 664 at 668-9 
(1969); Edwards v Aguillard 482 US 578 at 617 and 640 (1987). 
3' Everson note 2 supra; cfBradfield v Roberts 175 US 292 at 297 (1899); Quick Bear 
vLeupp 210 US 50 at 81-2 (1908); Arver v United States 245 US 366 at 389-90 (1917). 
"*" Everson note 2 supra at 15-16. 
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non-believers",^' a principle that shows diat Justice Black's idea of neutrality is in 
substance one of religious equality. This, as I discuss later, is not realised when, 
consistendy with Justice Black's earlier statement of the concept of separation, a group 
is denied governmental benefits and privileges for legitimate secular objectives just 
because it is religious. The outcome in Everson acmally proves this inconsistency 
because, as we will see later, it is incompatible with Justice Black's concept of 
separation but could have given proper effect to the concept of neutrality. Indeed, 
consistent application of the concept of separation probably only emerged in decisions 
made in the 1960s. 
These decisions related to religious observances in government schools. The 
y 
first, Engel v Vitale,'^^'- concemed an ecumenical but monotheistic prayer being recited 
in New York schools."'3 The second. School Bistrict of Abington Township v 
Schempp,"^ related to the recitation of the Lord's Prayer and Bible readings in 
Pennsylvania and Baltimore schools. In both cases, the Supreme Court mled the 
observances invalid under the establishment clause. Schempp, involving Judeo-Christian 
Scripmres and a Christian prayer, was a more extreme case than Engel, but in neither 
case did the Court hesitate to classify the observance as religious.'*^ In Engel, the 
majority said that, because "it is no part of the business of government to compose 
"*' Ibid at 18. 
'^  370 US 421 (1962) {"Engel"). 
'*3 The prayer stated: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and 
we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Country". 
^ 374 US 203 (1963) {"Schempp"). 
'*^  Engel note 42 supra at 424; Schempp note 44 supra at 223 and 267. 
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official prayers for any group of the American people to recite as a part of a religious 
program carried on by government", the prayer "breaches the constimtional wall of 
separation between Church and State".'*^ In Schempp, the Court's rhetorical support 
for separation reached its highest peak and the Court claimed to permit no connections 
between the governmental and religious spheres.•*' The test the majority applied was 
outlined by Justice Tom Clark:"** 
[W]hat are the purpose and the primary effect of the enactment? If 
either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment 
exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the 
Constimtion. That is to say that to withstand the stricmres of the 
Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a 
primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion. 
The recitation of the Lord's Prayer and Bible readings manifesdy advanced religious 
purposes, and so were unconstimtional. 
Though, by limiting government to secular objectives, these decisions could be 
explained in terms of the principle of equal religious liberty, the Court intended more 
to realise the concept of separation that, in Everson, had only been a promise. In doing 
so, Engel especially showed how uneasily the concept sat with the traditional practice 
of the civil religion. There, Justice William Douglas argued that consistent application 
of the concept called the opening prayers in Congress and the Supreme Court into 
question. These observances, he suggested, were in constimtional terms 
indistinguishable from praying in New York schools.'*'^  Exacdy the same implication 
'*^  Engel note 42 supra at 425. 
•*' Schempp note 44 supra at 294-304. 
''* Ibid at 222. 
'*^  Engel note 42 supra at 439-41; see RJ McKeever, "The Fall and Rise of Judicial 
Activism in the United States: The Case of Justice William O Douglas" (1990) 11 Jnl 
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of separation was realised by Justice Potter Stewart who held conversely that, as the 
incidents of the civil religion were inconsistent with the concept of separation, it should 
not be used as a principle for organising relations between government and religion in 
the United States. In both Engel and Schempp, he held that the prayers and Bible 
reading in government schools were valid, although he never suggested an altemative 
interpretation of the establishment clause.^° 
The concept of separation was applied again in Epperson v Arkansas,^^ in 
which the Court invalidated legislation prohibiting the teaching of biological evolution 
in schools. The Court also drew on Everson's concept of neutrality, although again the 
decision seems to show competition between separation and neutrality." In Epperson 
y 
Justice Black concurred in the majority judgment, but sdll thought it possible that, to 
achieve neutrality, the State should have removed biological evolution from the 
curriculum. There was no evidence in Epperson that the literal Biblical doctrine of 
human origins was taught in Arkansas schools, and a neutral position between religion 
and non-religion probably required the theory of evolution to be treated similarly.^3 
Epperson, like Everson, could therefore show how separation and neutrality could lead 
to different outcomes, and possibly penalised religion and preferred non-religion (even 
secularism) in its stead. 
Leg Hist 437 at 444. 
°^ Engel note 42 supra at 444-50; Schempp note 44 supra at 308-20. 
" 393 US 97 (1968). 
" Ibid at 104. 
^^ Ibid at 113. 
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However, from close examination of most of the Supreme Court's decisions on 
the establishment clause before 1971, it sdll appears that justices have had concems 
about the impracticability of the concept of separation. It is evident that the Court had 
difficulties applying the concept by the methods it used to avoid its logical 
consequences. 
1. Ignoring Separation. Ignoring the proper application of the concept was one 
such method, and Everson itself was a good example. The New Jersey legislation 
involved entitled parents to be reimbursed by the State for the cost of transporting their 
children by bus to Catholic schools. The Court unanimously accepted the concept of 
separadon, but in applying the concept the justices divided.^ "* The majority (though 
intimating that the legislation approached the limits of governmental power) upheld it 
by equating bus transportation to schools with civil services like police, fire protection 
and roads. In doing so. religious equality and the possible secularism inhering in the 
concept of separation seem to have been paramount concems. For, noting the concept 
of neutrality between the religious and the non-religious, they held that "the First 
Amendment ... does not require the state to be [the former's] adversary".^^ 
It is thus hard to see that, in practice, Everson raised the Jefferson wall "so high 
and impregnable" as the majority claimed it should be.-^ ^ The decision, contrary to 
Justice Black's own principle, endorsed the use of governmental assistance indirectly 
to support activities related to religion. In dissent. Justice Robert Jackson said "the 
^"^ Everson note 2 supra at 15-16, 31, 44, 60 and 63. 
5^  Ibid at 18. 
^^ Ibid at 18. 
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undertones of the opinion ... seem utteriy discordant with its conclusion" and that the 
Court failed "to apply the principles it avows".^' Justices Jackson, Wiley Rutledge, 
Felix Frankfurter and Harold Burton required "complete and permanent separation", 
and more consistently held that this "forbids any appropriation, large or small, from 
public funds to aid and support all religious exercises".^* 
In § 6, we will see that this method would again be used to avoid the 
implications of the concept of separation as applied in the 1980s. 
2. Legitimising Historical Practices. The justices also moderated the impact of 
the concept of separation through irregular support for an historical approach to assess 
legitimate connections between government and religion. The approach is, in the tmest 
sense, conservative because it tends to endorse traditional practices. It had theoretical 
origins in the historical jurispmdence of Sir Henry Maine, but was mediated to the 
Supreme Court through the scholarship and opinions of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 
Jr.^ ^ Indeed, it was in echoing Justice Holmes that Chief Justice Warren Burger said: 
"[t]his principle ... is premised more on experience and history than on logic".^ 
The historical approach first appeared in Justice Stanley Reed's sole dissent in 
^' Ibid at 19 and 25. 
*^ 7^ 7/^  at 31 and 41. 
^^  OW Holmes, The Common Law (Ix)ndon 1968) pp xiv and xxv; Jackson v 
Rosenbaum Co 260 US 22 at 31 (1922); New York Trust Co v Eisner 256 US 345 at 
349 (1921). 
^ Committee for Public Education v Nyquist 413 US 756 at 802 (1973). 
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Illinois (ex rel McCollum) v Board of Education .^^ There, the Court held that Illinois 
legislation permitting religious groups to conduct religious education in school buildings 
during compulsory school hours offended the establishment clause. Justice Reed drew 
attention to "the many instances of close association of church and state in American 
society", and included incidents of the civil religion.^- In Zorach v Clauson,^^ the 
approach secured majority support and the validation of a similar religious education 
arrangement by which smdents left school during school hours to attend religious 
education classes conducted by their own religious groups. Justice Douglas delivered 
the Court's opinion, and recognised that the establishment clause "does not say that in 
every and all respects there shall be a separation of Church and State".^ In direct 
opposition to his later opinion in Engel v Vitale, he considered that separation could not 
be so strict as to make incidents of the civil religion unconstimtional.^^ The historical 
approach was also used in Board of Education v Allen^ to uphold New York 
legislation requiring school district boards to lend textbooks to smdents in religious 
schools. In Walz v Tax Commission,^^ Chief Justice Burger said that the Court in 
Allen was "heeding both its own prior decisions and our religious tradition".^* 
'^ Illinois (ex rel McCollum) v Board of Education of School Bistrict No 71, Champaign 
County 333 US 203 (1948). 
^^ Ibid at 239 and 253-5. 
3^ 343 US 306 (1952). 
^ Ibid at 312 and 314. 
^' Ibid at 312-13. 
^ 392 US 236 (1967). 
'^ 397 US 664 (1969). 
*^ Ibid at 672. 
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Walz is itself a good example of the historical method's being applied. It 
involved New York legislation granting a taxation exemption on property held by a 
religious group. Chief Justice Burger took the leitmotif of "benevolent neutrality" as 
a guide to the interpretation of the establishment clause.'''^ He acknowledged that the 
Court had failed to apply the concept of separation consistently, but still set the 
principle for ordering relations between government and religion in terms of legitimate 
and illegitimate degrees of separation. Together with the concurring Justices William 
Brennan and John Harlan, he suggested that the establishment clause was really 
intended to prevent "excessive entanglement" between government and religious 
groups.'° The long history of tax exemptions for religious groups indicated to Chief 
Justice Burger that they did not lead to excessive entanglement. Indeed, they acmally 
y 
reduced the contacts between government's taxation administration and religious groups, 
and so were valid. 
§ 6: The Lemon Paradigm and its Crisis 
It is possible to consider separation as the primary instimtion, though not the 
unquestioned mle, of relations between government and religion from Everson to the 
early 1970s. The "excessive entanglement" test of Walz, a concession to tradidonal 
practices, may have been a lower threshold than the "high and impregnable wall" of 
Everson, but still required a degree of separation. In 1971 in Lemon v Kurtzman,^^ 
the Court attempted to reconcile the previous authorities by amalgamating the tests from 
Schempp and Walz. Thus, to be consistent with the constimtional limits of the 
^' Ibid at 669 and 676. 
'° Ibid at 670, 674, 679, 690 and 695. 
" Lemon note 5 supra. 
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establishment clause, legislation (and presumably administration and adjudication) had 
to satisfy three elements:'' 
First, the stamte must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its 
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits 
religion ...; finally, the stamte must not foster "an excessive government 
entanglement with religion". 
In Lemon itself, the Court held that the State legislation involved led to excessive 
entanglements between government and religious groups. Rhode Island and 
Pennsylvania legislation provided governmental assistance to support teachers of secular 
subjects in religious schools.'3 However, the administrative surveillance necessary 
under both schemes to ensure that the secular purpose of the legislation was realised 
created excessive entanglement. 
Therefore, the Lemon test preserved the concept of separation as the central 
insdmtion of the establishment clause. The disintegration of establishment clause 
application into a tripartite test indicates that the more rational concept of the "wall of 
separation" set in Everson had been clouded by precedent: precedent that largely 
reflected the Court's inability or unwillingness to apply the concept of separation 
consistently. On the other hand, in amalgamating the tests used in Schempp and Walz, 
the Supreme Court maintained exacting criteria for governmental action to survive the 
application of the establishment clause, (i) Three tests had to be sadsfied. (ii) The first 
and second elements of the Lemon test preserved the secular demands from Schempp. 
(iii) However, as the outcome in Lemon v Kurtzman showed, government could not 
comply with the first and second elements and therefore advance, through the agency 
'^7^7/^ at 612-13. 
'3 Salary Supplement Act 1969 (RI); Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act 1968 (Pa). 
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of a religious group, purely secular motives and objectives (as probably permitted in 
Schempp) without risking the prohibited "excessive entanglement", (iv) Thus, the 
combinadon, on the one hand, of the first and second elements of the test and, on the 
other, the third meant in substance that Lemon v Kurtzman largely preserved the concept 
of separation generally, and in particular largely denied benefits and privileges to 
groups just because they were religious. However, at the same time the Court, as in 
Walz, permitted "inexcessive" entanglements, and in Lemon abandoned any pretence of 
support for "complete" separation:''* 
... the line of separadon, far from being a "wall", is a blurred, 
indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a 
particular relationship. 
It was almost inevitable that a vague concession like this would lead to unpredictable 
adjudication and that, I believe, has undermined the credibility of the Lemon test and, 
in the result, of any concept of separation. 
Lemon v Kurtzman nevertheless settled establishment clause interpretadon until, 
at the earliest, 1983. Until then, the Court only avoided its implications by 
distinguishing it or, as in Everson, not applying it at all. Lemon's companion case, 
Tilton V Richardson,^^ like Lemon, involved governmental financial assistance to 
religious educational instimtions, although in Tilton these were universities.'^ The 
Court applied the Lemon test, but held that the assistance was lawful." In part, it 
'** Lemon note 5 supra at 614; Committee for Public Education v Nyquist 413 US 756 
at 760 (1973). 
" 403 US 672 (1971) {"Tilton"). 
'^  Higher Education Facilities Act 1963 (US). 
" Tilton note 75 supra at 678. 
162 V: § 6 
relied on arguments that university smdents were less impressionable than school 
smdents, and that assistance was made by a one-time grant and unlikely to promote 
continuing relations with government.'* 
In 1985 in Wallace v Jaffree^'^ the only defences Justice Lewis Powell could 
suggest for the Lemon test were that it provided certainty to lower courts, and that it 
had majority support on the Supreme Court. Even at that point, both arguments were 
difficult to sustain. Wallace v Jaffree itself demonstrated how unpredictable the Lemon 
test was, as the Court relied on the religious reasons expressed by a single member of 
the Alabama Senate to classify legislation as having a religious purpose.*° 
Furthermore, the different decisions on governmental financial assistance to religious 
y 
educational instimtions in Lemon and Tilton pre-empted two decades of decisions on 
financial assistance that are, if at all possible, difficult to reconcile.*' 
In the second place, the majority support for the Lemon test on the Supreme 
'* Ibid at 685-8. 
'^  472 US 38 (1985) {"Wallace"). 
*° Ibid at 56-8 and 65; but cfibid at 77. It is unlikely that the High Court of Australia 
would allow such a consideration to affect its classification of legislation, as it regards 
the attimde of a single parliamentarian as irrelevant to the general legislative intention 
expressed by a parliament as a whole: Victoria v Commonwealth and Connor (1975) 
134 CLR 81 at 122-3, 151 and 188-9. 
*' For those not allowing financial assistance, see Committee for Public Education v 
Nyquist 413 US 756 (1972); Aguilar v Fenton 473 US 402 (1985); School Bistrict of 
the City of Grand Rapids v Ball 473 US 373 (1985). For those allowing assistance, see 
Hunt V McNair 413 US 734 (1973); Roemer v Maryland Board of Public Works 426 US 
736 (1976); Committee for Public Education v Regan 444 US 646 (1980); Mueller v 
Allen 463 US 388 (1983); Witters v Washington Bepartment of Services for the Blind 
474 US 481 (1986); cf Wolman v Walter 433 US 229 (1977); Wallace note 79 supra 
at 110-11. 
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Court suggests nothing about the justice of the concept, and to this I will remrn in § 8. 
However, even in 1984 it was incorrect to hold that the Lemon test had majority 
support on the Supreme Court because, in Marsh v Chambers^^ the majority had {sub 
silentio) refused to apply it. This decision and others which followed in the 1980s 
pointed to the justices' willingness to experiment with different principles for organising 
reladons between government and religion and possibly led, in Lee v Weisman, to the 
Court's rejection of the separation of church and state, although developments since Lee 
cannot yet make this certain. 
1. The Civil Religion Exception. Incidents of the civil religion had long exerted 
pressure on the concept of separadon. In 1964, the Supreme Court even denied 
certiorari on an establishment clause challenge to the Pledge of Allegiance.*3 But not 
until Marsh v Chambers did the Court have to decide explicidy between the concept of 
separation and the civil religion. There, the majority upheld the practice of appointing 
chaplains to State legislamres, and did so by almost ignoring the Lemon test completely. 
In fact, it only mentioned that Lemon v Kurtzman had been applied in the lower 
courts.*"* The early appointment of chaplains to Congress, contemporaneously with 
the adoption of the First Amendment, suggested that the establishment clause was not 
intended to invalidate the practice.*^ 
The exception of Marsh further diluted the predictability of the Lemon test. It 
*^  463 US 783 (1983) {"Marsh"). 
*3 Lewis V Allen 379 US 923 (1964); see L Pfeffer "The Deity" note 30 supra at 237. 
*'* Marsh note 82 supra at 786. 
*^  Ibid at 790. 
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led directly to a disagreement between the Sixth and First Circuits as to the validity of 
prayer in government schools.*^ Otherwise, it did not seriously undermine the Lemon 
paradigm. In dissent, Justice Brennan held that the appointment of legislative chaplains 
offended all three elements of the Lemon test and, given the majority silence on the 
point, his was probably a correct application.*' Still, Justice Brennan thought it best 
to regard the majority decision as an exception to the general principle, and not a 
revision of establishment clause interpretation. That the majority did not apply Lemon 
meant that "the Court is carving out an exception to the Establishment Clause rather 
than reshaping Establishment Clause doctrine to accommodate legislative prayer", said 
Jusdce Brennan.** 
2. The National Church Interpretation. In determining Wallace v Jaffree,^'^ the 
Supreme Court invalidated Alabama legislation allowing a one minute silence in State 
schools for personal meditation and prayer. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Byron 
White and William Rehnquist dissented, and Justice Rehnquist took (what was then) the 
narrowest approach to the establishment clause yet proposed. He held that it "should 
be read no more broadly than to prevent the establishment of a national religion or the 
governmental preference of one sect over another".^ This he based on an historical 
review of the adoption of the religion clauses and a rejection of Jefferson's symbolic 
*^  Stein V Plainwell Community Schools 822 F 2d 1406 (1987); Weisryian v Lee 908 F 
2d 1090 (1990). 
*' Marsh note 82 supra at 796-801. 
** Ibid at 796. 
*^  Wallace note 79 supra. 
^ Ibid at 100; see also ibid at 106 and 113. 
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wridngs as determinative.^' Justice (now Chief Justice) Rehnquist has since supported 
Justice Anthony Kennedy's coercion test, but in any case this parallels the scope of the 
national church interpretation he suggested in Wallace.'^^ 
3. The Endorsement Test. The closest alternative to the Lemon test in the 1980s 
was Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's "endorsement" test. Expressed as a "clarification" 
of Lemon v Kurtzman, it was until 1992 thought the test most likely to replace Lemon 
as the paradigm in establishment clause interpretation.^3 Justice O'Connor proposed 
the test in Lynch v Bonnelly,'^'^ a case involving a challenge to a Christmas display -
which included a Nativity scene but also secular symbols of Christmas like reindeer, 
a Santa Claus house and a Christmas tree - erected by the City of Pawmcket, Rhode 
Island. The majority rejected a challenge to the display: it again downplayed the 
Lemon test and relied on the national religious tradition to do so.^ ^ Justice O'Connor 
agreed, but offered her reinterpretadon of Lemon. To Justice O'Connor, the Court's 
traditional approach to the establishment clause placed two prohibitions on governmental 
power: ^ ^ 
One is excessive entanglement of religious instimtions, which may 
interfere with the independence of the instimtions, give the instimtions 
access to government or governmental powers not fully shared by 
nonadherents of the religion, and foster the creation of political 
constimencies defined along religious lines ... The second ... is 
'^ Ibid at 92-106. 
^ § 7 infra. 
3^ See SD Smith, "Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions; Establishment 
Neutrality and the 'No Endorsement' Test" (1987) 86 Mich L Rev 266 at 276. 
^^  465 US 668 at 687 (1984) {"Lynch"). 
^^ Ibid at 679 and 686. 
' ' Ibid at 687-8. 
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government endorsement or disapproval of religion. 
In Lynch, Justice O'Connor held that Pawmcket neither intended to endorse the 
Christian religion in erecting the Christmas display, nor could it be interpreted as 
endorsing Christianity in doing so. The City had a valid secular purpose, the 
celebradon of Christmas through its traditional symbols, and the setting of the Nativity 
scene among other symbols of Christmas eliminated any perception that the City 
endorsed its relisious significance. 
Despite Justice O'Connor's claim that the endorsement test clarified Lemon v 
Kurtzman, it is more ambivalent than Lemon to the concept of separation. In dissent 
in Lynch, Justice Brennan argued that the outcome reversed the secular themes of the 
y 
Court's traditional establishment clause interpretation.^' It is nevertheless doubtful that 
the endorsement test had these consequences.^ * On the one hand, the endorsement 
test, applied consistently without the civil religion exception of the Lemon paradigm, 
would most likely invalidate incidents of the civil religion. These unambiguously send 
a message of approval for theisms.^ ^ In addition, the entanglement element 
perpemates some demand for separation, albeit the "benevolently neutral" demand of 
Walz. On the other hand, the endorsement test has a stronger emphasis on religious 
equality. The concept of separation has been thought to require the disqualification of 
clergy from positions of public office or tmst. Under the endorsement test, this 
'^ Ibid at 717-18; see also W Van Alstyne, "Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr 
Jefferson's Cmmbling Wall - A Comment on Lynch v Bonnelly" [1984] Duke LJ 770 
at 771 and 784. 
'* AH Loewy, "Rethinking Government Neutrality Towards Religion Under the 
Establishment Clause: The Untapped Potential of Justice O'Connor's Insight" (1986) 
64 North Carolina L Rev 1049 at 1053-4. 
'>''Ibid at 1055. 
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disapproves of religion and would be unconstimtional. To that extent, it also reconciled 
the independent operation of the free exercise clause better than did earlier separation 
or "nonentanglement" requirements.'°*^ 
The endorsement test nevertheless preserved some legacy of Lemon v Kurtzman 
and the concept of separation. This became evident when it secured more support on 
the Court in County of Allegheny v American Civil Liberties Union, ^ ^^ where Justices 
Harry Blackmun, Brennan and John Paul Stevens joined with Justice O'Connor in 
defending the endorsement test against criticism.'"- The case involved a challenge to 
a Nativity scene, this time in a courthouse, and a menorah (Jewish candelabmm) outside 
a public building in Pittsburgh, Virginia. The majority held that the Nativity scene was 
y'' 
illegal but that the menorah was permissible. The decision on the Nativity scene 
distinguished the outcome in Lynch v Bonnelly, the majority holding that there were 
contexmal differences between the two displays. The Pittsburgh scene stood alone. 
Unlike the Pawmcket display, no secular symbol of Christmas detracted from its 
religious theme.'°3 
4. The Religious Equality Interpretation. The Lemon test, despite the debt it 
owed to precedent and the resulting complications of establishment clause application, 
still did not comprehend that second theme of the establishment clause Justice Black had 
'°° Ibid at 1053; AP Stokes and L Pfeffer note 12 supra at 622; L Tribe note 4 supra 
at 1159; see McBaniel v Paty 455 US 618 at 622 and 628 (1978); but cfibid at 645. 
'°' 492 US 573 (1989) {"Allegheny County"). 
'°' Ibid at 595 and 625-32. 
'°3 Ibid at 598 and 626. 
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alluded to (and probably applied) in Everson: neutrality. The test was directed towards 
the assessment of governmental action which could relate to religious groups generally, 
and therefore did not even address governmental action which preferred one religious 
group over another. This was evident in the application of the Lemon test in lower 
courts. For example, it was held repeatedly that religious groups could not meet in 
government schools even though non-religious groups could.'°"* The Tenth Circuit 
held that a teacher could not keep The Bible in Pictures or The Story of Jesus in a 
classroom library when books on Buddhism and native American religion were 
permissible.'°^ It is not surprising therefore that, in Larson v Valente,^^^ when the 
Supreme Court invalidated legislation which effectively discriminated against the 
Unificadon Church (the Moonies), it had to hold Lemon v Kurtzman "not necessary to 
y 
the disposition of the case".'*" There was some attempt to restore religious equality 
in Bowen v Kendrick,^^^ when the Court held that religious groups could have the 
same rights as other groups to participate in federal welfare programmes. Here, it was 
again necessary for the Court to note the deficiencies of the Lemon test, and in 
particular its entanglement element.'°^ In 1989, the Court tried to cure this deficiency 
in its establishment clause interpretation by bringing Larson and Lemon together. In 
"^ Brandon v Board of Education of the Guilderland Central School Bistrict 635 F 2d 
971 (1980); Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v Lubbock Independent School Bistrict 669 
F 2d 1038 (1982); Nartowicz v Clayton County School Bistrict 736 F 2d 646 (1984); 
Garnett v Renton School Bistrict 874 F 2d 608 (1989). 
'°' Roberts v Madigan 921 F 2d 1047 (1990). 
'°^ 456 US 228 (1982). 
'°' Ibid at 252. 
'°* 487 US 589 (1988). 
' °^ /^ /^ at 615-16. 
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Hernandez v Commissioner of Internal Revenue,^^^ the Court set religious equality as 
a precondition to the application of L^mon v Kurtzman:^^^ 
... when it is claimed that a denominational preference exists, the initial 
inquiry is whether the law facially differentiates among religions. If no 
such facial preference exists, we proceed to apply the customary three-
pronged Establishment Clause inquiry derived from Lemon v Kurtzman. 
Hernandez is nevertheless no exemplar of the principle of religious equality, because 
the Court allowed taxation exemptions to be refused to the Church of Scientology even 
though they were available to other religious groups. 
The incoherence of the Court's approach to neutrality was perpemated in its 
application of Justice O'Connor's endorsement test which, despite its improved doctrinal 
response to religious equality, proved as unpredictable as the Lemon test. In Allegheny 
County, application of the endorsement test led to the Court's holding a Nativity display 
on government property illegal, but allowing a menorah. On the other hand, when the 
Court again used the test in Board of Education v Mergens,^^'^ it upheld Congress' 
Equal Access Act, which gave religious (and political and philosophical) groups the 
right to meet in government schools. In Larson, Bowen and Mergens, justices had been 
recognising inmitively the need to treat different religious groups equally, and religious 
and non-religious groups equally. However, the idea of religious equality was largely 
anomalous in the separation paradigm and therefore, without a radical reconstmction 
of establishment clause interpretation, the Court's attempts to incorporate it into its 
adjudication were invariably ineffecmal. 
"° 490 US 767 (1989). 
''' Ibid at 695. 
"^ Board of Education of the Westside Community Schools (Bist 66) v Mergens 496 US 
226 (1990). 
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However, Allegheny also saw Justice Kennedy devise the "coercion" test, which 
accommodates governmental relations with religion to a much greater extent than either 
the wall of separation, nonentanglement or the endorsement test. It immediately 
secured the support of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Antonin Scalia, 
and so by Allegheny the Supreme Court's position on relations between government and 
religion had been polarised by the smallest margin. Lee v Weisman offered some 
promise to provide, at least, some consensus in establishment clause interpretation, but 
even that must still be considered either doubtful or premamre."3 
§ 7: Quo Vadis Separation? 
Lee V Weisman^^^ revived the question of school prayer, and involved a 
challenge to the use of a Judeo-Christian prayer in a State school graduation ceremony 
in Rhode Island. The majority held that the prayer was unconstimtional,"^ and most 
justices gave some support to the coercion test. Though the justices' positions on the 
coercion test was complicated, Lee v Weisman could mark an important change to 
constimtional relations between government and religion in the United States. For in 
embracing the coercion test in Lee a majority on the Supreme Court had, for the first 
time since Everson, given no operation to any concept of separation. 
In Allegheny, Justice Kennedy held that the Nativity display was legal and it 
seems the national religious tradition shaped his decision and the resulting coercion test. 
"3 Cf Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v Board of Equalization of California 493 US 378 at 
394 (1990). 
"'* Lee note 6 supra. 
"5 Ibid at 488. 
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The majority decision reflected, said Justice Kennedy, "an unjustifiable hostility toward 
religion, a hostility inconsistent with our history and our precedents"."^ 
Furthermore, in being more accommodating to religion. Justice Kennedy believed that 
incidents of the civil religion should survive the application of the establishment 
clause.'" He resurrected a theme raised in Zorach v Clauson, but later consistently 
rejected, that to offend the establishment clause governmental action had to be 
coercive."* Justice Kennedy could therefore only identify two limitations on 
government required by the establishment clause:"^ 
... government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in any 
religion or its exercise; and it may not, in the guise of avoiding hostility 
or callous indifference, give direct benefits to religion in such a degree 
that it in fact "establishes a [state] religion or religious faith or tends to 
do so". 
In Allegheny, Justice Kennedy held that "coercion" did not necessarily require physical 
force. In extreme cases (like the display of a Latin cross on a public building), the 
symbolic recognition of religion could create illegitimate psychological coercion.'^° 
Justice Kennedy therefore prohibited "proselytising",'-' though in Lee the 
psychological coercion was much less apparent than that. The majority in Lee 
(comprising Justices Kennedy, Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor and Souter) prohibited 
psychological coercion in less than extreme cases. They held that the graduation prayer 
^^^ Allegheny County note 101 supra at 655. 
' " Ibid at 662-3, 665 and 670-4. 
"* Zorach v Clauson 343 US 306 at 311-12 (1952); Engel note 42 supra at 430; 
Schempp note 44 supra at 222-3; Committee for Public Education v Nyquist 413 US 756 
at 786 (1973). 
^^^ Allegheny County note 101 supra at 659. 
'^ ° Ibid at 661; but cf Murray v City of Austin 744 F Supp 771 (1990). 
'^' Allegheny County note 101 supra at 606, 659-60, 661 and 664. 
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was coercive, because the State "in every practical sense compelled attendance at and 
participation in an explicit religious exercise".'" Even though attendance at the 
graduadon ceremony was voluntary, "[t]he Constimtion forbids the State to exact 
religious conformity from a smdent as the price of attending her own high school 
graduadon".'^3 x^g minority in Lee (comprising Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices 
White, Scalia and Clarence Thomas) rejected a ban on psychological coercion. To 
Justice Scalia, coercion involved the imposition of a monopoly or privileged religious 
establishment supported "by force of law and threat of penalty".'''* In addition, he 
relied on longstanding rehgious traditions to reject any expanded idea of "psycho-
" 125 
coercion . 
The coercion element in the test from both Allegheny and Lee seems to add little 
to the prohibition on the protection of religion demanded by the free exercise clause 
and, to that extent, unifies the operation of the religion clauses and, therefore, does not 
seem to reflect their independent expression in the First Amendment.'^^ This means 
that the only unique contribution the establishment clause makes to the protections of 
the religion clauses on this interpretation is the prohibition on the concession to a 
religious group of direct benefits which tend towards the establishment of a national 
church or religion.'" Justice Rehnquist's national church interpretation from Wallace 
'^ ^ Lee note 6 supra at 487. 
"3 Ibid at 486. 
" V ^ ^ at 515. 
"^ Ibid. 
'^ ^ Note, "The Supreme Court - Leading Cases" (1992) Harv L Rev 163 at 265-6; Lee 
note 6 supra at 502-3. 
' " Allegheny County note 101 supra at 659. 
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V Jaffree also prevented "the establishment of a national religion", but included demands 
of religious equality in prohibiting the "governmental preference of one religious sect 
over another".'-* Indeed, the benefits element of Allegheny and Lee seems to allow 
preferential treatment in the form of financial assistance, so long as it is either indirect 
or, if direct, does not tend to the establishment of a national religion. It is conceivable 
that this permits discrimination against particular religious groups by removing or 
withholding benefits or privileges enjoyed generally by others, as in Larson and 
Hernandez by withholding taxation exemptions, because no one religion is thereby 
preferred to the extent of becoming a national church. In this respect, the coercion test 
rests on almost the same limited concept of establishment which the High Court of 
Australia adopted earlier in the State Aid Case,^''^ and parallels the scope of the High 
Court's interpretation of the Commonwealth establishment clause. This will be 
discussed in chapter VII.'3° In effect Lee v Weisman might therefore represent as 
decisive a rejection of the concept of separation as, it will be seen, took place in State 
Aid, but there are two factors which require us to suspend judgment on this at present. 
The first is that the majority in Lee expressly refused to reconsider Lemon v Kurtzman 
or the general principles of establishment clause application.'3' Lee's coercion test 
might, at worst, still be limited to government school prayer cases. The second is that 
the Supreme Court's adjudication on the establishment clause since Lee v Weisman has 
not expressly confirmed its implicit rejection of Lemon or of some concept of 
separation. 
'^ * Wallace note 79 supra at 100. 
^^'^Attorney-General (Vic) (ex rel Black) v Commonwealth (1981) 146 CLR 559. 
'3° VII: § 2,3 and 7 infra. 
'3' Lee note 6 supra at 480. 
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This second factor could be exemplified by any of the Court's decisions on the 
establishment clause since Lee, but its most recent decision in Rosenberger v University 
of Virginia is sufficient to serve this purpose.'3^ The University, a State insdmtion, 
paid monies to a Smdent Activities Fund (SAF) which was used to meet printing costs 
incurred by smdent groups that published material related to the University's 
educational purposes. However, it refused permission to pay the printing costs of Wide 
Awake, a newspaper which included comment on a range of issues within the relevant 
educational purposes, but from a Christian (and specifically evangelical Protestant) 
perspective. The University's decision was challenged as offensive to Wide Awake's 
smdent publisher's liberty of expression under the First Amendment's free speech 
clause. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals to rejected the claim:'33 and its decision 
y 
neady ilustrates how secularist establishment clause interpretation had become under 
Lemon v Kurtzman, and also how this secularist interpretation had undermined the 
judicamre's ability to expound an adequate scheme of equal basic liberties under the 
First Amendment. It held that the smdent publisher's liberty of expression had been 
burdened because he had been treated unequally in comparison to non-religious smdent 
publsihers, and so the University had discriminated on the ground of a Christian 
viewpoint. But the remarkable aspect of the Fourth Circuit's decision is that it held that 
this discrimination was legitimate because it was acmally required by the First 
'3^ Rosenberger v Rector and Visitor of University of Virginia US LEXIS 4461 (1995) 
{"Rosenberger IF); see also Lamb's Chapel v Center Moriches Union Free School 
Bistrict 61 LW 4549, esp at 4553 (1993); Zorbrest v Catalina Foothills School Bistrict 
61 LW 4641 (1993); Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School Bistrict v 
Grumet 62 LW 4665 (1994). 
'33 Rosenberger v Rector and Visitor of University of Virginia 18 F 3d 269 (1994) 
{"Rosenberger I"); see also 795 F Supp 175 (1992). 
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Amendment's establishment clause.'3"* 
In 1995 the Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit's decision.'3^ It is thus 
possible that Rosenberger evidences a more pronounced concem by the Court that the 
establishment clause not be used to promote secularism or religious inequality and, 
therefore, its continuing unwillingness to apply the concept of separation or Lemon v 
Kurtzman. However, for a number of reasons it also revives serious uncertainty in the 
Court's establishment clause interpretation. First of all, the majority judgment was 
delivered by Justice Kennedy and joined by Chief Justice Rhenquist and Justices Scalia, 
O'Connor and Thomas although the latter two justices also delivered concurring 
judgments. Justice Kennedy held that Wide Awake was not a religious instimtion, and 
so the case did not even involve the problem of whether religious and non-religious 
groups were being treated unequally.'3^ This necessarily limits Rosenberger's 
potential to serve as a controlling establishment clause precedent. Secondly, despite the 
criticism of the "nonentanglement" element of Walz and Lemon in Bowen v Kendrick, 
the majority in Rosenberger assumed it was still a valid constimtional requirement.'3' 
Thirdly, in her concurring judgment Justice O'Connor more directly recognised that the 
case involved a collision between the concept of separadon (and specifically its 
prohibition on the provision of assistance to religious groups) and the principle of 
religious equality, and held that in this case the equal treatment of Wide Awake and 
other publications was required. However, Justice O'Connor also denied that this 
'3"* Rosenberger I note 133 supra at 282-7. 
'3^ Rosenberger U note 132 supra. 
'3^ Rosenberger II note 132 supra at 43-7. 
'3' Ibid at 47. 
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represented the necessary lexical priority of "neutrality" over "the funding 
prohibition".'3* These collisions, she held, do not require "categorical answers" and 
must be resolved by "careful judgment" on, presumably, no principled basis.'3^ 
Fourthly, the minority Justices Souter, Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsberg and Stephen 
Breyer held that Wide Awake was a religious publicadon and that the establishment 
clause prohibited the indirect provision of financial assistance to the newspaper through 
the SAF.'"*° This conclusion necessarily assumes the separation of church and state 
or nonentanglement. Indeed, only Justice Thomas suggested in his concurring judgment 
that religious groups could have equal access to governmental benefits and privileges 
that were available to other groups, and therefore that Wide Awake's printing costs 
could be paid from the University's SAF.'**' 
The last three points suggest that there might still be majority support on the 
United States Supreme Court for some concept of separation, and the possibility is 
reinforced by the Court's failure in Rosenberger even to discuss Lee v Weisman or the 
coercion test.'"*- The result in Rosenberger shows that a religious equality 
interpretation of the establishment clause can help to produce a practicable and adequate 
scheme of equal basic liberties because it would allow the provision of assistance to 
'^^ Ibid at 53. 
'3^ Ibid at 55-6. Justice O'Connor explained Everson note 2 supra in these terms: "the 
decision reflected the need to rely on careful judgment - not simple categories - when 
two principles, of equal historical and jurispmdential pedigree, came into conflict": 
Rosenberger II note 132 supra at 55. 
"° 7^ /6? at 79-136. 
' ' ' Ibid at 68. 
" ' C / / ^ / ^ a t 9 3 . 
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Wide Awake through the SAF to meet the demands of both the establishment and free 
speech clauses simultaneously. However, at present it is uncertain how the Court views 
separation, the endorsement test, the coercion test, Lemon v Kurtzman or Lee v 
Weisman. It is still possible that Lee represents a critical mming point in establishment 
clause interpretation but until Lemon v Kurtzman is addressed expressly this assessment 
must be suspended. Until this occurs, the only existing certainty in the Supreme 
Court's establishment clause interpretation is that it is, in Justice Souter's words, in 
"hopeless disarray".'•*3 
§ 8: Conclusion 
In remrning the discussion to the justice of the political constitution developed 
in the United States, the religion clauses in the First Amendment, consistently with 
principles of a secular commonwealth, properly remove decisions about religion from 
the legislative majority in a parliament and, indeed, from any branch of government 
except the courts of judicamre. But even here the judicamre is not, provided it honours 
its special obligation to act as custodian of the constimtion and to use public reason, 
negotiating or limiting the practice of the citizen's religious conceptions. Instead, it is 
refining and applying the instimtions which acmally limit government's ability to deal 
with the citizen's religious liberty. 
In contrast to the British principle of toleration, the problem in the United 
States, in terms of the principles of a secular commonwealth, has not therefore involved 
either the source of the citizen's right to equal religious liberty or the process for 
securing that right. Instead, the concem is with the Supreme Court's consistent 
"3 Ibid at 75. 
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secularist interpretation of the establishment clause as requiring government to 
discriminate against religious groups. The concept of separation, as stated in Everson 
and adjusted in Lemon v Kurtzman, required government largely to deny benefits and 
privileges (available to non-religious groups) to groups just because they were religious. 
It has been a theme of this chapter that, inmitively. Supreme Court justices have 
resisted this result as unjust and, in consequence, have ignored the concept of 
separation, have made exceptions to it and possibly even, in Lee v Weisman, implicitly 
rejected it. It has proved to be impracticable and impossible to implement consistendy 
even in the country which nurmred it. 
There is some argument that, in his Memorial and Remonstrance, even Madison 
proposed the irrelevance of the citizen's religion to his political and legal stams as a 
central instimtion of constimtional government, and the separation of church and state 
merely as a means to realising that. '*'* The Virginia Religious Freedom Act also made 
equal citizenship, irrespective of the individual's religion, the primordial instimtion of 
secular government, and more recently Justices O'Connor and Souter have identified 
the same theme as essential to the demands of the establishment clause.'"*^ In the 
small government of Jefferson's and Madison's time separation might have supported 
this central idea of a secular commonwealth, but not in the modem welfare state. For 
'*^  Eg in criticising the proposal to levy an assessment in support of Virginia's 
churches, Madison wrote: "[t]he Bill violates that equality which ought to be the basis 
of every law ... by subjecting some to peculiar burdens ... [and] granting to others 
peculiar exemptions." 
"... It degrades from the equal rank of citizens all those whose opinions in 
religion do not bend to those of the legislative authority ..." [like the Quakers and 
Mennonites who rejected public support for their churches]: see JF Wilson and DL 
Drakeman note 15 supra at 69-70 and 71. 
"*^  See § 4 supra; Lynch note 94 supra at 687; Lee note 6 supra at 506; see also 
Rosenberger II note 132 supra. 
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religion has illegitimately become relevant to the citizen's political stams if it is the 
operative reason why government cannot use a particular group for the provision of 
educational, welfare and health services, even though at the same time non-religious 
groups can be used by government for those purposes. 
Still, even without doubts about the extent of its applicability or its continuing 
stams as a precedent, Lee v Weisman did not bring establishment clause interpretation 
to the point where the political constimtion in the United States can be said to realise 
the principle of equal religious liberty. For, while the possible implicit rejection of 
Lemon v Kurtzman was legitimate, the narrowing of establishment clause interpretadon 
to the coercion test was probably not. In particular, the Supreme Court overlooked 
y 
"neutrality", a prominent secondary theme of establishment clause interpretation that 
has co-existed with separation and, as I discussed in § 5, occasionally undermined it. 
Because some scholars like Professor Wojchiech Sadurski equate the term "neutrality" 
with "separadon", it is probably better to refer to the Supreme Court's concept of 
neutrality as equivalent to the liberal principle of religious equality.'"*^ This principle 
has been recognised by the Court through Everson, Larson, Bowen and Mergens and, 
in effect, Rosenberger. Those decisions are probably incompatible with Lemon v 
Kurtzman, but the Court has long refused to address the continuing viability of the 
Lemon paradigm. In practicality it cannot co-exist with these substantial anomalies for 
too long, and in principle the anomalies should not be left unexplained or, at at present, 
establishment clause interpretation left in suspension at all. In chapter VIII, we will see 
that the Court and (through its Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993) Congress 
have ensured that the free exercise clause gives adequate protection to religious liberty 
146 C/W Sadurski, "Neutrality of Law Towards Religion" (1990) 12 Syd L Rev 420. 
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in the United States. If the United States Supreme Court were to reconcile the practice 
of Rosenberger with principle and expressly interpret the establishment clause as 
requiring religious equality, it will have taken important steps to securing the central 
political principle of a secular commonwealth in that country: steps the High Court of 
Australia should also consider seriously. 
PART 2: 
THE CONSTITUTION 
J 
VI. SECTION 116: 
ORIGINS, GENERAL SCOPE 
AND OPERATION 
§ 1: Introduction 
The Commonwealth Constimdon includes two provisions relating to religion, 
together representing a compromise on the political and social stams of religion in 
Australia at Federation in 1901. On the one hand, the Preamble to the Commonwealth 
of Australia Constitution Act begins: 
Whereas the people of New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, 
Queensland, and Tasmania, humbly relying on the blessing of Almighty 
God, have agreed to unite in one indissoluble Federal Commonwealth 
1 
Patrick Glynn, the sponsor of this "recognition clause", intended by it to mark the 
Constimtion with a permanent declaration of divine omnipotence and etemity.^ This 
is counter-balanced, on the other hand, by the religion clauses of section 116 of the 
Constimdon. These imitate, combine and expand the First Amendment and the test 
clause in the United States Constimtion, and provide that "[t]he Commonwealth shall 
Emphasis added. 
^ Official Record of the Bebates of the Australasian Federal Convention: Third Session 
(Sydney 1986) p 1733 {"Official Record"). 
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not make any law for establishing any religion ("the establishment clause"), or for 
imposing any religious observance ("the observance clause"), or for prohibiting the free 
exercise of any religion ("the free exercise clause"), and [that] no religious test shall 
be required as a qualification for any office or public tmst under the Commonwealth 
("die test clause")." However, in comparison especially to section 116's American 
ancestors the subsequent impact these provisions have had on relations between 
government and religion has been limited. The recognition clause is probably of 
historic and symbolic importance only. In contrast, the religion clauses have only made 
minimal demands for secular government because, in the first place, they are not 
expressed to apply to the States and, in the second, the High Court has interpreted 
section 116 narrowly. Still, it is premamre to dismiss either the recognidon or religion 
clauses as a "dead letter" since, if only because they have constimdonal stams, they 
remain the central controlling instimtions of governmental relations with religion in 
Australia.3 They therefore require close examinadon and, throughout this part, are 
considered from two perspectives. 
1. The interpretation of the clauses by the judicamre is oudined and evaluated. 
Here, substantive anomalies in the High Court's interpretadon of the religion clauses 
are idendfied. I submit that the limited meaning the Court read into section 116 in a 
series of decisions made between 1979 and 1983 is inconsistent with the liberal 
interpretadon that the High Court, under the leadership of Chief Justice Sir John 
3 C/K Mason, Constancy & Change (Sydney 1990) p 118; M Hogan "Separadon of 
Church and State: Section 116 of the Constimtion" (1981) 53 Aust Qtly 214 at 226; 
NFK O'Neill "Constimtional Human Rights In Australia" (1987) 17 Fed L Rev 85 at 
118. 
184 VI: § 1 
Ladiam, gave to section 116 in Jehovah's Witnesses.^ It is also inconsistent with the 
interpretation of religion clauses in operation in other common law countries and the 
High Court's more recent interpretation of other constimtional liberties and limitations 
on governmental powers. 
2. The scope, operation and interpretation of the religion clauses are evaluated 
in accordance with the theory of a secular commonwealth. I suggest that the religion 
clauses of section 116 can be reinterpreted to provide a more principled response to 
religion in Australia, and consider the possible extension of the religion clauses to the 
States. 
y 
However, in this chapter I discuss more generally the origins of the recognition 
and religion clauses (§§2 and 3), the impact of the recognition clause (§ 2) and, as 
background to the interpretation of the religion clauses, the High Court's decision in 
Jehovah's Witnesses (§ 4) and the general principles of interpretation the Court has 
stated for secdon 116 (§ 5). I also consider the impact of section 116 on the three 
branches of government in Australia (§ 6), and on the various levels of government (§ 
7). Finally, I consider the attempts in 1944 and 1988 to extend section 116 to the 
States (§ 8). This chapter provides the historical and legal context needed to understand 
die discussions in chapters VII and VIII on the position of the religion clauses in the 
Australian political constimtion, and the promise they offer for a more complete 
^Adelaide Company of Jehovah's Witnesses Inc v Commonwealth (1943) 67 CLR 116 
{"Jehovah's Witnesses"); Cf Church of Scientology Inc v Woodward (1979) 154 CLR 
79 {"Scientology /"); Attorney-General (Vic) (ex rel Black) v Commonwealth (1981) 146 
CLR 559 {"State Aid"); New v New, Unreported, 5 March 1982, High Court of 
Australia {"New"); Church of Scientology Inc v Woodward (1982) 154 CLR 25 
{"Scientology IF); Church of the New Faith v Commissioner of Pay-roll Tax (Vic) 
(1983) 154 CLR 120 {"Scientology III"). 
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realisation of a secular commonwealth in this country. 
§ 2: The Recognition Clause 
Even though there was some degree of religious pluralism in the Bridsh colonies 
in Australia in the 1890s, there was a large homogeneous Christian majority that shaped 
the colonies' dominant culmral pattems.^ The Preamble to the Constitution Act 
resulted from the demands of this majority to have God "recognised" in the Constimtion 
and, in part, may have been motivated by the churches' hope of securing through the 
recognidon clause a special stams in the new Commonwealth. Protestants led the cause 
for "recognidon", but public support was even more broadly based and included 
Catholics and some Jews. Though secularist opposition to recognition secured the 
rejection of a religious Preamble by the 1897 Constimtional Committee in Adelaide, the 
churches had consolidated their position by the time the Melboume Convention met in 
1898. There, the present recognition clause was agreed to on the voices.^ 
The Preamble therefore reflects Christian political and social dominance, a 
quality it shares with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and, even more 
overtly, the Papua New Guinea Constimtion.' However, there has been some doubt. 
^ In 1901, the nadonal Census indicated that 97.5% of Australians identified with a 
Christian denomination. The largest groups were Anglicans (40.28%), Catholics 
(23.02%), Methodists (13.56%), Presbyterians (11.46%) and Baptists (2.4%): R 
Humphreys and R Ward, Religious Bodies in Australia (Melboume 1988) p xi; c/I: § 
5 supra. 
^ R Ely, Unto God and Caesar (Melboume 1976) pp 21, 24, 33-5, 38, 45 and 69-74; 
JA La Nauze, The Making of the Australian Constitution (Melbourne 1972) p 128; 
Official Record note 2 supra at 1732-41; cf Official Record of the Bebates of the 
Australasian Federal Convention: Adelaide 1897 (Sydney 1986) pp 1184-9. 
' "Canada is founded upon principles that recognise the supremacy of God and the mle 
of law", and "We, the people of Papua New Guinea ... pledge ourselves to guard and 
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most strongly expressed during the Federation debates, as to how the majoritarian 
religious ideas implicit in the language of recognition are to be reconciled with the 
political rights of religious and non-religious minorities.* The leading objector to a 
religious Preamble in the 1898 Convention, Henry Bournes Higgins, had concerns that 
it could legitimate unequal preferences for the religious majority, especially through 
Sunday closing legislation.^ In 1891 in Church of the Holy Trinity v United States,""^ 
the United States Supreme Court had relied on national religious patterns to hold that 
Americans were a "religious people" and the United States "a Chrisdan nation", and 
to use this majoritarian position to uphold preferential immigration treatment for an 
Anglican clergyman." Higgins does not seem to have understood the implications of 
the decision in Holy Trinity properly, but he contended that, if this were possible in the 
y 
United States where the Constimtion did not expressly recognise God, a religious 
Preamble was even more likely to enable the Commonwealth legally to offend religious 
equality.'^ 
Higgins' arguments probably overstated the potential impact of the Preamble's 
recognition clause. The common law principle is that a preamble only oudines the 
pass on to those who come after us our noble traditions and the Christian principles that 
are ours now". 
* In this connection, the texmal surrounds of the recognition clause are significant. The 
Preamble's language of assimilation is strong, involving references to the agreement of 
"thepeople ... to unite in one ... Commonwealth". 
^ Official Record note 2 supra at 1769-70; see also State Aid note 4 supra at 612 and 
634. 
"^  143 US 457 (1891). 
" Ibid at 465 and 471; see also Zorach v Clauson 343 US 306 at 313 (1952). 
'^  Cf Official Record note 2 supra at 1769-70; CL Pannam, "Travelling Section 116 
with a US Road Map" (1963) 4 Melboume Univ L Rev 41 at 54. 
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reasons for enacting legislation. Hence, it has no direct legal effect.'3 However, if 
the language of the relevant legislation is ambiguous, its preamble could be used to help 
interpretation and, therefore, could have indirect effect.''' In this context a religious 
preamble in a constimtion could operate symbolically to express the country's dominant 
religious ideas, but legally it is likely to be regarded as subordinate to any express 
requirements of equal religious liberty. Indeed, the adjudicadon has tended to deny any 
legal effect to the majoritarian messages in religious preambles. In 1985, the Supreme 
Court of Canada casually rejected the argument that the religious Preamble to the 
Charter could limit the operation of its express right to religious liberty in section 2 
(a).'^ In 1988, the Ontario Court of Appeal discussed the same issue more 
comprehensively in Zylberberg v Sudbury Board of Education.^^ There, it was 
suggested that the Preamble to the Charter legalised the recitation of the Lord's Prayer 
and public Bible readings in Provincial schools." The majority held that the Preamble 
could only be used to resolve ambiguity and therefore, whatever the Preamble might 
mean, it could not be used to limit the unambiguous right to religious liberty in section 
2 (a).'* Still, Justice Maurice Lacourciere's dissent in Zylberberg is precisely the 
'3 RD Lumb and GA Moens, The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia 
Annotated 5th ed (Sydney 1995) p 38; DC Pearce, Statutory Interpretation in Australia 
2nded (Sydney 1981) p 11. 
'^  Southern Centre of Theosophy Inc v South Australia (1979) 27 ALR 59 at 66; RD 
Lumb and GA Moens note 13 supra; DC Pearce note 13 supra at 51-2; c/C Howard, 
Australian Federal Constitutional Law 3rd ed (Sydney 1985) p 6. 
'^  i? V Big M Brug Mart [1985] 1 SCR 295 at 355; cf R v Morgentaler [1988] 1 SCR 
30 at 178. 
'^  (1988) 52 DLR (4th) 577. 
" Education Act 1980 (0), s 50. 
'* Note 16 supra at 593; see also Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (ex rel Brown) v 
Rundle 227 A 2d 895 at 896 (1967). 
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opinion which could give credence to Higgins' concems. He held that, as suggested 
by the theism of its Preamble, the Canadian Constimtion built "a bridge between church 
and state".'^ Though conceding that in some respects Canada had secular government, 
he held that government could properly implement positive measures to advance 
religion.^ ° Justice Lacourciere's reasoning reinforces the positive message of Christian 
dominance in the Canadian and, by analogy, the Commonwealth Constimtions. 
However by using the Preamble not merely to resolve ambiguity, but also to define 
basic instimtions of constimtional government. Justice Lacourciere's legal reasoning is 
unpersuasive. In this light, it is only if consistent with the secular requirements of the 
religion clauses that the theism of the recognition clause could have some indirect legal 
effect. Thus, in Papua New Guinea the Christian Preamble to the Constimtion allowed 
y 
Justice Dermid McDermott in the Supreme Court to use Christian principles of human 
dignity to challenge the savagery, vindictiveness and self-righteousness of legislation 
relating to native matrimonial disputes.^' To retain consistency with the religion 
clauses, it is only likely to be through more profound and ecumenical religious ideas 
like these that the recognition clause could have legal implications. It is, therefore, 
unlikely to permit government to apportion unequal benefits and privileges between 
particular religious groups.^' 
'^  Note 16 supra at 610. 
^"^ CfRv Big M Brug Mart [1983] 4 WWR 54 at 76. 
'^ Asi Burunge v John Kaupa, Unreported, Supreme Court of Papua New Guinea, 1983, 
pp 12-13. 
^^  The Constimtional Commission which reported in 1988 recommended against any 
change to the Preamble to the Constitution Act: Final Report of the Constitutional 
Commission - Summary (Canberra 1988) p 2. 
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§ 3: The Religion Clauses: Origins 
Once the Melboume Convention accepted the recognition clause, Higgins 
proposed the adoption of religion clauses to negate any implication it carried that the 
Commonwealth would have power to legislate on religion.-3 He had energetic public 
support in the Seventh-Day Adventists, who had a two-kingdoms theology and held to 
some concept of the separation of church and state, and who were also troubled by the 
prospect of Commonwealth Sunday closing legislation. They began serious 
campaigning for religion clauses in 1897.-'* 
However, Higgins' proposal for Commonwealth religion clauses represented a 
significant change from the 1891 Convention in Sydney which had accepted a free 
y 
exercise clause limiting the powers of the States, but which had also rejected any 
religion clauses which would place limits on the Commonwealth. His initial proposal 
in the 1898 Convention was to place limits on both Commonwealth and State powers 
over religion, but he deferred to States' rights and settled on clauses limiting the 
Commonwealth alone. The Melboume Convention accepted them. Sir Edmund Barton 
made minor adjustments in the drafting stage, and the clauses became section 116.^ ^ 
The origins of the religion clauses tell us little about the precise objectives the 
Founding Fathers hoped to achieve through them. Except in the case of the observance 
clause, I believe these origins also severely restrain the possibility of defining any clear 
original intent capable of informing the positive interpretation of the clauses. Indeed, 
" Official Record note 2 supra at 1770. 
'^* R Ely note 6 supra at 26-30. 
25 Ibid at 1 and 76-88; JA La Nauze note 6 supra at 229. 
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the Founding Fathers seem to have given little consideration to their purpose. 
Obviously, the religion clauses copy the First Amendment and the test clause in the 
United States Constimtion. In the 1898 Melbourne Convention Higgins and Richard 
O'Connor thought that the religion clauses would replicate the operation of the First 
Amendment, although neither seemed to show any real understanding of the purposes 
of the First Amendment or the Supreme Court's early interpretation of its free exercise 
clause.^^ Furthermore, as I discuss in chapter VII, some delegates at the Melbourne 
Convention expressed understandings of the religion clauses which were incompatible 
with readings of the First Amendment taken by the United States Supreme Court in 
1899." In any case, since Federadon in Australia, the Supreme Court has placed 
more emphasis on its understanding of the original intent of the First Amendment and, 
y 
in particular, Jefferson's and Madison's symbolic writings that must be considered less 
relevant to the original intent of the Commonwealth religion clauses.^* 
The observance clause was the only autochthonous contribution to the religion 
clauses. It was the focus of the Melboume Convention debates on the religion clauses, 
and it seems to have been directed at prohibiting Sunday closing legislation. In chapter 
VIII, we will see that the language of the observance clause does not appear to realise 
even this purpose.^^ 
If the original intent of the religion clauses is at all helpful, it must only be to 
^^  R Ely note 6 supra at 87; Official Record note 2 supra at 1769 and 1778. 
" Bradfield v Roberts 175 US 292 (1899); see VII: § 1 infra. 
*^ V: § 4 supra. 
' ' VIII: § 2 infra. 
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the extent that it reveals the general mischief that Higgins, as sponsor, hoped they 
would prevent. This was his (probably misconceived) percepdon of the effect of the 
Supreme Court's decision in Holy Trinity and of the recognition clause: the possibility 
of Commonwealth Sunday closing legislation.3*^ Still, the express terms of the religion 
clauses encompass much more. The blatant plagiarism of the First Amendment and the 
United States test clause was, on the whole, unthinking and in ignorance of their history 
and early interpretation. It merely lends credence to the argument that the acmal 
language of section 116 is largely accidental, imprecise and has litde reference to its 
historical surrounds. 
The High Court made some reference to the religion clauses of section 116 in 
the 1910s and 1920s,3' but did not genuinely attempt to expound its general effect until 
1943 in Jehovah's Witnesses. That decision remains the broadest reading of section 116 
and includes the most comprehensive statements of principle relevant to most aspects 
of its operation. In consequence I refer to Jehovah's Witnesses repeatedly throughout 
the rest of this part and, therefore, now discuss the circumstances of the case at length. 
§ 4: The Jehovah's Witnesses Case 
The Jehovah's Witnesses first met in Australia (as "Millenial Dawnists") in 
1903. The group is a marginal Christian church, with central control over doctrine and 
organisation being exercised by the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society in New York. 
3° § 2 supra. In the Melbourne Convention, Higgins said "... I merely want to preserve 
to the individual state the absolute power of regulating all observances [ie of imposing 
Sunday observances] of this sort": Official Record note 2 supra at 1769-70. 
3' Colonial Sugar Refining v Attorney-General (Cth) (1912) 15 CLR 182 at 194; 
Krygger v Williams (1912) 15 CLR 366; Porter v R; ex parte Yee (1926) 37 CLR 432 
at 448; Judd v McKeon (1926) 38 CLR 380 at 387. 
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It bases its beliefs on the Bible (and emphasises the apocalyptic books), but rejects 
mainstream Christian doctrines like the Trinity, the divinity of Christ and his physical 
resurrection. There is a strong millenialist stream in Witnesses' doctrine. Traditionally 
they have held that these are the end times, although changes in expectation have 
occurred since 1975, which many Witnesses believed would be the year of 
Armageddon. 
In most countries (and especially early in the twentieth cenmry) the Witnesses 
have been viewed with suspicion. There are some moral practices that, socially, are 
considered deviant: notably the refusal of blood transfusions, but also a tendency to 
social isolation. However, it was the bitter criticism of government, business and 
y 
organised religion (and particularly the Catholic Church) by the Watch Tower 
President, "Judge" JF Rutherford, that brought the Witnesses under close surveillance 
in the 1930s. In English-speaking countries, they came into collision with government 
by refusing to participate in government (by refusing to vote, to salute the flag or to 
undertake military service) and by their intolerance of other religious groups. 
Throughout the Second World War, the Witnesses were able to practise their religion 
in the United Kingdom and the United States, but between 1941 and 1943 they were 
banned in Australia.3^ 
Sdll, the events leading to the 1941 ban on the Adelaide Company of Jehovah's 
Witnesses show that some sectarian squabbling was involved. In response to their 
vilification of the Church, the Catholic Archbishop of Sydney, Sir Norman (later 
3^  JA Beckford, The Trumpet of Prophecy (Oxford 1975) p 36; R Humphreys and R 
Ward note 5 supra at 119-25. 
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Cardinal) Gilroy, complained to Commonwealth Attorney-General William ("Billy") 
Hughes about the Witnesses. Though Hughes replied that he was concerned about the 
possible impact of the free exercise clause, he said he doubted that this "ecclesiastical 
curiosity" was a religion and was considering a ban on the Witnesses under the National 
Security Act.^^ The ban was issued on 17 January 1941 under the National Security 
(Subversive Organisations) Regulations, by which the Governor-General could declare 
the existence of any group illegal, if the group was considered prejudicial to the defence 
of the Commonwealth or the efficient prosecution of the war. The group could then 
be dissolved, and its property seized. The doctrines of the group would thereby be 
deemed illegal, and this also made it illegal to print or publish those doctrines, or to 
hold meetings advocating them.3"* In consequence, on a number of occasions the 
Witnesses challenged the ban and the Subversive Organisations Regulations as offensive 
to secdon 116.3^  In the High Court proceedings,3*' it was accepted that the Witnesses 
believed that Satan mled the world through organised material agencies like the British 
Empire and the Commonwealth and that, being devoted to the Kingdom of God, they 
could not be involved in political affairs or participate in war. Otherwise, it was 
accepted that the Witnesses held "primitive religious beliefs". It was also accepted that 
the Witnesses' teaching was prejudicial to the national war effort. Ultimately, the High 
Court held that the ban on the Witnesses was invalid: the regulations were ultra vires 
33 The Lismore Protestant Association also entered this sectarian debate, protesting 
about the ban on the Witnesses and about Catholic political influence: see New South 
Wales Anti-Discrimination Board, Biscrimination and Religious Conviction (Sydney 
1984) paras 5.31-2 pp 204-5. 
^'^ National Security (Subversive Organisations) Regulations (Cth), rr 2, 3, 7-9 and 11. 
^^  See also Smith v Handcock (1944) 44 WALR 21 at 24. 
^^ Jehovah's Witnesses note 4 supra. 
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the parent National Security Act and, in part, the Constimtion's defence power.3' 
Importantly, the High Court also considered section 116. It concentrated on the 
limits to the protection of religion recognised by the free exercise clause and held, by 
a majority, that the ban on the Witnesses could be legitimate under section 116 as 
reasonably necessary for the protection of the Commonwealth. Here, in dissent Justice 
Dudley Williams did hold that secdon 116 invalidated the regulation which made it 
illegal to print or publish "unlawful doctrines" or to hold meetings advocating them.3^ 
However, Chief Jusdce Latham delivered the leading judgment. This is notable 
in that, contrary to Justice Sir George Rich's hesitadons. Chief Justice Latham took the 
y 
opportunity to state a general and abstract principle behind the religion clauses of 
section 116.3^ He said:'*° 
Section 116 ... is based upon the principle that religion should, for 
political purposes, be regarded as irrelevant. 
This principle reflects, of course, the central idea of a secular commonwealth and, (to 
some extent) consistendy with this. Chief Justice Latham's judgment was in the first 
place deeply influenced by liberal political philosophy. In particular. Chief Justice 
Latham consciously drew on Mill's On Liberty but, as I discuss in chapter VIII, there 
are aspects of his opinion that also pre-empt Rawls' theory of basic liberties.'*' 
3' Constimtion (Cth), s 51 (vi). 
3* Jehovah's Witnesses note 4 supra at 165. 
3^  Ibid at 148-9. 
'^  Ibid at 126. 
" Ibid at 131; cfibid at 123 to JS Mill, On Liberty (Harmondsworth 1974) pp 68, 71-2 
and 159; see also VIII: § 4 supra. 
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In the second place. Chief Justice Latham and Justice Sir Hayden Starke relied 
on contemporaneous decisions of the United States Supreme Court to help define 
limitadons to the protection of religion.^^ These cases, which had also involved the 
Jehovah's Witnesses' social deviance, recognised the existence of religious pluralism 
but instimtionalised it, by realising rights to both individual choice and even excesses 
in religion.'*3 
These two considerations establish the importance of Chief Justice Latham's 
judgment in Jehovah's Witnesses in the interpretation of section 116 as a central 
instimtion of secular government in Australia and, indeed, as probably the most 
principled exposition of religion clauses ever made in the common law tradition. It is 
y 
also the most important High Court precedent in the interpretation of section 116, and 
helps to reveal how badly flawed the Court's mm in the interpretation of the religion 
clause was, when it revisited section 116 between 1979 and 1983. 
§ 5: The Religion Clauses: Principles of Interpretation 
The liberal interpretation Chief Justice Latham took to section 116 \n Jehovah's 
Witnesses has not discouraged suggestions that his judgment narrowed its operation.'*^ 
These rest on Chief Justice Latham's reference to the preposition "for", which 
introduces the establishment, observance and free exercise clauses. He held that, in 
''^  Jehovah's Witnesses note 4 supra at 128 and 154-5. 
'3 Schneider v Town of Irvington 308 US 147 (1939); Cantwell v Connecticut 310 US 
296 (1940); Minersville School Bistrict v Gobitis 310 US 586 (1940); see also RC Post 
"Culmral Heterogeneity and the Law: Pomography, Blasphemy and the First 
Amendment" (1988) 76 Cal L Rev 297 at 319-20. 
^ C/PJ Hanks, Constitutional Law in Australia (Sydney 1991) p 433. 
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considering whether a law was "for prohibiting the free exercise of any religion" and 
so invalid, the word "for" indicated that "the purpose of the legislation may properly 
be taken into account".'*^ However, this does not mean that the judicamre takes into 
account only the purpose of legislation or, as I will argue in § 6, administration or 
adjudication in deciding whether it offends section 116. The Court in Jehovah's 
Witnesses implicitly assumed that a regulation purposely directed at the suppression of 
subversive organisations and only burdening religion by its effect might offend the free 
exercise clause. It is therefore more likely that Latham was holding that the judicamre 
could take into account the purpose of governmental action or its effect in deciding 
whether it offended section 116. Thus, Jehovah's Witnesses probably supports the idea 
that the religion clauses limit the purpose and the effect of governmental action. 
The idea that section 116 only limits governmental purposes was nevertheless 
upheld by the High Court in the State Aid Case^" in 1981, a decision relating to the 
validity of Commonwealth financial assistance for religious schools under the 
establishment clause. In State Aid, the Court accepted that the establishment clause 
only controlled governmental purposes. Therefore, it only invalidated governmental 
action if it was deliberately intended for establishing any religion. The Court could not 
resolve whether, to offend the establishment clause, establishing had to be the only 
purpose, or merely a primary or significant purpose. However, it admitted that 
government could indirectly promote or advance any religion, when that was incidental 
to the principal purpose it was pursuing.'*' 
'^^ Jehovah's Witnesses note 4 supra at 132. 
'*^  State Aid note 4 supra. 
47 Ibid at 579, 583-4, 604, 615-16 and 653. 
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Extending the State Aid interpretation to the observance and free exercise clauses 
it follows that, provided government has the necessary secular purpose, it can also 
indirectly and effectively impose any religious observance or prohibit the free exercise 
of any religion. This extension was supported by the Federal Court's decision in the 
Lebanese Moslem Association Case. There, Justice William Pincus had set aside an 
order of the Minister for Immigration (made under Commonwealth Government 
migradon powers) to deport the Imam of the Lakemba Mosque in Sydney, who since 
arriving there in 1982 had constantly been in the centre of controversy with his 
predecessor. Justice Pincus held that the deportation had not necessarily offended 
section 116, but the decision to deport was invalid because, in making the decision, the 
Minister had not expressly considered the relevant demands of the free exercise 
y 
clause.'** On appeal, the Full Court of the Federal Court reversed Justice Pincus' 
decision.'*^ Justice David Jackson adopted the State Aid interpretation that the religion 
clauses only controlled governmental purposes.^'^ 
[T]he question which arises is not whether the [Minister] took into 
account the terms of s 116 ... but rather whether the exercise of power 
is "for" one of the ends provided by s 116. 
In making the decision, the Minister had not deliberately intended to burden the practice 
of religious conceptions in the mosque. In any case. Justice Jackson held that this was 
not the purpose, effect or result of the deportation, although indirectly it could have 
dismpted public worship in the Lebanese Muslim community.^' 
•** Lebanese Moslem Association v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1986) 67 
ALR 195 at 211 and 212-13. 
"•^  Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Lebanese Moslem Association (1987) 71 
ALR 578 {"Lebanese Moslem Association"). 
^^ Ibid at 5S5. 
" Ibid at 593-4. 
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The "secular purpose only" approach reduces the religion clauses to regulating 
the form in which governmental action is expressed. Therefore, it also removes any 
requirement that governmental action have a substantive secular effect. The United 
States Supreme Court read this same limitation into the First Amendment in the early 
1960s, but less consistently because it only applied to the free exercise clause." It 
was soon rejected.^3 j ^ general, the Supreme Court's establishment clause 
interpretation has explicitly required governmental action to have a primary secular 
effect.^ '* In 1990 in Employment Bivision, Bepartment of Human Resources v 
Smith,^^ Justice Antonin Scalia revived the approach by holding that one prohibition 
of the free exercise clause is that government is not intentionally to discriminate against 
religion by imposing disqualifications for religious opinions or stams.^^ However, this 
approach has again been reversed. In 1993 the Congress passed the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act, which has operation as paramount federal legislation and expressly 
provides that effective burdens on religion are prima facie invalid.^' One of the more 
recent approaches taken to the establishment clause in Lee v Weisman^^ also only 
prohibits government's rendering direct benefits to religion, and this obscures the extent 
" Gallagher v Crown Kosher Super Market of Massachusetts 366 US 617 at 631 (1961); 
Braunfield v Brown 366 US 599 at 606 (1961). 
3^ Sherbert v Verner 374 US 398 (1963); McBaniel v Paty 435 US 618 at 633n (1978). 
^^  School Bistrict of Abington Township v Schempp 374 US 203 at 294-304 (1963); 
Lemon v Kurtzman 403 US 602 at 612-13 (1971); Lynch v Bonnelly 465 US 668 at 687-
8 and 690 (1984). 
^^  494 US 876 (1990). 
^^  Ibid at 877. 
'^ Religious Freedom Restoration Act 1993 (US), s 3; see VIII: § 4 infra. 
*^ 120 L Ed 2d 467 (1992). 
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to which the older requirement that legislation have a secular effect now applies.^^ In 
contrast to the judicial experimentation recently taken in Australia and the United 
States, the Supreme Court of Canada has consistently held that the right to religious 
liberty in the Charter limits both the purpose and effect of governmental action.^ 
It has been suggested that the "secular purpose only" approach to section 116 
stems from the High Court's traditional commitment to technical reasoning or, as Chief 
Justice Sir Owen Dixon notably expressed it, "strict and complete legalism".^' That 
may have been the case, but when measured against its more general principles of 
interpretation and its precedents the restrictive approach the Court has adopted for 
section 116 is seriously misconceived and anomalous. The most obvious objection is 
y 
that, contrary to the Court's currently preferred interpretation of constimtional liberties, 
the present approach empties section 116 of any meaningful content. It is now accepted 
that expressed constimtional liberties should be generously interpreted:^^ a more 
principled and balanced position given that since 1920 the High Court has demanded 
that positive grants of Commonwealth legislative power be interpreted generously.^3 
59 V: § 7 supra. 
^ Rv Big M Brug Mart [1985] 1 SCR 295 at 337; R v Edwards Books & Art Limited 
[1986] 2 SCR 713. 
'^ (1952) 85 CLR xi at xiv; H Charlesworth "Individual Rights and the Australian High 
Court" [1986] Law in Context 53 at 53 and 65; S McLeish "Making Sense of Religion 
and the Consdmtion: A Fresh Start for Section 116" (1992) 18 Monash Univ L Rev 207 
at 209-12. 
^^  Eg Street v Queensland Bar Association (1989) 168 CLR 461 at 527 and 569 
(:'Street"). 
" Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 129 
at 153; RD Lumb note 13 supra at 21-2. Indeed, the Court's traditionally broad 
approach to Commonwealth legislative powers and narrow approach to limitations on 
legislative powers strongly suggests that it was reasoning towards enhanced central 
power, and not merely giving effect to the language of the Constimtion. 
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This is also consistent with the generous operation recently given to implied 
constimtional liberties.^ However, to place limits on purposes only imposes the 
smallest demands on governmental power. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v City of 
Hialeah,^^ a decision of the United States Supreme Court before the passage of the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, is one example where government did not meet 
even these demands. There, a City Council in Florida prohibited the rimal sacrifice of 
animals, a prohibition deliberately aimed at the Santeria religion, which was of ancient 
African origin. The Supreme Court applied Justice Scalia's judgment in Smith and held 
that, primarily because the City's ordinances targeted a religious practice, they were 
invalid. ^ ^ 
In Australia, the "secular purpose only" approach would have less impact on 
governmental action than, as shown in Lukumi Babalu Aye, it could have in the United 
States. This is because, as I discuss in § 7, section 116 does not touch State 
governmental power. I recognise that, through the complex interrelations of 
Commonwealth legislative powers and the broad interpretations the High Court has 
given them, the Commonwealth Parliament could, on occasions, pass legislation 
supported by its positive grants of power and, say, specifically directed at burdening 
^ Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1; Australian Capital Television 
Pty Ltd V Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106; Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times 
Ltd (1994) 68 ALJR 713; Stephens v West Australian Newspapers Ltd (1994) 68 ALJR 
765. 
^Ml3 S Ct 2217 (1993); see KA Taylor, "Recent Decisions" (1994) 32 Duquesne L 
Rev 915. 
66 Ibid at 2227-32. 
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a religious group.^' This would therefore offend the "secular purpose only" approach 
of State Aid. However, there is less possibility for section 116 to operate like this than 
for the First Amendment, which does, as in Lukumi Babalu Aye, limit State 
governmental power. The result is that, to a large extent, the "secular purpose only" 
approach enables "colourable evasion" of the liberty.^* To put the issue more 
concretely into the context of secdon 116, it is possible, as Jehovah's Witnesses shows, 
to prohibit the open practice of any religion completely without any deliberate intention 
in the law to touch religion at all. But the mere presence of a provision like section 
116 in the Constimtion suggests it must have some effect, and probably more than is 
presently possible. If it is to have any meaningful operation, section 116 should, 
consistently with other expressed and implied liberties, be interpreted more generously. 
The acmal process of enquiry used in Jehovah's Witnesses directly supports this 
more expansive approach, for it assumes that section 116 controlled governmental 
effects. The Subversive Organisations Regulations had the necessary neutral purpose, 
and did not in express terms operate to limit religion at all. They nevertheless 
effectively imposed a serious ban on the practice of religion. However, the Court 
proceeded on the assumption that the regulations could have offended the free exercise 
clause, because all justices deemed it necessary to examine the permissible limits to the 
protecdon of religion under the free exercise clause, and to determine whether the 
regulations could be considered valid within those limits. Justice Williams held that one 
'^ For the broad approach the Court takes to "characterisation" of Commonwealth 
legislative powers, see eg Actors and Announcers Equity Association of Australia v 
Fontana Films Pty Ltd (1982) 150 CLR 169 at 190-4. 
*^ Eg Hematite Petroleum Pty Ltd v Victoria (1983) 151 CLR 599 at 633; Street note 
62 supra at 487-8, 489, 518 and 527. 
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reguladon did offend section 116.^ ^ Though the Court did not state it explicidy, these 
latter enquiries could only have been necessary if the regulations were prima facie 
offensive to section 116. The High Court's method in Jehovah's Witnesses could 
proceed on no other basis than the assumption that section 116 required, to some extent, 
governmental action to have secular purposes and effects. 
The current approach the High Court is taking to constimtional liberties and 
limitations on governmental power also makes it unsafe to assume that the Court is 
going to maintain the formalism applied to section 116 in State Aid and the Lebanese 
Moslem Association Case. In Street v Queensland Bar Association, Justices Sir Gerard 
Brennan and Sir William Deane implied the need for a broader approach to secdon 
116.'° In addition, the High Court has consistently rejected similar exclusive 
emphases on governmental purposes in the interpretation of sections 90, 92 and 117, 
and has invested these provisions with control over the effect of governmental action." 
^'^ Jehovah's Witnesses note 4 supra at 131-2, 149, 155 and 160. 
'° Street note 68 supra at 518-19 and 522. 
" Section 90 prevents the States from levying an excise. Excepting Sir Daryl Dawson, 
all present members of the Court reject the idea that, irrespective of its effect, to be an 
excise the levy had to be expressed to operate directly on some step in the process of 
production or distribution. The levy is now also considered an excise if its practical 
effect is to burden production or distribution: Philip Morris Limited v Commissioner 
of Business Franchises (1989) 167 CLR 399 at 433-4, 450, 484-5 and 492. Section 92 
protects interstate trade and commerce, and the Court requires scmtiny of both purpose 
and effect. The test is whether government is imposing a discriminatory burden of a 
protecdonist kind, and the High Court has indicated that "the concept of discriminadon 
... necessarily embraces facmal discrimination as well as legal operation": Cole v 
Whitfield (1988) 165 CLR 360 at 399; Castlemaine-Tooheys Ltd v South Australia 
(1990) 169 CLR 436. Section 117 gives an interstate resident immunity from State 
imposed disabilities and discriminations. The Court, overmling previous authority, has 
unanimously held that the presence of a disability or discrimination could be idendfied 
by considering, not only the legal operation of the legislation, but also its practical 
effect: Street note 62 supra at 487, 489, 510, 518, 524-5, 546, 554, 566, 569, 581 and 
582. 
203 VI: § 5 
These can no longer be regarded merely as isolated constmcdons of the provisions 
concerned. Together, they prove a general principle of examining the effect of 
governmental action in addition to its purpose when interpreting the operadon of 
constimtional limitations and liberties.'" In Street. Justices Deane and Mary Gaudron 
partially justified reinterpreting section 117 on the ground that the Court had rejected 
any preference for form over substance in its interpretation of sections 90 and 92.'3 
In this light, the only principled response to section 116 would be that it, too, is to 
impose some limitation on governmental effects. It would be a glaring sole anomaly 
in the Court's existing paradigm of constimtional interpretadon for the Court to retain 
the State Aid approach to the interpretation of section 116. 
y 
The oudined revision is likely to upset existing interrelations in the interpretation 
of section 116 and, through somewhat complex interactions, require additional revisions 
to other aspects of its operation. First, especially in considering the impact of the free 
exercise clause on governmental effects, section 116 could become a more potent 
demand of religious equality. This is clouded by the High Court's decision on the 
establishment clause in State Aid which, as I discuss in chapter VII, is itself open to 
reconsideration.'^ Secondly, it negates the legitimacy of some suggested limitations 
to the protecdon of religion under the free exercise clause. These issues will be 
considered in chapter VIII.'^ 
'^  See Hematite Petroleum Pty Ltd v Victoria (1983) 151 CLR 599, 633; cf Philip 
Morris Ltd v Commissioner of Business Franchises (1989) 167 CLR 399, 450-1. 
'3 Street note 62 supra at 524-5 and 569. 
'^  VII: §§6 and 7 infra. 
'^  VIII: §§ 3 and 4 infra 
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§ 6: Limits on Legislative, Executive and Judicial Power 
Section 116 states that "[t]he Commonwealth shall not make any law" for any 
object prohibited by the establishment, observance or free exercise clause. These 
limitations therefore apply generally to all Commonwealth legislation. They touch 
legislation passed under the specific powers given to the Commonwealth Parliament in 
secdons 51 and 52, but these are nonetheless expressed to be subject to the rest of the 
Constimtion, which necessarily includes section 116. However, other Commonwealth 
legislative powers also seem to be limited by secdon 116.'^ Specifically, it has been 
held to limit the powers the Parliament has to appropriate monies under section 81 and 
to make State grants under section 96." In § 7, we will see that most dicta of High 
Court justices also suggest that section 116 limits the Commonwealth's power to make 
y 
laws for the government of Territories under section 122. 
To remove any remaining ambiguity inherent in the reference to "law" in section 
116, the Constimtional Commission which reported in 1988 recommended that the term 
be deleted from section 116 to ensure that the provision extended to non-legislative 
governmental actions. In particular, the Commission was concemed that section 116 
did not expressly apply to executive power or administradve action.'* However, most 
other governmental action like administration must be intra vires the legislation 
authorising it. In State Aid, Chief Justice Sir Garfield Barwick recognised that this 
brought subordinate legislation and executive administration, like proclamations, 
stamtory mles and by-laws, into the compass of section 116. He held that, to the extent 
'^  Eg Jehovah's Witnesses note 4 supra at 123 and 156. 
" State Aid note 4 supra at 576, 593, 618 621 and 651. 
78 Note 4 supra at 37-8. 
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that Commonwealth legislation authorised executive action which did not have an 
appropriate secular purpose, the parent legislation itself would be invalid. Thus, the 
dependent executive action would also be invalid.'^ So, in the Lebanese Moslem 
Association Case, the Federal Court could hold that Commonwealth migration 
legislation could not authorise a decision for prohibiting the free exercise of any 
religion. Therefore, section 116 had immediate application to an order to deport a 
Muslim Imam, even though in that particular case the Court held that the decision did 
not acmally offend the demands of the free exercise clause.*° 
Currendy, the orthodox position seems to be that judicial orders made in the 
exercise of Federal or Territory jurisdiction are not controlled by section 116. The 
y 
application of section 116 to the granting of orders under the Matrimonial Causes Act 
of 1959 (Cth) and the Family Law Act of 1975 (Cth) had been recognised by the 
matrimonial courts up until 1982.*' Then, in an application for special leave to appeal 
to the High Court in New v New,^- Chief Justice Sir Harry Gibbs expressly rejected 
the application of secdon 116 to judicial orders. The problem he saw lay in the use of 
the word "law". This only addressed legislation, and did not speak to the judicamre. 
He therefore thought the Family Court should disregard the operation of section 116 in 
child custody causes.*3 However, the Family Court has continued to hold section 116 
'^  State Aid note 4 supra at 580-1; cf FD Cumbrae-Stewart, "Section 116 of die 
Constimtion" (1946) 20 A U 207 at 208. 
*° Lebanese Moslem Association note supra at 579 and 584. 
*' See IX: § 4 infra. 
*^  New note 4 supra. 
*3 Ibid at 2, 3 and 7. 
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relevant to the determination of these disputes.*"* This, despite Chief Justice Gibbs' 
decision in New v New, is also more consistent with the rationale Chief Justice Barwick 
gave in State Aid for applying section 116 to executive administration. For orders made 
in matrimonial causes are authorised by Commonwealth legislation, and to the extent 
that the parent legislation allows decisions amounting to, say, the establishing of any 
religion, the legislation could be invalid. The Court rejected this argument in New v 
New,^^ but did not state why this principle should extend section 116 to the executive 
government and not the judicamre. 
§ 7: Limits on the Commonwealth, States and Territories 
Section 116 is found in Chapter V of the Commonwealth Constimtion, entided 
"The States", but this is misleading and only helps to prove the unthinking, accidental 
origins of the provision. For, as we will see, the States are the only political entities 
in Australia which are not directly limited by section 116. However, the locadon of 
section 116 in Chapter V of the Constimtion might suggest that it is declaratory; 
reinforcing that the Commonwealth has no power to legislate with respect to religion 
and that such a power is reserved to the States.*^ Tme the Commonwealth has no 
express power over religion,*' and even under its corporations power the 
*" See IX: § 4 infra. 
*^  New note 4 supra at 3. 
*^  The United States Supreme Court has recognised that similar considerations may have 
led to the adoption of the First Amendment, but this does not affect the substantive 
operadon given to its religion clauses: School Bistrict of Abington Township v Schempp 
374 US 203 at 254-5 and 309-10 (1962); Wallace v Jaffree 472 US 38 at 113 (1985); 
cf Jaffiee v Board of Commissioners of Mobile County 554 F Supp 1104 (1983). 
87 State Aid note 4 supra at 654. 
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Commonwealth is unable to regulate the acdvities of religious corporations.** (There 
are, as I mentioned in § 5, some possibilities that the Commonwealth might be able to 
regulate religious groups through the complex interaction of Commonwealth powers.) 
Sdll, section 116 is more than a declaratory provision. In Jehovah's Witnesses, Chief 
Justice Latham held that "[i]t is an overriding provision" and "prevails over and lunits 
all provisions which give power to make laws".*'^  This understanding has some 
implications for the interpretation of the religion clauses. The provision is a limitadon 
on Commonwealth power. Each separate religion clause must therefore be able to limit 
some actions which, if that clause were not to exist, would otherwise be permissible 
exercises of Commonwealth power. Thus, it is doubtful that any part of section 116 
can be properly interpreted so as only to prohibit actions which would not otherwise be 
within Commonwealth power. It would render the clause declaratory, and deny its 
effective overriding and limiting operation. 
It seems unlikely that any implication that section 116 extends to the States could 
be extracted from its location in Chapter V.^ This position is in marked contrast to 
the United States, where the due process clause in the Fourteenth Amendment has been 
held to extend both the establishment and free exercise clauses to the States,^' and to 
Canada, where the Charter ordinarily limits the powers of both the Dominion and 
** Constimtion, s 51 (xx); Huddart Parker & Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead (1908) 8 CLR 
330 at 393; R v Federal Court of Australia; ex parte Western Australian National 
Football League (Inc) (1979) 143 CLR 190 at 234. 
*^  Jehovah's Witnesses note 4 supra at 123; see also ibid at 156. 
^ Cf Scientology I note 4 supra at 83; Street note 62 supra at 485 and 503. 
'^ Cantwell v Connecticut 310 US 296 at 303 (1940); Everson v Board of Education of 
the Township ofEwing 330 US 1 at 15 (1947). 
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Provincial parliaments. Except in Tasmania, which has free exercise and test clauses 
in die State Constimtion,^ in no State of Australia is there any express constimtional 
limit on governmental powers relating to religion and, on the whole, relations between 
government and religion in the mainland States are largely moderated by the unwritten 
principle of toleration and, with less precision, by principles of public reason.^3 
Its inapplicability to the States has nevertheless not prevented justices from using 
section 116 to shape adjudication on matters of State competence. In doing so, they 
have resorted to section 116 to legitimate principles of religious equality as demands 
of the common law. Nelan v Bownes^'^ was an appeal from the Supreme Court of 
Victoria to the High Court, and concemed a setdement of £50 for masses for the repose 
of souls. In England, such settlements had been held invalid under Reformation 
legislation as superstitious uses.^^ However, the High Court held that the legislation 
had not been received into the law of Victoria or any other State, and the bequest could 
be treated as charitable. Justice Sir Isaac Isaacs, another Founding Father, used section 
116 to reinforce that conclusion. Holding that in Australia all religions stood equally 
before the law, he said that "[i]t is not unimportant that the people of the 
Commonwealth have declared their public policy on the subject by sec. 116 of the 
Constimtion".^^ He admitted that this did not determine the State law of tmsts, but 
^ Constitution Act 1934 (Tas), s 46. 
'3 See II: § 8 supra; IV: § 7 supra. 
^^ (1917) 23 CLR 546; c/M Blakeney "Sequestered Piety and Charity - A Comparative 
Analysis" (1981) 2 Jnl Legal Hist 207 at 220-3. 
'^  1 Edw VI c 14. 
^^  Note 94 supra at 568. 
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was "a strong indication of public policy" suggesting the correct legal posidon.^ 
Similarly, Justice Michael McHugh alluded to section 116 as a signpost of religious 
equality in Canterbury Municipal Council v Moslem Alawy Society."^^ There, a 
majority of the New South Wales Court of Appeal held that a house used for prayer and 
the reading of the Koran was a "place of public worship" for town planning purposes, 
even though the general public had no access to it. In reaching this conclusion, Jusdce 
McHugh held that a court should be reluctant to give legislation an interpretation which 
in effect gives preference to one religion over another.^^ 
The preservation of religious equality has always been a matter of 
fundamental concern to the people of Australia and finds its place in the 
Constimtion, si 16. 
In both cases, religious equality is considered a legitimate objective of State 
y 
adjudication. In the Moslem Alawy Case it was probably decisive, because there was 
a sound line of precedent against the majority's interpretation. Here, section 116 is 
used only to indicate that some legal manifestadon of the principle of religious equality 
exists, even though according to more conventional legal method it could not apply 
directly to the case. 
The 1988 Constimtional Commission recommended the express extension of 
secdon 116 to the Federal Territories, although in this case the recommendation was 
probably only made to have uncertainty about the provision's applicability to the 
Territories clarified."^ There should be little doubt about the impact of section 116 
'^ Ibid. 
*^ [1985] 1 NSWLR 525. 
^^  Ibid at 544. 
'°° Consdmdonal Commission note 22 supra at 37-8. 
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on government in the Territories. It controls the Commonwealth power to legislate for 
the government of the Territories in section 122 of the Constimtion, and therefore the 
powers the Commonwealth delegates to the Territories could not be larger than the 
powers of the parent Commonwealth Parliament as limited by section 116. Initially, 
some doubts were expressed about the operation of section 116 on the Territories 
power.'°' But more recent obiter dicta overwhelmingly support the application of 
secdon 116 to the Territories. These include comments by a majority of the High 
Court in Lamshed v Lake,^^-^ a unanimous Court in Teori Tau v Commonwealth^^^ 
and two justices in State Aid.^^ In the latter case Justice Gibbs, who consistendy 
took a narrow approach to section 116, sdll remained in doubt, but the point is best 
regarded as settled.'°'^ The potential operation of secdon 116 here is extensive 
y 
because, like the States, the Territories have a general power to legislate on religion. 
However, there are no reported decisions involving any alleged contest between section 
116 and Territory governmental powers.'°^ 
"" Porter v R; ex parte Yee (1926) 37 CLR 432 at 448; HT Gibbs "Section 116 of the 
Constimtion and the Territories of the Commonwealth" (1947) 20 ALJ 375; c /FD 
Cumbrae-Stewart note 79 supra; CL Pannam "Section 116 and the Federal Territories" 
(1961) 35 A U 209. 
'°^ (1958) 99 CLR 132 at 143, 152 and 154. 
'°3 (1969) 119 CLR 564 at 567 and 571. 
"^ State Aid note 4 supra at 621 and 649. 
'°^  Ibid at 594; see HT Gibbs note 101 supra; and New note 4 supra. 
"^ Cf Scandrett v Bowling (1992) 27 NSWLR 483. The New South Wales Court of 
Appeal was asked to determine the effect of section 116 on its capacity to prevent the 
Bishop of Canberra-Goulbum from ordaining women to the Anglican priesthood in 
violation of Anglican ecclesiastical law. It did not deal with the issue, but perhaps it 
was because the Bishop's diocese extended into the Australian Capital Territory that 
section 116 was thought to be relevant: ibid at 517-18, 519 and 566, and see X: § 1 
infra. 
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§ 8: The 1944 and 1988 Referenda 
The extension of section 116 to the States has been proposed twice: in 1944 and 
1988. On both occasions, it was rejected. It is widely recognised that the 
Commonwealth Constimtion is hard to amend, principally because the amending 
Commonwealth legislation must be approved, in most cases, by the electors voting in 
referendum, and because two majorities must be obtained: a majority of electors 
overall, and a majority of electors in a majority of the States.'°' In practice, at least 
while voting in referenda remains compulsory, the support of both the Commonwealth 
Government and Opposition seems necessary (but not sufficient) if the two majorities 
are to be secured. In neither 1944 nor 1988 was there bipartisan support, nor was 
either majority obtained.'"* 
The 1944 referendum mainly related to powers the Commonwealth I^bor 
Government thought it needed to undertake national post-war reconstmction, and these 
were to expire five years after the Second World War ended. Commonwealth Attomey-
General and former High Court justice HV Evatt KC had an extension of section 116 
to the States included in the referendum, although curiously, as Evatt recognised, this 
would also be temporary: the extension of the religion clauses also to expire five years 
after the war ended.'°^ His intention was that, during this period, there would be a 
107 See and c/Constimtion (Cth), s 128. 
'°* 42 referenda have been held since Federation, but only eight have succeeded: E 
Campbell, "Changing the Constimtion - Past and Fumre" (1989) 17 Melboume Univ 
L Rev 1 at 2, 6, 20 and 22. 
'°^ "Section one hundred and sixteen of this Constimtion shall apply to and in relation 
to every State in like manner as it applies to and in relation to the Commonwealth": 
Constitution Alteration (Post-war Reconstruction and Bemocratic Rights) Act 1944 
(Cth), s 2 (3); see also s 2 (5). 
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more comprehensive Constimtional Convention to consider a complete revision of the 
Commonwealth Constimdon. The Government's case for extending the religion clauses 
was, simply, that in light of the recent rise of totalitarian government it was time to 
reinforce liberal democracy, even if there was no present and immediate threat to 
religious liberty in Australia. In the House of Representatives, Evatt argued that it was 
anomalous that the religion clauses only limited the Commonwealth when, given the 
distribution of legislative powers between the Commonwealth and the States, State 
legislation was more likely to threaten religious liberty."° 
In the 1944 referendum, the recommended amendments on Commonwealth 
power, the religion clauses and, also, a proposal to introduce a free expression clause 
were presented as one question to the electorate. However, the United Australia-
Country Parties Opposition objected to any enlargement of Commonwealth legislative 
power as it was intended to provide the Labor Government with the means of 
socialising the national economy. It therefore campaigned against the proposal, 
although the extension of the religion clauses was not, to the Opposition, a point of 
contention.'" 46% of electors overall voted on favour of the 1944 referendum. 
"° Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Bebates (Canberra 1944) clxxvi pp 
1152-4, and clxxviii pp 1403-6; Referendum to be taken on the Proposed Law 
Constitution Alteration (Post-war Reconstruction and Bemocratic Rights) Act 1944 
(Brisbane 1944) p 10; Commonwealth Government of Australia, You ... and the 
Referendum (1944?). 
' " I t was, at worst, called a distraction, but the Opposidon's official case did not even 
refer to the religion clauses. It did acknowledge that the electorate was, despite some 
unobjectionable aspects to the proposal, forced to reject them all if, as the Opposition 
recommended, the amendments for increasing Commonwealth legislative powers be 
rejected: Commonwealth of Australia Referendum note 110 supra at 12 and 14; see 
generally JB Paul, "The 1944 Referendum" in Proceedings of the Second Conference 
of The Samuel Griffith Society: Upholding the Australian Constitution (Melboume 
1993) pp 225-62. 
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There were majorides in South Australia and Westem Australia."^ 
If any public debate on the extension of the religion clauses in 1944 was 
swallowed by the central issue of socialism, that was not the case in 1988. The 
referendum followed a recommendation of the Constimtional Commission that section 
116 be extended and clarified. Once more the concern was that in no State except 
Tasmania were governmental powers over religion limited, and this concem had been 
enhanced by the 1984 decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South 
Australia in Grace Bible Church Inc v Reedman,^^^ a decision I discuss in chapter 
IX.""* The Commission also recommended that the terminology of section 116 be 
adjusted slighdy to clarify its operation in the Territories, and that it limited executive 
y 
action as well as legislation."^ Four separate referenda were presented to the 
electorate in 1988, although the extension of the religion clauses was grouped with an 
extension of rights to due process and property as one question. This time the debate 
about the proposed religion clauses dominated the question, although there is evidence 
to suggest that the Liberal-National Parties Opposition only objected to them to give 
coherence to a broader political strategy. 
"^ E Campbell note 108 supra at 20. 
"3(1984)54 ALR 571. 
114 IX: § 1 infra. 
"^ "The Commonwealth, a State or a Territory shall not establish any religion, impose 
any religious observance or prohibit the free exercise of any religion, and no religious 
test shall be required as a qualification for any office or public tmst under the 
Commonwealth, a State or a Territory": Constitution Alteration (Rights and Freedoms) 
Act 1988 (Cth), s 4; Constimtional Commission note 22 supra at 37-8; M Sneddon, 
"Religious Freedom" (1988) 62 Law Inst Jnl 844. 
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The Commonwealth Government's case for the extension and revision of section 
116 repeated that of the Constimtional Commission."^ The Opposition's shadow 
Cabinet also seems to have supported the referendum on the religion clauses, but to 
have objected to two of the other 1988 referenda on extending parliamentary terms and 
introducing equal-sized electorates in all levels of government. However, a joint 
meeting of all Liberal and National Party members of Parliament rejected shadow 
Cabinet's position, and decided to reject all proposals being presented to the 
electorate.'" This, of course, enabled the Opposition to present a simple message of 
rejection to the electorate and, in tmth, may not have been motivated by its general 
opinion on the merits of the religion clause proposal."* Nevertheless, the campaign 
raised, amongst Opposition parliamentarians, religious leaders and lawyers, a number 
y 
of broad objections to the proposed extension and clarification of the religion clauses. 
1. It is recognised that there is widespread ignorance of the content of the 
Commonwealth Constimtion throughout the electorate, and this has been confirmed by 
empirical evidence since 1988."^ But some (including at least one eminent lawyer) 
"^  Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Bebates (House of Representatives) 
(Canberra 1988) clxi p 2390; Parliamentary Bebates (Senate) (Canberra 1988) cxxvii 
p 2528. 
'" P Austin, "Coalidon rejects all referendum proposals" Australian, 11 May 1988, p 
1. Liberal members from Queensland were able to campaign in support of equal-sized 
electorates: Note, "Constimdonal Reform" [1988] Refonn 183 at 185. 
"* "Irradonal Opposition" (editorial) Canberra Times, 20 May 1988, p 2. 
"^  Civics Expert Group, Whereas the people ... : Civics and Citizenship Education 
(Canberra 1994) pp 18-21 and 129-58; In 1988, some polling suggested that only 54% 
of Australians even knew that there was a Commonwealth Constimtion. This suggests 
that a high proportion of Australians, who are compelled to vote in referenda, do not 
even understand the reason why a referendum is held: see B Galligan, "The 1988 
Referendums in Perspective" in B Galligan and JR Nethercote (eds). The Constitutional 
Commission and the 1988 Referendums (Canberra 1989) p 130; "The 1988 Referendums 
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seem to have thought that the Constimtion already protected religious liberty in the 
States, and could not understand what the Government intended the referendum to 
achieve.'^° 
2. The Anglican Dean of Sydney, Lance Shilton, asserted that there was already 
a reasonably clear understanding of religious liberty in Australia (without elaborating 
what that understanding was), and that an amendment of section 116 was only likely to 
confuse that.'^ '^ This is largely a matter of impression, but given that, to understand 
relations between government and religion in Australia, one must consider the 
Commonwealth Constimtion, the Tasmanian Constitution Act, the unwritten principle 
of toleradon, an unstated governmental commitment to an imprecise idea of public 
y 
reason and, as I will discuss in part 3, an extensive range of legislation and 
adjudicadon, the Dean's assertion is debatable. His stance is one that has confidence 
in the principle of toleration, by which the mainland States enjoy a large measure of 
religious liberty, and is related to other arguments that the only real guarantee of 
religious liberty is a civic obligation of mumal respect.'^ "^ 
3. The more serious arguments centred on contentions that an amended section 
and Australia's Record on Constimtional Change" (1990) 43 Parliamentary Affairs 497 
at 501. 
'^ ° JG Starke, "The Failure of the Bicentennial Referendum to Amend the Constimdon, 
3 September 1988" (1988) 62 A U 976 at 977; c/L Bowen, "The Yes Case" Australian 
Law News, August 1988, p 22. 
'^ ' "Referendum 'Could Lead to Religious Confusion'" Canberra Times, 15 August 
1988, p 2. 
'^ ^ Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Bebates (Senate) (Canberra 1988) 
cxxviii p 552; R Davis, "An Exercise in Obscuring the Tmth" Australian, 16 August 
1988, p 14. 
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116 would enable the High Court to import some concept of the separation of church 
and state and, in particular, the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the 
First Amendment's establishment clause.''3 The first and most common of these was 
that an amended section 116 would lead the Court to re-open the State Aid Case, and 
so possibly prohibit governmental financial assistance to religious schools. This became 
the thmst of the Opposition's campaign against the referendum on the religion clauses. 
The argument depended on the substimtion of the predicate "shall not make any law for 
establishing any religion" in the establishment clause with "shall not establish any 
religion", which the Constimtional Commission recommended to clarify that section 116 
encompassed administrative action.'^'* In the House of Representatives, Opposition 
Leader John Howard and, throughout the campaign, shadow Attorney-General Peter 
_y 
Reith argued that the reason why, in State Aid, the High Court had allowed 
governmental assistance to religious schools was its interpretation of the words "make 
any law". It was argued that as, should the referendum succeed, these words would 
be omitted from section 116, the High Court could reconsider the question of assistance 
for religious schools.'^^ On legal advice, the Australian Catholic Bishops Conference 
raised a similar argument, concluding that "a 'Yes' vote on this question could in fact 
end up seriously restricting freedom of religion". Father Frank Brennan SJ later 
criticised this conclusion as a lost opportunity for the bishops to see the Vatican II 
"3 See V: §§ 5 and 6 supra. 
'^ '* Constimdonal Commission note 22 supra at 37-8. 
'^ ^ R Alston, "The No Case" in B Galligan and JR Nethercote note 119 supra at 102; 
Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Bebates (House of Representatives) 
(Canberra 1988) clxii pp 578-81; Parliamentary Bebates (Senate) (Canberra 1988) 
cxxviii pp 550-1 and 553; P Reith, "The No Case" Australian Law News, August 1988, 
p 25; "No, Yes, No, No is the Best Result" (editorial) Australian, 2 September 1988, 
p 10. 
217 VI: § 8 
declaration Bignitatis Humanae realised in the Australian political constimtion.'^^ 
The Opposition Leader and the bishops both expressed a preference that questions of 
religious liberty be decided in parliaments, and not the judicamre.'" 
This argument relies on an extraordinary misreading of State Aid, in which, as 
I discuss in chapter VII, the High Court decided the validity of governmental assistance 
to religious schools on the basis of its interpretation of the concept of establishment, 
expressed in section 116 in the present participle "establishing".''* In the proposed 
amended section 116, this was only to be changed to the present indicative "establish", 
and it is unlikely that this would have had interpretative significance. Indeed, in State 
Aid Justices Sir Harry Gibbs, Sir Keith Aickin and Sir Ninian Stephen acmally 
discussed the question of governmental assistance by reference to the verb "establish" 
(as it appeared in 1988 in the proposed amendment) and never regarded the grammatical 
contrast to "establishing" as important.'^^ Hence, while reconsideration of State Aid 
is always possible, it is unlikely that it could ever have been due to the clarification of 
the religion clauses proposed in 1988. 
The second of these concerns about the possible introduction of the United States 
Supreme Court's interpretation of the establishment clause had more convincing legal 
'^ ^ F Brennan, "The 1988 Referendum - A Lost Oppormnity for an Australian 
Declaration on Religious Freedom" (1992) 69 Australasian Catholic Record 205 at 207 
and 215-16. 
^'^'^ Ibid; Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Bebates (House of Representatives) 
(Canberra 1988) clxii p 581; Parliamentary Bebates (Senate) (Canberra 1988) cxxviii 
p552. 
'^ * VII: § 3 infra. 
'^' State Aid note 4 supra at 597-8 and 606. 
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support. These related to the sponsorship of religious practices like prayer in State 
schools and Nativity scenes on government property, both of which, as we saw in 
chapter V, have been held by the Supreme Court to offend the First Amendment's 
establishment clause.'3° Once more an extension to the States of section 116's 
establishment clause, as interpreted in State Aid, is unlikely to have had these 
consequences. However, the extension of the observance clause to the States would 
almost certainly have made prayer in State schools unconstimtional.'3' The likely 
effect that an extended section 116 would have on Nativity scenes on government 
property is harder to assess. 
In 1988, all referenda were roundly defeated. The quesdon including the 
extension and clarification of the religion clauses received support from only 30.79% 
of electors overall, and did not obtain a majority in any State. This makes it the least 
successful referendum presented to the electorate since Federation and, given that the 
debate on this question concentrated on its impact on governmental assistance to 
religious schools, this is more likely to be due to the electorate's concems about the 
religion clauses than the rights to due process and property.'3^ 
§ 9: Conclusion 
The 1944 referendum cannot realistically be considered an electoral judgment 
on the extension of the religion clauses to the States. This is not the case for the 1988 
'3° V: §§ 5 and 6 supra; Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Bebates (House 
of Representatives) (Canberra 1988) clxii pp 376-7; D Russell, "Protection May Spell 
Prohibition" Australian, 16 August 1988, p 15. 
'^ ' See VIII: § 2 infra. 
'^ ^ B Galligan and JR Nethercote note 119 supra at 119 and 137. 
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referendum. The decisive rejection of this referendum removes an extension of section 
116 from proposals for constimtional change in Australia in the foreseeable fumre. 
This is the most serious practical obstmction to the realisation of a secular 
commonwealth in this country. In chapter II, I discussed how the principle of equal 
religious liberty is best included in the political constimdon, where it can effectively 
limit parliamentary power.'33 However, some (including Opposition leader John 
Howard and the Catholic bishops) who argued against the extension of section 116 in 
1988 denied this very principle. They preferred to allocate responsibility for decisions 
about religious liberties and equalities to the legislative majority in a parliament, 
ultimately leaving the protection of religious minorities to a civic obligation of mumal 
respect on the part of members of parliaments.'3-^ I certainly hold that religion 
y 
clauses must be supplemented by parliamentary legislation implementing the principle 
of fair equality of oppormnity and a civic and official obligation of public reason if, as 
nearly as practicable, religion is to be regarded as irrelevant to a citizen's political, 
legal and social stams.'3^ But, as I discussed in chapter IV, without religion clauses 
a citizen's religious liberty is regarded as having its source in the powers of 
government, rather than constimting a limitation on government. Furthermore, the 
evidence shows that members of parliaments do not always demonstrate civic or official 
respect for religious groups. We have already seen that, in the way the Court of 
Session applied parliamentary legislation in Strathbogie 11,^^^ it has been used severely 
133 II: § 6 supra. 
'3'* F Brennan note 126 supra at 207; Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary 
Bebates (House of Representatives) (Canberra 1988) clxii pp 578-81; R Davis note 122 
supra at 14. 
'3^  II: §§ 7 and 8 supra. 
"^ Presbytery of Strathbogie v Cruickshank (1840) 2 D 585. 
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to curtail the practices of even the religious majority, and more recently the Parliaments 
of South Australia, Victoria and Westem Australia have either banned or restricted at 
least one religious minority: the Church of Scientology.'3' In conditions of 
increasing religious pluralism, the risk that governments can even accidentally limit a 
new (and unknown) religious minority's liberty also increases. In consequence, the 
only practicable means for realising equal religious liberty is to allow the unpact of 
governmental action to be tested by the citizen or religious group as the possible burden 
on the practice of religious conceptions arises. This requires enforcement of a supreme 
constimtional limitation on government, most likely through litigation and judicial 
review.'3^ 
y 
Still, the result of the 1988 referendum on amending the religion clauses in the 
Commonwealth Constimtion means that, in practical terms, proposals for religion 
clauses applicable to the States must be redirected elsewhere: either towards the 
separate inclusion of religion clauses in each individual State constimtion; or to the 
inclusion of religion clauses in the Australia Act, which largely relates to the 
government of the States generally. 
1. Amending State Constitutions. The separate amendment of State constimtions, 
on the one hand, is easier to achieve. Individual State constimtions can be amended by 
legislation passed by the relevant State parliament. This also probably means that, on 
the other hand, any religion clauses included in a State constimtion (like the present 
Tasmanian free exercise and test clauses) can also be repealed by an ordinary majority 
'3' I: § 4 supra; IV: §§ 6 and 7 supra. 
'3* See II: § 6 supra. 
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in the relevant State parliament. Even if the State parliament decides to impose special 
procedures (like a special majority in parliament or a State referendum) for the repeal 
of any religion clauses, under existing State constimtional law there are doubts as to 
whether that special procedure would have to be honoured by a later parliament.'3^ 
2. Amending the Australia Act. One means of amending the Australia Act is 
Commonwealth legislation approved by all State parliaments.'''° This method (or the 
referendum procedure for amending the Commonwealth Constimtion) would also have 
to be used to repeal any religion clauses applicable to the States that were included in 
the Australia Act, and so the principle of equal religious liberty would better protected 
if embodied in religion clauses in the Australia Act. than in State constimtions. 
y 
However constimtional instimtions in Australia have to be amended to secure the 
principle of equal religious liberty, it is now obvious that the question of governmental 
assistance to religious schools has to be addressed expressly. The argument that an 
amended section 116 would reopen the State Aid Case was, as I have discussed. 
'3^ See Australia Act 1986 (Cth & UK), s 6. This requires a State parliament to comply 
with any special procedure imposed for amending the State constimtion if the amending 
legislation relates to "the constimtion, powers and procedure of the [State] Parliament" 
(emphasis added). See also Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 (UK), s 5. It could be 
argued that legislation amending or repealing State religion clauses does relate to the 
"powers" of the State parliament because religion clauses limit parliamentary power. 
It remains uncertain whether a State parliament would have to comply with a special 
procedure imposed on amending legislation not relating to "the constimtion, powers and 
procedure of the Parliament": see RD Lumb, The Constitutions of the Australian States 
5th ed (Brisbane 1991) pp 116-31. Of course, if the principle of equal religious liberty 
is inalienable it presumably should not, once included in the political constimdon, be 
possible to repeal even by special majorities: see II: § 6 supra. However, at present 
it is consdmtionally impermissible to make any provision in a State constimtion legally 
and practically impossible to repeal: see W Freidmann, "Trethowan's Case, 
Pariiamentary Sovereignty and the Limits of Legal Change" (1951) 24 A U 103. 
140 See and cf Australia Act 1986 (Cth & UK), s 15. 
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misconceived and on the Opposition's part possibly insincere, but given the emphasis 
placed on it in the 1988 referendum campaign it seems to have been the most important 
reason for the referendum's failure. It cautions us that any fumre proposals for religion 
clauses in Australia must expressly preserve the principle of voluntary engagement: 
here, government's right to provide assistance to religious schools that serve secular 
educational purposes. I contended in chapter II that this is a necessary development of 
the principle of equal religious liberty.''*' But even though equal religious liberty can 
even require government to provide this assistance to religious schools, in State Aid the 
High Court settled on an interpretation of the establishment clause that recognised no 
principle of secular government more demanding than disestablishment. 
J 
141 II: § 6 supra. 
VII. SECTION 116: 
THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
§ 1: Introduction 
The legitimate kinds of co-operation between the Commonwealth and the 
Territories and religious groups should, if the Commonwealth Constimtion is properly 
enforced, mainly be determined by the establishment clause. In consequence, as it is 
the only clause in section 116 exclusively addressing these institutional relations, the 
establishment clause should be prominent in dictating the pattem of secular government 
in Australia. However, it has not served this purpose and, I admit, it is not clear it was 
meant to. Thus, even though it is a close adaptation of the First Amendment's 
establishment clause, it is questionable that the Commonwealth clause was originally 
intended to incorporate the concept of the separation of church and state that the United 
States Supreme Court has subsequently read into the First Amendment's clause. Tme, 
some mood of separation did surround the adoption of section 116. On the one hand, 
the Seventh-Day Adventists who led the campaign in 1897 and 1898 to have religion 
clauses included in the Consdmtion were militant separatists.' There were also some 
Founding Fathers who, at the Melboume Convention in 1898, preferred instimdonal 
relations necessarily implied by the concept of separadon. Sir George Reid believed 
R Ely, Unto God and Caesar (Melboume 1976) pp 26-30. 
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that the Commonwealth should not have been able to give financial assistance to a 
church and Sir Edmund Barton that, under its spending powers, the Commonwealth 
could not channel assistance to a church.^  Still, these comments reveal nothing about 
the effect of the establishment clause. On the other hand, Henry Bournes Higgins and 
Richard O'Connor suggested that the religion clauses would replicate the effect of the 
First Amendment, but both were preoccupied with the observance clause, and never 
supported the concept of separation expressly.3 In any case, in the next year in 
Bradfield v Roberts'^ the United States Supreme Court held that, without offending the 
First Amendment, government could legitimately appropriate monies for a hospital 
conducted by Catholic nuns. Though Bradfield is unclear on the concept of separation, 
the Court did state that financial assistance could be given to a religious group to 
advance a secular purpose: a position that, especially under more recent establishment 
clause interpretation prohibiting excessive entanglement between government and 
religious groups, is hard to reconcile with the concept of separation.^ Indeed, 
separation was not pinned to the First Amendment's establishment clause until 1947.^  
It seems therefore that there was no agreed originally intended purpose to the 
Commonwealth establishment clause, and this lends some legitimacy to an 
^ Official Record of the Bebates of the Australasian Federal Convention: Third Session 
(Sydney 1986) pp 1772 and 1778 {"Official Record"); cfR Ely note 1 supra at 87-8. 
Barton's understanding of the spending powers has been superseded: see RD Lumb and 
GA Moens, The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia Annotated 5th ed 
(Sydney 1995) pp 426-9 and 480-3. 
3 Official Record note 2 supra at 1769-70 and 1778-9; R Ely note 1 supra at 87. 
" 175 US 291 (1891). 
^ Ibid at 298-9; V: §§ 5 and 6 supra. 
^ Everson v Board of Education of the Township ofEwing 330 US 1 at 15-16 (1947); 
V: § 5 supra. 
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autochthonous approach to the clause's interpretation. The High Court only seized this 
oppormnity in the State Aid Case,^ in 1981. 
§ 2: The State Aid Case 
The question of governmental financial assistance for religious (and principally 
Catholic) schools had vexed colonial governments in Australia, but assistance was 
terminated in the 1880s in all colonies except Queensland, where a programme of per 
capita grants for all school smdents maintained indirect assistance into the twentieth 
cenmry. However, the question was more generally revived with new funding and 
stmcmral pressures on both State and Catholic schools in the 1950s. Then, the 
combined political power of Catholic and mainstream Protestant coalidons and the 
practical reality that a viable Catholic school system relieved pressure on the State 
schools brought Commonwealth assistance to religious schools in the late 1960s.* 
Commonwealth legislation passed between 1969 and 1979 authorised the 
Commonwealth Government to provide financial assistance to non-government schools 
but, though the Catholic school system was its primary beneficiary, it placed no 
restricdons on religious practices or instmction in the supported schools.^ The 
Commonwealth claimed the power to pass the legislation under its spending and 
^Attorney-General (Vic) (ex rel Black) v Commonwealth (1981) 146 CLR 559 {"State 
Aid"). 
* M Hogan, The Catholic Campaign for State Aid (Sydney 1978) pp 1-6; The Sectarian 
Strand (Melbourne 1987) pp 94 and 251-5. 
^Independent Schools (Loans Guarantee) Act 1969; Schools Commission Act 1973; 
State Grants (Schools) Act 1973-4; State Grants (Schools) Act 1976; State Grants 
(Schools) Amendment Act 1976; State Grants (Schools Assistance) Act 1976; State 
Grants (Schools Assistance) Act 1977; State Grants (Schools Assistance) Act 1978; State 
Grants (Schools Assistance) Amendment Act 1977; State Grants (Schools Assistance) 
Amendment Act 1978 (Cth). 
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Territories powers and withdrew the monies under its appropriations power. "^  In 
1981, the legislation was challenged in the High Court by the Council for the Defence 
of Government Schools (or "DOGS") organisation, an interest group originally formed 
in evangelical Protestant circles. DOGS obtained the support of secularists, teachers 
and parents of smdents in State schools, and through the late 1960s and early 1970s had 
operated as a political party and lobby group. Its political oppormnities collapsed on 
the election in 1972 of Gough Whidam QC's (pro-aid) Commonwealth Labor 
Government, and thereafter the campaign had to be conducted through litigation. The 
State Aid Case came before the High Court when in 1979 Victorian Attomey-General 
Haddon Storey QC granted a fiat to DOGS, allowing it to challenge the Commonwealth 
scheme. 
Three interpretations of the establishment clause were put to the High Court in 
State Aid. The DOGS organisation's success depended on the concept of separation. 
It argued, by reference to the United States Supreme Court's establishment clause 
interpretation, the general principle that the Commonwealth could not recognise or 
render support to a religious group and, more specifically, that Supreme Court decisions 
prohibited governmental assistance for religious schools. Secondly, the defending 
governments and religious schools proposed the national church interpretation, arguing 
diat the establishment clause only prevented the Commonwealth from creating a national 
church or religion. Thirdly, the DOGS organisadon also proposed a religious equality 
interpretation, and argued that the legisladon was invalid under the establishment clause 
because it did not require the equal treatment of religious groups: it did not expressly 
prevent the Commonwealth from conceding preferential treatment to some schools over 
10 Constimdon (Cth), ss 81, 96 and 122. 
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others on the basis of religious affiliation. This interpretation did not necessarily help 
the DOGS' case and, as we will see in § 6, probably would have helped the defendants 
who, however, were not prepared to advance it." In the result, by a strong majority 
of six justices to one the High Court upheld the validity of the legislation and, 
consequendy, removed the question of assistance for religious schools from national 
political and legal debate. 
§ 3: State Aid: The National Church Interpretation 
The majority in State Aid comprised Chief Jusdce Sir Garfield Barwick and 
Justices Sir Harry Gibbs, Sir Ninian Stephen, Sir Anthony Mason, Sir Keith Aickin and 
Sir Ronald Wilson. In substance, they agreed that the establishment clause only 
prevented the Commonwealth from creating a national church or religion. This 
interpretadon largely relied on the meaning of "establishing" in 1900, when the British 
Parliament passed the Commonwealth Constimtion. However the Court did not, as has 
the United States Supreme Court, try to determine the original intent of the 
establishment clause. It expressly excluded all possible references to the debates of the 
Australasian Federal Conventions.'^ Instead, the Court tried to identify the legal 
meaning of the concept of establishment at 1900. In doing so, it drew (more 
orthodoxly) on the Shorter Oxford Bictionary, legal scholarship and obiter dicta and 
(more heterodoxly and less convincingly) on the Westminster Confession of Faith. ^^ 
Justice Gibbs probably relied on the most conventional and cogent source in referring 
" State Aid note 7 supra at 561-75; see also PD Lane "Commonwealth Reimbursements 
for Fees at Non State Schools" (1964) 38 A U 130. 
'^  State Aid note 7 supra at 577-8 and 654. 
" Ibid at 582, 596, 606, 612-14 and 653. 
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to Justice Sir Walter Phillimore's description of the English religious establishment in 
Marshall v Graham.^'^ 
The process of establishment means that the State has accepted the 
Church as the religious body in its opinion tmly teaching the Christian 
faith, and given it a certain legal position, and to its decrees, if rendered 
under certain legal conditions, civil sanctions. 
So, under the national church interpretation, the establishment clause prohibits the 
Commonwealth or a Territory from creating a national (or Territory) religion of the 
dimension and reach and with the incidents of the Church of England or, according to 
Justice Mason, the Church of Scotland and, presumably as it was before 1871, the 
Church of Ireland.'^ The namre of that establishment is complex, imprecise and, as 
Justice Stephen admitted in the case of the Church of England, a product of all its 
relations with the government.' However, some sense of the arrangements which are 
prohibited emerges from Chief Justice Barwick's elaboradon of the process of 
"establishing", which he based on the Westminster Confession. The process involved, 
said Chief Justice Barwick. "the entrenchment of a religion as a feamre of and 
identified with the body politic ... so as to involve the citizen in a duty to maintain it 
and the obligation of, in this case, the Commonwealth to patronize, protect and promote 
the established religion."" On this understanding, the Court properly held that the 
Commonwealth's assistance for religious schools did not approximate a religious 
establishment, and therefore complied with the establishment clause. 
" [1907] 2KB 112 at 126. 
'^  State Aid note 7 supra at 616. 
'^ Ibid at 601. 
'' Ibid at 5S2. 
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§ 4: State Aid: The Dissent 
Even as early as 1962, as a Labor senator for New South Wales, Lionel Murphy 
had argued an interpretation of section 116 that assumed the separation of church and 
state.'* In the light of this and his personal secularist beliefs, it is not surprising that, 
as a High Court justice in State Aid, he accepted the DOGS organisation's argument 
that the Commonwealth establishment clause required the separation of church and 
state. His primary reason for endorsing "strict separation" in State Aid was the United 
States Supreme Court's establishment clause interpretation. Justice Murphy held that 
the First Amendment's establishment clause had been held to prohibit the provision of 
financial assistance for religious schools, and therefore that section 116's establishment 
clause prevented the Commonwealth from providing any assistance to a religious 
school. The legislation therefore offended the establishment clause, and was invalid.'^ 
But, even if the Supreme Court's decisions were relevant in interpreting section 
116, Justice Murphy's recourse to them was selective. Significantly, he did not apply 
the three elements of Lemon v Kurtzman^^ which the Supreme Court had set as the 
paradigm for establishment clause interpretation (until at the earliest 1983).^' Jusdce 
Wilson did address the elements of Lemon, which he held to be inapplicable. He 
'* Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Bebates (Senate) (Canberra 1962) xxii 
pp 1225-9. Murphy argued, seemingly on the basis of Torcaso v Watkins 496 US 488 
(1961), that section 116's test clause prohibited the Royal Australian Navy from asking 
questions about servicemen's religious affiliation. Torcaso, despite its addressing a 
religious test, was decided on the basis of the First Amendment's establishment clause: 
see VIII: § 5 infra. 
'^  State Aid note 7 supra at 622-3 and 632-3; see V: § 5 supra. 
'° 403 US 602 (1971). 
'^ See V: § 6 supra. 
230 VII: § 4 
nevertheless applied them in obiter dicta, and held that, in intentionally advancing 
public educational objectives, the legislation had a secular purpose and a primary 
secular effect. In addition, he thought that the administrative arrangements between the 
Commonwealth and religious schools did not amount to an "entanglement" of 
government and religion." Therefore, to Wilson, even in applying some concept of 
separation the legislation would have been valid. But this did not lead either him or the 
other majority justices to venmre beyond anything but the most limited interpretation 
of the establishment clause possible on the legal sources available. 
§ 5: State Aid: Legal Evaluation 
The meaning of the participle "establishing", which dictates the substantive 
y 
limits imposed by the establishment clause, is not immediately self-evident. Obviously, 
the diverse sources that supported the national church interpretation of State Aid help 
to show that, around Federation, the national church interpretation of "establishment" 
could be drawn from English law.^ 3 However, it does not follow that this represents 
the only relevant interpretation of the concept or, more importantly, the most 
appropriate interpretation of the Commonwealth establishment clause. There are a 
number of other legal considerations that suggest that a more expansive interpretation 
of the establishment clause is preferable. 
1. Inappropriate Precedents. Though the majority claimed to focus on the legal 
^^  State Aid note 7 supra at 656-1. This conclusion, especially in relation to the 
entanglement element, is not necessarily compatible with the Supreme Court's decisions 
on assistance for religious educational instimtions: see V: § 6 supra. 
" This interpretation could also be supported on the basis of Canadian sources: MH 
Ogilvie, "What is a Church by Law Established?" (1990) 28 Osgoode Hall U 235. 
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meaning of the concept of establishment in 1900, Chief Justice Barwick and Justice 
Wilson effectively placed more significance on a Calvinist understanding of the concept 
from the seventeenth cenmry. This occurred through the importance they placed on the 
concept of establishment discussed by the House of Lords in General Assembly of the 
Free Church of Scotland v Lord Overtoun.^'' The decision in Overtoun was certainly 
contemporaneous with Federation. However, a closer examination of the decision 
would reveal that the question before the House of Lords was whether the Free Church 
had held the concept of establishment as expressed in its subordinate standard, the 
Westminster Confession of 1643, as a fundamental doctrine at the time of the Dismption 
in 1843.^ ^^  Justice Gibbs recognised that the concept of establishment discussed in 
Overtoun was an inappropriate interpretation of section 116 and, indeed. Chief Justice 
Barwick's and Justice Wilson's treatment of Overtoun undermines the coherence and 
persuasiveness of their judgments.^^ 
2. Original Intent. The second consideration is the original intent of the 
establishment clause. I have already argued that there is litde possibility of defining 
any clear original intent in section 116 capable of informing its positive interpretation, 
and that there was no agreed originally intended purpose to the establishment clause in 
particular." This also means that it can be said with certainty that the Founding 
Fathers did not positively intend that the establishment clause only prohibit the creation 
of a national church or religion. This is also why, in State Aid, it helped the Court's 
^^  [1904] AC 515; see State Aid note 7 supra at 582 and 653; X: § 6 infra. 
^^  See III: § 6 supra. 
^^ Cf State Aid note 7 supra at 596-7. 
" V I : § 3 supra; § 1 supra. 
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purpose to exclude all possible references to the Federation debates.^* The minimal 
and vague evidence on the Founder's understanding of the establishment clause can 
only, at best, be said to support a more expansive interpretation. 
3. Australian Precedents. State Aid is notable in that the justices' failed 
even to mention previous decisions relevant to Commonwealth establishment clause 
interpretation. I admit that, in these decisions, the judicamre only referred to section 
116 generally, and did not isolate the establishment clause in particular. However, they 
all related to instimtional relations between branches of Commonwealth government and 
religious groups and, therefore, are better treated as references to the establishment 
clause than, say, to the observance or free exercise clause. The earliest of these is the 
High Court's 1912 decision in Colonial Sugar Refining Co Ltd v Attorney-General 
(Cth).^'^ In that case. Chief Justice Sir Samuel Griffith suggested that section 116 
prevented the Commonwealth from appointing a Royal Commission "to investigate the 
tenets of any religious body in the Commonwealth, its assets, the administration of its 
revenue, and the internal management of its instimtions".3° If anything, this dictum 
lends more support to Justice Murphy's interpretation of the establishment clause in 
State Aid than to the majority's. The principle on which Chief Justice Griffith based 
this conclusion was not explained, but he seems to have understood that section 116 
prohibited any significant contacts between the Commonwealth executive government 
and religious groups: in short, to have accepted the separation of church and state. 
Though overlooked in State Aid, Chief Justice Griffith's dictum was raised afterwards 
*^ State Aid note 7 supra at 577-8 and 654. 
^^  (1912) 15 CLR 182. 
30 Ibid at 194. 
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in the Second Scientology Case^^ in 1982, in support of an unsuccessful applicadon to 
have an Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) investigation into the 
Church of Scientology restrained. However, all claims under secdon 116 in Scientology 
II were later abandoned.3^ State Aid and Scientology II would suggest that, now. 
Chief Justice Griffith's dictum has no authority. 
The more important line of decisions emerged in the matrimonial courts, where 
it has been held consistently that section 116 requires the judicamre not to discriminate 
between the competing religious conceptions or practices of litigants in child custody 
causes, where the contesting parties introduce one or the other's religious conceptions 
or practices as a qualification or disqualification to the grant of a custody order, or the 
y 
order relates to the child's religious upbringing or education. This requirement was 
developed in English and Irish courts through the nineteenth cenmry, mainly to honour 
principles of public reason, and was applied in Australian courts in the exercise of 
inherent common law and equitable jurisdiction.33 In 1966, the Supreme Court of 
Queensland, exercising jurisdiction under the Commonwealth Matrimonial Causes Act 
of 1959, relied on section 116 as another reason not to discriminate between competing 
religious conceptions.3"* However, it was only in 1971 that Justice Gordon Carmichael 
positively read this principle of religious equality into section 116. In Evers v Evers,^^ 
3' Church of Scientology Inc v Woodward (1982) 154 CLR 25 at 43. 
3^  Ibid at 45 and 50. 
33 See IX: § 4 infra. 
3^  Mauger v Mauger (No 1) (1966) 10 FLR 285 at 302; Kiorgaard v Kiorgaard and 
Lange [1967] Qd R 162 at 165-7. 
" (1972) 19 FLR 296. 
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bodi parents had been Jehovah's Witnesses although, by the time of her claim for 
custody of her boys, the mother's convictions had lapsed. Justice Carmichael refused 
to take the father's religion into account in making the custody order and, in part, relied 
on secdon 116. Here, it seems he thought that the question involved the free exercise 
clause, but in this respect his reasoning is inexact because he stated the principle by 
reference to religious liberty and instimtional relations between government and 
religion. It is therefore possible that both the free exercise and the establishment 
clauses are involved in this principle, but the distinction between them is one the 
matrimonial courts have still never recognised. Thus, in Evers Justice Carmichael 
concluded that "[t]he freedom I see ... granted [by section 116] is a freedom from the 
imposition of theological ideas: Parliament and the courts cannot prefer Christianity 
y 
to any other religion, or prefer any religion to none at all".3^ This interpretation of 
section 116 has been applied in child custody causes in the Family Court since Evers.^'^ 
These decisions were overlooked by counsel and justices in State Aid even though 
afterwards, in 1982, Chief Justice Gibbs attempted in New v New^^ to exclude the 
operadon of section 116 in child custody causes. Had special leave to appeal to the 
High Court been granted in New, these decisions might also have presented a direct 
challenge to the Court's recent holding in State Aid. In its subsequent decisions in In 
the Marriage of Litchfield^'^ and In the Marriage of Firth,'^^ the Family Court still 
36 Ibid at 302. 
3'7/2 the Marriage of Shulsinger (1977) 8 Fam LR 11,611 at 11,616-7; 7/7 the Marriage 
ofPaisio [1979] FLC 90-659 (78,513-15); KvK [1979] FLC 90-680 (78,630); In the 
Marriage of Plows [1979] FLC 90-712 (78,798); Nv N [1981] FLC 91-111 (76,828); 
cfin the Marriage of Plows [1979] FLC 90-607 (78,116); /AI the Marriage of Grimshaw 
[1981] FLC 91-090. 
3* Unreported, High Court of Australia, 5 March 1982. 
35 (1987) 11 Fam LR 435 at 440. 
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relied on secdon 116 as a source of this principle of religious equality in relations 
between the judicamre and the contesting parties in child custody causes, and it remains 
an operative and competing interpretation of, I believe, the establishment clause.'*' 
4. Ineffective Operation. In chapter VI I mentioned how, according to Chief 
Justice Sir John Latham's judgment in Jehovah's Witnesses,'^^ section 116 must be 
treated as a limitation on Commonwealth power. The result is that each clause of 
section 116 must be able to limit some actions which, if that clause were not to exist, 
would otherwise be legitimate exercises of Commonwealth power.'*3 Therefore, the 
national church interpretation of the establishment clause can only give effect to the 
requirement that the clause be a limitation on Commonwealth power if, without an 
establishment clause, the Commonwealth could validly create a national church or 
religion. The problem is that there seems to be no power or combination of powers in 
the Commonwealth Constimtion that would enable the Commonwealth to constmct a 
national religion of the dimension and reach and with the incidents of the Church of 
England or, if it can be considered established, the Church of Scotland. This arises 
primarily because, as Justice Wilson implicitly recognised in State Aid, the 
Commonwealth has no express power over religion and, secondarily, because it cannot 
even constimte or regulate a religious corporation.'*^ Furthermore, as Justice Wilson 
"^  [1988] FLC 91-171 (76-024). 
" See VI: § 6 supra. 
^^ Adelaide Company of Jehovah's Witnesses Inc v Commonwealth (1943) 67 CLR 116. 
'3 VI: § 7 supra. 
'*'* State Aid note 7 supra at 654; Huddart Parker & Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead (1908) 8 
CLR 330 at 393; i? v Federal Court of Australia; ex parte Western Australian National 
Football League (Inc) (1979) 143 CLR 190 at 234. 
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explicitly recognised in State Aid, it is hard to see how, without those powers, die 
Commonwealth could also rely on other powers to create a national church or 
religion."*^  Therefore, contrary to Chief Justice Latham's judgment in Jehovah's 
Witnesses, the national church interpretation makes the establishment clause a 
declaratory provision. In other words, according to the High Court in State Aid the 
establishment clause means nothing.''^ 
The latter three considerations especially suggest that, even on the basis of the 
legal sources, a more expansive interpretation of the establishment clause is possible 
and, to retain consistency with Jehovah's Witnesses, even preferable. 
I iJ Via Media: Towards Religious Equality 
There is some evidence to suggest that, as understood in the common law 
tradition in the Empire in 1900, the concept of establishment was broader than the High 
Court thought in State Aid. The Irish Church Act of 1869, which like the 
Commonwealth Constimdon was Bridsh legislation, was the nearest legislative 
predecessor to the Constimtion that dealt with the concept of establishment. The 
45 State Aid note 7 supra at 654. 
"^  The establishment clause applies to the Territories and the Territories have, in the 
absence of the Commonwealth establishment clause, powers equivalent to the States 
over religion and, therefore, could create a Territory church or religion. It might be 
argued that this is how the establishment clause operates as a limitation: ie as a 
limitation on Territory (not Commonwealth) power. The argument does not account 
for two consideradons. First, section 116 is expressly directed to the Commonwealth 
(and only by necessary implication to the Territories) and, therefore, its interpretadon 
should principally address its relations with Commonwealth powers. Secondly, there 
were no Commonwealth Territories until 1906, when the British Government 
transferred responsibility for the Territory of Papua to the Commonwealth. Thus, the 
argument does not explain how the establishment clause would have operated as a 
limitadon in the early 19(X)s, when it applied to the Commonwealth alone. 
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preamble to the Irish Church Act stated diat the Church of Ireland (which was united 
widi the Church of England) "should cease to be established by law" and that one of 
the objects of the legislation was to determine "all just and equitable claims" 
(presumably to property) "upon principles of equality as between the several religious 
denominations in Ireland". Thus, the Irish Church Act suggests that, under British 
legislation, (iwestablishment could be understood as a process of equalising the political 
and legal (and to some extent the economic) status of the Church with other religious 
groups. It is possible to suggest therefore that a prohibition on "establishing" can be, 
in British legislative terms, aimed at preserving the equality of religious groups. Tme, 
even though it is British legislation, unlike the Irish Church Act the Commonwealth 
Constimtion was drafted in Australia and Higgins modelled section 116 on the language 
of the First Amendment. But in State Aid the majority used British sources like 
Marshall v Graham and 0\'ertoun, instead of the available Australian or American 
sources. The Irish Church Act only shows that even these permitted a religious equality 
interpretation of the establishment clause. 
The religious equality interpretation has added support in conventional legal 
sources in that, before the High Court decided State Aid, Australian adjudication and 
legal scholarship overwhelmingly supported the idea that the Commonwealth 
establishment clause prohibited the Commonwealth from treating religious groups 
unequally. Indeed, Chief Justice Griffith's dictum in Colonial Sugar Refinery seems to 
have been the only exception to a religious equality interpretadon in the legal literamre 
and, of course, it does not support the national church interpretation of State Aid. 
Where section 116 has been used to help in adjudication on State law, it has always 
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been thought to require a decision consistent with the principle of religious equality."*' 
Furthermore, the matrimonial courts, as I discussed in § 5, have drawn a religious 
equality interpretation of section 116 from principles of public reason traditionally 
applied in child custody causes. 
The scholars have tended to support the same interpretation of the establishment 
clause, but rather by adopting Sir John Quick and Sir Robert Garran's claim (made in 
1901) that the establishment clause prevented "the erection of a State Church, or the 
concession of special favours, titles, and advantages to one church which are denied to 
others".'** This interpretation embodied an unwritten principle of constimdonal 
government that had emerged in the Australian colonies as early as the New South 
y 
Wales Church Acts, but which was consolidated in the late nineteenth cenmry.'*5 In 
an effort to remain out of the denominational disputes (mainly between Catholics and 
Protestants) that had plagued politics and education, colonial governments adopted a 
policy of equal treatment of religious groups.^ ° This obviously informed the 
establishment clause interpretation of Quick and Garran and, soon after. Professor 
Harrison Moore, who termed it "stricdy unsectarian" government.^' The most 
important commentators on section 116 all accepted this principle, which demands more 
"' VI: § 7 supra. 
"** J Quick and R Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth 
(Sydney 1901) p 951. 
5^ C/III: § 7 supra. 
°^ S McLeish, "Making Sense of Religion and the Constimdon: A Fresh Start for 
Section 116" (1992) 18 Monash Univ L Rev 207 at 222-3. 
'^ WH Moore, The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia 2nd ed (Melboume 
1910)p 55. 
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than a prohibition on a national church or religion. ^ ^ 
Still, consistently with the result in State Aid, the scholarly support for the 
religious equality interpretation of the establishment clause did not question the validity 
of non-discruninatory assistance for religious groups." It is somewhat incongmous 
then that, in State Aid, it was the DOGS organisation that raised, as a secondary 
argument, the possibility of a religious equality interpretation of the establishment 
clause. DOGS argued that the principle of religious equality was offended because the 
legislation did not in its terms require assistance to be provided on an equal basis to 
religious schools irrespective of religious affiliation (even if in effect it was).^ "* 
In consequence, some connection between the principle of religious equality and 
the establishment clause was dimly perceived by three justices in State Aid, but all 
refused {sub silentio) to introduce it into establishment clause interpretation. There is 
some intemal incoherence between the reasoning and conclusions of Justices Stephen 
and Mason, who both noted that, in the 1890s, the First Amendment was understood 
to require religious equality, even if this did not prohibit governmental assistance for 
religious schools generally.-^ Justice Mason also held that the principle of religious 
equality was considered more important in colonial Australia than religious liberty. He 
^^  FD Cumbrae-Stewart, "Section 116 of the Constimtion" (1946) 20 A U 207 at 208; 
WA Wynes, Legislative, Executive and Judicial Powers in Australia (Sydney 1976) p 
134; RD Lumb and KW Ryan, The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia 
Annotated 3rd ed (Sydney 1981) p 382; CL Pannam "Travelling Section 116 with a US 
Road Map" (1963) 4 Melboume Univ L Rev 81 at 85. 
3^ See PD Lane note 11 supra at 132. 
'^* State Aid note 7 supra at 564. 
^^  Ibid at 609-10 and 614. 
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even adopted Quick and Garran's interpretation, but qualified it by holding that the 
concession of preferences to one religious group over another could only be invalid if 
it created a national church or religion.^^ Justice Wilson also identified in the 
establishment clause a prohibition on the selection of one religious group for 
preferential treatment, but again only to the extent that it created a national church." 
Hence, in these judgments any effective operation to the principle of religious equality 
was subordinated completely to the prohibition on a nadonal church or religion. The 
reasons are impossible to gauge, as no justice explained his aversion to the religious 
equality interpretation. Indeed, Jusdce Mason gave no reason for qualifying Quick and 
Garran, let alone why that qualification was even necessary to the decision. 
y 
Professor Wojciech Sadurski has argued that only the "strict separation" of 
church and state can realise the principle of religious equality, and therefore that 
governmental financial assistance of religious schools offends this principle.^* In 
chapters II and V, I argued that the principle of equal religious liberty suggests also a 
principle of voluntary engagement, under which governmental privileges and benefits 
generally available to non-religious groups should not be denied to a religious group just 
because it is religious. Otherwise, contrary to the idea of a secular commonwealth 
religion is being treated as relevant to a citizen's political, legal, social and economic 
stams, and government is mming secularist in discriminating against religious 
groups.^^ For two reasons, Sadurski suggested that the provision of assistance for 
^^ Ibid at 612, 613 and 617. 
^Ubid at 653. 
*^ W Sadurski "Neutrality of Law Towards Religion" (1990) 12 Sydney L Rev 420. 
^^  II: § 6 supra; V: § 8 supra. 
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religious schools did not merely equalise the benefits received by citizens who, on the 
one hand, sent their children to State schools and, on the other, to religious schools. 
First, it subsidised "'extra' requirements ... above the minimum already provided": 
extras dictated only by religious considerations.** Sadurski argued that government 
had no duty to subsidise religious preferences like these. Secondly, in determining a 
"neutral" solution between one religious group and another or religion generally and 
non-religion, it was inappropriate to compare between religious schools and State 
schools. It was reasonable to argue that the State schools did not promote secularism 
and, in government's attempt to remain impartial between, say, the religious and the 
secularist, were a just and practicable soludon. The religious was not to be compared 
to the already neutral.^' 
y 
However, in this case Sadurski has probably overstated the source of the 
connection with religion in the provision of governmental financial assistance to 
religious schools. It is tme that government has no general duty to provide assistance, 
and certainly cannot in a secular commonwealth subsidise religious practice without 
offending the requirement that it only pursue secular objectives.^^ However, it 
misconceives governmental assistance, as provided historically in Australia, to 
concepmalise it as a duty of government. It is better concepmalised as a voluntary 
exercise of governmental power. The establishment clause therefore does not, as 
Sadurski implies, deny a duty: it conditions a power. Thus, I agree with Sadurski that 
there is no duty requiring government to provide assistance to religious schools, and 
^ W Sadurski note 58 supra at 438. 
'^ Ibid at 435-40. 
^^  See II: § 6 supra. 
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principles of a secular commonwealth are legitimately realised if government only 
provides assistance for education to cidzens directly through, say, secular State schools. 
But the denial of a duty is not also the denial of power. I contend that, if government 
decides (on practical, economic or political grounds) to exercise a power to provide 
assistance to non-State schools, the establishment clause might then control how that 
power is exercised. So, if a religious equality interpretation of the establishment clause 
were adopted, that assistance must be made available to all non-State schools, whether 
the school be religious or non-religious. This need not, even indirecdy, subsidise 
religious practices in the school, although complex administrative "entanglements" 
might be required to ensure the assistance is used only for secular educational 
objecdves. In addition, government could set secular criteria as terms of assistance, 
such as a requirement that the school comply with equal oppormnity policies in 
employing teachers in positions and offices that government supports. Stdl, the 
school's relations with government and compliance with the secular conditions it 
imposes are voluntarily assumed. Thus, in the provision of assistance engagement is 
voluntary on the part of both government and the religious school. On this 
interpretation, what the establishment clause should prohibit is the effective denial of 
assistance to an independent school that meets these criteria, by reference to the 
affiliation or non-affiliadon of the school with a particular religious group.^3 
I therefore argue that the principle of religious equality allows the provision of 
financial assistance to religious schools, as well as religious health and welfare 
instimtions that serve legitimate secular purposes. It is, as I discussed in chapters II 
3^ However, the Canadian Supreme Court endorsed such an arrangement under which 
assistance was only given to Catholic schools in Ontario: Reference re an Act to Amend 
the Education Act [1987] 1 SCR 1148. 
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and V, required by a just political constimtion, and it is, in contrast to the concept of 
separation, a more practicable principle in that it allows government to take advantage 
of a religious group where its secular objectives and the group's religious objectives 
coincide, and can be pursued cooperadvely.^ 
Even though exisdng arrangements between the Commonwealth and religious 
schools are almost certainly consistent with a religious equality interpretation of the 
establishment clause, there are some preferences to religious groups under existing 
Commonwealth legislation and administration that might be invalid under an effective 
and meaningful establishment clause. 
1. Matrimonial Legislation. There is some possibility, mooted by Justice Sir 
William Deane, that the administration of Commonwealth matrimonial legislation might 
be unconstimtional. In Nelson v Fish,^^ Justice Robert French in the Federal Court 
confirmed that, under existing establishment clause interpretation, there is little demand 
of religious equality in the certification of marriage celebrants. In 1988, the 
^11: § 6 supra; V: § 8 supra; see also MW McConnell and RA Posner, "An Economic 
Approach to Issues of Religious Freedom" (1989) 56 Univ Chic L Rev 1 at 17-18 and 
39. Sadurski's point that State schools provide minimal community educational 
requirements is, in Australia, empirically hard to sustain. The State school system 
partially retained its financial viability before the 1950s because it did not have to 
accommodate the significant proportion of children channelled into the Catholic schools. 
Indeed, the political campaign for assistance gained effectiveness after the Goulbum 
Catholic schools closed temporarily in 1962, and the State schools could not adequately 
meet the increased schooling demand: M Hogan Catholic Campaign note 8 supra at 63-
91; Sectarian Strand note 8 supra at 252. In practical terms, it is likely that in 
Australia the educational system generally would be less viable had the concept of 
separadon had been adopted in State Aid, and Catholic schools closed. In 1994, 19% 
of primary and secondary smdents in Australia were enrolled in Catholic schools: C 
Jones, "Parents Send Children Back to Private Schools" Australian, 31 January 1995, 
p 2 . 
65 (1990) 92 ALR 187. 
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Commonwealth Attomey-General's Department refused to register a religious group 
called "God's Kingdom Managed by his Priest and Lord" as a recognised denomination 
entided to solemnise legally valid marriages on the ground that, because it had only one 
congregation, "God's Kingdom" did not satisfy departmental guidelines issued under 
the Commonwealth Marriage Act of 1961. The group's high priest sued the 
Department for damages, and in the course challenged the validity of the relevant 
provisions of the Marriage Act under the establishment clause. Justice French held that 
the provisions did not offend the establishment clause. He admitted that there could be 
some valid preference to one religion over another, but the only preference he was 
prepared to identify as prohibited in the administration of matrimonial legislation was 
one which gave a particular denomination a monopoly to solemnise legally recognised 
y y 
marriages.^ However, Justice French also approved Quick and Garran's religious 
equality interpretation of the establishment clause (although he did not refer to Justice 
Mason's qualification to this in State Aid). He nevertheless did not apply the principle 
of religious equality to the administration of the Marriage Act, but only said that the 
Commonwealth marriage power had to be interpreted broadly.^' In this connection, 
Justice French's judgment also seems to overlook the overriding operation of section 
116 and its ability to limit the otherwise valid operation of the marriage power. The 
result is nonetheless consistent with State Aid. 
An applicadon for special leave to appeal against Justice French's decision in 
Nelson v Fish was made in the High Court. Special leave was refused on procedural 
grounds, but Justice Deane indicated he was prepared to hear argument on the validity 
^^ Ibid at 191. 
'^ Ibid; see Constimtion (Cdi), s 51 (xxi). 
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of the matrimonial legislation relating to recognised denominations under the 
establishment and test clauses.^* Together with his and Justice Sir Gerard Brennan's 
later intimations that the hold of narrow precedents on section 116 was not strong, 
Jusdce Deane's comment in the course of this application is suggestive of a more 
principled reinterpretation of the establishment clause.^^ 
2. Aboriginal Heritage Legislation. The second area in which the 
Commonwealth is possibly conceding preferences to a particular religious group is in 
its legislative and administrative protecdon of sacred sites and tribal aboriginal spirimal 
beliefs. Once more this issue is brought into sharp relief by Chapman v Minister for 
Aboriginal Affairs,''^ in which Commonwealth Aboriginal Affairs Minister Robert 
/ y 
Tickner issued a ban on the building of the bridge." Mr Tickner exercised powers 
granted in the Commonwealth Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection 
Act, under which he could declare the protection of "a significant Aboriginal area" that 
was "under threat of injury or desecration". The significance of the area had to be 
assessed by reference to the "traditions, observances, customs and beliefs" of aborigines 
generally, or of a particular tribe or community of aborigines.'^ Though little is 
known about the beliefs of the Ngarrendjeri women involved in this case, the power 
*^ D Solomon, "Marriage Act and Consdmtion Make Unhappy Bedfellows" Australian, 
3-4 December 1988, p 18. 
^^  Street v Queensland Bar Association (1989) 168 CLR 461 at 518-9 and 588. 
'° Chapman v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs and Saunders, 
Unreported, Federal Court of Australia, 15 Febmary 1995. 
" See I: § 1 supra. 
'^  Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders Heritage Protection Act 1984 (Cth), ss 3, 10 
and 11. 
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was exercised specifically to protect the women's beliefs that the tribe's reproduction 
would be affected if the site on Hindmarsh Island were desecrated by the constmction 
of the bridge. The Commonwealth's "protection" of religious conceptions is, according 
to Chief Justice Barwick in State Aid, an element in "establishing" that religion, but 
more is required before he thought the Commonwealth would offend the establishment 
clause: governmental patronage and promodon, and the responsibility of citizens to 
maintain the religion.'3 Thus, before Justice O'Loughlin in the Federal Court 
invalidated Mr Tickner's ban on the bridge, it had the purpose and effect of shielding 
the Ngarrendjeri women's religious conceptions behind Commonwealth legislation 
(including the threat of fine and imprisonment) and, therefore, edged towards a 
prohibited establishment.''* It is likely not to have offended the State Aid interpretation 
of the establishment clause but, should a religious equality interpretation be adopted 
instead, constimtional problems could mount. For. in the first place, the ban under the 
Heritage Protection Act and similar protecdon of sacred sites under the legislation and 
the Commonwealth Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act arguably, in 
protecdng religious conceptions and places of religious significance only, have a 
religious purpose and object which, we have seen, offend the principle of equal 
religious liberty.'"^ In the second place, unless provision for similar protection of non-
aboriginal religious beliefs is made under Commonwealth legislation then, prima facie, 
there is unequal protection of religious conceptions. The Federal Court has expressly 
recognised that the aboriginal heritage legislation is "beneficial legislation, remedying 
'3 State Aid note 7 supra at 582. 
'" See Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders Heritage Protection Act 1984 (Cth), s 23. 
'^  Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders Heritage Protection Act 1984 (Cth), ss 9 and 
10; Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth), ss 3 and 69; see II: 
§ 6 supra. 
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the social disadvantage of Aboriginals [sic] and Islanders", and provides that aboriginal 
spirimality must have "a special degree of protection and respect in Australian 
courts".'^ The empirical evidence set out in chapter I shows that the practice of tribal 
religious conceptions is under serious threat of extinction, and so secular 
anthropological, sociological and sciendfic reasons might be mustered to legitimise the 
"special ... protection and respect" of these most primeval beliefs." However, 
governmental protection intended to perpemate the acmal practice of tribal religious 
conceptions and, through sanction, to give governmental effect to them is more difficult 
to legitimise. It is likely to be. at best, problematic under any expanded interpretation 
of the establishment clause. Certainly, this could present pracdcal obstacles to the 
preservation of tribal aboriginal culmre, unless there are, as I contend there should be, 
y 
competing protecdons originating in aboriginal citizens' religious liberties under an 
extended free exercise clause.'* 
§ 7: Conclusion 
Unless the High Court is to explain why section 116 is to be a sole anomaly in 
the existing paradigm of constimtional interpretation (which requires constimtional 
liberties and limitations to be interpreted broadly), then its establishment clause 
interpretation in State Aid should be revised, and expanded.'^ The same consequence 
is also demanded by Chief Justice Latham's judgment in Jehovah's Witnesses which. 
'^  Tickner v Bropho (1993) 40 FCR 183 at 193; Aboriginal Scared Sites Protection 
Authority v Maurice; re The Waramungu Land Claim (1986) 10 FCR 104 at 114. 
" See I: § 5 supra. 
'* See VIII: § 5 infra. 
'^  See VI: § 5 supra. 
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as I discussed in § 5, requires the establishment clause to operate as an effective 
limitation on Commonwealth power and not, as in State Aid, to be treated as 
meaningless surplusage. 
However, an expanded reading of the establishment clause does not require the 
religious equality interpretation. I do nevertheless suggest it as an interpretadon which 
is available to the High Court and, given the existing legal sources and the Family 
Court's continued support of the principle of religious equality in its use of section 116, 
the strongest legal altemative to State Aid. Importantly it also partially helps to 
introduce, as a constimtional requirement for Commonwealth and Territory 
governments, the principle of equal religious liberty and, in consequence, to 
y 
instimtionalise relations between government and religion which are just and practicable 
in exisdng conditions of religious pluralism. There are possibly other dimensions of 
reladons between government and religion that could be touched, in other ways, by the 
establishment clause but, provided the aim in its interpretation is to respect the idea of 
a secular commonwealth, these generally should not be allowed to offend the principle 
of religious equality. 
Finally, contrary to the arguments presented by the DOGS organisation in State 
Aid and by Professor Sadurski, the religious equality interpretation should not affect 
existing arrangements for the provision of financial assistance to religious schools. In 
this connection, it is a more just and practicable approach to the establishment clause 
than the separation of church and state, so earnestly supported by Justice Murphy in 
State Aid. Though there remain uncertainties in the interpretation of the First 
Amendment's establishment clause, even the United States Supreme Court has, with 
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increasing frequency, mmed from the concept of separation. Indeed, in Lee v 
Weisman^^ the Supreme Court came close to a State Aid interpretation of the 
establishment clause. I have argued that the concept of separadon has been secularist, 
unjust and impracticable.*' The concept migh have, after extensive examination in the 
judicamre, proved inappropriate for the original establishment clause and, in light of 
these considerations, there is no compelling reason why it should be imported into 
Australia in interpreting its Commonwealth descendant.*3 
*° 120 L Ed 2d 467 (1992). 
*' V: §§ 7 and 8 supra. 
82 Cf Breavington v Godleman (1988) 169 CLR 41 at 82-3. 
VIII. SECTION 116: 
THE OBSERVANCE, FREE EXERCISE 
AND TEST CLAUSES 
I li Introduction 
It has been seen that the establishment clause exclusively addresses instimtional 
relations between government and religion. In contrast, the observance, free exercise 
and test clauses primarily address relations between government and the individual 
citizen (to the extent that these relations involve his religious conceptions or practices). 
These clauses can still protect the religious group, but largely to the extent that the 
group collects the equal religious liberties of the individuals it comprises. In this 
chapter, the current role and interpretation of the observance, free exercise and test 
clauses are examined (§§ 2-5). The most important of these clauses, as will be seen 
by its special potential to realise the principle of equal religious liberty, is the free 
exercise clause. I therefore pay close attention to the interpretation of this clause and, 
in particular, the limits to the protecdon of religion recognised by the High Court and 
the United States Supreme Court in free exercise clause adjudicadon. This has 
consistendy been an issue of concem to government throughout the twentieth cenmry. 
In this chapter, I therefore aim to state some limits to the protection of religion that are 
consistent with the idea of a secular commonwealth (§ 4). In conclusion, I bring 
together the themes of this part to suggest that section 116 generally can support the 
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principle of equal religious liberty and, with appropriate extension to the States, can 
operate as a central instimtion of a just and practicable political constimtion (§6). 
§ 2: The Observance Clause 
The only clause in section 116 not directly modelled on provisions in the United 
States Consdmtion is that which prohibits the Commonwealth or a Territory from 
making any law "for imposing any religious observance". Its novelty might be the 
reason why the observance clause attracted most comment in the debate on the religion 
clauses at the Melboume Convention in 1898. Henry Boumes Higgins' stated purpose 
for the clause was to negate any implication in the recognition clause in the Preamble 
that the Commonwealth had power to impose Sunday observances, by which he meant 
Sunday closing legislation.' Others like Sir Edmund Barton, Bemhard Wise, Charles 
Kingston and Richard O'Connor understood the concept of an observance more 
broadly.^  Indeed, as O'Connor indicated, it is unlikely that Sunday closing could 
reasonably be considered a religious observance.3 In § 3, we will see that Sunday 
closing legislation is more likely to offend the free exercise clause. 
The observance clause nevertheless has potential as a protection/rom religion. 
' Official Record of the Bebates of the Australasian Federal Convention: Third Session 
(Sydney 1986) p 1769 {"Official Record"). 
^ Ibid at 1770, 1774, 1777 and 1778. 
3 Ibid at 1778; CL Pannam, "Travelling Section 116 with a US Road Map" (1963) 4 
Melboume Univ L Rev 81 at 86-90. This is supported by decisions in which Sunday 
closing is explained as providing the opportunity for "religious observances": Specht 
V Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 8 Pa 312 at 323 (1848); Bennett v Brooks 91 Mass 
118 at 119 (1864). 
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In Jehovah's Witnesses,^ Chief Justice Sir John Latham suggested the citizen's liberty 
from religion rested in the incapacity of any Commonwealth legislation to impose any 
religious observance, regarding this as the source for "the principle of toleration of 
absence of religion".^ In the United States, the judicamre has based the citizen's 
liberty from religion on the establishment clause because the free exercise clause is only 
offended by a burden on religious conceptions or practices.^ This is even the case 
under the narrower interpretation the establishment clause received \nLee v Weisman,'' 
which provides that "government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in any 
religion or its exercise".* The establishment clause in section 116 currently protects 
the non-religious only to the extent it forbids their being subjected to a national church 
or religion although, on the suggested religious equality interpretation of the 
y 
establishment clause, the Commonwealth or a Territory would be prohibited from 
preferring religious conceptions generally over non-religious conceptions.^ 
On the basis of the High Court's interpretation of the concept of religion in 
Scientology III,^^ a "religious observance" is likely to be some conduct or practice 
having supemamral significance. However, it seems to have a more specific 
^Adelaide Company of Jehovah's Witnesses Inc v Commonwealth (1943) 67 CLR 116 
("Jehovah's Witnesses"). 
^ Ibid at 123. 
^ People V Woody 394 P 2d 813 (1964); cf McGowan v Maryland 366 US 420 at 564 
(1961). 
' 120 L Ed 2d 467 (1992) {"Lee"); see V: § 7 supra. 
* See County of Allegheny v American Civil Liberties Union 492 US 573 at 659 (1989). 
' VII: §§ 3 and 6 supra. 
'° Church of the New Faith v Commissioner of Pay-roll Tax (Vic) (1983) 154 CLR 120 
{"Scientology III"); see I: § 4 supra. 
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connotadon than the general moral standards encouraged or demanded by a religious 
group. The term "observance" seems to address the cultus of religion: its public 
procedures, rites and ceremonies. Professor Cumbrae-Stewart linked it directly to acts 
known to have sacramental, magical or symbolic significance to a religion, and these 
do seem properly to centre on the cultic processes of religious worship." Specifically, 
the observance clause prevents legislation comparable to the English Uniformity Act of 
1558'^  which (until as late as 1969) imposed a prima facie obligation to attend the 
parish church every Sunday.'3 It probably also prohibits governmental actions 
compelling public prayer and Bible readings.''* However, the one problem the 
observance clause has created in adjudication is its possible impact on the use of oaths 
having legal and political consequences, and therefore on one of the most entrenched 
y 
instimtions of legal procedure. The Founding Fathers supported the traditional power 
to impose the taking of oaths, but the observance clause opens this to serious 
question.'^  In R v Winneke; ex parte Gallagher,^^ Justice Lionel Murphy queried 
even a prima facie obligation to take an oath in official procedures used under 
Commonwealth direction. The Royal Commissions Act of 1902 (Cth) empowered a 
Commissioner to administer an oath or, if the witness conscientiously objected to taking 
" FD Cumbrae-Stewart, "Section 116 of the Constimtion" (1946) 20 AU 207 at 209. 
'^  Uniformity Act 1558 (1 Eliz 1 c 2), s 3. 
'3 Statute Law Repeals Act 1969 (UK); cf Anderson v Laird 316 F Supp 1081 (1970). 
"* Cf Engel V Vitale 370 US 421 (1962); School Bistrict of Abington Township v 
Schempp 374 US 203 (1963); Lee note 7 supra; Zylberberg v Sudbury Board of 
Education (1988) 52 DLR (4th) 577; Russow c& Lambert v Attorney-General (British 
Columbia) (1989) 35 BCLR 29. 
'^  Official Record note 1 supra at 1779. 
" (1982) 152 CLR 211 {"Winneke"). 
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an oath, an affirmation." Justice Murphy held that section 116 prevented the 
Commonwealth from requiring any person to take an oath or even to state a 
conscientious objection to taking an oath. Under both the observance and free exercise 
clauses, the Commonwealth was prohibited from requiring the religious and the non-
religious to take an oath or express a preference for an affirmadon.'* 
There is little doubt that oath-taking in the common law tradition has religious 
origins. However, it is not the historical origin of an instimtion that makes it an 
impermissible observance.'^ It is impermissible if its purpose or, as I have argued, 
its effect is to impose a procedure, rite or ceremony having supemamral significance. 
In the common law tradition, the utility of an oath lies historically in the deponent's 
belief in God and His rewarding and punishing words and deeds in this world or the 
next.^° Clearly, this requires the oath to be classified as a procedure of supemamral 
significance. Canadian opinion dismisses the theory as "highly talismanic", and English 
courts have conceded that most deponents are ignorant of the oath's religious dimension 
and, therefore, have been prepared to admit evidence if the deponent merely appreciated 
the added responsibility the procedure requires to tell the tmth.-' The traditional 
interpretation of the oath has nevertheless been upheld in Queensland and, however 
appropriate that decision may be, it shows that it is at least possible to understand the 
" Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Cth), ss 3 and 4. 
'* Winneke note 16 supra at 229. 
'^  Cf McGowan v Maryland 366 US 420 at 444-5 and 498-505 (1961); Gallagher v 
Crown Kosher Super Market of Massachusetts 366 US 617 at 624 and 630 (1961); R 
V Edwards Books & Art Limited [1986] 2 SCR 713 at 743. 
°^ Omichund v Barker (1744) 1 Atk 21 at 45; i? v Brasier (1779) 1 Leach 199 at 200. 
2' 7? V Horsburgh (1966) 55 DLR (2d) 289 at 305; i? v Hayes [1977] 2 All ER 288 at 
291; Rv Lai Khan (1981) 73 Cr App R 190. 
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oath as a religious observance." On this understanding. Justice Murphy's conclusion 
in Winneke is probably correct. Thus, while the oath could be available as a 
preliminary condition to the tendering of evidence, under the observance clause it 
cannot be the only procedure available. If any meaningful content is to be read into the 
observance clause, altemative procedures would have to be available. Indeed, the only 
provision in the Commonwealth Constimtion to prescribe an oath, section 42, sets it 
equally beside an affirmation, without the need to prove a conscientious objecdon to 
taking oaths before taking the affirmation is permitted. The observance clause probably 
makes the same demand. 
§ 3: The Free Exercise Clause I: The Liberty 
Its potential to help realise the principle of equal religious liberty probably 
makes the free exercise clause the most important part of section 116. This is also 
demonstrated in the Tasmanian Constitution Act, where free exercise and test clauses 
are the only provisions thought necessary to guarantee secular government in that 
State.^ 3 por, on the one hand the free exercise clause is the central means by which 
religious liberty has been incorporated into the Commonwealth Constimtion. Then on 
the other hand, so long as the "secular purpose and effects" approach I advocated in 
chapter VI is taken to section 116, the free exercise clause can add to the central 
purpose of the establishment clause I discussed in chapter VII: the requirement of 
religious equality.'* 
22 R V Brown [1977] Qd R 220 at 221-2 and 227. 
" "Freedom of conscience and the free profession and practice of religion are, subject 
to public order and morality, guaranteed to every citizen": Constitution Act 1934 (Tas), 
s46. 
'^* VI: § 5 supra; VII: § 6 supra. 
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The precise scope and namre of the religious liberty protected by the free 
exercise clause has received little attendon in the High Court where, in general, the 
limitations on the protection of religious conceptions and practices have been the 
primary concern in adjudication. To date, it seems the only aspect of the liberty 
provided by the free exercise clause that the High Court has discussed is that it only 
recognises the religious liberty of the individual citizen, and not of the religious group. 
This was emphasised in Jehovah's Witnesses. Chief Justice Latham held that a 
corporation like the Adelaide Company of Jehovah's Witnesses Inc could not practise 
a religion.'^ Justice Sir George Rich also rejected the possibility that individuals' 
rights to religious liberty could be collected by the religious group they formed."^ 
I cannot believe that the suppression of the plaintiff corporation prohibits 
the free exercise of any part of the religious faith ascribed .,. to the 
individual corporators. 
In the First Scientology Case. Justice Sir Keith Aickin took the same approach to deny 
the protection of the free exercise clause to the Church of Scientology.^' 
There are reasons to suggest that the distinction between individual and group 
rights here is specious, not the least of which is the language of section 116 itself. The 
reference to "the free exercise of any religion" is arguably more suggestive of limits on 
governmental power over the religious group than over the religious individual. The 
same term - "any religion" -is used in the establishment clause, where the emphasis is 
plainly on the religious group. It is therefore hard to see how the denial of a religious 
group's rights in Jehovah's Witnesses and Scientology I could be based on any 
^^  Jehovah's Witnesses note 4 supra at 147. 
2^  Ibid at 149. 
^' Church of Scientology Inc v Woodward (1979) 154 CLR 79 {"Scientology I"). 
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consistent interpretation of section 116. 
The distincdon also imperils the oldest principles of secular government, 
because the group's right to lawful existence correlates with the citizen's right to belong 
to a group of people holding to the same (or similar) religious conceptions. To deny 
this is to allow the constimtional validity of governmental actions like the English 
Conventicle Acts and recusancy legislation and the Scottish legislation imposing the 
death penalty for attending field meetings.^ * It is also to repudiate the principle of 
voluntary association, by which government carmot prescribe the conditions on which 
the citizen joins, maintains membership in and leaves a religious group.^ ^ For in 
allowing, say, the suppression of a religious group (as Justice Rich would have allowed 
in Jehovah's Witnesses), the judicamre is also limiting the citizen's choice to practise 
his religious conceptions in association with others, and on the terms he believes are 
required or appropriate. Therefore, it is equally a suppression of the individual's 
religious liberty. 
In spite of these High Court decisions. Justice William Pincus in the Federal 
Court recognised a group's right to religious liberty in the Lebanese Moslem Association 
Case.^^ There, he held that a religious group had the right to appoint and remove its 
own leaders and that, by ordering the Imam of the Lakemba Mosque in Sydney to be 
*^ III: §§ 2 and 3 supra. 
^^11: § 6 supra. 
3° Lebanese Moslem Association v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1986) 67 
ALR 195 {"Lebanese Moslem Association I"). 
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deported, die Commonwealth Immigration Minister had compromised that right.3' 
The conclusion should be uncontroversial, as it relied on decisions in the United States 
upholding the responsibility the free exercise clause imposes on religious groups to 
resolve intemal disputes without recourse to the civil judicamre.3^ In the resuk. 
Justice Pincus held that the deportation was a justifiable limitation on the protection of 
religion in the free exercise clause.33 On appeal, the Full Court of the Federal Court 
did not address the question of the existence of this group right to religious liberty 
although, again. Justice David Jackson emphasised the individual right in holding that 
section 116 recognised "the right to exercise without impediment by or under 
Commonwealth laws any religion which is the choice of the person in question" .^"^ 
In its express terms, section 116 only denies the validity of legislation "for 
prohibiting" religious liberty. It is therefore undoubtedly offended by governmental 
action that completely bans the practice of a religion. Certainly, such excessive 
exercises of governmental power are likely to be rare, but the Subversive Organisations 
Regulations considered in Jehovah's Witnesses had such an extreme effect. The ban 
issued by the Govemor-General on 17 January 1941 inadvertently reached much further 
31 Ibid at 211. 
3^  Kedroffv Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church of North America 
344 US 94 (1952); Kreshik v Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church 
of North America 344 US 94 (1959); Presbyterian Church v Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull 
Memorial Church 393 US 440 (1969); Maryland and Virginia Eldership of the Churches 
of God V Church of God at Sharpsburg 396 US 367 (1970); Serbian Eastern Orthodox 
Biocese v Milivojevich 426 US 696 (1976); Jones v Wolff 443 US 595 (1979); see X: 
§ ?? infra. 
33 Lebanese Moslem Association I note 30 supra at 212. 
3"* Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Lebanese Moslem Association (1987) 71 
ALR 578 (emphasis added) {"Lebanese Moslem Association II"). 
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in legal terms than the Jehovah's Witnesses mentioned in the proclamation. One 
regulation made doctrines and meetings advocating them unlawful if they were held by 
a group declared illegal. The result, as Chief Justice Latham held, was that advocating 
"the Ten Commandments, or annual elections to the Commonwealth Parliament, or 
improvements to the education system" thereby became unlawful if the group held these 
beliefs.3^ In consequence, it was held by the various justices that this regulation was 
ultra vires either the Commonwealth defence power or the parent National Security Act. 
Justice Dudley Williams added that, because the Jehovah's Witnesses held some 
religious conceptions common to mainstream Christians, the regulation indirecdy made 
every church service in the country illegal. He also held that the relevant regulation 
was ultra vires the defence power. "But", he continued, "it is also prohibited by s 
116".3^ It is impossible to imagine a broader and deeper prohibition on the practice 
of religion in Australia than a ban on all meetings of the Christian churches, and 
therefore, so long as the "secular purpose and effects" approach to section 116 is taken. 
Justice Williams' judgment is almost certainly correct. Strictly however, because the 
regulation could not be supported by either Commonwealth power or legislation, the 
limiting operation of section 116 on the defence power did not have to be discussed. 
In other contexts, the High Court has held that a "prohibition" includes a 
complete, substantial and partial prohibition, and an unconditional and conditional 
prohibition.3' Thus, it does not seem that a complete ban on the practice of religious 
conceptions is required for the free exercise clause to operate. The adjudication is 
3^  Jehovah's Witnesses note 4 supra at 144; see also ibid at 150, 154 and 157. 
^^ Ibid at 165. 
3' Country Roads Board v Neale Ads Pty Ltd (1930) 43 CLR 126 at 135. 
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consistent with this understanding. In the Lebanese Moslem Association Case, the Full 
Court of the Federal Court only required an "impediment" to religious practice.3* In 
§ 2, I discussed Justice Murphy's decision \nRv Winneke; ex parte Gallagher that the 
prima facie obligation to take an oath instead of an affirmation under the Royal 
Commissions Act offended the observance and free exercise clauses. The prohibition 
on the practice of religious (or non-religious) conceptions here is incomplete, and only 
amounts to a requirement to prove a religious belief or disbelief in order to displace the 
obligation to take an oath. It has not yet been discussed in Australia how important a 
religious conception or practice must be to the religion in question if some prohibition 
is to be considered invalid. In the Lebanese Moslem Association Case, Justice Pincus 
held that the free exercise clause prohibited a law which prevented "only an aspect of 
religious practice", but the United States and Canadian decisions also suggest that the 
less important the burdened practice is to the religion involved, the more likely the 
prohibition wdl be considered valid.3^ 
In chapter VII foreshadowed that, in considering the impact of the free exercise 
clause on governmental effects, it could become a more potent demand of religious 
equality.'*" Social and economic pressures that have a disparate impact on different 
religious groups can be created by the interaction of, on the one hand, legislation that 
does not in express terms operate to limit religion and, on the other, social condidons 
38 Lebanese Moslem Association II note 34 supra at 594. 
3^  Lebanese Moslem Association I note 30 supra at 209; Tony & Susan Alamo 
Foundation v Secretary of Labor 471 US 290 (1985); Jones v R [1986] 2 SCR 284 at 
299 and 313-14; R v Edwards Books & Art Limited [1986] 2 SCR 713 at 759. 
40 VI: § 5 supra. 
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of religious pluralism. In chapter VII, I discussed Nelson v Fish,^^ in which Justice 
Robert French held that the Commonwealth Attomey-General's Department had not 
offended the establishment clause by refusing to register "God's Kingdom Managed by 
His Priest and Lord" as a recognised denomination entitled to solemnise legally valid 
marriages under matrimonial legislation. He also held that the Department had not 
offended the free exercise clause. The refusal to grant "God's Kingdom" recognised 
denomination stams did not prohibit its conducting purely religious marriage 
ceremonies.'*^ The result in Nelson v Fish can be compared to the United States 
Supreme Court's decision in Sherbert v Verner,^^ acknowledged as early approval that 
the free exercise clause controlled governmental effects and, under the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, still a controlling precedent in the United States.'*^ 
In Sherbert, the Court upheld a Seventh-Day Adventist's rights to unemployment 
benefits, even though by rejecting on religious grounds employment requiring her to 
work on Samrdays she had not satisfied criteria set by South Carolina to be eligible for 
social security. Justice William Brennan held that, in refusing the benefits. South 
Carolina effectively compelled the appellant to make a religious choice: either to 
practise her religion and lose benefits, or to abandon her religion to secure employment. 
That, he thought, was practically indistinguishable from a fine imposed for Samrday 
worship. In addition, because South Carolina also preserved the right not to work on 
Sunday the social security law was discruninatory. Thus Sherbert shows that, both to 
" (1990) 92 ALR 187. 
'^ Ibid at 192; VI: § 6 supra. 
3^ 374 US 398 (1963). 
^ McBaniel v Paty 435 US 618 at 633n (1978); Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
1993 (US), s 2. 
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minimise and to equalise the impact of governmental action on religious choices, 
posidve accommodation to religious practices, though no doubt difficult, is sometimes 
required.'*^ In remming to Nelson v Fish we see that, unlike a member of, say, a 
recognised Christian denomination, a member of "God's Kingdom" who wanted a 
religious marriage ceremony and to enter a legally valid marriage would be forced to 
undergo two ceremonies: the religious and the civil. The choice that the 
Commonwealth Attorney-General's Department thereby imposed on members of "God's 
Kingdom" in Nelson v Fish, though less severe than the choice imposed in Sherbert v 
Verner, is no less discriminatory, and one that imposes social burdens on the group that 
a recognised denomination does not suffer. 
y 
The means by which, in considering its impact on governmental effects, the free 
exercise clause can become a more potent demand of religious equality is also 
demonstrated in the economic sphere by North American decisions on Sunday closing 
legislation. In Braunfield v Brown,^^ the United States Supreme Court rejected a claim 
by Orthodox Jews that Pennsylvania Sunday closing legislation offended the First 
Amendment's free exercise clause. It conceded that the legislation made the practice 
of Orthodox Judaism more expensive because it required its adherents not to work on 
Sundays when they were also required, by their religion, not to work on Samrdays. 
However, the justices in the majority upheld the legisladon on the distinction between 
legisladon imposing a direct burden by prohibiting, on pain of criminal sanction, the 
'*^  See also Thomas v Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Bivision 450 
US 707 (1981); Hobbie v Unemployment Appeals Commission 480 US 136 (1987). 
'*^  366 US 599 (1961); cf McGowan v Maryland 366 US 420 (1961); Two Guys from 
Harrison-Allentown v McGinley 366 US 582 (1961); Gallagher v Crown Kosher Super 
Market of Massachusetts 366 US 617 (1961). 
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religious practice itself, and one, like Sunday closing legislation, imposing an indirect 
economic burden by its unequal rnipact on Christians and Jews, which would often be 
valid. In comparison, the Supreme Court of Canada has consistently rejected this 
distinction between the purpose and effect of legislation in its decisions under section 
2 (a) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.'^^ It held in /? v Edwards Books & Art 
Limited^^ that Ontario Sunday closing legislation burdened Jewish and Seventh-Day 
Adventist retailers."*'^  The legislation effectively created a competitive imbalance on 
religious grounds. Under both legal and religious obligations Jewish and Adventist 
retailers had to close for two days every week, where mainstream Christians only had 
to close for one. The legislation therefore offended section 2 (a). The Court also held 
that the legislation did not disadvantage the non-religious, who probably had no 
y 
preference in observing a weekly sabbath-day rest.^° In these cases, the disadvantage 
suffered by the more burdened religion is no less real even though the immediate 
pressure is social or economic, rather than political or legal. The legislation also 
remains a cause of the burden on the religion, even though other conditions also helped 
to cause that burden. It is therefore no less a real prohibition on religious conceptions 
or pracdces, than legislation expressly imposing the same burden by more direct 
political or legal means. This problem is likely to become more complex as the 
underlying conditions of pluralism increase, and will probably require increasingly 
sensitive governmental accommodation to the needs of religious minorities. 
"' /? V Big M Brug Mart [1985] 1 SCR 295 at 337. 
"** [1986] 2 SCR 713 {"Edwards Books & Art"). 
"^  Retail Business Holidays Act 1980 (O), ss 2 and 3. 
°^ Edwards Books & Art note 48 supra at 762-8. 
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The Canadian Supreme Court's decision in Edwards Books & Art also shows 
how, once secular effects especially are required, the problem of the just and 
practicable limits to religious liberty becomes more pronounced and that the protection 
of religion cannot and, in some cases, should not be perfectly realised. The Supreme 
Court ultimately upheld the Sunday closing legislation under section 1 of the Charter 
as a reasonable and demonstrably justifiable limitation on the religious liberty provided 
by section 2 (a).^' Hence the Ontario Sunday closing legislation created, according 
to the Supreme Court, a legitunate religious inequality. This brings us to probably the 
largest problem of adjudication on questions of secular government in the twentieth 
cenmry: the legitimate limitations on the protection of religion. 
y 
§ 4: The Free Exercise Clause II: Limitations on Liberty 
In Australia, the namre and extent of the permissible limits to the protection of 
religion remain unresolved, even though this issue has preoccupied the High Court's 
adjudication on the free exercise clause. The justices have suggested several approaches 
to dividing impermissible and permissible burdens on religion, and more recent 
approaches to other constimtional liberties and limitations suggest even more. With the 
exception of the judgments in Jehovah's Witnesses they show some debt to approaches 
taken in the United States, and all represent conflicting assessments of the priorities to 
be given to the rights of the majority through parliamentary supremacy, and the 
individual citizen's religious liberty. These approaches will be reviewed briefly, before 
considering the limitations that are most appropriately adapted to realising the idea of 
a secular commonwealth. 
^' Ibid at 16S-83. 
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1. The Opinion-Action Bichotomy. The earliest approach relied on a distinction 
between religious conceptions and practices (opinions and actions): the liberty to hold 
religious conceptions could not be legitimately limited by governmental action but the 
liberty to practise them could.^- This distinction had its origins in the United States 
Supreme Court's first decision on the religion clauses: Reynolds v United States.^^ 
The case concerned the conviction of a Mormon for bigamy under federal legislation, 
even though he had proved that his Mormonism required him to practise multiple 
marriage. The Supreme Court rejected an argument that the conviction offended the 
free exercise clause. Chief Justice Morrison Waite based the distinction between 
opinions and actions on Jefferson's Religious Freedom Act and his Letter to the Banbury 
Baptist Association and held that, in the religion clauses, "Congress was deprived of 
all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were 
in violation of social duties or subversive of good order". '^* The distinction was 
discussed (but not completely supported) by Chief Justice Latham in Jehovah's 
Witnesses.^^ In contrast, it did receive the support of Justices Sir Anthony Mason and 
Sir Gerard Brennan in Scientology Ilf^ and, in the United States, of Justice Antonin 
Scalia in Employment Bivision, Bepartment of Human Resources v Smith.^^ 
However, I believe that the distinction is both superficial and inconsistent with 
" Cantwell v Connecticut 310 US 296 at 303-4 (1940); Braunfield v Brown 366 US 599 
at 603 (1961); Sherbert v Verner 374 US 398 at 402-3 (1962). 
'3 98 US 145 (1878); see also Miles v United States 103 US 304 (1888). 
'^* Ibid at 164; see V: § 4 supra. 
^^ Jehovah's Witnesses note 4 supra at 130. 
^^  Scientology III note 10 supra at 135-6. 
'^ 494 US 872 at 877 (1990). 
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acmal adjudication. It is not so easy, in practical terms, to separate the different 
concepts of opinion and action. In Justices Mason and Brennan's judgment in 
Scientology III itself, both belief and conduct were required as essential components of 
religion and, in the close attention they gave to the need for a connection between 
Scientology's teaching about the supemamral and its practices like auditing, the justices 
placed a strong emphasis on the need for the conduct to be direcdy motivated by 
religious conceptions.-* If (as I assume) this is correct, then invariably any burden on 
a religious practice also presents some burden on religious conceptions. They are not 
mumally exclusive concepts.^ '^  
The distinction is also arguably an ethnocentric constmct. Though westem 
religions inevitably have a theology expressive of intangible or abstract ideas, the 
religions of indigenous peoples in Australia and North America need not. In Lyng v 
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association,^ Justice William Brennan indicated 
that some indigenous religious practices are even violated if an attempt is made to 
explain them.^' In this connection, the distinction between opinions and actions cannot 
be a useful means of prioritising the protection of religion on the one hand, and the 
58 Scientology III note 10 supra at 136 and 146-8; I: § 4 supra. 
^^ Wisconsin v Yoder 406 US 205 at 220 (1972); G Moens "The Action-Belief 
Dichotomy and Freedom of Religion" (1989) 12 Syd L Rev 195 at 213. 
60 485 US 439 (1987) {"Lyng"). 
'^ "In marked contrast to traditional Western religions, the belief systems of Nadve 
Americans do not rely on doctrines, creeds, or dogmas. Established or universal tmths 
- the mainstay of Westem religions - play no part in Indian faith. Ceremonies are 
communal efforts undertaken for specific purposes in accordance with instmctions 
handed down from generation to generation. Commentaries on or interpretations of the 
rimals themselves are deemed absolute violations of the ceremonies, whose value lies 
not in their ability to explain the namral world or to enlighten individual believers but 
in their efficacy as protectors and enhancers of tribal existence": ibid at 460. 
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interests of the majority on the other. It would be equally unhelpful in Australia in 
claims made by aborigines about sacred sites. The common law tradition has not, as 
is also apparent in the circumstances of Chapman v Minister for Aboriginal Affairs, ^ ^ 
adjusted comfortably to the practices of tribal aboriginal religion, and the problem 
might be compounded if adjudication under the free exercise clause were to depend on 
a distinction that responds more direcdy to the stmcmre of Judaism, Chrisdanity, Islam 
and other westem religious traditions. 
Since governmental action is physically incapable of touching the conceptions 
a citizen holds by mere mental assent, to have any meaningful content the absolute 
protection this distinction gave to religious opinions is more likely to be related to the 
y 
verbal expression of those opinions. However, both the Supreme Court and the High 
Court have upheld some burdens on the expression of religious opinion under the 
respective free exercise clauses. In the United States, Reynolds was followed by Bavis 
V Beason.^^ The latter concerned Idaho legislation prescribing, as a prerequisite to 
voting, an oath or affirmation that the deponent did not belong to a group which taught 
or encouraged polygamy. Davis was a Mormon, but not acmally polygamous. He took 
the oath and was subsequently charged with conspiracy to pervert the due administration 
of the law, convicted and imprisoned. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction 
despite a challenge under the free exercise clause. Thus, Davis was denied his right 
to participate in elections as a free and equal citizen because he believed in Mormonism 
generally, even though he did not practise its teaching on polygamy. In Jehovah's 
^^ Chapman v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs and Saunders, 
Unreported, Federal Court of Australia, 15 Febmary 1995 {"Chapman"); see I: § 1 
supra; VII: § 6 supra. 
3^ 133 US 333 (1889). 
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Witnesses, the High Court held that the free exercise clause was not offended by 
regulations that made any doctrines held by a group banned under the Subversive 
Organisations Regulations illegal, or that made it illegal to print or publish them. 
Here, the prohibition was on the mere holding and the expression of religious opmions. 
There is surely some argument that, however the legitimate limitations on the protection 
of religion are defined, they should be narrower when applied direcdy to opinions than 
to actions, especially as a different basic liberty of expression is also involved. 
However, Jehovah's Witnesses shows that, contrary to the opinion and action 
distinction, even the verbal expression of religious conceptions is better regarded as 
being open to limitation. For, as the Witnesses conceded in the case, their teaching that 
Satan mled the world through material agencies like the Empire and the Commonwealth 
was prejudicial to the national war effort and thus, as we will see, legitimately limited 
to protect security rights. In tmth, it is only to recognise the power of ideas.^ 
2. The Ordinary Laws Limitation. The second approach discussed in High Court 
adjudication was also raised by Justices Mason and Brennan in Scientology III, where 
in obiter dicta they held that the protection of religion did not extend to practices that 
offended against the "ordinary laws". These are "laws which do not discriminate 
against religion generally or against particular religions or against conduct of a kind 
which is characteristic only of religion" .^ ^ That this is a broad limitation on the 
protection of religion can be illustrated by reference to the circumstances of Judd v 
McKeon.^ The case concemed a socialist's objection to voting but, in obiter dicta. 
^ Jehovah's Witnesses note 6 supra at 160. 
^^  Scientology III note 10 supra at 136. 
66 (1926) 38 CLR 380. 
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Justice Henry Higgins (the sponsor of the religion clauses at die 1898 Melboume 
Convendon) indicated that an objecdon based on religious conceptions would give a 
constimtional immunity from compulsory voting legisladon.^' The judgment 
represents a broader interpretation of section 116 than Justices Mason and Brennan 
allowed in Scientology III because, in applying the limitation they supported, 
compulsory voting could be considered a legitimate burden on religious groups (like the 
Jehovah's Witnesses) that might object to participation in civil government. There is 
nothing in the form of compulsory voting legislation which discriminates against 
religion generally or any religion in particular. In addition, as Judd v McKeon 
illustrates, objections to voting may be based on non-religious conceptions, and 
therefore cannot be considered characteristic only of religion. Once more this only 
shows how, in the early 1980s, the High Court narrowed its interpretation of section 
116. 
In the United States. Justice Scalia adopted a similar approach in Employment 
Bivision, Bepartment of Human Resources v Smith.^^ There, he held that "neutral, 
generally applicable regulatory laws that compelled activity forbidden by an individual's 
religion" do not offend the free exercise clause.^^ This equated the Scientology III 
limitation that legislation that does not burden "conduct of a kind characteristic only of 
religion" is valid. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act has probably now rendered 
the Smith limitation inoperative in the United States. 
" Ibid at 387. 
'*494US 872 (1990). 
' ' Ibid at 880. 
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The ordinary laws limitadon is a namral consequence of the State Aid''^ holding 
that, irrespective of its effect, only the purposes of governmental action had to have the 
necessary secular object." It is evident that governmental action intentionally 
undertaken to prohibit the free exercise of any religion operates directly on religion and 
therefore discriminates against religion generally or a religion in particular. It is 
therefore outside the ordinary laws limitadon. Hence, the ordinary laws limitation 
mirrors the prevailing principles for the interpretation of section 116. It also means 
that, because the ordinary laws limitation is incompatible with any assessment of the 
effect of governmental action on religious conceptions and practices, if ever the High 
Court were to accept the "secular purpose and effects" approach to section 116, the 
limitation should logically be reconsidered. 
3. The Compelling Interest Test. In 1993, the United States Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act reinstated the "compelling interest" test as the appropriate limitation to 
apply in application of the free exercise clause. This only permits a burden on religion 
if government proves that the burden (a) helps to realise a compelling governmental 
interest, and (b) is the least restrictive method of realising that interest.'^ Here, the 
onus of proof shifts to government, recognising the preferred position that the citizen's 
religious conceptions or practices be protected. Furthermore, even if the interest is 
compelling, government must prove that it would be unable to realise the interest if it 
were to provide an exemption from the burden on the ground of religion. Sherbert v 
^"^ Attorney-General (Vic) (ex rel Black) v Commonwealth (1981) 146 CLR 559 {"State 
Aid"). 
71 VI: § 5 supra. 
^^ Cf L Tribe American Constitutional Law 2nd ed (Mineola NY 1988) p 1251; 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act 1993 (US), s 3. 
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yemcr'3 ^^^ Wisconsin v Yoder'"' are the most liberal Supreme Court decisions on 
the free exercise clause, and show the invalidation of governmental action at the two 
stages of this test. 
In Sherbert, the Court held that government did not have a compelling interest 
legitimately capable of burdening religion in its method of distributing unemployment 
benefits. In Yoder, Amish refused to comply with compulsory school attendance 
legislation because, to expose adolescent children to the public school system seriously 
undermined the ability of the Amish to integrate them into their simple agrarian 
community. The Court held that the State had a compelling interest in universal 
education. However, in refusing to exempt the Amish, who had proved that they 
themselves could prepare children to be responsible, productive and self-reliant citizens, 
it had not realised the interest by the method least restrictive on the practice of Amish 
religion. 
Since Yoder the Supreme Court's application of the compelling interest test has 
been less exacting, with the result that challenges under the free exercise clause have 
generally been rejected by holding that government had a compelling interest that 
displaced the citizen's religious liberty.'^ The excessive extent to which the Court has 
been prepared to hold that a governmental interest is compelling is exemplified by 
'3 374 US 398 (1963). 
"406 US 205 (1972). 
75 L Tribe note 70 supra at 1261-2; JH Choper, "The Rise and Decline of the 
Constimdonal Protection of Religious Liberty" (1991) 70 Nebraska L Rev 651 at 659-
70, 
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Lyng,^^ a case that has obvious parallels to Chapman v Minister for Aboriginal 
Affairs.'''' In Lyng, the Court upheld the power of the United States Government to 
allow timber harvesting and to build a road in a national park that adjoined a native 
American reservation in Califomia. This is despite the fact that, as Justice Sandra Day 
O'Connor admitted in the majority judgment, the physical integrity of the area was of 
profound religious importance to the Yurok, Karok and Tolowa tribes, and the 
harvesting and road "would interfere significandy with private persons' ability to pursue 
spirimal fulfilment according to their own religious beliefs".'* However, the majority 
did not even attempt to classify the governmental interest in the case as compelling, let 
alone as to whether the particular harvesting and road involved in Lyng were necessary 
to realise that interest. Though I believe that government could certainly argue that it 
might have some interest in, say, developing and maintaining a national road and 
transport infrastmcmre, it would be more difficult to prove that the road in question 
was necessary to achieve that interest or that, by preserving the physical integrity of the 
area, the maintenance of the road-transport system would be defeated. In dissent. 
Justice Brennan thought that the burden on religion in Lyng was more serious than it 
was in Yoder. The area was an essential source of tribal religious practice, and its 
economic development would, according to the native tribes' religion, destroy the 
power and medicine they needed for almost all their rimals and ceremonies.'^ The 
broad theory of the compelling interest test was still retained in Lyng, but the Court's 
increasing reluctance to give the free exercise clause much substantive effect 
'^  Lyng note 60 supra. 
" Chapman note 62 supra. 
'* Lyng note 60 supra at 449. 
'^  Ibid at 467-8. 
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foreshadowed Justice Scalia's rejection of the test in Smith. The Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act was intended to reinstate the Sherbert-Yoder paradigm, but it is yet to 
be seen whether the Supreme Court will give the legislation equal effect.*" 
This test also has the advantage of use in other common law countries. It is 
similar to the test used in assessing legitimate limitations on liberties under section 1 
of the Canadian Charter.^^ Through the 1980s and 1990s, as the High Court of 
Australia progressively supported more generous interpretations of constimtional 
liberties, it also developed limitations to the liberties under section 92 and the implied 
right of free communication in polidcal and public affairs that largely equate the 
compelling interest test.*- Once more, if section 116 is to be interpreted consistendy 
*'' The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Swanner v Anchorage Equal Rights 
Commission 130 L Ed 2d 368 (1994) but, in dissent. Justice Clarence Thomas applied 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and held that Alaska did not have a compelling 
interest in preventing marital stams discrimination: ibid at 369. In 1995, the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act was mled invalid by a federal District Court in Texas on the 
ground it was an impermissible exercise of judicial power by the Congress. This is yet 
to be determined by the Supreme Court: see Flores v Boerne 63 LW 2571 (1995); JC 
Brant, "Taking the Supreme Court at its Word: The Implications for RFRA and 
Separation of Powers" (1995) 56 Montana L Rev 5; DO Conkle, "The Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act: The Constimtional Significance of an Unconstimtional 
Stamte" (1995) 56 Montana L Rev 39. 
*' i? V Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103 at 138-9. 
*^  This was drawn from the requirement that, to be valid under the extemal affairs 
power. Commonwealth legislation that implemented an intemational treaty or 
convention had to use means that were proportionate to the object of the treaty or 
convention: Constimtion (Cth), s 51 (xxix); Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 
CLR 1 at 130-1, 172, 232-3, 259-61, 266-7, 278 and 536-7; Richardson v Forestry 
Commission (1988) 164 CLR 261 at 292, 295-6, 303, 311-12, 317, 326, 336, 344-6 and 
347-8; South Australia v Tanner (1989) 166 CLR 161 at 165 and 178. The requirement 
of "proportionality" was later adopted in the definition of limitadons on constimtional 
liberties. In its application of section 92 and the implied right of free communication 
in public and political affairs, the Court has distinguished direct and indirect burdens 
on the liberty. It has not yet settled whether governmental action that deliberately 
burdens a constimtional liberty could ever be valid and, to some extent, the answer may 
depend on the particular right involved: cfCole v Whifield (1988) 165 CLR 360 at 408 
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with other constimtional liberties, the compelling interest test should define the extent 
of the limitations to the protection of religion under the free exercise clause.*3 
So, the adoption of the compelling interest test seems to be the most consistent 
interpretation of the free exercise clause and, as in contrast to the other approaches I 
have mentioned it provides a more liberal interpretation of the religious liberty 
recognised under the free exercise clause, this would better realise the idea of a secular 
commonwealth. For the narrower the limitation on the protection of religion, die less 
power parliaments and executive governments have to limit the citizen's religious 
liberty according to, say, some udlitarian assessment that such a limitation maximises 
the net sum of social happiness. However, there is a significant concepmal problem 
y 
with the test that needs some resolution: what governmental interests should be 
considered compelling? Unless there are acceptable criteria that, at the least, guide the 
to Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106 at 142-
2. The burden nevertheless must be supported by a compelling interest, but must be 
proportionate to the realisation of that interest in that it can be no more than is 
reasonably necessary to protect the public: Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v 
Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106 at 142-4; see also Street v Queensland Bar 
Association (1989) 168 CLR 461 at 573 and 584-5. The limitation on indirect burdens 
is broader, but even here the burden cannot be disproportionate to the realisation of a 
legitimate governmental object because the existence of a disproportionate burden 
indicates that the purpose and effect of the burden is to restrict the enjoyment of the 
right: Cole v Whitfield (1988) 165 CLR 360 at 408; Australian Capital Television Pty 
Ltd V Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106 at 142-4. To date, the High Court has 
applied this test conscientiously and, in consequence, has imposed real restrictions on 
the methods government can use in pursuing legitimate objects. For example, in 
applying the test under section 92 in Castlemaine-Tooheys Pty Ltd v South Australia 
(1990) 169 CLR 436, the Court held that government had a legitimate interest in the 
protection of the environment. However, evidence showed that South Australia could 
achieve its environmental protection purposes with less impact on interstate trade than 
the impugned legislation had, and it was therefore considered disproportionate to the 
object and invalid: ibid at 472, 477 and 480. 
*3 C/S McLeish, "Making Sense of Religion and the Constimtion: A Fresh Start for 
Section 116" (1992) 18 Monash Univ L Rev 207 at 234-5. 
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judicial decision on whedier a governmental interest is compelling, then the utilitarian 
assessment about how one citizen's religious liberty should be balanced against the 
interests of the legislative majority in the parliament or executive government is merely 
allocated to another arena: the judicamre. In chapter II, I stated the lunits to the 
protection of religion under the principle of equal religious liberty as being based on 
the interests of liberty or, more precisely, by some other basic liberty.*"* These have 
the consequence that it might be possible to state a compelling interest as one required 
to achieve an adequate scheme of equal basic liberties for all cidzens and, as a 
qualification, to realise the minimum demands of the principle of fair equality of 
oppormnity. In other words, these limitations are needed to realise the first and the 
minunum requirements of the second principles of justice.*^ Thus, as elaborated in 
y 
chapter II priority is to be given to government's interest in the maintenance and 
enforcement of security rights: those that are required for the maintenance of an 
organised political society, and that relate most directly to political and social 
stability.*^ This was identified by most of the justices in Jehovah's Witnesses, but 
with most exceptional clarity by Chief Justice Latham.*' Inspired mainly by John 
Smart Mill's On Liberty, Chief Justice Latham said that there could be no protecdon 
of any liberty outside the continued existence of an organised society. He therefore 
concluded:** 
It is consistent with the maintenance of religious liberty for the State to 
restrain actions and courses of conduct which are inconsistent with the 
*" II: § 6 supra. 
*MI: § 5 supra. 
*^  II: § 6 supra. 
^''Jehovah's Witnesses note 4 supra at 126, 129, 131-2, 149-50, 154-5, 157 and 160. 
^^ Ibid at 131-2. 
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maintenance of civil government or prejudicial to the continued existence 
of the community. 
This is certainly a limitation on the protection of religious conceptions and practices. 
However, it is not a Ihnitation on the principle of equal religious liberty itself because 
that principle can only be sustained in conditions of political and social stabdity.*^ 
Instead, the lunitation is therefore an application of the principle. The statement of this 
limitation in Jehovah's Witnesses probably benefited by the decision's concems with the 
operation of the defence power and, therefore, issues that involved real threats to the 
continued existence of the Commonwealth.^ In retrospect it might seem questionable 
whether there was any practical necessity for the Commonwealth to suppress the 
Jehovah's Witnesses in 1941, especially since the ban was made before the Pacific War 
brought the risk of a Japanese fnvasion. However, what is more immediately relevant 
to understanding the decision in Jehovah's Witnesses is the acmal evidence presented 
to the Court which, of course, constrained the acmal result the Court could reach. In 
particular, the case stated to the Court was that the Jehovah's Witnesses taught doctrines 
prejudicial to the defence of the Commonwealth and the efficient prosecution of the 
war. However impmdently, the Witnesses conceded this and, because it introduced 
issues immediately relevant to the existence of the Commonwealth, on that basis alone 
the suppression of the Jehovah's Witnesses did not offend the free exercise clause or 
the principle of equal religious liberty. 
*^  In a similar vein. Justice Mason later held that any denial of Commonwealth 
sovereignty is inconsistent with a claim made under section 116 of the same 
Constimtion that establishes that sovereignty: Coe v Commonwealth (1978) 18 ALR 
592. 
^ The defence power is accepted as central to the maintenance of the Commonwealth 
and its Constimtion. Justice Sir Isaac Isaacs said that the defence power was "the 
ultima ratio of the nation ... the pivot of the Constimtion ... the bulwark of die State 
[whose] limits then are bounded only by the requirements of self-preservation": Farey 
V Burvett (1916) 21 CLR 433 at 453. 
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In fact it is difficult to see where a valid exercise of the defence power that 
burdens religion could ever offend the free exercise clause, as governmental action 
properly undertaken for the defence of the Commonwealth is also likely to be consistent 
with the maintenance of the polidcal and social stability required for the exercise of any 
liberty. Thus, the compulsory military training required of the Christian pacifist in 
Krygger v Williams,'^^ which I discussed in chapter I, could be regarded as valid, even 
though in 1912 the military threat to Australia was less immediate than it was in 
Jehovah's Witnesses. The imposidon of military service, certainly in wartime and 
probably in peace, is governmental action directed towards the defence of the 
Commonwealth and, ultimately, the maintenance of civil government, and so is likely 
to be a legitimate burden on pacifist religion under the free exercise clause.^' It would 
y 
also appear that, as the valid exercise of the defence power expands and contracts with 
the rise and fall of international tensions, there would be a coordinate contraction and 
expansion of the protection of religion under the free exercise clause.^3 
Outside the exercise of the defence power, whether governmental action is 
required for the effective enforcement of security rights is more likely to be considered 
on an ad hoc basis. '^* The related but more difficult issue is that of action that 
'^ (1912) 15 CLR 366; see I: § 3 supra. 
^^ Hamilton v Regents of the University of Califomia 293 US 245 at 262-3 (1934); 
Minersville School Bistrict v Gobitis 310 US 586 at 602-3 (1940); Jehovah's Witnesses 
note 4 supra at 133 and 155. 
3^ Cf Polyukovich v Commonwealth (1991) 172 CLR 501 at 592-3. 
''* In most cases, the practice of religious conceptions is unlikely to excuse a citizen 
from the enforcement of the ordinary criminal law, since it is basic to the maintenance 
of public order and safety. For example, it should be no defence to a conviction for 
unlawful killing or assault that the death or injury was caused by procedures the accused 
believed he should use in the course of an exorcism: see S Coomber, "'Exorcist' 
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constimtes governmental intolerance of intolerant religious groups or practices that 
themselves present a real threat to others' liberty. In chapter II, I mentioned that it 
could be possible to deny equal liberty to an intolerant religious group which, contrary 
to its own practice, could be compelled to respect others' liberties. Here the critical 
issue is the group's practice and not just its beliefs, because the threat to liberty and 
political and social stability must be real - and not a colourable excuse. For, as with 
the Catholic Church as late as Pope Pius IX's Syllabus of Errors in 1864, the group 
might notionally hold to illiberal conceptions but (as more than 70 years experience of 
Catholic toleration in England had already demonstrated) present no substantial threat 
to others' religious liberties, or to peace and order generally.^^ 
These are obvious limits. It becomes more difficult where the practice of 
religion collides with other basic liberties.^^ Thus, in Abbott and Abbott'^'' the Full 
Court of the Family Court had to consider a Catholic husband's objection to his wife's 
application for divorce on the ground that the Catholic Church did not recognise the 
validity of divorce. There was a collision here between the spouses' individual rights 
to religious liberty: the husband's belief he could not be divorced (even if the nuances 
of Roman canon law are more complex than he thought), and the wife's liberty not to 
Husband Acquitted of Manslaughter" Australian, 1 December 1994, p 3; "Exorcist 
Husband Walks Free After Trial" Australian, 2 December 1994, p 3; "Town Tries to 
Exorcise Fallout of Vollmer Trial", Australian, 3-4 December 1994, p 11. The same 
applies to prohibitions on certain female circumcision practices: see Family Law 
Council, Female Genital Mutilation (Canberra 1994). 
^' J Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford 1972) pp 216-20 {"ATJ"); W Walker, A History 
of the Christian Church, 4th ed (Edinburgh 1986) p 670; see II: § 6 supra; IV: § 5 
supra. 
^^ ATJ note 95 supra at 203. 
'^ (1995) FLC 92-582. 
279 VIII: § 4 
have the husband's religious beliefs imposed on her. Furthermore, I mentioned in 
chapter I how, had the religious questions raised by Chapman v Minister for Aboriginal 
Affairs^^ been dealt with in the Federal Court, there might have been a collision 
between the Ngarrendjeri people's right to religious liberty and the developer's rights 
to due process (another basic liberty). In these cases, how should the courts prioridse 
die competing basic liberties? In chapter II, I mentioned how the question here reverted 
to a more basic assessment about the relative importance of the competing liberties, and 
specifically how necessary each liberty is to the development of a sense of justice or a 
conception of the good. Since the criterion is essentially vague, it does not seem to be 
intended to dictate specific outcomes in particular cases. It is possible that it is only 
meant to set the parameters of a legitimate adjustment.^^ If applied to the 
circumstances of Abbott, these criteria require the divorce to be granted. To a small 
extent, the husband's religious practice might be burdened by a divorce, even if (more 
importantly to the husband) he is still regarded as married under canon law. However, 
to impose his religious conceptions on the wife by denying the divorce is a serious 
denial of her religious liberty and, in all, would constimte a more basic restraint on 
either spouse's ability to pursue a conception of the good.'°° The potential collision 
in Chapman is much more problematic, although I believe it could still be decided 
according to these criteria. To require, contrary to its claimed religious obligations. 
'* Chapman note 62 supra; see also Aboriginal Sacred Sites Protection Authority v 
Maurice; re The Waramungu Land Claim (1986) 10 FCR 104 {"Maurice"). 
^11: § 6 supra. This follows from James Nickel's understanding that the principle 
concentrates on collisions involving "the core of the core" of a liberty. It is therefore 
less determinative in collisions involving more marginal operations of the relevant 
liberties: "Rethinking Rawls's Theory of Liberty and Rights" (1994) 69 Chi-Kent L 
Rev 763 at 781-2. 
'°° This was the result in Abbott, but it was decided by rejecting the operation of section 
116 without reasons: note 97 supra (81,778-9). 
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the Ngarrendjeri tribe to prove that its beliefs about the island were religious could, if 
they acmally were, offend its religious liberty, a right that is essential to the citizen's 
capacity to hold a conception of the good. Equally, to allow the tribe to assert a right 
to religious liberty without having to prove that its beliefs are religious makes it, on this 
point, a judge in its own cause, contrary to rights of due process: nemo potest esse 
simul actor et iudex. The rights of due process are necessary to the development of a 
sense of justice. Thus, the liberties could apparently be equally important. However, 
I am still inclined to believe that, in this case, the Ngarrendjeri's right to religious 
liberty could be limited (or adjusted) by the requirement that the tribe prove the namre 
and relevance of its beliefs. For here, rights of due process could also serve to protect 
religious liberty, and therefore would also be indirectly necessary for the citizen to hold 
a conception of the good. The principle of equal religious liberty is, as I discussed in 
chapter II, based primarily on the civil and political implications of the namre of 
religion, as seen through the original position.'°' It would nevertheless be dislodged 
from this basis if its priority could be invoked when the conceptions being protected 
were not religious (nor paralleled the religious). So, to protect the integrity of the 
principle and deter its abuse, the Court could reasonably demand that the liberty only 
tmbvaze. proven religious conceptions.'°- In chapter I, this was offered as one reason 
for preferring an objective approach to the concept of religion.'°3 Tme, special 
provision or even an exception could be made in unusual cases like the Ngarrendjeri's. 
But it is not required. Thus, while the theory of basic liberties which partly underlies 
'°' II: § 6 supra. 
'°^ This was acmally contemplated in Chapman note 62 supra, and \n Maurice note 98 
supra at 130. 
'°3 I: § 3 supra. 
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the idea of a secular commonwealth does not demand this solution to the potential 
collision of basic liberties in Chapman, it would not be w/7just to impose this limit on 
the tribe's right of religious liberty in the interests of the developer's rights of due 
104 
process. 
The limitations permitted to realise the minimum demands of the principle of fair 
equality of oppormnity raise special questions about the operation of discrunination 
laws, and are therefore discussed in chapter XL'"-'' Otherwise, the criteria that I have 
used to detail these limitations allow no other limitations. The first principle of justice 
is held to have priority over the second, subject to the need to preserve the minimum 
requirements of the principle of fair equality of oppormnity. This is because, as we 
y 
saw in the selection of the principle of equal religious liberty, religion is inherently 
"non-negotiable" and not, from the perspective of the impartial procedure of the 
original posidon, a good that would be exchanged for political and social benefits."^ 
Thus, governmental action directed towards the redistribution of social and economic 
benefits and privileges is in most cases unlikely to be regarded, according to these 
criteria, as helping to realise a compelling interest. This means that the principle of 
equal religious liberty has priority over utilitarian decisions about social and economic 
development. It therefore would not permit a decision like Lyng (to the extent that it 
involved a governmental decision to allow the harvesting of forests) because important 
religious conceptions were allowed to be burdened only by government's interests in 
"^ For this classification of the rights of equal religious liberty and due process, see JW 
Nickel note 99 supra at 779. 
'°' XI: § 6 infra. 
'°^ II: § 6 supra. 
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economic development. Here, an appropriate analogy can also be drawn to Chapman 
(assuming momentarily that these free exercise clause protections would apply to the 
States and diat the Ngarrendjeri people proved the relevance and sincerity of the 
religious conceptions involved). The decision of the South Australian Government to 
allow the building of the bridge to Hindmarsh Island probably should have been made 
subject to the priority of the tribe's religious liberty, and under a just polidcal 
constimtion is probably illegitimate. Indeed, a decision in favour of the Ngarrendjeri 
women by invalidating the State Government's actions also would have eliminated the 
political pressure on the Commonwealth to issue the ban under the Heritage Protection 
Act, and the problems under the principle of equal religious liberty that Commonwealth 
intervention caused.'* '^ 
Investing the compelling interest test with the appropriate criteria to indicate just 
what governmental interests are compelling, the test should help to realise, through 
consistent adjudication, the principle of equal religious liberty. In enacting the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the United States Congress has shown confidence 
that this liberal test is a preferable and more practicable means of organising relations 
between government and religion to the narrow liberty recognised in Smith. 
Undoubtedly, as I will discuss in chapter XI in relation to discrimination laws, some 
consistent applications of the test could be politically controversial. However that is 
inevitable whenever governmental interests (and especially those recognised as aspects 
of a conception of justice) are in contention with an individual's liberties. 
107 VII: § 6 supra. 
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§ 5: The Test Clause 
The Commonwealth test clause replicates that in the United States 
Constimtion.'°* Like its predecessor, the test clause prohibits the sacramental and 
doctrinal professions that, in England, denied to any but members of the religious 
establishment the right to participate in government: the Corporation Act for 
Trinitarian Protestant Dissenters, the Blasphemy Act for Unitarians, the Test Acts for 
Catholics and the Security Act for Jews."^ That the test clause is intended to prevent 
the specific mischief caused historically by this legislation is demonstrated by Justice 
Sir Wilfrid Fullager's decision in Crittendon v Anderson.^^^ The case was a challenge 
to the election of a member of the House of Representatives on the ground that, 
contrary to section 44 of the Commonwealth Constimtion, he acknowledged adherence, 
y 
obedience or allegiance to a foreign power. The member-elect was a Catholic, and the 
challenge resurrected the old claim that Catholics had divided political loyalties because 
they recognised allegiance to the Pope. Justice Fullagar was sitting as the Court of 
Disputed Remms, and held that section 116 controlled the case because to give effect 
to die allegation would be to impose a religious test. To this end, he found that the test 
clause embodied the principles of the British Catholic Relief Act of 1829, under which 
a parliamentarian could not be disqualified simply because he was a Catholic.'" 
'°* The Tasmanian test clause provides that "no religious test shall be imposed in respect 
of the appointment to or holding of any public office": Constitution Act 1934 (Tas), 
s46. 
'°^ See III: § 2 supra; IV: §§ 4-6 supra. 
"° Unreported, High Court of Australia, 23 August 1950; noted 51 AU 170; c/NFK 
O'Neill, "Constimtional Human Rights in Australia" (1987) 17 Fed L Rev 85 at 112. 
' " See IV: § 5 supra. 
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Thus, if the test clause is equivalent in purpose but more general than, say, the 
Catholic Relief Act, it must prohibit Commonwealth and Territory attempts to prescribe 
a citizen's religious concepdons or practices as a disqualification from his assuming an 
official position or office in any branch of government. In its terms, this must prohibit 
any governmental action that purports to impose a religious disqualification. Unlike the 
establishment, observance and free exercise clauses, the test clause does not limit the 
object of its prohibition on the Commonwealth to "law". I have already discussed how, 
in New v New,'^^- Chief Justice Sir Harry Gibbs thought that the reference to the word 
"law" in section 116's other clauses meant they only addressed legislation."3 This 
is debatable, but even according to Chief Justice Gibbs' reasoning in New the test clause 
would not be similarly limited. It presumably prohibits any religious test required by 
legislation, administration or adjudication. It is consistent with this that, in Crittendon 
V Anderson, Justice Fullager effectively denied he had the power to impose a religious 
test by judicial order. 
Justice Aickin's decision in Scientology /"•* is possibly incompatible with this 
position. Scientology I was the first of the cases the High Court decided between 1979 
and 1983 that narrowed the interpretation of section 116."^ The Church of 
Scientology alleged that a Royal Commission had allowed the Australian Security 
Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) to impose a religious test by its recommending against 
the appointment of Scientologists to the Commonwealth public service, largely on the 
"^ Unreported, High Court of Australia, 5 March 1982. 
"3 VI: § 6 supra. 
"•* Scientology I note 27 supra. 
"^ See I: § 2 supra; VI: § 1 supra 
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ground diat diey endangered national security. However, Justice Aickin denied that by 
providing information on an applicant's religious identification a religious test was being 
imposed."^ This is possibly correct, but if then that information was even considered 
relevant to employment in the execudve government then a religious test even more 
blatant than those set out in the Corporation and Test Acts was being required.'" The 
resuh in Scientology / is, as we will see, possibly legitimate, but better reasoning would 
suggest that, prima facie, the Commonwealth was requiring a religious test and 
therefore had to prove an exception was justified. 
Even though, in Crittendon, Justice Fullager equated the test clause to legislation 
that had removed the specific doctrinal professions of the Test Acts, his use of section 
y 
116 was consistent with the High Court's process of enquiry in Jehovah's Witnesses 
under which the purpose and effect of governmental action was considered."* For, 
despite Justice Fullager's reference to the Catholic Relief Act, what was impugned in 
Crittendon was not legislation in the genre of the Test Acts but rather the effect of 
allowing a claim under section 44 of the Constimtion. Obviously, consistent 
interpretation means that the principles of "secular purpose and effect" I suggested in 
chapter VI also apply to the test clause."^ The consequence is that governmental 
employment criteria that do not expressly refer to religion could still offend the test 
clause if they effectively disqualified those who held particular religious conceptions 
116 Scientology I note 27 supra at 82-3. 
'" C/L Click "Church of Scientology v Mr Justice Woodward" (1980) 11 Fed L Rev 
102 at 107. 
"* See VI: § 5 supra. 
"' VI: § 5 supra. 
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from a public office or tmst. The simation and the problems that can arise in applying 
the principle are well-illustrated by the New Bmnswick Provincial Court of Queen's 
Bench's decision in Ross v Moncton Board of School Trustees.^^'^ There, a teacher 
in a Provincial school was dismissed for religious discrimination because a board of 
enquiry found that his mere presence in the classroom induced an atmosphere which 
encouraged discrimination against Jews. The Provincial Court upheld the board's 
decision to put the teacher on leave of absence and to appoint him to a non-teaching 
position if one became available. The teacher was known publicly as being anti-
semitic, and his anti-semitism had origins in his Protestant fundamentalism. There was 
no evidence that he had expressed anti-semitic attimdes in the classroom. The Court 
recognised that its decision burdened the teacher's religious liberty, but it held that this 
burden was permissible.'^' Ross v Moncton Board is a hard case, because whatever 
decision the Court made it would be seen to endorse religious discrimination or 
intolerance. Still, it is arguable the Court made the wrong decision. It effectively 
imposed a religious test on the teacher because it excluded him from a public office and 
tmst merely because he was known to hold, for religious reasons, anti-semitic opinions. 
Tme, the principle of fair equality of opportunity can require government to make it 
unlawful to discriminate on the ground of religion and, therefore, demand that its agents 
(like a Provincial school teacher) comply with that standard when acting in an official 
capacity.'^^ However, there was no evidence of the teacher's discriminating against 
Jews or even his expressing anti-semitic ideas in the classroom. Thus, it could be an 
example of a citizen's voluntarily limiting the expression of his religious conceptions 
'^ ° Ross V Moncton Board of School Trustees, Bistrict No 15 {1991) S6 DLR (4th) 749. 
' " Ibid at 757. 
122 II: § 7 supra; XI: § 2 infra. 
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(however repugnant to social norms) when exercising his governmental office. To the 
contrary, it can be argued that it was the school board and, it follows, the Court which 
offended the principle of religious liberty by disqualifying die teacher for his religious 
opinions, even though on the evidence he was prepared to respect principles of secular 
government. 
The test clause reinforces the central assumption of secular government that the 
citizen's religion is not, ipso facto, an indication of disloyalty, divided loyalty or an 
inability to contribute to the common good.''3 It therefore helps to realise the 
principle of religious equality by incorporating this assumption in the political 
constimtion. This conclusion was reached in Leeth v Commonwealth,^^^ where 
y 
Justices Sir William Deane and John Toohey in the High Court expressly recognised 
that the test clause manifested, in the context of the citizen's religion, the principle of 
each citizen's equal position before the law.'-^ It was also made evident in Torcaso 
V Watkins^'^ where the United States Supreme Court held that the First Amendment's 
establishment clause invalidated Maryland legislation requiring a person to declare 
belief in the existence of God as a condition of public office.'" To do so offended 
both the concept of separation and the principle that government could not prefer a 
citizen who held religious conceptions to one who did not, or theistic conceptions to 
' " CfWieman v Updegraff 344 US 183 at 191 (1952). 
'^'(1992) 174 CLR 455. 
' " Ibid at 487. 
'-^  367 US 488 (1961). 
'^' Beclaration of Rights (Md), art 37; see also GR Cover "Reflections on the History 
of North Carolina's Religious Test for Public Office" (1986) 64 North Carolina L Rev 
1071. 
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atheistic or agnostic conceptions.'-* Torcaso demonstrates that, though predating die 
First Amendment, the United States test clause is subordinate to the establishment 
clause's demands of religious equality.'^ ^ 
Since the test clause helps to realise the principle of equal religious liberty, it 
is likely to embody the same limits on the protection of religious conceptions and 
practices as the free exercise clause. Thus, the Commonwealth might be able to 
legitimise action that constimtes a prima facie invalid religious test by proving its 
necessity for the effective enforcement of security rights that makes the exercise of 
other liberties possible. The result in Scientology I is explicable in these terms. If, as 
is probable, the Commonwealth used a person's adherence to Scientology as a relevant 
y 
consideration to employment in the executive government, then it is reasonable to 
classify this as a religious test. But the test could be justified on proof that, because 
of their beliefs and practices. Scientologists were likely risks to national security, and 
this would still support the test clause's place in an adequate scheme of equal basic 
liberties. However, the difference is that, as in the process of free exercise clause 
enquiry, it shifts the evidential onus to government to prove that an exception to the 
usual protections of the test clause is justified, but only in the proven circumstances of 
this particular case. It thus openly recognises the religious test, and does not establish 
a binding precedent that could allow government effectively to concede preferences to 
majoritarian religious groups in other cases that were less challenging to security rights. 
"* Ibid at 495-6. 
'^ ^ Ibid at 489n; Anderson v Laird 316 F Supp 1080 at 1093 (1970). 
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§ 6: Conclusion 
The discussion of section 116 in this part shows that it has latent potendal as a 
constimtional requirement of equal religious liberty. There are, as I foreshadowed in 
chapter VI, two main reasons why this only remains mere potential.'3° The most 
unportant restraint on section 116's realising its potential is its inapplicability to the 
States, and this is a problem that can only be cured by constimtional change. Having 
been rejected by the electorate twice and, in 1988, decisively so, in present political 
terms an attempt to extend the religion clauses to the States by an amendment of section 
116 itself could not be more remote. In terms of constimtional process, the separate 
inclusion of religion clauses in the individual State constimtions or in the Australia Act 
is a more attainable goal. But the memory of the electorate's rejection of the 1988 
referendum is even likely to impede constimtional changes like these.'3' 
The second restraint that helps to render section 116 ineffective is the High 
Court's interpretadon of the establishment clause and the free exercise clause. 
Throughout this and the last chapter, I have aimed to show how the Court's 
interpretadon of the religion clauses between 1979 and 1983 is inconsistent with Chief 
Justice Latham's approach to section 116 in Jehovah's Witnesses, the interpretation of 
religion clauses in other common law countries and the High Court's more recent 
interpretation of other constimtional liberties and limitations. In this light the current 
narrow approach to section 116 is anomalous, and should be revised by more principled 
adjudication. 
'30 VI: § 1 supra. 
'3' VI: §§ 8 and 9 supra. 
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The enlarged significance of section 116 that would result should also heighten 
the awareness that secular government is one of the basic instimtions of organised 
government recognised in the Commonwealth Constimtion. In the course of its 
adjudication the High Court has identified basic instimtions of constimtional government 
that are not referred to expressly in the Constimtion's text, but which are inferred from 
the combined operation of individual provisions or the general stmcmre of the 
Consdmtion, or which are necessary but unstated assumptions about instimtions of 
government on which the express and more detailed prescriptions in the Constimtion 
are based. These include the mle of law, popular sovereignty, representadve 
democracy, the separation of powers and responsible government, federalism, rights to 
due process and, according to Justices Deane and Toohey, equality before the law.'3^ 
The combined operation of the religion clauses could reasonably lead to the inference 
that secular government is one aspect of constimtionalism to be included with these. 
It is, after all, an insdmtion of liberal democracy that predates most of them. In State 
Aid, Justice Sir Ronald Wilson denied that section 116 could represent any broad 
principle of government greater than the separate prohibitions of each of its clauses.'33 
But once more this approach cannot be reconciled with the Court's inference of other 
'3^ See Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Company Limited 
(1920) 28 CLR 129 (responsible government); Victorian Stevedoring and General 
Contracting Co Pty Ltd v Bignan (1931) 46 CLR 73 (separation of powers); Melbourne 
Corporation v Commonwealth (1947) 74 CLR 31 (federalism); Attorney-General v R 
(1957) 95 CLR 529 (separation of powers); Australian Communist Party v 
Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 (mle of law); Attorney-General (Cth) (ex rel 
McKinlay) v Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 1 (representative democracy); Polyukovich 
V Commonwealth (1991) 172 CLR 501 (due process: retrospective and ad hominem 
legislation); Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1 (representative 
democracy); Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 
106 (popular sovereignty and representadve democracy); Leeth v Commonwealth (1992) 
174 CLR 455 at 485-6 (equality before die law); Bietrich vi? (1992) 177 CLR 292 (due 
process: right to legal representation). 
133 State Aid note 68 supra at 609. 
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basic insdmtions of constimtional government in the Consdmtion and, again, it is 
inconsistent with Chief Justice Latham's judgment in Jehovah's Witnesses. There, as 
we have seen, he said that section 116 embodied the idea "that religion should, for 
political purposes, be regarded as irrelevant". It was also meant to limit the 
Commonwealth's power "to enact legislation which favours any religion or which 
interferes with any religion".'3"* This is not only recognition of the Constimtion's 
requirement of secular government, but more specifically the idea of a secular 
commonwealth and its central political principle of equal religious liberty. 
In arguing against the inclusion of the religion clauses in the Commonwealth 
Constimtion at the Melbourne Convention, Sir Simon Eraser expressed concem that 
they might undermine the homogeneous religious pattems of colonial Australia.'3^ 
Here, Fraser accurately identified some connection between the religion clauses and 
pluralism, even if his claims that they cause pluralism and that the colonial populations 
were homogeneous are debatable.'3^ It is probable that religion clauses maintain 
pluralism. But, more importantly, they help to guarantee the equal citizenship of people 
who hold profoundly different religious, philosophical and moral conceptions of the 
good and, I contend, are a just accommodation to the present challenges of increasing 
religious pluralism in Australia. 
'3^ * Jehovah's Witnesses note 4 supra at 122 and 126; see II: § 9 supra; VI: § 4 supra. 
'^ ^ Official Record note 1 supra at 1775. 
'3^ See VI: § 2 supra. 
PART 3: 
THE LAW 
y 
EX. PUBLIC REASON 
IN THE COMMON LAW 
§ 1: Grace Bible Church Inc v Reedman 
The extent to which religious conceptions and practices are protected by the 
common law was, in Australia, most completely considered in Grace Bible Church Inc 
V Reedman.^ In that case, the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia 
upheld a conviction against a church which, contrary to the State Education Act,^ had 
refused to obtain government registration of an independent school it conducted. Grace 
Bible Church had, it was assumed, a sincere religious objection to registradon. Its 
pastor gave evidence that the Church believed that it was under God's control alone, 
and that registration of the school would subordinate the Church to governmental 
control as well.3 The primary submission made on its behalf was the broad proposition 
that no State legislation could burden the Church's "inalienable" right to religious 
' (1984) 54 ALR 571 {"Grace Bible Church"). 
^ Education Act 1972 (SA), ss 72f-i. 
3 The pastor relied on Rom xiii 1-7. Justice Howard Zelling disputed the accuracy of 
die pastor's exegesis, but accepted (correctly) that "I must take the pastor's 
interpretation as one which he is entided to make in his smdy of the Scripmres": Grace 
Bible Church note 1 supra at 573; c/I: § 3 supra. 
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liberty."* It was argued that this right was based on section 116 of the Commonwealth 
Constimtion and Commonwealth discriminadon laws, but because these only addressed 
Commonwealth legislation the Court deemed them irrelevant.^ 
Equally, it was argued that this right was based on the received common law. 
The Court also rejected this argument, and thus the basic contention that there was a 
right to religious liberty which recognised some protection for religion from the 
operation of State legislation. In Justice James White's words, "the common law has 
never contained a fundamental guarantee of the inalienable right of religious freedom 
and expression".^ Furthermore, the Court held that even if there were a common law 
right to religious liberty it would also be irrelevant, because under the principle of 
parliamentary supremacy legislation has lexical priority over common law rights.' 
It follows that, given their similar constimtional arrangements, Grace Bible 
Church also represents the law in the other mainland States. However, the Full Court's 
unqualified conclusion that there is no common law right to religious liberty is, on 
closer examination, open to qualification. This is because the reason used by the 
common law courts has become profoundly secular, and consequently the judicamre has 
developed common law mles that do recognise some legal rights' to equal religious 
liberty. These mles are discussed in the rest of this chapter. First, I briefly revisit the 
"* Ibid. I presume this really meant that the right was inviolable. 
^ Ie Human Rights Commission Act 1981 (Cth); see International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 1966 (UN); XI: §§ 2-5 infra. 
^ Grace Bible Church note 1 supra at 582. 
' Ibid at 579 and 580. 
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principles of public reason (§ 2). Then, I consider the process by which one aspect of 
common law reason acmally did secularise (§ 3), and how public reason has been used 
in two aspects of matrimonial jurisdicdon (§ 4). In conclusion I explain how public 
reason is an important obligation of judges in a secular commonwealth, but also how, 
in itself, it is inadequate to realise a just political constimtion (§ 5). This conclusion 
reinforces my contention that, to achieve a secular commonwealth, there is a need in 
Australia to extend the religion clauses by constimtional change and more liberal 
interpretation.* 
§ I : Public Reason in Adjudication 
In chapter II, I introduced the idea of public reason: an obligation that limits 
the citizen's and the official's reliance on religious reasons in deciding public questions. 
This occurred historically, as the increase of religious pluralism since the Reformation 
has made specific religious reasons less persuasive and less accessible to the public 
generally. However, in conditions of religious pluralism it is also a civic, official and, 
to an extent, a legal obligation resting on the equal citizenship of citizens who hold 
different religious, philosophical and moral conceptions of the good. It is an obligation 
that constrains decision-making in all branches of government, but as I also explained 
in chapter II, is especially adapted to adjudication. Since in common law countries 
(excepting some of the United States) a judge is not a directly elected official, the 
polidcal legitimacy of his decisions depends less on a popular mandate than on the 
effectiveness of his reasoning. This elevates the importance of the tradidonal judicial 
practice of explaining publicly how a decision is made, but also the need that the 
judge's reasons be publicly acceptable. In conditions of religious pluralism, it means 
VIII: § 6 supra. 
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diat the judge is officially and even legally required to decide questions consistently 
with principles of secular government, and the obligations of secular rationale and 
secular resolution. The judge, above all others, should also have a secular motivation 
for his decision, although this is best regarded as a personal moral obligation voluntarily 
assumed by a judge prepared to respect principles of secular government and, in 
particular, the idea of public reason. Together these obligations mean that, conversely, 
the judicamre is better placed than the parliament and executive government to promote 
public reason in decision-making on public questions.^ Indeed, close examination of 
common law adjudication shows that, since the monopoly religious establishment in 
England in the late seventeenth cenmry, judicial reason has secularised into public 
reason and that, in most cases, the judicamre continues to honour the idea of public 
y 
reason in its decision-making. 
§ 3: The Part and Parcel Maxim: The Alpha and Omega of a Religious Reason 
In integrated societies where law, morality and religion remain incompletely 
differentiated, a religious reason is often one of the most effective legitimations of a 
social instimtion. It places that instimtion safely within the people's uhimate frame of 
reference, and lends it a permanence and durability that other reasons cannot.'° It also 
has its legacy. For, while the Christian ius diuinum does not seem to have been a 
significant source of common law reason even in late Middle Ages, in the modem era 
some use has still been made of Chrisdan instimtions, the laws of God and the Church 
' II: § 8 supra. 
'° RG Mortensen, "The Theory Behind Legal Secularisation" (1993) 18 Bulletin Aust 
Soc Legal Philosophy 19 at 31-1. 
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and, more often, the Bible as sources for the development of the common law." 
In the modern era the maxim "Christianity is part and parcel of the laws of 
England" has been the most prominent religious reason invoked by the common law 
courts in deciding questions, and thus in shaping the common law. It has also been the 
most controversial religious reason the judicamre has used. However, it is not enough 
to explain this maxim - as Thomas Jefferson did - as the result of a conspiracy between 
the English courts and the religious establishment.'^ In the first place, the context in 
which Sir Matthew Hale originally stated the part and parcel maxim in R v Taylor^^ 
in 1677 reveals more. Taylor introduced the offence of blasphemous libel to the 
common law, and there were important legal conditions which compelled this 
development. On the one hand was the monopoly religious establishment which, since 
the Restoration, Parliament had been consolidating in England.'"* On the other was 
the vacuum created by the abolition of the Court of Star Chamber which, as custos 
morum, had punished the holding of heterodox opinions before the Interregnum.'^ 
These make the introduction of the blasphemy law in Taylor socially understandable. 
But they do not make it inevitable, and it is arguable that Hale's use of the religious 
reason that "Christianity is parcel of the laws of England" in deciding that blasphemy 
should be punished at common law also helped to legitimate his Court's assumpdon of 
" See N Doe, Fundamental Authority in Late Medieval English Law (Cambridge 1990) 
pp 70-4; St German, Boctor and Student (London 1974) pp 39-45; eg R v Lilburne 
(1649) 4 St Tr 1269 at 1307. 
'^  T Jefferson, Writings (New York 1984) pp 1321 and 1328. 
'3 (1677) 1 Vent 293. 
"* III: § 2 supra. 
" XII: § 2 infra. 
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a novel jurisdiction. '^  
In the second place, Jefferson's anti-clerical explanation of Taylor does not 
explain the different uses of the part and parcel maxim in England, the Empire and the 
United States. In conditions of increasing religious pluralism and secularism, the 
religious reason did undermine the principle of equal religious liberty and litigants' 
equal access to social and economic goods. Only infrequently was the maxim used 
more constmctively to broaden the protection of the common law. 
1. The Blasphemy Law. The original use of the part and parcel maxim was the 
most common: it was the reason why blasphemy was punished at common law. 
y 
Indeed, the maxim can be considered the sole rationale for the offence until Ix)rd 
Coleridge rejected it in 1883." I discuss the content, purpose and validity of the 
blasphemy law in chapter XII. 
2. Matrimonial Jurisdiction. Outside the blasphemy law, there is one reported 
case when the part and parcel maxim was used to impose a political or legal inequality. 
In 1737, Lord Hardwicke relied on the maxim to grant the custody of children to their 
Christian mother instead of their Jewish grandfather.'* The use of public reason in 
child custody causes is discussed in § 4. 
3. Trusts, Contract and Property. The most common use of the part and parcel 
'^(1677) 1 Vent 293. 
" 7? V Ramsay & Foote (1883) 15 Cox 231 at 235. 
'* Villareal v Mellish (1737) 2 Swans 533 at 538-9. 
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maxim, outside the blasphemy law, was in questions involving access to social and 
economic goods. In these cases, the maxim reason was recognised as limiting the rights 
that those who belonged to non-Christian minorities had to enforce contracts, to hold 
intellecmal property, to settle tmsts or to make bequests.'^ There was even a 
redistribution of property on purely religious lines in one extreme case discussed in 
chapter IV, Be Costa v Be Paz.'° Invoking the part and parcel maxim. Lord 
Hardwicke denied that the testator had any equitable right to leave moneys on tmst to 
support a Jewish school. So, applying the doctrine of cy pres, he ordered that the 
moneys be used to maintain an establishment minister. 
However, apparently without any impact on the part and parcel maxim, it was 
y 
recognised in 1860 that the Jews had been released from these inequalities.^' In the 
nineteenth cenmry, it was rather the emerging secularists who suffered under its use, 
but who also, in both blasphemy prosecutions and civil disputes, put pressure on its 
continuing validity. Thus, in Briggs v Hartley" it was held that a bequest left as a 
prize for an essay on namral theology was invalid: and, in Cowan v Milbourn^^ and 
'^  For contracts, see Cowan v Milbourn (1867) LR 2 Ex 230; Bring le v Town of 
Napanee (1878) 43 UCQBR 285; cf Boucher v Shewan (1984) 14 UCCPR 419. For 
intellecmal property, see Lawrence v Smith (1822) Jac 470 at 474; Murray v Benbow 
(1822) Jac 474n; cf Thompson v Thompson (1844) 1 Coll 381 at 396; Pare v Clegg 
(1861) 29 Beav 589 at 601-2. For tmsts, see Be Costa v Be Paz (1744) 2 Swan 487n; 
(1754) Amb 228; Isaac v Gompertz (1786) cited 7 Ves Jun 61; cf Re Michel's Trust 
(1860) 28 Beav 39 at 41-2 and 43. For bequests, see Vidal v Girard's Executors (1844) 
2 How 127; Briggs v Hartley (1850) 29 U (NS) Ch 416. 
'° (1744) 2 Swanst 487n; (1754) Amb 228; see IV: § 6 supra. 
'^ Re Michel's Trust (1860) 28 Beav 39. 
2^  (1850) 29 U (NS) Ch 416, esp at 417. 
" (1867) LR 2 Ex 230. 
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its indistinguishable Upper Canadian partner, Pringle v Town of Napanee,-^ landlords 
were allowed to renege on contracts they had made with secularists who had intended 
to use the premises for public lecmres which critiqued Christian conceptions. The use 
of the maxim in these cases was probably even more severe than in contemporaneous 
blasphemy cases and, arguably, than was possible in the United States.^ ^ 
4. Protection of Public Worship. There was one occasion when the part and 
parcel maxim was used to reinforce the principle of religious equality in colonial New 
South Wales. In 1874, the Supreme Court assumed that the part and parcel maxim had 
been received as law in the colony.-^ It was resurrected when, in 1884, members of 
the "Skeleton Army" were convicted of the common law offence of dismrbing public 
Christian worship. The Skeleton Army was a band of mffians who openly parodied and 
harassed the nascent Salvation Army. In this case, R v Barling,^^ the Court rejected 
a challenge to the convictions based on the ground that there was no such offence at 
common law, and it added that the offence could not be limited to dismrbing the 
services of the Church of England. Here, Chief Justice Sir James Martin stated the part 
and parcel maxim and said: "I speak of Christianity in its broadest sense when I say 
that Chrisdanity is part of the common law of England, and part of the law of this 
colony".^ * To some extent, he acmally relied on the maxim to decide that those who 
dismrb Christian worship should be punished. In Barling therefore, the maxim was 
^' (1878) 43 UCQBR 285; cf Boucher v Shewan (1864) 14 UCCPR 419. 
^^  See XII: § 2 infra; Vidal v Girard's Executors (1844) 2 How 127 at 198-9. 
^"^ Ex parte Thackeray [1874] SCR (L) 1 at 61. 
"(1884)5 NSWR405. 
28 Ibid at 411; see also ibid at 410 and 411-12. 
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used for its usual end of protecdng specific religious conceptions. However, at the 
same tune it supported a more comprehensive protection of different religious 
concepdons, even if this was necessarily limited to those held by Christian 
denominations. 
5. Tort. Perhaps the most tolerable use of the maxim was in Justice Sir Wdliam 
Best's decision in Bird v J ones.-'^ There, he relied on the part and parcel maxun to 
uphold a novel action on the case, in which the plaindff sought compensation for 
injuries - caused by a spring-gun - that could not sustain any other common law claim 
in tort. If the defendant's conduct was immoral to the Christian religion, it was 
unlawful at common law.3" But unlike the other uses of the maxim, this humane result 
relied on the judge's reference to more profound (and ecumenical) Christian principles 
of justice in the common law, rather than the protection of Chrisdan instimtions. It is 
a method Lord Atkin repeated, without using the part and parcel maxim, in his even 
more celebrated appeal to the Parable of the Good Samaritan in Bonoghue v 
Stevenson.^"^ 
In 1883, Lord Coleridge declared that, as the principle of religious toleration 
had long since dissolved the monopoly religious establishment, the maxim "Christianity 
is part of the law of the land" no longer meant what it meant in Taylor, and hinted at 
^^  (1828) 4 Bing 628. 
^'^ Ibid at 641. 
'^ [1932] AC 562 at 580; see also A'Court v Cross (1825) 3 Bing 329 at 333; Ogilvie 
V Adams [1981] VR 1041 at 1053. 
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its dotage.3^ This was confirmed when, in Bowman v Secular Society Limited,^^ Lord 
Sumner completely interred it. Bowman involved the narrow question of whether a 
testator could leave money to the Secular Society - a corporadon established "to 
promote ... the principle that human conduct should be based upon namral knowledge 
and not upon supemamral belief ... and the secularisation of the State". The legacy 
was challenged as unlawful and against public policy, because the purposes of the 
Secular Society were said to offend the part and parcel maxim.3"* In fact, the case 
need not have raised the role of the part and parcel maxim at all.3^ However, the 
maxim was considered throughout the trial and appeals and, ultimately, only Lord 
Finlay in the House of Lords accepted it.3^ The courts therefore held that the legacy 
to the Secular Society was lawful. 
y 
However, beyond the determination of the acmal dispute, there were more 
important legal developments in Bowman. First, both Briggs v Hartley and Cowan v 
Milbourn were overmled.3' Secondly, the use of the part and parcel maxim in 
adjudication was, in different degrees, rejected. In the House of Lords, Lords Parker 
32 R V Ramsay & Foote (1883) 15 Cox 231 at 235; IV: § 1 supra. 
33 [1917] AC 406 {"Bowman IF); also In re Bowman, Secular Society Limited v 
Bowman [1915] 2 Ch 447 {"Bowman I"). 
3"* Bowman I note 33 supra at 451-5; Bowman II note 33 supra at 409-13. 
3^  It could have been decided solely on the ground that the legacy was a gift to a 
corporation and not a tmst, and therefore the purposes of the corporation need not have 
been considered: Bowman II note 33 supra at 435, 440-1 and 478. 
3^  Ibid at 432. 
3' Bowman I note 33 supra at 463-4, 467 and 472; Bowman II note 33 supra at 434-5, 
446-8, 462-3, 464 and 476-7. 
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and Buckmaster only seemed to limit the reach of the maxim.3* Lord Sumner rejected 
it unequivocally. He held that the maxim was not a mle of positive law: instead it was 
but mere "rhetoric". This he proved by the maxim's obscurity.3^ 
One asks what part of our law may Christianity be, and what part of 
Chrisdanity may it be that is part of the law. 
However, here Lord Sumner did not address the basic question: why should the maxim 
be rejected? In fact, the maxim had never been used as a mle. It was always used as 
a reason, and as a reason it had a broader and deeper effect on the content of common 
law mles. It can be said that, in accordance with the idea of a secular commonwealth, 
the judicamre has an official and legal obligation not to use a religious reason in 
adjudication, but of course the Lords' speeches in Bowman make no reference to the 
idea of public reason which Has only been refined through the 1980s and 1990s. 
Instead, it seems that the rejection of the part and parcel maxim was really a response 
to social change. This was especially important to the Court of Appeal and, in the 
House of Ix)rds, again to Lord Sumner:"*" 
In the present day reasonable men do not apprehend the dissolution or 
downfall of society because religion is publicly assailed by methods not 
scandalous ... [If] the attimde of the law both civil and criminal towards 
all religions depends fundamentally on the safety of the State and not on 
the doctrines or metaphysics of those who profess them, it is not 
necessary to consider whether or why any given body was relieved by 
the law at one time or frowned on at another, or to analyse creeds and 
tenets. Christian and other, in which I can profess no competence. 
Bowman is therefore best regarded as a conscious reaction to more basic social 
developments: instimtional laicisation, religious pluralism, secularism."" Even though 
3* Bowman II note 33 supra at 446 and 477. 
3^  Ibid at 464. 
^ Bowman I note 33 supra at 459, 462, 467 and 471; Bowman II note 33 supra at 467. 
"' Cf Bowman II note 33 supra at 428 and 454. 
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in England Pariiament continues to maintain a privileged religious establishment, in 
Bowman the judicamre responded more immediately to a Sitz im Leben that acmally 
requires, as a matter of justice and practicability, a secular commonwealth. 
In Commonwealth countries. Bowman v Secular Society has, sometimes literally, 
unquestioned authority. In Australia and New Zealand, judges have merely assumed 
that Bowman represents the common law.^ - There has been no comment on the 
previous operation of the part and parcel maxim in New South Wales: even in Re 
Pyke,^^ where the Supreme Court of Victoria upheld a bequest to the Radonalist 
Association, there was no comment on the unpact Bowman had on the maxun. In 
Alberta, there was more comment on Bowman in R v Big M Brug Mart.'^'^ There, 
y 
Justice William Stevenson lamented the persistence of Sunday closing laws that 
embodied preferences to Christian churches. He thought that, in substance, these 
embodied the part and parcel maxim. Therefore, they ignored the impact of 
secularising instimtions like Bowman, which the judge grouped with non-establishment 
and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.^^ The position in England and the 
Commonwealth proves that Bowman is a critical decision in the secularisation of the 
2^ In re Hamilton-Grey: Perpetual Trustee Co (Ltd) v Melville (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 262 
at 273; Re Inman, Beceased [1965] VR 238 at 245 and 248; Australian Securities 
Commission v SIB Resources NL (1991) 103 ALR 374 at 380; Knowles v Commissioner 
of Stamp Buties [1945] NZLR 522 at 528-9; cf Bouzaid v Horowhena Indoor Bowls 
Centre Inc [1964] NZLR 187 at 192. 
'*3 Re Pyke; Perpetual Executors and Trustees Association of Australia Ltd v Pyke [1974] 
VR 788. 
"" [1983] 4 WWR 54; see also Boardwalk Merchandising Mart Ltd v R [1972] 6 WWR 
1 at 19-20. 
^^  Ibid at 65-71. The same policy of religious equality exists under the civil law of 
Quebec, where the equitable principles of Bowman v Secular Society could have no 
direct operadon: see Chaput v Remain (1955) 1 DLR (2d) 241 at 246. 
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common law and, therefore, in the use of public reason by the judicamre. It is 
therefore of basic importance to the realisation of a secular commonwealth. 
§ 4: Public Reason in Matrimonial Jurisdiction 
To an extent, the use of public reason in adjudication can be assessed by the 
judicamre's decisions in a jurisdiction where its discretions are large, and where the 
constraints of stare decisis are correspondingly small. There are two aspects of 
matrimonial jurisdiction which create this oppormnity: the use of public policy in 
matrimonial causes, and child custody causes. Here, in a jurisdiction which partly 
descends from the ecclesiastical courts and where, even in Australia, the English 
religious establishment sdll has its impact, public reason has in most cases been 
honoured.'*^ 
Inheriting the procedure used by the Roman ecclesiastical courts, when deciding 
whether to recognise the validity of any decree made by foreign matrimonial courts, the 
judicamre has traditionally held that it will ordinarily recognise the decree if, according 
to private intemational law, the foreign court had the jurisdiction to make it."*' Under 
this procedure, the recognition of the decree therefore depends initially on where it was 
made, and not why. For example, an annulment of a marriage will initially be 
recognised at common law if it had been granted by a court in the place where the 
'*^  See the persistent civil recognition of the English canon law marriage, and the 
disputed requirement that it be solemnised by an episcopally ordained priest: R v Millis 
(1844) 10 CI & Fin 534; Hodgson v Stawell (1854) 1 VLT 51; Caterall v Caterall 
(1857) 1 Rob Ecc 580; Savenis v Savenis [1050] SASR 309; Quick v Quick [1953] VLR 
224; Persian v Persian [1970] 2 NSWR 538; Kuklycz v Kuklycz [1972] VR 50. 
"*' 0 Kahn-Freund, The Growth of Internationalism in English Private International Law 
(1960) pp 11-12. 
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parties were domiciled."** 
This procedure still need not be used in an exceptional case, when the judge 
dislikes either the reason why a decree was made, or its effect. Specifically, when 
deciding whether to recognise a foreign decree the judge has a discretion to invoke 
considerations of public policy, that allow him not to recognise a decree which, under 
the normal procedure, he would recognise. Since this use of public policy reverses the 
expected decision in a matter, it is properly invoked only in extreme cases.'**' Indeed, 
as Justice Benjamin Cardozo said, the public policy which can serve this purpose must 
represent "some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good 
morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the commonweal".^° Hence, the English courts' 
y 
refusal to recognise decrees which, on the one hand, limit religious liberty and, on the 
other, concede religious preferences extraterritorially helps to prove how thoroughly the 
common law is now permeated by some idea of public reason. 
The question of foreign decrees made on religious grounds had earlier 
confronted the English judicamre, but only in the 1960s did it express public policy 
problems with them.^' From the 1940s to the 1960s the courts in Malta, a 
Commonwealth country but one where Roman ecclesiastical law was applied in 
"** Salvesen v Administrator of Austrian Property [1927] AC 641. 
"*' However, it is sometimes used because a court prefers to apply its own domestic law 
to a foreign law: PB Carter "The Role of Public Policy in Private Intemational Law" 
(1993) 42 Int Comp Law Qtly 1 at 2. 
^° Loucks V Standard Oil Co of New York 120 NE 198 at 202 (1918). 
'^ Chetti (Venugopal) v Chetti (Venugopal) [1909] P 67. Chetti relied on Sottomayer 
vBe Barros (1879) 5 PD 94, which was criticised in Miller v Teale (1954) 92 CLR 406 
at 414 as "dubious guidance". 
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matrimonial causes, annulled several English marriages which, though solemnised in 
accordance with English law, had not complied with the ecclesiastical law." This 
meant that, in Malta, a religious reason was used to impose a legal disability. In 1949, 
Justice Sir Henry Willmer overlooked this problem, and still would have recognised one 
such annulment because Malta was the place where the husband was domiciled.^ 3 
However, in 1962 one of these annulments openly offended the Court of Appeal. Gray 
V Formosa^'^ involved a marriage between a Maltese man and an English woman in an 
English registry office. In 1951, the husband deserted his wife and their three children 
and remmed to Malta. The wife obtained a maintenance order against him in England, 
but could not enforce it against the husband in Malta. Under Roman ecclesiastical law, 
the Maltese courts could not regard the couple as married or the children as legitimate: 
y 
the husband, a baptised Catholic, had not been married in a Catholic Church. The wife 
petitioned the English courts for either an annulment, or a divorce on the ground of 
desertion. So initially, in the Court of Appeal, the validity of the Maltese annulment 
had to be considered. 
The husband was domiciled in Malta, so an English court would ordinarily have 
recognised the annulment. However, in this case the Court refused to recognise the 
decree, and invoked unstated public policy considerations to do so. Inmitively the 
judges thought the decree repugnant: it offended English ideas of justice. The Court 
still did not hold that recognition of the decree would introduce a religious reason for 
" The relevant mle was "inter baptizatos nequit matrimonialis contractus validus 
consistere quin sit eo ipso sacramentum": see now Code of Canon Law (1983) can 
1055 and 1059. 
3^ Chapelle v Chapelle [1950] P 134. 
'^ [1963] P 259. 
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imposing a legal disability. In fact, the direct concem was that recognition would result 
in injustice: the wife being treated as a concubine and the children illegitmiate because 
the ecclesiastical law had been offended.^^ 
But what was only used in Gray to achieve a just result in one particular case 
was in Lepre v Lepre^^ consolidated as a principle of public policy. The question in 
Lepre also involved the recognition of a Maltese annulment based on the couple's not 
marrying in a Catholic Church when the husband was a bapdsed Catholic. However, 
in contrast to the decision in Gray, it was held in Lepre that recognition of the decree 
would not impact adversely on the couple's child. But as it was "incumbent on the law 
to speak with a clear, consistent and unequivocal voice", the President of the Probate 
Division Sir Jocelyn Simon refused to distinguish the result in Gray." He interpreted 
the previous decision as a refusal to recognise a decree on the ground it attempted to 
use a religious reason to impose an extraterritorial legal disability.^* 
[I]t was an intolerable injustice that a system of law should seek to 
impose extraterritorially, as a condition to the validity of a marriage, that 
it should take place according to the tenets of a particular faith. 
Thus, where in Gray the Court objected to the unjust effect of the decree, in Lepre it 
objected to the religious reason on which the decree was based. The consequence of 
this reinterpretation is that it is public policy in England, and arguably elsewhere in the 
Commonwealth, that the judicamre not recognise any decree which, in effect, imposes 
a legal disability on a religious ground and, within the constraints of stare decisis, it 
^^ Ibid at 269, 270 and 271. 
^^  [1965] P 52. 
" Ibid at 64. 
^*/^/^ at 64-5. 
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should refuse to decide quesdons in ways that undermine that principle. The principle 
is consistent with the idea that a religion should, as nearly as practicable, be regarded 
as irrelevant to a citizen's legal stams, and therefore embodies an important but 
previously unstated commitment to religious equality into adjudication. 
In child custody causes, we find a second aspect of matrimonial jurisdiction 
where the judicamre has developed an extensive scheme of rights to equal religious 
liberty.^ ^ These oft-reported causes either deal with orders of guardianship, custody 
and access, where the contesting parties introduce one or the other's religious 
conceptions as a qualification or disqualification to the grant of the order, or with 
orders relating to the child's religious upbringing or education. The principles 
y '~ ^ 
originated in England and Ireland in the nineteenth cenmry, in equitable jurisdiction in 
suits involving children and deceased estates, and in common law jurisdiction in 
petitions for writs of habeas corpus.^ 
In eighteenth cenmry causes where the contestants held different religious 
conceptions, the judges preferred members of the religious establishment to have 
guardianship or custody, instead of Catholics, Jews and even, despite the Toleration 
Act, Protestant Dissenters.''' Obviously, this preference was based on the public law 
of the establishment. But this did not help a judge where the public law did not 
^^ For a general treatment, see E Goodman, "The Relevance of Religion in Custody 
Adjudication under the Family Law Act" (1981) 7 Monash Univ L Rev 217. 
^ See In re Barceys, Infants (1860) 11 Ir CL Rep 298 at 311; Skinner v Orde (1872) 
LR 4 PC 60 at 70. 
'^ Lady Teynham v Lennard (1724) 4 Bro 302 at 306; Storke v Storke (1730) 3 P Wms 
51 at 53; Villareal v Mellish (1737) 2 Swans 533; Blake v Leigh (1756) Amb 306. 
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discriminate between the religious conceptions held by the contestants, as in causes 
involving only Protestant Dissenters. Thus, when in 1821 Lord Eldon had to decide 
Lyons v Blenkin,^^^ a guardianship suit involving a Unitarian father and more distant 
Bapdst relatives, he had to adopt a less partial approach to the contestants' religious 
conceptions. So in Lyons v Blenkin, he held that religious conceptions were prima facie 
irrelevant and, in fact, could only become relevant considerations in the decision to 
grant guardianship if they were illegal, or if the children were so settled in the course 
of their religious education that intermpdng it would affect their happiness. This 
decision openly changed the law.^ 3 However, the principles Lord Eldon established 
in Lyons v Blenkin have not changed significantly since then. Oddly, they were then 
applied in causes involving members of the religious establishment without comment, 
y 
and still largely determine how a judge is to respond to the question of religion in a 
child custody cause. 
The basic principle now applied embodies the principle of equal religious liberty. 
Inidally, the equality was limited to Christian denominations. It is now unlimited: a 
court will not discriminate between particular religious concepdons or between religious 
conceptions generally and non-religious conceptions.^ In the nineteenth cenmry, some 
judges credited this principle to the idea of agnostic government and others to a non-
denominadonal idea of Christian obligation.^ ^ But, in the recognition of this principle 
^^(1821) Jac 245. 
3^ Ibid at 260 and 264n. 
^ CfIn re Violet Nevin (an Infant) [1891] 2 Ch 299 at 309; In re Besant (1879) 11 Ch 
D 519 at 520. 
^^  See II: § 4 supra; eg Attorney-General v Cullum (1842) 1 Y & CCC 411 at 417; In 
re Grimes (1877) IR 11 Eq 465 at 470; In re Clarke (1882) LR 21 Ch D 817 at 823; 
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as an obligadon of judicial office, there is no example clearer than Justice Sir Edward 
Kay's decision in Re Clarke.^^ The question there was whether a boy was to be 
brought up in the religious establishment or as a Catholic. In the course of his 
judgment, Justice Kay stated candidly that his personal preference was that an English 
boy of landed Protestant descent be brought up as a Protestant. However, sitting in 
court he had to treat all religious conceptions equally and, despite his personal opinion, 
ultimately ordered the boy be raised a Catholic.^' 
Of course, once the judicamre removed the relevance of the merits of any 
religious conceptions, it could only use a secular rationale to decide questions which 
affected the child's religious development. This was largely achieved. The primary 
consideration in all child custody causes has long been the welfare of the child, and in 
those where the child's religion is in issue, this has meant that, if he has strongly 
developed religious impressions, he should not be raised or educated in other religious 
conceptions. The reason is the child's temporal welfare; unsetding his "settled" 
religious impressions risks dismrbing his health, happiness and moral character.^* 
Even though no mention of the child's right to practice his own religion is ever made. 
In re Scanlan, Infants (1888) LR 40 Ch D 200 at 207; Bamardo v McHugh [1891] AC 
388 at 400; In re McGrath (Infants) [1893] 1 Ch 143 at 149; In re Carroll, an Infant 
[1931] 1 KB 317 at 336; see also Austin v Austin (1865) 34 Beav 257 at 262-3. 
^ (1882) LR 21 Ch D 817. 
'^ Ibid at 823 and 827; see also In re Newton (Infants) [1896] 1 Ch 740 at 752. 
*^ Witty V Marshall (1841) 1 Y & CCC 68 at 72-3; Stourton v Stourton (1857) 8 De G 
M & G 760 at 767-8, 771 and 772-3; Bavis v Bavis (1862) WR 245 at 246; Re Lyons 
(an Infant) (1869) 22 LT (NS) 770; Re Meade (1871) 19 WR 313 at 314; Hawkesworth 
V Hawkesworth (1871) LR 6 Ch App 539 at 545; Condon v Valium (1887) 3 TLR 686; 
In re Violet Nevin (an Infant) [1891] 2 Ch 299; /n re Newton (Infants) [1896] 1 Ch 740 
at 743-4 and 748-9; Ward v Laverty [1925] AC 101. 
312 IX: § 4 
the mle acmally provides such a right, and it properly recognises that this right enlarges 
as the child's moral power to hold a conception of the good increases. 
In most cases the child does not hold developed religious impressions, and some 
other reason must be used to decide his religious upbringing or education. Once more 
this is consistent with the lesser liberties of the child, which only increase with his 
power to hold a conception of the good. In the nineteenth cenmry, courts of equity 
centred the decision on the father's religion.^^ This could be displaced, but only 
where the father had been indifferent to religious conceptions or chose to have the child 
educated in another religion.'° In the courts of equity, the mother's religion was only 
ever as important as the father's if the child were illegitimate." The common law 
courts did recognise that a mother's limited rights to guardianship for nurture carried 
^^  In re Agar-Ellis; Agar-Ellis v Lascelles (1883) LR 24 Ch D 317. The father could 
choose the child's religion by testamentary direction or the appointment of a guardian: 
Talbot V Earl of Shrewsbury (1840) 9 U Eq 125 at 128; In re Browne (1852) 2 Ir Ch 
Rep 151 at 164; Bavis vBavis (1862) WR 245; F v F [1902] 1 Ch 688. In other cases, 
the courts merely ordered that the child be raised in the father's religion. Occasionally, 
they were prepared to determine his religious conceptions by inference: In re North 
(1847) 11 Jur 7 at 10; In re Newbery (1865) LR 1 Eq 431; Hawkesworth v 
Hawkesworth (1871) LR 6 Ch App 539; Skinner v Orde (1871) LR 4 PC 60 at 70; In 
re Besant (1879) 11 Ch D 508; In re Scanlan, Infants (1888) LR 40 Ch D 200; cf In 
re McGrath (Infants) [1892] 2 Ch 496 at 506; In re X; X v Y [1899] 1 Ch 526; In re 
Grey, Infants [1902] IR 684; R v Guardians of the Poor of the Belfast Union [1908] 2 
IR 343. 
'° In re O'Malleys, Minors (1858) 8 Ir Ch Rep 291 at 305-7; Hill v Hill (1862) 31 U 
Ch 505 at 512; Andrews v Salt (1873) LR 8 Ch App 622 at 639; In re Clarke (1882) 
LR 21 Ch D 817 at 824 and 829. However, the father could not abdicate his 
responsibility for the child's religious upbringing to the mother: Vansittart v Vansittart 
(1858) 27 LJ Ch 222 at 224-5 & 289 at 293; In re Andrews (an Infant) (1873) LR 8 QB 
153 at 158. 
" In re Barceys, Infants (1860) 11 Ir CL Rep 298; Bamardo v McHugh [1891] AC 388 
at 400. CfIn re O'Malleys, Minors (1858) 8 Ir Ch Rep 291 at 302; /? v Bolton Union 
and Stallard (1892) 36 Sol J 255; In re White (1893) 9 TLR 575; In re McGrath 
(Infants) [1893] 1 Ch 143 at 150-1. 
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some control of her child's religious upbringing, but even this control could be removed 
by the intervention of a court of equity and, after the passage of the Judicature Act in 
1873, the mles of equity relating to children prevailed in all superior courts of 
judicamre.'^ The important point here is that, despite the sex discrimination in these 
mles, they dictated a secular - not a religious - rationale for determining the religion 
in which a child should be raised. When in 1925 the British Parliament removed the 
sex discrimination, the secular principles largely remained intact. The paramount 
consideration thus remains the welfare of the child, but the court still will not 
discriminate between particular religious conceptions or between religious conceptions 
generally and non-religious conceptions.'3 Where the child has not developed religious 
impressions that a court is prepared to protect, the right to control his religious 
upbringing or education now centres on the custodial parent. Somewhat perversely, this 
builds a stronger cormection between custody and religion than the gender biased mles 
required,'"* and that cormection has, on recent occasions, once more made religious 
conceptions relevant in decisions to grant custody. 
'^  CfIn re Andrews (an Infant) (1873) LR 8 QB 153 at 160; see Judicature Act 1873 
(UK), s 25 {10); Re Goldsworthy (1876) 2 QBD 75 at 82; In re Grey, Infants [1902] 
2 IR 684 at 917-18 and 919; In re Carroll, an Infant [1931] 1 KB 317 at 333, 343 and 
349-50. For an example, see the jurisdictional contest in 7? v Clarke (1857) 7 El & Bl 
186 and In re Alice Race, an Infant (1857) 1 H & M 420n. But this also meant that 
the greater willingness of the courts of equity to make decisions based on the child's 
welfare also prevailed: In re Andrews (an Infant) (1873) LR 8 QB 153 at 157-8; 
Andrews v Salt (1873) LR 8 Ch App 622 at 641-2; cf In re Agar-Ellis; Agar-Ellis v 
Lascelles (1883) LR 24 Ch D 317 at 327. 
'3 Guardianship of Infants Act 1925 (UK), s 1; In re Carroll, an Infant [1931] 1 KB 
317 at 337; In re Collins (an Infant) [1950] 1 Ch 498. 
'"' Ie because a custodial mother could be ordered to raise the child in the father's 
religion: In re Scanlan, Infants (1888) LR 40 Ch d 200 at 212-13; Hawkesworth v 
Hawkesworth (1871) LR 6 Ch App 539. 
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The courts in the Australian colonies and States applied the same principles and 
mles, and most State parliaments copied the British legislation which removed any sex 
discrimination in the mles.'^ On occasions, these principles were also based expressly 
on the idea of agnostic government.'^ Furthermore, there was no immediate change 
to this position when the Commonwealth Parliament first assumed legislative power 
over matrimonial causes in 1959." Then in 1966, the matrimonial courts also began 
to appeal to section 116 of the Commonwealth Constimtion as a second reason not to 
discriminate between religious conceptions in child custody causes. This, as I discussed 
in chapter VII, has continued even though in refusing special leave to appeal in New v 
New,''^ Chief Justice Sir Harry Gibbs rejected the relevance of section 116 to decisions 
'5 In re Pennington (1875) 1 VLR (E) 343; In re Butler (1889) 10 NSWR (E) 85; In re 
Sparrow (1903) 20 WN (NSW) 42; In re McCrohon [1893] Q U 33; In re McCann 
[1906] SRQ 75; In re Uren (Infants) [1936] SRQ 168; Evans v Evans and Cleary (1939) 
WN (NSW) 168; i? V Murdoch; ex parte Hoath [1940] VLR 61; Rochfort v Rochfort 
(1944) 44 SR (NSW) 238; McKinley v McKinley [1947] VLR 149; Re Lane (Infants) 
[1959] Qd R 1; Paxton v Paxton (1961) 62 SR (NSW) 743; Ex parte Paul; re Paul 
(1962) 63 WN (NSW) 557; Rudolph v Bent (1985) 10 Fam LR 669 at 672; Infants 
Custody and Settlements Act 1899-1934 (NSW), s 5; Guardianship and Custody of 
Infants Act 1891-1928 (Qld), s 3; Guardianship of Infants Act 1940 (SA), s 11; 
Marriage Act Amendment Act 1929 (Vic), s 15; cf Guardianship and Custody of Infants 
Act 1934 (Tas), s 10; Matrimonial Causes and Personal Status Code 1948 (WA), s 44. 
For New Zealand, see In re Thomson (1911) 30 NZR 168; Guardianship of Infants Act 
1926 (NZ), s 2. 
'^  II: § 4 supra; In re McCrohon [1893] Q U 33 at 37; In re Uren (Infants) [1936] SRQ 
168 at 173-5. 
" Matrimonial Causes Act 1959; see now Family Law Act 1975 (Cth); see Bemardi v 
Bernardi (1964) 6 FLR 342; Mauger vMauger (No 1) (1966) 7 FLR 484, 10 FLR 285; 
Barker v Barker (1966) 8 FLR 266; Strum v Strum (1969) 14 FLR 284; Hanrahan v 
Hanrahan (1972) 19 FLR 262; In the Marriage of Dyer [1976] FLC 90-229; Wellington 
V Wellington [1976] FLC 90-277; In the Marriage of Plows [1979] FLC 90-607, 90712; 
Kennard v Kennard (1979) 34 FLR 525, [1979] FLC 90-680; In the Marriage of 
Goudge [1984] FLC 91-534 (79,318); In the Marriage of Sheridan [1994] FLC 92-517 
(81-332). 
78 Unreported, High Court of Australia, 5 March 1982. 
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in child custody causes.'^ This is demonstrably a use of section 116 as a public reason 
and not as a constimdonal mle. In none of these cases has a matrimonial court ever 
applied the terms of, say, the establishment or free exercise clause. Instead, the judges 
seem to be invoking an nnstattd principle or value of equal religious liberty which they 
believe section 116 represents.*° 
In reported child custody causes since Lyons v Blenkin and with rare possible 
exceptions,*' public reason has been used with remarkable consistency. However, as 
I foreshadowed, the stronger connection between custody and religion has allowed the 
contestants' religious conceptions to be reintroduced as relevant considerations in 
decisions to grant custody. There seems no escaping this, so the Family Court has 
y 
settled the mle that, in deciding to grant custody, it should regard a contestant's 
religious conceptions as relevant if the practice of that religion is detrimental to the 
79 See VII: § 5 supra. 
*° I have already argued (VI: § 6 supra) that section 116 should apply to judicial orders 
made in the exercise of Commonwealth jurisdiction, and therefore suggest that section 
116 should, where necessary, be applied in child custody causes. Thus, it could be 
argued that the establishment clause, on my suggested interpretation (VII: §§ 6 and 7 
supra), imposes a requirement on the judicature as a branch of the Commonwealth 
government to treat religious conceptions equally. It could also be argued that the free 
exercise clause demands that each contestant's religious conceptions not be burdened 
illegitimately and, therefore, in the context of a child custody cause, be treated equally 
to the other contestants' religious conceptions (VIII: §§ 3 and 4 supra). The free 
exercise clause should also give increasing priority to the child's religious conceptions 
as his power to hold them increases. This interplay of consdmdonal liberties and 
limitadons does not markedly alter the existing law, which might explain why the 
matrimonial courts have never had to detail how section 116 would apply in these 
causes. 
*' Ie In re Newbery (1865) LR 1 Eq 431; see In re Butler (1889) 10 NSWR (E) 85 at 
121-2. 
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welfare of the child.*^ In light of the principle of equal religious liberty, there should 
be no objection to this mle as stated in the abstract. Once more, the contestant's 
religious conceptions and practices are only being limited in the interests of the child's 
liberties. The problem comes in application when, especially in assessing the possible 
social detriment to the child a religion could cause, the judge is not to refer even 
unconsciously to either his own religious conceptions, or to those of the other 
contestants: social detriment must be assessed using a secular rationale only. This 
problem has been compounded as "the chasm of different religious opinions" has 
broadened and deepened.*3 For, in the reported Australian and English causes before 
the 1960s, the contest was nearly always between a Catholic and a Protestant, and the 
rare exceptions were between Protestants, or involved Jews or atheists.*"* In all of 
y 
these except causes involving an atheist, no issue of social detriment to the child ever 
arose as the competing religious conceptions were in the social mainstream. The 
reported causes now include Exclusive Brethren, Jehovah's Witnesses and Pentecostals, 
and could move well beyond the Christian penumbra. Where increased pluralism 
generally makes even the existence of a social mainstream questionable, the dilemma 
a judge faces in assessing the social detriment a religious conception can cause is 
evident. Three examples suffice to show how a judge undertaking this enquiry could 
*^  In the Marriage of Grimshaw [1981] FLC 91-090 (76,618); In the Marriage of 
Litchfield (1987) 11 Fam LR 435 at 441; Firth v Firth [1988] FLC 91-971 (77,025); 
In the Marriage of Sheridan [1994] FLC 92-517 (81,337). Cf the eariier test, 
originating in Evers v Evers (1972) 19 FLR 296 at 302-3, under which a contestant's 
religious liberty could be limited to protect the community and in the interests of social 
order. This is probably broader than is immediately necessary to protect the welfare 
of the child. 
*3 See Ward VLaverty [1925] AC 101 at 111. 
*^  Ie Lyons v Blenkin (1821) Jac 245; Shelley v Westbrook (1821) Jac 266; In re 
Newbery (1865) LR 1 Eq 431; Re Lyons (an Infant) (1869) 22 LT (NS) 770; In re 
5 m « r (1879) 11 C h D 508. 
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neglect to honour public reason. 
1. Jehovah's Witnesses have had a mixed reception in these cases. Their 
tendency to isolate themselves socially has told against them in child custody causes.*^ 
On occasions, they have been granted access on condidon that the child not be taken 
to Bible smdy meedngs or evangelistic door-knocking.*^ However, a judge should not 
repeat Lord Justice Sir Roger Ormrod's mistake in treating the Witnesses' refusal to 
celebrate a mainstream Christian holiday like Christmas as a disadvantage.*' 
2. The nearest the matrimonial courts have come to the extreme but legitimate 
decision not to tolerate an intolerant religious group is in causes involving the Exclusive 
y 
Brethren. This is a marginal Christian group which, owing to its literal exegesis of 
some New Testament passages, discourages its members from having outside social 
contact. It is also uncompromising in requiring Brethren to "shun" any past member 
whom the world leader or local elders has excluded. He is considered evil, and even 
a spouse, parent or child who remains Brethren must "withdraw" from him. In almost 
every reported child custody cause involving a member of the Exclusive Brethren, 
Australian matrimonial courts have refused custody to the member because these 
practices are thought detrimental to the welfare of the child.** But despite the 
85 In the Marriage ofPaisio [1979] FLC 90-659 (78,515-16). 
*^  Hanrahan v Hanrahan (1972) 19 FLR 262; Wellington v Wellington [1976] FLC 90-
277 
*' In re C (Minors) [1978] Fam 105 at 119; see also A Dickey, Family Law (Sydney 
1990) p 354. 
^^ Ex parte Paul: Re Paul (1962) 80 WN (NSW) 557; Mauger v Mauger (1966) 7 FLR 
485; Mauger v Mauger (No 1) {1961) 10 FLR 285; Kennard v Kennard (1979) 34 FLR 
525, [1979] FLC 90-680; In the Marriage of Plows [1979] FLC 90-607, 90712; In the 
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disconcerting social deviance of these pracdces, they can be protected by the principle 
of equal religious liberty when exercised by adult citizens. So, trial justices in the 
Supreme Court of Queensland obviously expressed unnecessary opinions on the merits 
of Brethren doctrine when they held that some of these practices were contrary to public 
policy.*^ This assessment went beyond the needs of the causes before them. In fact, 
only the contestant's understanding of Brethren theology and how he practises it are 
relevant to the question of welfare, and on appeal this evaluation was properly 
cortected.^ 
3. The most extraordinary neglect of public reason occurred In New v New,^'^ 
where the contestants merely disagreed on the emphasis they preferred for their boys' 
y 
religious upbringing. Both parents were Orthodox Jews and wanted the boys raised as 
such, but the father preferred a greater degree of rimal observance than did the mother. 
In the Family Court, Justice Margaret Lusink dwelt on this issue and concluded that the 
boys "would be advantaged in a religious sense by being in their father's custody". She 
also decided most other issues in the father's favour, so on appeal, despite holding that 
Justice Lusink gave undue attention to the question of religion, the Full Court of the 
Family Court upheld her decision. That outcome might well be justified. However, 
Justice Lusink's decision remains a serious neglect of public reason. In deciding how 
the boys "would be advantaged in a religious sense", she not only misapplied the 
Marriage of Grimshaw [1981] FLC 91-090; In the Marriage of Firth [1988] FLC 91-
lll;cfln the Marriage of Litchfield (1987) 11 Fam LR 435. 
*' Mauger v Mauger (1966) 7 FLR 484 at 485 and 486. 
^ Mauger V Mauger (No 1) (1966) 10 FLR 285 at 287, 301, 303 and 315; see also In 
the Marriage of Plows [1979] FLC 90-712 (78,807 and 78,809). 
" [1981] FLC 91-111. 
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principles of matrimonial law. She also did precisely what the public reason prohibits: 
she used a religious reason to reach her decision. For, as the dissenting Justice Steven 
Strauss said in the Full Court, "she espoused the husband's point of view on the basis 
that the more rigid observances were the more desirable ones".^^ The result was that 
she discriminated against the wife on the ground of religion, and possibly, since in 
Orthodox Judaism a man has a greater role than a woman in rimal observance, on the 
ground of sex.^ 3 g^t^ ^s we have seen, the High Court refused to grant leave to 
appeal against the Full Court's decision in A^ cw.^ "* In the Marriage of Sheridan^^ 
raised the opposite problem, the judge preferring the more liberal approach to religion. 
The contestants did not rely on religious differences in this custody dispute, but Justice 
Warwick Rourke granted custody to the wife, partially on the ground that the husband, 
y 
a pracdsing Catholic, was less "flexible" in matters of religion than the wife, who was 
not Catholic. Once more, the Full Court of the Family Court held that this could be 
interpreted as a judicial preference for the wife's approach to religion, and ordered that 
the question of custody be retried.^^ 
The judicamre has not limited its use of public reason to its matrimonial 
jurisdicdon. In Australia, the pleas that judges exercising other jurisdictions have 
^ Ibid at 16,d>35. 
3^ Ibid at 76,833 and 76,834. 
'^* New V New, Unreported, High Court of Australia, 5 March 1982; VI: § 6 supra. 
' ' [1994] FLC 92-517. 
96 Ibid at 81-338. 
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especially made to the principle of religious equality have been reasonably common.^ 
However, the decisions in matrimonial jurisdiction show how it is prepared to 
exemplify public reason in adjudication that receives little direction from the polidcal 
constimtion or legislation. The principles it has developed are not without practical 
complications and, as New and Sheridan show, are sometimes dishonoured. Sdll, they 
do prove that public reason can help to realise aspects of the principle of equal religious 
liberty when deciding public questions of litigation. 
§ 5: Conclusion 
The idea of public reason helps the judicamre to decide how and when the 
principles of justice, the consdmtion and positive laws are to be applied consistendy 
with a political conception of justice.^* Thus, even where a constimtion includes 
religion clauses, public reason is needed to apply them without conceding, through 
judicial interpretation, a preference to one religious concepdon or practice over another. 
It is certainly evident that the reasoning used in the earliest religion clause decisions in 
the United States Supreme Court and, through Krygger v Williams,'^'^ the High Court 
could have been improved had the judges not based limitadons on the protection of 
religion on mainstream Christian morals and conceptions.'°° 
^ Eg Nelan v Bownes (1917) 23 CLR 546 at 568; Attorney-General (NSW) v Grant 
(1976) 135 CLR 587 at 600; Onus v Alcoa of Australia Limited (1981) 149 CLR 27 at 
46; Church of the New Faith v Commissioner of Pay-roll Tax (Vic) (1983) 154 CLR 120 
at 130; Canterbury Municipal Council v Muslim Alawy Society [1985] 1 NSWLR 525. 
*^ J Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York 1993) p 224. 
^^  (1912) 15 CLR 36; see I: § 3 supra. 
'°^ See Reynolds v United States 98 US 145 (1878); Bavis v Beason 133 US 333 (1889). 
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However, as Grace Bible Church indicates, in the mainland States there are no 
religion clauses that guarantee the principle of equal religious liberty and that public 
reason could reinforce. Indeed, in the mainland States the unwritten principle of 
toleration and the official obligation the parliament, the execudve government and the 
judicamre has to use public reason are the only guarantees a citizen has that his 
religious conceptions and practices will be protected. There are some, like former 
Chief Justice Gibbs, who consider this a better approach for the protection of religion 
than the use of effective religion clauses.'°' This is becoming a harder position to 
maintain, especially since the principle of equal religious liberty now has quasi-
constimtional stams in New Zealand and the United Kingdom, because the mainland 
States of Australia are now alone in the English-speaking world in hoping that these 
y 
alone will be sufficient to provide equal religious liberty.'°^ 
However, the problem is really deeper. In Grace Bible Church again, the Full 
Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia recognised that the principle of 
parliamentary supremacy allows governmental burdens on religious liberty.'°3 
"^ ' For Sir Harry Gibbs' consistently narrow approach to secdon 116, see "Section 116 
of the Consdmtion and the Territories of the Commonwealth" (1947) 20 A U 375; 
Attorney-General (Vic) (ex rel Black) v Commonwealth (1981) 146 CLR 559; and New 
V New, Unreported, High Court of Australia, 5 March 1982. For his support of 
religious liberty at common law, see Attorney-General (NSW) v Grant (1976) 135 CLR 
587 at 600. 
'°^ Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ), s 15; Convention for the Protection of Fundamental 
Rights and Freedoms 1953 (Council of Europe), art 9. 
'°3 Grace Bible Church note 1 supra at 579 and 580. C/G de Q Walker, "Dicey's 
Dubious Dogma of Parliamentary Sovereignty: A Recent Fray with Freedom of 
Religion" (1985) 59 A U 276. For discussion on whether parliamentary supremacy is 
permissible in a constimtional regime, see J Rawls note 98 supra at 231-5. This is not 
to say that religion clauses would have changed the outcome of Grace Bible Church 
itself In similar cases in the United States, the courts have held that registration 
requirements did not violate religion clauses: North Bakota v Shaver 294 NW 2d 883 
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However, the principle of parliamentary supremacy has been used to support extreme 
burdens on religion: as I discussed in chapter VI, in Australia and the United Kingdom 
the practice of some religious conceptions has, at times, been banned completely.'""* 
Obviously, pariiaments and executive governments, though largely honouring the 
principle of toleration and public reason, do not always, and whether by accident or 
design, under the principle of parliamentary supremacy have the power to remove equal 
religious liberty completely. 
The problem is that, as I discussed in chapters II and IV, the principle of 
toleration and public reason, without religion clauses, place the citizen's liberty to 
practise his religion in the powers of government.'°^ In Grace Bible Church, Justices 
y 
Howard Zelling and Robin Millhouse told the Church that a remedy to correct a 
violation of religious liberty must be pursued through political channels, and not by 
litigation.'°^ This is legally correct, but again classes the citizen's religious liberty 
as a good capable of exchange in the parliament and executive government. The 
utilitarian approach to religious liberty therefore persists, and wdl until religion clauses, 
assuming they are enforced by judicial review, allocate decisions on public questions 
involving religion to the judicamre. 
(1980); Nebraska (ex rel Bouglas) v Faith Baptist Church 301 NW 2d 571 (1981); New 
Jersey State Board of Higher Education v The Board of Birectors of Shelton College 
448 A 2d 988 (1982); Sheridan Road Baptist Church v Bepartment of Education 348 
NW 2d 263 (1984); cf Ohio v Whisner 351 NE 2d 750 (1976). 
"^  VI: § 9 supra. 
'"' II: § 6 supra; IV: § 7 supra. 
'°^  Grace Bible Church note 1 supra at 579 and 585. 
X. RELIGIOUS GROUP AUTONOMY 
§ 1: The Ordination of Women Cases 
Through 1991 and 1992 the Anglican Church in Australia was torn intemally by 
a protracted and public controversy on the propriety of ordaining women as priests. 
The controversy reached its peak in civil litigation conducted in the New South Wales 
Supreme Court, and the decisions that resulted indicate the potential that the civil 
judicamre has to become involved in ecclesiastical disputes. On 6 December 1991, the 
Appellate Tribunal (the highest court in the Church) mled that a bishop could not ordain 
a woman to the priesthood without the authority of a canon of the General Synod (the 
highest legislamre in the Church). However, several bishops indicated that, regardless 
of the mling, they would still ordain women, and litigadon to restrain the ordinations 
ensued. Scandrett v Bowling involved actions sponsored by the largely evangelical 
archdiocese of Sydney in the Supreme Court against the Bishop of Canberra-Goulbum. 
The Bishop had intended to ordain 11 women on 2 Febmary 1992, and initially an 
injunction was sought to restrain the ordinations. On 28 January Justice Andrew 
Rogers refused the injunction, but was overmled on 31 January by the Court of 
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Appeal.' That Court dealt with the main issues on 3 July and, there, exercised 
restraint. The Court refused to determine the issue on the basis that the constimtion of 
the Church, embodied in New South Wales in the Constitution Act of 1961, could only 
be enforced in property related matters, and therefore the women's ordination question 
did not qualify for civil adjudication.- Bartholomew v Ramage,'^ decided by Jusdce 
John Brownie in September 1992, involved almost the same issue and was decided the 
same way. There, members of the continuing Presbyterian Church challenged a 
decision of the General Assembly in 1991 that rescinded the Church's power to ordain 
women to the ministry, but again civil jurisdiction was declined. 
The Scandrett litigation in particular revealed confused assumptions amongst 
y 
Anglicans on the legal stams of the Church. On the one hand, the injunction of 31 
January caused concem that the legal independence of the Church could be 
compromised by civil adjudication. On the other hand, the Court's emphasis in its 
decisions on the Church's stams as a voluntary associadon seems to have surprised 
Anglican media commentators.'* However, in this chapter it wdl be seen that these 
decisions confirm that the legal independence the civil judicamre ascribes to organised 
religious groups acmally arises from this voluntary stams. It will also be seen that this 
' Unreported, New South Wales Supreme Court, 28 January 1992 {"Scandrett /"); 
Unreported, New South Wales Court of Appeal, 30 January 1992 {"Scandrett IF). 
- (1992) 27 NSWLR 483 {" Scandrett IIF); cf Scandrett v Carnley, Unreported, Westem 
Australian Supreme Court, 6 March 1992; Scandrett v Carnley, Unreported, New South 
Wales Supreme Court, 28 April 1992. 
3 Unreported, New South Wales Supreme Court, 4 September 1992. 
•* M Thomas, "After the Cold Hand of the Law ... A Time to Weep" Australian, 3 
Febmary 1992, p 3; J Murray, "Move is as Wise as Solomon" Australian, 4 July 1992, 
p 2; J Murray, "Church Unity as Elusive as Decisions" Australian, 8 July 1992, p 2; 
"A Challenge for Church and State" (editorial) Australian, 13 July 1992, p 8. 
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independence is qualified: under the general law there is judicial power to determine 
the intemal disputes of religious groups, and so to enforce ecclesiastical law, to 
interpret doctrine and, within the context of the particular group involved in the 
litigation, to decide what is orthodox and what is heterodox (§§ 5 to 6). This 
jurisdiction was developed in the Court of Chancery in suits involving Protestant 
Dissenters (§ 3). But in England and Scotland its limits also seem to be shaped by the 
religious establishments, and in the United States by the recognition of rights and 
obligations of religious liberty in the First Amendment's free exercise clause (§§ 2 and 
7). In Australia (with the possible excepdons of Tasmania and the Territories), the 
equitable jurisdiction is largely unchecked by analogous instimtions. In this chapter, 
I also explain how, since Lord Eldon's awkward attempts to determine disputes amongst 
Protestant dissenters in the early nineteenth cenmry, the jurisdiction has been used to 
decide questions involving religious groups' doctrines. This aspect of the jurisdiction 
was reaffirmed in Scandrett v Bowling but, as I conclude, is not easy to reconcile with 
the legitimate exercise of judicial power in a secular commonwealth or the inalienability 
of the citizen's rights to equal religious liberty (§ 8).^ 
§ 2: The British Establishments: Courts and Law 
In Great Britain, the Churches of England and Scotland are officially instimtions 
of government. Their different courts are regarded as part of the national court 
stmcmre, and their respective ecclesiastical laws as originating in the powers of the 
national government. The English ecclesiastical courts exercise the inherent judicial 
power the diocesan bishops possess as ordinaries, and so replicate the Episcopal 
hierarchy of the English religious establishment. In each diocese there is a consistory 
Scandrett III note 2 supra at 505-6. 
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court exercising original jurisdiction to hear and determine most ecclesiastical causes. 
From the consistory courts, appeals lie to die provincial courts: the Arches Court of 
Canterbury and the Chancery Court of York. Thereafter, appeals lie to the Privy 
Council. There is also a separate jurisdicdon vested in the Court of Ecclesiastical 
Causes Reserved to hear and determine ecclesiastical offences relating to doctrine, rimal 
or ceremonial, and proceedings of duplex querela against a bishop who has refused the 
instimtion or admission of a priest.'' These courts are probably inferior courts of 
justice but, subject to the limits imposed by the civil judicamre through the writ of 
prohibition and the injunction, exercise power in spirimal causes as complete as the 
Supreme Court of Judicamre's power in civil proceedings.' In theory, it is the Queen's 
ecclesiastical law which is administered in these courts.* Though limited to punishing 
by censure and, therefore, unable to access government's monopoly on the legitimate 
use of coercion, these courts exercise the power and authority of the national 
government.^  
The organisation of die courts in the Scottish religious establishment differs, but 
in theory the source of the power and authority they exercise is the same. The Scottish 
ecclesiastical courts are pattemed on the Presbyterian hierarchy of kirk sessions. 
^Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963 (UK), ss 1, 6-8 and 10. 
' DM Gordon, "Certiorari to an Ecclesiastical Court" (1947) 63 LQR 208 at 212; 7? v 
Chancellor of St Edmundsbury and Ipswich Biocese; ex parte White [1948] 1 KB 195 
at 214, 219 and 220; cf Ricketts v Bodenham (1836) 4 A & E 433 at 446; R v 
Chancellor of St Edmundsbury and Ipswich Biocese; ex parte White [1947] 1 KB 263 
at 274. 
* Caudrey's Case (1590) 5 Co Rep la at 8b-9a and 39b-40b. 
"^Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963 (UK), s 49; cf Mackonochie vLord Penzance 
(1881) 6 App Cas 424 at 446. 
327 X: § 2 
presbyteries, synods and a General Assembly.'° In Scodand, it has also been 
recognised that the ecclesiastical courts exercise the power and authority of the national 
government." 
§ 3: Civil Jurisdiction over Voluntary Religious Groups I: Origins 
In light of the questionable polidcal legitimacy of the English religious 
establishment especially, it is ironic that as instimtions of government the establishment 
courts give the religious establishments an independence from the intervention of the 
civil judicamre which, at common law and in equity, is not enjoyed by other religious 
groups. Once the Glorious Revolution settlement collapsed the monopoly religious 
establishments and the inner logic of the toleration of Protestant dissent was better 
y 
appreciated, the civil judicamre began to recognise the voluntary relations created in 
dissenting congregations as being legal in stams.'- Early intervention in a dispute 
amongst dissenters is recorded in the Court of King's Bench in 1762.'3 But it was the 
Court of Chancery which, in settling that the Toleration Act permitted tmsts to be 
settled for the benefit of Protestant dissenters, developed the jurisdiction and made the 
charitable tmst available as a basis on which it could intervene in dissenters' 
disputes.'"* The consolidation of toleration as an unwritten principle of British and 
colonial political constimtions in the nineteenth cenmry undoubtedly means that the 
'''^ Act Anent Church Jurisdiction 1567; Church Act 1579; Church Jurisdiction Act 1579; 
Act Establishing Presbytery 1690 (Scotland); see DC Douglas (ed), English Historical 
Bocuments (London 1953) viii p 640. 
" M'Millan v Free Church of Scotland (the Cardross Case) (1859) 16 D 290 at 323. 
'^  See III: § 4 and 5 supra; C/Note, (1962) 75 Harvard L Rev 1142 at 1145. 
'^Rv Barker (1762) 3 Burr 1265. 
^^Attorney-General v Cock (1751) 2 Ves Sen 273; IV: § 2 supra. 
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same jurisdiction to intervene is available regardless of the namre of the religious group 
concemed (unless in Great Britain it is one of the establishments). 
Sdll, in practice civil adjudication in these proceedings has invariably involved 
a Protestant church. Indeed, throughout the Commonwealth there are only two reported 
cases involving the Catholic Church and none involving a non-Christian religious 
group.'^ The "dejuridification" of Protestant religion, which as I discussed in chapter 
II originates in the Reformation itself, has made Protestant churches prone to frequent 
intemal reorganisation and, in historical terms, rapid doctrinal change: conditions that 
make it more likely that intemal disputes will occur, but less likely that intemal 
procedures will be available to resolve them.'^ Protestants therefore are also more 
likely to submit disputes to adjudication by an extemal agent, and in particular by a 
civil judge. 
§ 4: Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction in Australia 
The possible reception of English ecclesiastical jurisdiction and law in New 
South Wales has only a rough correspondence to the existence of a religious 
establishment in the colony. In chapter III I concluded that colonial governmental 
arrangements suggested that the Church of England was initially established in New 
'^  Brown v Les Cure et Marguilliers de I'CEuvre et Fabrique de Notre Bame de 
Montreal (1874) LR 6 PC 157; Bodd v Society of the Love of Jesus (1975) 53 DLR (3d) 
532. For the United States, see Z Chafee, "The Intemal Affairs of Associations Not 
For Profit" (1930) 43 Harvard L Rev 993 at 1025. 
'Ml: § 2 supra; JD Hunter, "Conservative Protestantism" in PE Hammond (ed). The 
Sacred in a Secular Age (Berkeley 1985) p 150; E Troeltsch, Protestantism and 
Progress (Philadelphia 1986) pp 37-8 and 96-9. 
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South Wales, but was disestablished, at latest, in 1842." The parallel operation of the 
ecclesiastical law is less certain, but this need not be treated as an essential aspect of 
a privileged religious establishment. Sir William Blackstone's mle was that a settled 
colony (like New South Wales) did not receive laws relating to "the mode of 
maintenance for the established clergy" and "the jurisdiction of spirimal courts".'* 
This excluded most ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and even though Blackstone never 
attempted to explain the exclusion it has hardly been questioned.'^ In New South 
Wales, judges have assumed that coercive ecclesiastical jurisdiction was not received, 
though largely on the basis of the doubtful assumption that the Church of England in 
the colony was not established.3° 
The exclusion of ecclesiastical jurisdiction and law afier disestablishment in New 
South Wales is largely consistent with several important decisions made in the 1860s 
by the Privy Council and, in the Court of Chancery, by Lord Romilly on the stams of 
the Church of England in Cape Colony and Natal. These still do not explain why 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction and law were excluded before disestablishment because the 
basic principle settled in the South African cases was that, in places where it was not 
established by law, the Church of England was a voluntary association that enjoyed the 
" III: § 7 supra. 
'* W Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 14th ed (London 1803) I; AC 
Castles, An Australian Legal History (Sydney 1982) pp 9-13. 
'^  CfBurtis V Burtis 14 Am Dec 563 at 564-5 (1825) (New York); Crump v Morgan 40 
Am Dec 447 at 452 (1843) (North Carolina). 
^"^ Ex parte Ryan (1855) 2 Legge 876 at 877 and 878-9; Ex parte King (1861) 2 Legge 
1307 at 1314, 1319 and 1324; Ex parte Thackeray [1874] SCR (L) 1 at 64; In the Will 
of Purcell (1895) 21 VLR 249 at 250; Wylde v Attorney-General (NSW) (ex rel 
Ashelford) (1948) 78 CLR 224 at 293 {"Red Book III"). 
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same legal stams as any other religious group. In consequence, once a colony received 
constimtional government, the British executive government, through the monarch's 
position as Supreme Head of the Church, could not introduce coercive ecclesiasdcal 
jurisdiction in the colony by executive action (usually Letters Patent).^' The principle 
was curiously qualified by L^rd Romilly in Bishop of Natal v Gladstone,^^ where he 
suggested that a colonial bishop could enforce his orders with the cooperation of the 
civil judicamre in the colony. This opinion is best regarded as anomalous.^ 3 j^g 
New South Wales Supreme Court had earlier decided on two occasions that coercive 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction was not received in the colony, although on the first occasion 
this conclusion was difficult to reconcile with an ordinarial jurisdiction in New South 
Wales invested in the Bishop of Calcutta under British legisladon: the East India 
Company Act. In 1824, the Archdeacon of Sydney was empowered by a British Order-
in-Council to exercise the Bishop of Calcutta's jurisdiction in the colony, but in 1827 
Chief Justice Sir Francis Forbes held that no coercive jurisdiction had been properly 
authorised.^ "* In 1861 (undoubtedly after disestablishment) the Supreme Court reached 
the same conclusion in Ex parte King,^^ holding that the monarch had no power to 
'^ Long V Bishop of Cape Town (1863) 1 Moo PC (NS) 411 at 460, 461-2 and 466; Re 
Bishop of Natal (1864) 3 Moo PC (NS) 115 at 128-9 and 148-52; Bishop of Natal v 
Gladstone (1866) LR 3 Eq 1 at 35 and 38; Merriman v Williams (1882) 7 App Cas 484 
at 502; cf Bishop of Natal v Green (1868) 18 LT 112. 
22 (1866) LR 3 Eq 1 at 33. 
3^ Brown v Les Cure et Marguilliers de I'CEuvre et Fabrique de Notre Bame de 
Montreal (1874) LR 6 PC 157 at 187; Scandrett III note 2 supra at 544, 546, 552 and 
554-5. The Bishop of Nova Scotia seems to have had some power to exercise coercive 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction in Lower and Upper Canada: Constitutional Act 1791 (UK) 
(31 Geo 3 c 31), s 40. 
^^  AC Castles note 17 supra at 187; cf East India Company ^crl813 (UK) (53 Geo 3 
c 155), ss 49-52. 
25 (1861) 2 Legge 1307. 
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invest the Bishop of Sydney with coercive ecclesiastical jurisdiction by Letters Patent. 
Ultunately, the reasons that best explain why the colonial judicamre repeatedly 
held that ecclesiastical jurisdiction and law were not received in New South Wales, 
despite (in public law) a privileged religious establishment in the colony, relate to the 
progressive development of secular government in Great Britain and the colonies. 
First, some connection has been made between exclusion of ecclesiastical law and the 
demise of the cuius regio principle by the emergence of different religious 
establishments in England and Scotland and the legislative toleration of Protestant 
dissenters.^^ Secondly, it has been thought that the existence of a Presbyterian 
establishment in Scotland made it inappropriate to receive English ecclesiastical law in 
y 
a British colony.^' Thirdly, through the operation of the Toleration Act English 
ecclesiasdcal law did not apply generally to all people in England and, therefore, did 
not travel with them generally to the colonies.-* Fourthly, in Will of Purcell^^ 
Victorian Supreme Court Justice Henry Hodges linked the exclusion of English 
ecclesiastical law direcdy to colonial condidons of religious pluralism. 
In two respects, some ecclesiasdcal law does seem to have slipped through the 
^^  CfCatterall v Catterall (1947) 1 Rob Ecc 580 at 582-3; Ex parte Thackeray [1847] 
SCR(L) 1 at 65. 
^'' Ex parte Ryan (1855) 2 Legge 876 at 877 and 879; cf Ex parte King (1861) 2 Legge 
1307 at 1324. British legislation showed some tendency to treat ministers of the two 
establishments in the colonies equally: Indian Marriages Validity Act 1818 (58 Geo 3 
c 84) (UK); Foreign Marriages Act 1849 (UK), s 20. 
^^ Ex parte King (1861) 2 Legge 1307 at 1324; cfIn the Will of Purcell (1895) 21 VLR 
249 at 252-3. 
29 (1895)21 VLR 249 at 252-3. 
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general exclusion. In the first place, there is a tentative suggestion that Bridsh troops 
carried English ecclesiastical law with them to overseas postings, namrally including 
New South Wales.3° In the second place, there was the express reception of probate 
and matrimonial jurisdiction in all settled colonies. In England these were originally 
an important part of the ecclesiastical practice of the advocates and proctors of Doctors' 
Commons, but were transferred to the civil courts in 1856.3' jgday (subject to 
Commonwealth power in matrimonial causes) all State and Territory Supreme Courts 
have inherent jurisdiction in probate and matrimonial causes. That this originated in 
the judicial power of the English religious establishment is best recognised in 
Queensland, where the Supreme Court has "the same powers [as] the Prerogative Court 
of the Archbishop of Canterbury [had] in the province of Canterbury".3^ Otherwise, 
English ecclesiastical law was only received in the terms of the consensual compact 
which govems internal relations in the (disestablished) Anglican Church.33 Its 
continuing justiciable stams in England might suggest that it is intended to be 
^° R V Inhabitants of Brampton (1808) 10 East 282 at 288-9; Beard v Balkham Hills 
Shire Council (1986) 7 NSWLR 273 at 277. 
3' Probates and Letters of Administration Act 1856 (UK), ss 3 and 4; Matrimonial 
Causes Act 1856 (UK), ss 2 and 6; AH Manchester, "The Reform of the Ecclesiastical 
Courts" (1966) 10 AJLH 51 at 75. 
3^  Supreme Court Act 1867 (Qld), s 23; see also Australian Courts Act 1828 (UK), ss 
3, 11 and 12; Constimtion (Cth), ss 51 (xxi) and (xxii); Australian Capital Territory 
Supreme Court Act 1933 (Cth), s 11; Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), ss 4 and 31; 
Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 (Cth); Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), 
s 23; Supreme Court Act 1979 (NT), s 14; Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA), ss 17-19; 
Constitution Act 1975 (Vic), s 85; Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA), ss 16-22; In re Twist 
(1861) 1 IE & M 17; In re Blackwood (1881) 2 NSWR (E) 83; BC Cairns, Australian 
Civil Procedure 3rd ed (Sydney 1992) pp 1-2. 
33 Long V Bishop of Cape Town (1863) 1 Moo PC (NS) 411; Fielding v Houison (1908) 
7 CLR 393 at 402; Red Book III note 20 supra at 261 and 293; Gent v Robin [1958] 
SASR 328 at 347-8 and 349-50; cf Ex parte King (1861) 2 Legge 1307 at 1327-8; 
Dodwell V Bishop of Wellington (1886) 5 NZLR 263. 
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enforceable within the Church in Australia, but this could only on a diminished 
voluntary basis.3^ Similariy, Scottish ecclesiastical law might have been received in 
the terms of the consensual compact which govems various Presbyterian groups, 
including the continuing Presbyterian Church of Australia, but not the Uniting Church, 
even though its constimtion and regulations show a large debt to Scottish ecclesiastical 
law. 35 
§ 5: Civil Jurisdiction over Voluntary Religious Groups II: Practice and 
Principles 
Judges often express reluctance to hear and determine the intemal disputes of 
religious groups. Officially this should have no direct effect on the judge's 
y 
responsibility to apply the law unless, as is usual in an ecclesiastical dispute, the judge 
is exercising equitable jurisdiction and a reluctance to intervene emerges as relevant in 
the exercise of his discretion to refuse a remedy.3^ This hesitation is common in 
disputes involving any voluntary association.3' Still, in cases involving a religious 
group judges have expressed an even greater concem that the litigation discredits the 
group's moral and spirimal integrity.3* However, more relevant to questions of just 
3"* Scandrett III note 2 supra at 505. 
35 CfMilligan v Mitchell (1837) 2 My & Cr 72; Attorney-General v Welsh (1844) 4 
Hare 572; Lang v Presbytery of Irvine (1864) 2 M 823 at 835-6; Attorney-General 
(NSW) V Grant (1976) 135 CLR 587 at 589 and 594-5; Bailey v Uniting Church in 
Australia Property Trust (Qld) [1984] 1 Qd R 42 at 51-2. 
3^  Scandrett II note 1 supra at 22; Scandrett v Carnley, Umeported, Western Australian 
Supreme Court, 6 March 1992, p 12. 
3' Cameron v Hogan (1934) 51 CLR 358 at 384; c/JRS Forbes, Bisciplinary Tribunals 
(Sydney 1990) pp 23-4. 
*^ Foley V Wotner (1820) 2 Jac & W 245 at 248; Attorney-General v Clapham (1853) 
10 Hare 540 at 613; Attorney-General v Anderson (1888) 57 U Ch 543 at 551; General 
Assembly of the Free Church of Scotland v Lord Overtoun [1904] AC 515 at 666 
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and practicable government, in ecclesiastical questions judges have also expressed 
doubts about their personal competence to deal with the ecclesiastical law, discipline or 
theologies involved.3^ In England, this may have even contributed to the common law 
courts' refusal to issue certiorari against an ecclesiastical court to review its 
decisions.'*° Increasing religious pluralism makes this concem even more relevant in 
assessing this jurisdiction, especially if the dispute is doctrinal. It highlights one 
question invariably raised in these cases: is a civil court a forum conveniens to hear 
and determine a religious dispute? 
Judicial involvement in the intemal disputes of religious groups is partially 
restrained by substantive legal pre-requisites to civil adjudication. These provide a 
y 
legitimate secular rationale to civil jurisdiction in these disputes, even if, as I discuss 
in § 6, the judge can decide purely religious questions once jurisdiction is established. 
The relevant grounds of jurisdiction are common to all voluntary associations, and 
include: a charitable tmst, a proprietary or contracmal element to the dispute, and 
parliamentary legislation.*' In addition, a plaintiff may be required to exhaust his 
ecclesiastical remedies before a civil judge will assume jurisdiction. 
{"Overtoun"); Frackelton v Macqueen [1909] St R Qd 89 at 94; Solicitor-General v 
Wylde (1945) 46 SR (NSW) 83 at 110 {"RedBook /"); Attorney-General v Wylde (1948) 
48 SR (NSW) 366 at 379 {"Red Book IF); Red Book III note 20 supra at 273 and 297; 
Scandrett III note 2 supra at 505-6; cf Scandrett I note 1 supra at 2. 
3^  Elliott V Johnstone (1902) 28 VLR 239 at 265; Red Book III note 20 supra at 297 
Gent V Robin [1958] SASR 328 at 356; Barker v O'Gorman [1971] 1 Ch 215 at 220 
cfRed Book I note 38 supra at 110; F Lyall, "Religion and Law" [1975] JR 58 at 65 
cfBalkou V Gouleff {19S8) 65 OR (2d) 97 at 101, (1989) 68 OR (2d) 574 at 576. 
^^ Rv Chancellor of St Edmundsbury and Ipswich Biocese; ex parte White [1947] 1 O 
263 at 274; [1948] 1 KB 195 at 214 & 221. 
'^ C/JB Poppinga, "Comment" (1955) 54 Michigan L Rev 102. 
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1. Trust. The charitable tmst has proved the most common secular rationale for 
civil jurisdiction over a voluntary religious group."*^ In Australia, it is only 
enforceable by the State or Territory Attomey-General, although he might issue his fiat 
to a private citizen to bring relator proceedings to enforce the tmst on his behalf.'*3 
2. Property and Contract. The altemative need to prove that there is a 
proprietary or contracmal element to the dispute is settled by the High Court's decision 
in Cameron v Hogan""^ that a member of an association cannot complain about a 
breach of its mles unless some civil right of a proprietary namre has been affected. 
The Court also seems to have thought that a contract alone could support civil 
jurisdiction, as it held that a voluntary association is established on a consensual basis 
and that its mles could not be treated as an enforceable contract "unless there was some 
positive indication that the members contemplated the creation of legal relationships 
inter se" .^^ 
^^ Eg Craigdallie v Aickman (1813) 1 Dow 1; Attomey-General v Pearson (1817) 3 Mer 
353; Milligan v Mitchell (1837) 2 My & Cr 72; Broom v Summers (1840) 11 Sim 353; 
Shore v Wilson (1839-42) 9 CI & F 355, 4 St Tr (NS) 1370; Attorney-General v Welsh 
(1844) 4 Hare 572; Brummond v Attorney-General (1849) 2 HLC 837; Attorney-
General V Clapham (1853) 10 Hare 540; (1855) 4 De G M & G 591; Attorney-General 
V Gould (1860) 28 Beav 485; Attorney-General v Etheridge (1863) 32 U Ch 161; 
Attorney-General v Aust (1865) 13 LT 235; Attorney-General v Bunce (1868) LR 6 Eq 
563; Attorney-General v Anderson (1888) 57 U Ch 543; Overtoun note 38 supra; In 
re Hutchinson's Trusts [1914] 1 IR 271; Red Book II note 38 supra; Red Book III note 
20 supra; Holy Catholic & Apostolic Church of the East v Attorney-General (1989) 18 
NSWLR 291. 
*3 HAJ Ford and WA Lee, Principle of the Law of Trusts 2nd ed (Sydney 1990) pp 894-
6. 
'' (1934) 51 CLR 358. 
^^  Ibid at 370-1 and 384. 
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Traditionally, the proprietary element alone conditioned civil jurisdiction in these 
disputes."*^ Thus, according to Justice Lancelot Priesdey's leading judgment in 
Scandrett v Bowling, a civil court had no jurisdiction in the women's ordinadon 
question because the plaintiff had no proprietary interest that could be affected by civil 
adjudicadon in the dispute.*' Still, the civil judicamre has long recognised an 
exception to this requirement in the "patrimonial interest".'** This is a concept the 
Scottish courts developed in exercising jurisdiction over Presbyterian and Anglican 
dissenters and, in the Christian churches, seems to relate to quesdons of ministerial 
stams and income.*' The core "spirimal" aspects of professional ministry can indicate 
that no enforceable contracmal relationship between the religious group and the minister 
was intended.^° However, there are also "temporal" aspects to ministry that the courts 
have thought require legal protection.^' These include the deprivation of a minister's 
loss of stams, rights of office, rights to housing, stipend or earning capacity.^^ It 
^^  K Fletcher, Non-Profit Associations (Sydney 1986) pp 68-9 and 72; JRS Forbes note 
36 supra at 16-22. 
"*' Scandrett III note 2 supra at 563-4 and 565-6. 
** K Fletcher note 46 supra at 75; JRS Forbes note 36 supra at 22. 
*' M'Millan v Free Church of Scotland (the Cardross Case) (1859) 16 D 290 at 319; 
Forbes v Eden (1867) LR 1 Sc & Div 568 at 576. 
^^ Re Employment of Ministers of the United Methodist Church (1912) 107 LT 143 at 
145; Re Employment of Church of England Curates [1912] 2 Ch 563 at 568-9; Rogers 
V Booth [1937] 2 All ER 751 at 755; President of the Methodist Conference v Parfitt 
[1984] 1 QB 368 at 378; Bavies v Presbyterian Church of Wales [1986] 1 WLR 323 
at 329. 
'^ CfMacpherson v Sutherland (1885) 6 NSWR (E) 114 at 120-1; Ex parte Hay (1897) 
18 NSWR (L) 206 at 207 and 210. 
^^  M'Millan v Free Church of Scotland (the Cardross Case) (1859) 16 D 290 at 319; 
Long V Bishop of Cape Town (1863) 1 Moo PC (NS) 411; Frackelton v Macqueen 
[1909] St R Qd 89 at 111 and 153-4; Macqueen v Frackelton (1909) 8 CLR 673 at 693-
4 and 724; Baker v Gough (1964) 80 WN (NSW) 1263 at 1277; Bavies v Presbyterian 
Church of Wales [1986] 1 WLR 323 at 329. 
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seems injury to reputation is not included.^3 
The civil judicamre has also intendonally avoided the development of a general 
jurisdiction based on contract to decide the intemal disputes of any voluntary 
association.^ "* However, as 1 mentioned, in Cameron v Hogan the High Court did 
anticipate that a contract alone could support jurisdiction in these disputes so long as 
the evidence showed that there was a clear intention that the mles of the association be 
legally enforceable. Thus the Full Court of the South Australian Supreme Court 
thought, in Plenty v Seventh-Bay Adventist Church of Port Pirie,^^ that such an 
intention could be inferred from a church manual which, in admonishing members to 
exhaust intemal remedies before litigation, acmally contemplated that civil adjudication 
in ecclesiastical questions was possible.^^ The inference that legal relations might be 
intended may also be affected by the namre and content of the issue or the principle or 
mle in question. In his concurring judgment in Scandrett v Bowling, Justice Dennis 
Mahoney decided that, because the mles of the Anglican Church were given importance 
in the Church and, historically, originated in English ecclesiastical law, in general they 
gave rise to enforceable rights and obligations between members of the Church. But 
this did not mean that every mle could be enforced. For example, the namre of a mle 
that related to a bishop's power to ordain priests depended partially upon theological 
considerations, including "the will of Christ, as appearing in the Bible and otherwise" 
" Cf Frackelton V Macqueen [1909] St R Qd 89 at 110-11 and 141-2; Plenty v Seventh-
Bay Adventist Church of Port Pirie (1986) 43 SASR 121 at 124, 139 and 143. 
*^ JRS Forbes note 36 supra at 23-4. 
^' (1986) 43 SASR 121 at 124, 139 and 143. 
^^  Cf Stuart V Haughley Parochial Church Council [1936] 1 Ch 32. 
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and "the traditions of the Church as indicadng the will of Christ"." He said:^ * 
[I]t is relevant that the mles themselves are vague, that the meaning of 
them is ambiguous or indefinite, and that the decision as to what they 
require to be done in a particular case will depend upon standards or 
judgments of such complexity or vagueness that it is difficult or 
impossible to give content to or to apply them. 
Justice Mahoney therefore held that such a mle could not be enforced, or at least was 
not appropriately enforced by injuncdon. This does not seem to prevent a civil judge's 
enforcing the doctrine when there is a proprietary element to the dispute. It is 
nevertheless an appealing argument that the "dejuridified" namre of the issue, principle 
or doctrine should indicate its inherent capacity to be an appropriate object of civil 
adjudication. 
y 
3. Legislation. In a religious group that has its constimtion and law embodied 
in parliamentary legislation, civil jurisdiction might be supported on the assumption that 
the relevant parliament intended the constimtion and law to have legal effect within the 
group. For example, in Attomey-General (NSW) v Grant''^ the High Court held that 
the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church of Australia had power under the 
Presbyterian Church Act of 1971 (NSW) to unite with the Methodist Church and the 
Congregational Union in the Uniting Church in Australia.^ ° But again, the legislation 
can only support the jurisdiction if, in its terms, it shows an intention that it was meant 
" Scandrett III note 2 supra at 506. 
^^ Ibid at 505. 
'' (1976) 135 CLR 587. 
^ See also Gladstone v Armstrong [1908] VLR 454; Attorney-General (ex rel Murray) 
V Clarke [1914] VLR 454; In re Talbot; Jubb v Sheard [1933] 1 Ch 895; Barker v 
O'Gorman [1971] 1 Ch 215; United Church of Canada v Anderson (1991) 2 OR (3d) 
304, 
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to be enforced. In Scandrett v Bowling, Justice Priestley held that the Anglican 
Church's New South Wales Constitution Act could only be enforced in property related 
matters. This was purely a question of interpretation, drawn from the legislation's 
history and a section which limited its enforceability to "all purposes connected with or 
in any way relating to the property of the Church". But, he venmred obiter that, 
properly interpreted, the Church's Victorian Constitution Act of 1960 did give the 
Church's mles a more general legal effect within the Church in that State.^' 
4. Internal Processes and Remedies. Especially in Christian churches organised 
according to an hierarchical pattern, there may be intemal courts and legal processes 
for the resolution of any disputes within the religious group. This can impose limits 
y 
on civil adjudication, either by restraining the assumption of civil jurisdiction 
completely or by narrowing the issues that the civil judicamre is able to determine. For 
example, in Great Britain the constimtional stams of the establishment ecclesiastical 
courts does seem to limit any civil jurisdiction to determine intemal disputes in the 
establishments. In chapter III we saw that the Glorious Revolution setdement preserved 
the control the ordinary courts of judicamre exercised over the jurisdiction of the 
English ecclesiastical courts, and that in the 1830s and 1840s the Court of Session 
settled its own power to control the Scottish ecclesiastical courts.*'^  The civil 
judicamre has never completely abandoned its jurisdiction in disputes relating to the 
intemal processes of the establishments and, in consequence, has intervened even when 
ecclesiastical remedies could still be pursued.^3 However, it has also shown some 
" Scandrett III note 2 supra at 562-3 & 564. 
^^  III: §§ 4-6 supra. 
63 Eg Capel V Child (1832) 2 Cr & J 558 at 576. 
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policy of declining jurisdicdon in cases where a litigant could still use an ecclesiastical 
process: in effect, treating an ecclesiastical court as the fomm conveniens. In Attomey-
General V Bean and Chapter of Ripon Cathedral,^ the Royal College of Organists 
claimed a declaradon that full choral services be held in Ripon Cathedral every Sunday. 
Justice Sir Augusms Uthwatt thought that the English High Court had jurisdiction to 
entertain the claim, but he declined to exercise it because proceedings could also be 
taken in an ecclesiastical court.^ ^ In Lang v Presbytery of Irvine,^^ a Scottish 
Presbytery had removed Dr John Dunmore Lang as a minister of the Church of 
Scotland on evidence presented from New South Wales that he had scandalised the 
Presbytery of Sydney.^' Lang sought a reduction of the sentence and damages, but 
the Court of Session refused to become involved as Lang had not pursued his remedies 
before the General Assembly. In Australia, the voluntary stams all religious groups 
possess means ecclesiastical processes have much less weight.^ * There is no general 
requirement that a lidgant exhaust any ecclesiastical remedies that are merely available 
before he initiates civil proceedings, but if the religious group's constimdon or law 
itself demands that intemal remedies be exhausted as a condition precedent to civd 
"* [1945] 1 Ch 239. 
^^  Ibid at 248 and 252. 
^(1864) 2 M 823. 
67 Lang said in a sermon that the Presbytery was "a synagogue of Satan - a mere society 
of worldlings or hirelings" because it had accepted governmental financial assistance 
under the New South Wales Church Acts. See III: § 7 supra; "Dr Lang's Resignation" 
Colonial Observer, 9 Febmary 1842, p 146. For the subsequent litigation, see Purves 
vLang (1856) 2 Legge 955, (1860) 2 Legge 1189; Lang v Purves (1862) 15 Moo PC 
389. 
68 CfRed Book I note 38 supra at 110. 
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proceedings, then the civil court can require a litigant to honour them.^ ^ Indeed, this 
can only be consistent with the litigant's own claim that the group's mles must be 
respected. Thus, as Chief Justice Sir Samuel Griffith commented in Macqueen v 
Frackelton:^^ 
... it is no answer to a breach of contract that a plaindff may have 
obtained redress for the breach in some other way, unless there is an 
express or implied stipulation that failing to obtain redress in that other 
way shall be a condition precedent to the right to complain of the breach. 
However, the legal independence of the ecclesiastical process is not necessarily 
preserved by specifying it to be a condition precedent to civil jurisdiction. Such a 
condition probably contemplates that civil proceedings are possible, and thus allows the 
inference that legal relations had been intended. For the religious group that aims to 
preserve its legal independence;" this could provide an unwanted contracmal ground for 
civil jurisdiction." The problem is even more pronounced in that the group's 
constimtion or law probably could not attempt to exclude any remedy other than the 
ecclesiastical. This is likely to be an ouster of civil jurisdiction, and invalid.'^ 
Related to this acceptance that a litigant might have to exhaust any relevant 
ecclesiastical processes before establishing civil jurisdiction is the extent to which a civil 
court should recognise the decisions of ecclesiasdcal courts properly made. The 
'^ Long V Bishop of Cape Town (1862) 1 Moo PC (NS) 411 at 466; Frackelton v 
Macqueen [1909] St R Qd 89 at 152; HH Loring, "The Power of Courts over the 
Internal Affairs of Religious Groups" (195) 43 Calif L Rev 322 at 324. 
70 
71 
(1909) 8 CLR 673 at 695. 
Plenty v Seventh-Bay Adventist Church of Port Pirie (1986) 43 SASR 121 at 125, 139 
and 143-4. 
''^  JRS Forbes note 36 supra at 165; cf M'Millan v Free Church of Scotland (the 
Cardross Case) (1859) 16 D 290 at 321. 
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recognition of ecclesiastical decisions, whether as precedents or as creating issue 
estoppels between the litigants, would limit the range and scope of issues the civil court 
is to resolve. 
There has been some small use of ecclesiastical decisions as precedents. In the 
Red Book Case,''^ Chief Justice Sir John Latham and Jusdce Dudley Williams applied 
the decisions of the English ecclesiastical courts in holding that, in the Church of 
England in New South Wales, it was illegal to ring a sanctus bell during the eucharist 
or to make the sign of the cross in the absoludon and benedicdon. However, it is not 
clear how persuasive the legal stams of the English ecclesiastical courts in England was 
in justifying this recognition. Certainly, no direct assistance can be drawn from any 
civil recognition or implementation in England of the decisions of establishment 
ecclesiastical courts, as this aspect of English civil jurisdiction is conditioned by the 
constimtional stams of the Church of England.'* 
The question of issue estoppel is even less certain. In appropriate cases, foreign 
judgments can be considered conclusive on issues before a domesdc civil court, and 
even arbitral awards may now be res judicata between the parties.'^ Like these, 
ecclesiastical decisions are commonly made as the result of processes akin to domestic 
'3 Red Book III note 20 supra. 
'* AT Denning, "The Meaning of Ecclesiastical Law" (1944) 60 LQR 235 at 237. 
'^  EI Sykes and MC Pryles, Australian Private International Law 3rd ed (Sydney 1991) 
pp 10-12 and 181-2; Carl Zeiss Stifiung v Raynor & KeelerLtd (No 2) [1967] 1 AC 853 
at 967; Carl Zeiss Stifiung v Raynor & Keeler Ltd (No 3) [1970] 1 Ch 506 at 545-6; 
BSV Silo-und Verwaltungsgesellschaft [1985] 2 All ER 104; O'Brien v Tanning 
Research Laboratories Inc (1988) 14 NSWLR 601 at 609; cf Tanning Research 
Laboratories Inc v O'Brien (1990) 64 AUR 211 at 217. 
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civd adjudication. However, the comity that the civil judicamre extends to foreign 
proceedmgs and commercial arbitration is highly instimdonalised, and the most recent 
adjudication suggests it is unlikely that ecclesiastical proceedings will be treated 
similarly.'^  In December 1991, the Appellate Tribunal of the Anglican Church had 
decided that a bishop had no existing power to ordain women to the priesthood, but in 
Scandrett v Bowling this received little comment. Indeed, in Justice Mahoney's 
concurring judgment he held that the plaintiffs had not shown that the proposed 
ordinations would be in breach of the mles of the Church: a conclusion diat is 
apparendy inconsistent with the Appellate Tribunal's decision." 
It is hard to reconcile the Court's ignoring the Appellate Tribunal's decision in 
Scandrett with the High Court's complete reliance on the decisions of the English 
ecclesiasdcal courts in the Red Book Case, especially since, within the Anglican Church 
(or Church of England) in Australia, the Appellate Tribunal is the legal successor to 
those courts. Indeed it is difficult to see why ecclesiastical decisions should not be 
recognised, at least once they are proved in evidence before the civil court. The terms 
of a religious group's consensual compact, which can be enforceable once civd 
jurisdiction is established, are not necessarily limited to its constimtion, and the laws 
and doctrines adopted by its legislamres. It might also include the decisions of its 
properly constimted courts. In addition, these decisions could provide useful evidence 
about the interpretation and application of ecclesiastical law. "Toleradon of the 
76 
77 
Cf Smith V Galbraith (1843) 5 D 665 at 678 and 684. 
Scandrett III note 2 supra at 503. This conclusion might just be pooriy expressed. 
In light of Justice Mahoney's reasoning he could have been suggesting that there was 
no breach of the Church's legally enforceable mles: see ibid at 502-3. 
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hierarchical church implies broad toleration for the functioning of its judicatories".'* 
The recognition of its decisions might acmally improve the quality and efficiency of 
civil adjudicadon by rendering it unnecessary to reopen a question that had already been 
concluded du-ough appropriate intemal processes and, indeed, probably by the more 
expert and appropriate court.'^ 
§ 6: The Interpretation and Enforcement of Doctrine 
Once a plaintiff shows a secular rationale that establishes civil jurisdiction, a 
civil court in Australia seems to be able to decide any question involving the religious 
group that the litigants submit for adjudication. However, in terms of just and 
practicable secular government the most dismrbing aspect to this jurisdiction is the 
judicial power to determine a doctrinal or limrgical dispute. To some extent, the need 
to interpret and enforce doctrine has been encouraged by the terms in which the courts 
have defined a "church", as the decisions to date have always concemed a Christian 
denomination. The civil judicamre has developed a decidedly dogmatic ecclesiology: 
since Lord Eldon's decision in Attorney-General v Pearson^^ it has tended to identify 
die distinctiveness of a church in its doctrines, principles, opinions or rimals.*' In 
most cases, the group is thus deemed to be doctrinally inert, and any significant change 
in the group's doctrine therefore extinguishes what had been the particular "church". 
'* Note, (1962) 75 Harvard L Rev 1142 at 1176-7. 
'^  Cf O'Brien v Tanning Research Laboratories Inc (1988) 14 NSWLR 601 at 609. 
80 
81 
(1817) 3 Mer 353 at 402. 
Cf Attorney-General v Aust (1865) 13 LT 235 at 236; Forbes v Eden (1867) LR 1 Sc 
& Div 568 at 576; Overtoun note 38 supra at 612-13, 645, 651 and 657; Red Book III 
note 20 supra at 261; Note, (1962) 75 Harvard L Rev 1142 at 1146-7 and 1169; cf 
Glebe Administration Board v Commissioner of Pay-roll Tax (1987) 10 NSWLR 353 
at 375. 
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For example, in General Assembly of the Free Church of Scotland v Lord Overtoun 
Lord James described a church as:*^ 
... a body of men united only be the possession of common opinions, 
and if this community of opinion ceases to exist, the foundations of the 
Church give way. 
This does not seem an adequate understanding of a "church", and especially of some 
Protestant churches that have normally been the object of adjudication in these 
decisions. However, consistently with this definition, in deciding the intemal disputes 
of religious groups that do not require the interpretation of parliamentary legislation the 
civil judicamre has applied mles that tend to prefer the conservative position in the 
litigation. In reported decisions involving a schism, the seceding parties have generally 
been refused the right to use the property of the original religious group.*3 In those 
y 
that concem ecumenical developments and especially the organic union of religious 
groups (which also tend to involve a schism), the uniting parties have generally been 
refused that right.** In litigation where the question involves some evolution in 
thought, pracdce or ecclesiastical government, it is the theological liberals who have 
usually been unsuccessful.*^ It is evident that the mles have an inbuilt preference for 
*^  Overtoun note 38 supra at 656; see also Attorney-General (NSW) v Grant (1976) 135 
CLR 587 at 600. 
*3 Broom v Summers (1840) 11 Sim 353; Attorney-General v Welsh (1844) 4 Hare 572; 
Macpherson v Sutherland (1885) 6 NSWR (E) 114; cf Attorney-General v Aust (1865) 
13 LT 235. 
** Overtoun note 38 supra; cf Forbes v Eden (1867) LR 1 Sc & Div 568; In re Talbot: 
Jubb V Sheard [1933] 1 Ch 895; Barker v O'Gorman [1971] 1 Ch 215; Attorney-
General (NSW) V Grant (1976) 135 CLR 587; cf Bailey v Uniting Church in Australia 
Property Trust (Qld) [1984] 1 Qd R 42; and see AW Black, "Some Aspects of Religion 
and Law": The Case of Church Union in Australia" (1986) 16 Religion 225. 
^^ Eg Craigdallie v Aickman (1813) 1 Dow 1; Attorney-General v Pearson (1817) 3 Mer 
353; Milligan v Mitchell (1837) 2 My & Cr 72; Shore v Wilson (1839-42) 9 CI & F 
355, 4 St Tr (NS) 1370; Brummond v Attorney-General (1849) 2 HLC 837; Red Book 
II note 38 supra; Red Book III note 20 supra; cf Attorney-General v Gould (1860) 28 
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religious conservatism, and so some judges have searched for altemative definitions of 
a church that are, perhaps, more theologically neutral. The "living church" concept 
developed by Lord Macnaghten in Overtoun, that contemplates the possibility of 
doctrinal change, is the most commonly used altemative.*^ It has been adopted, at 
times, in Canada and the United States and, in Australia, by Justice Sir George Rich 
in the Red Book Case.^^ In Scandrett v Bowling, Justice Priestley also largely 
abandoned the traditional legal definidon of a church, and identified the unity of the 
Anglican Church in its "shared faith" and its own understanding that its members are 
"one in Christ Jesus".** These are nebulous religious, spirimal and even mystical 
ideas and, attached to a religious group, show an increased reluctance to deal with the 
concept of a church as an object of civil adjudication and explicable in legal terms. 
y 
The tendency that the civil judicamre has had in adopting a dogmatic 
ecclesiology and the resulting preference for the conservative position in litigation 
originated in the early reliance on the charitable tmst as the secular rationale for civil 
jurisdicdon in these disputes. In consequence, the courts have applied a basic principle 
of equitable jurisdiction over the enforcement of tmsts: effect must be given to the 
intention of the person who settled the tmst, whether that intention was expressed in, 
say, the tmst deed or whether that intention must be implied by the civil court from the 
Beav 485; Attorney-General v Etheridge (1963) 32 LJ Ch 161; Attorney-General v 
Bunce (1968) LR 6 Eq 543; In re Hutchinson's Trusts [1914] 1 IR 271; Attomey-
General (ex rel Murray) v Clarke [1914] VLR 71. 
*^  Overtoun note 38 supra at 631. 
87 Red Book III note 20 supra at 276; HH Loring note 68 supra at 332; Note, (1962) 
75 Harvard L Rev 1142 at 1151-2. 
** Scandrett III note 2 supra at 513 and 554. 
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deed or the circumstances surrounding the settlement. In either case, a civil court 
might have to decide whether a religious conception or practice is consistent with the 
setdor's intention. However, the civil court's involvement in doctrinal questions is 
compounded when that intention is only discernible by implication. In that simation, 
the civil court which adopts the traditional definition of a church identifies the terms of 
the tmst in the doctrines of the church. This "implied tmst approach" was pioneered 
by Lord Eldon in Craigdallie v Aickman^^ and Attorney-General v Pearson,'^ in 
which he decided that the settlor's personal religious conceptions dictated the doctrines 
the setdor intended to promote through the settlement of the tmst. These personal 
conceptions can appear, say, in the tmst deed, but reference can be made to other 
evidence, like the religious group's constiment documents or, at weakest, its proven 
y 
doctrine and practice at the time the settlement was made.^' 
Even further judicial investigation into religious conceptions and practices could 
be required under the implied tmst approach because, despite some suggestions to the 
contrary, it seems a civil court can only enforce essential doctrines. It must therefore 
distinguish them from non-essential doctrines."^ ^ The issue was litigated in the Scottish 
*'(1813) 1 Dow 1. 
^(1817) 3 Mer 353. 
^^  Attorney-General v Clapham (1853) 10 Hare 540 at 561-3; (1855) 4 De G M & G 
591 at 626; Attorney-General v Gould (1860) 28 Beav 485 at 501; Attorney-General v 
Aust (1865) 13 LT 235 at 236; eg Craigdallie v Aickman (1813) 1 Dow 1; Attorney-
General V Pearson (1817) 3 Mer 353; Shore v Wilson (1839-42) 9 CI & F 355, 4 St Tr 
(NS) 1370; Brummond v Attorney-General (1849) 2 HLC 837; Attorney-General v 
Etheridge (1863) 32 LJ Ch 161. 
'^  Attorney-General v Gould (1860) 28 Beav 485 at 495; Attorney-General v Etheridge 
(1863) 32 U Ch 161 at 169-70; Attorney-General (NSW) v Grant (1976) 135 CLR 587 
at 603; Scandrett III note 2 supra at 498; cf Overtoun note 38 supra at 613; Red Book 
III note 20 supra at 263; Scandrett III note 2 supra at 510-11. 
348 X: § 6 
courts in the celebrated case of General Assembly of the Free Church of Scotland v 
Lord Overtoun.'^^ This case came at an important stage in the process of Presbyterian 
reconciliation in Scodand when the Free Church of Scotland, which as we saw in 
chapter III was formed as a result of the Dismption in the Scottish religious 
establishment in 1843, agreed to unite with the United Presbyterian Church, another 
large group of Presbyterian dissenters, to form the United Free Church of Scotland.^ * 
There was a small minority in the Free Church ("the Wee Frees") who objected to an 
organic union in the United Free Church, principally because it did not require 
adherence to some aspects of the Free Church's subordinate standard: the Westminster 
Confession of Faith, the pre-eminent statement of British Calvinism. In particular, the 
Westminster Confession required civil government to establish and endow the church, 
,y 
and included the Calvinist doctrine of predestination (that God pre-ordains all people 
either to heaven or hell).''-'' The United Presbyterian Church advocated the Church's 
independence from civil government and the Arminian doctrine of free will (that 
individuals have a choice to respond to God's grace). In the hope of including both 
positions in its doctrinal standards, the United Free Church did not require adherence 
to the concept of establishment or predestinadon. So, the Free Church minority argued 
that, because they continued to adhere to the essential doctrines of the Free Church, 
they alone were entitled to hold its property. They ultimately succeeded in the House 
of Lords, where a majority held that the concept of establishment was an essential 
doctrine of the Free Church. Important to this conclusion were comments made by Dr 
Chalmers, the non-intmsionist leader who led the Dismption, who at the formation of 
3^ Overtoun note 38 supra. 
"* See III: § 6 supra. 
^^ For the use of this concept of establishment in Australia, see VII: § 5 supra. 
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the Free Church said it would support a religious establishment which had the liberty 
to determine its own doctrine and practice.^^ The Earl of Halsbury also held that the 
Westminster Confession"s doctrine of predestination was an essential doctrine of the 
(Calvinist) Free Church that was inconsistent with the Arminian doctrine of free will 
held by the United Presbyterian Church.^ 
The outcome of Overtoun caused serious public concem in Scotland, and had 
to be reversed by parliamentary legislation.''* However, Overtoun also shows how the 
implied tmst approach can open the due processes of litigation and adjudication to the 
most quesdonable methods of argument and reasoning. RB Haldane KC, counsel for 
the United Free Church, was also an Hegelian philosopher and argued that the Free 
Church's Calvinism and the United Presbyterian Church's Arminianism could (in 
Hegelian terms) be synthesised.^^ In what could only ever be legal reasoning of the 
most marginal relevance, the Earl of Halsbury also investigated some distinctions made 
between Calvinism and Arminianism in Greek Orthodox Councils!'°^ Still, the 
decision in Overtoun can be sustained on the evidence presented to the House of Lords 
and the legal assumption that a church is defined by its doctrines, principles, opinions 
or rimals. In an influential dissent, Lord Macnaghten could only reach a different 
result by treating the Free Church as a "living church" amenable to change, and thought 
^^  Overtoun note 38 supra at 620, 626, 647-8, 661-2, 681 and 706; see III: § 6 supra. 
^ Overtoun note 38 supra at 626. 
'* TM Taylor, "Church and State in Scodand" [1957] JR 121 at 131; Churches 
(Scotland) Act 1905 (UK). 
'^  Overtoun note 38 supra at 604-7; AR Vidler, The Church in an Age of Revolution 
(Harmonsdworth 1961) p 176. 
'°" Overtoun note 38 supra at 623-4; c /F Pollock, Note (1905) 81 LQR 1. 
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diat, to entrench doctrines stated by Dr Chalmers in 1843, probably made it a "dead 
branch" instead.'°' 
Though less reliant on the implied tmst approach and, thus, on the use of 
judicial power to interpret and define the religious group's essential doctrines, the High 
Court of Australia's decision in the Red Book Case^°^ is an even more extreme 
example of the judicial enforcement of doctrine. Like the litigadon of Scandrett v 
Bowling, this was initiated in New South Wales by evangelical churchmen who were 
concemed to maintain a conservative position on the Church's doctrine and 
practice. "^3 Unlike Scandrett, the dispute also involved the catholic party in the 
Church: specifically, the defendant Bishop of Bathurst, who hoped to use in the limrgy 
y 
an Anglo-catholic service book known as the "Red Book" instead of the Book of 
Common Prayer, and invoked an episcopal discretion {ius liturgicum) to do so. In the 
nineteenth and early twentieth cenmries, the English ecclesiastical courts had censured 
clergy for introducing catholic rites against ecclesiastical law and, as I discussed in 
chapter III, the Church of England's most serious collisions with the British Parliament 
diis cenmry centred on the Church's own attempts to accommodate the catholics in its 
limrgy.'°* Under the 1662 Uniformity Act, the Book of Common Prayer was to 
dictate the public limrgy of the Church, and the Privy Council (as the supreme English 
"" Overtoun note 38 supra at 630-1, 634-6 and 642-3. 
"^ ' Red Book III note 20 supra; see R Teale, "The 'Red Book' Case" (1986) 14 Jnl Rel 
Hist 74. 
'°3 See I: § 5 supra. 
'°* Eg Martin v Mackonachie (1868) LR 2 PC 365; Hebbert v Purchas (1872) LR 4 PC 
301 at 307; Read v Bishop of Lincoln [1891] P 9; Rector and Churchwardens of Capel 
St Mary, Suffolk v Packard [1927] P 289; III: § 5 supra. 
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ecclesiastical court) had insisted on strict compliance with the Book of Common Prayer 
in all details.'°^ The decisions that resulted from these "rimal prosecutions" of 
catholics in the Church then helped the High Court to decide the Red Book Case. The 
State Supreme Court had assumed jurisdiction on the basis of the charitable tmsts by 
which the Church's property was held, as New South Wales Attorney-General Clarence 
Martin had granted a fiat to have the question about the Red Book determined in a civil 
court. It granted an injunction to restrain the Bishop from using the Red Book, and the 
injunction was, with minor revisions, confirmed on appeal by a stamtory majority in 
the High Court. The majority. Chief Justice Latham and Justice Williams, held that the 
Uniformity Act and the Book of Common Prayer still dictated the doctrine and limrgy 
of the Church of England in New South Wales, and that two elements of the Red Book 
were inconsistent with them. First, it required the use of a sanctus bell during the 
eucharist and the sign of the cross during the absolution and the benediction. English 
ecclesiasdcal courts had previously held these to be illegal. Secondly, it advocated the 
doctrine of the Real Presence in the eucharist. The evidence showed that this doctrine 
was lawful, but that English ecclesiastical law did not require belief in the Real 
Presence. In that respect Chief Justice Latham and Justice Williams held that the Red 
Book was more exclusive than the Book of Common Prayer, and was therefore 
unlawful.'°^ 
In conditions of disestablishment in New South Wales the High Court's decision 
in the Red Book Case is a strange anomaly. In England catholic practices in the 
religious establishment had been restrained by ecclesiastical courts, but in most cases 
'°^  Martin v Mackonochie (1868) LR 2 PC 365. 
"^  Red Book III note 20 supra at 256, 262 and 265-9. 
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only morally through those courts' powers of censure. In Red Book Chief Justice 
Latham recognised that the Church of England in New South Wales was (at that tune) 
part of the English religious establishment. Sdll, it does not seem to have mattered 
that, in England, the convocations of Canterbury and York had declared, after the 
Prayer Book crisis of 1927 and 1928, that deviadons from the Book of Common Prayer 
that were nevertheless consistent with the 1928 Revised Prayer Book would not be 
prosecuted.'"' Even more importantly, it made no difference that in Red Book the 
decision was being made in the exercise of civil jurisdiction and, most seriously, that 
English ecclesiastical law was being enforced in New South Wales by a branch of civil 
government and, through the injunction, by coercion. In this respect, the effect of the 
decision can be seen from two perspectives that become important to a more general 
criticism of this jurisdiction. The first is that, through the secular rationale of a 
charitable tmst, the civil judicamre appropriated a coercive ecclesiastical jurisdiction 
despite the disestablishment of the Church in New South Wales. The second is that the 
plaindffs secured the cooperation of the civil judicamre and, through tht fiat granted 
by the State Attomey-General, the executive government to apply the ecclesiastical law, 
consistently with Lord Romilly's discredited opinion in Bishop of Natal v 
Gladstone.''^'^ In § 8, I expand on the problems these perspectives highlight about the 
prevailing principles of civil jurisdicdon over religious groups under the principle of 
equal religious liberty. In Red Book, dissenting Justices Sir George Rich and Sir Owen 
Dixon tried to avoid enforcing limrgy by luniting the content of potentially enforceable 
ecclesiastical laws to those relating to doctrine. Justice Rich was especially conscious 
that civil adjudication could upset the intemal limrgical development of the Church, and 
'"' See III: § 5 supra. 
'°* (1866) LR 3 Eq 1 at 33; § 4 supra. 
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embraced Lord Macnaghten's "living church" concept to justify his policy of 
restraint.'°^ 
Thus, whether the civil judicamre is enforcing an express or an unplied tmst it 
is limited to enforcing essential doctrines only. The Red Book Case shows how 
narrowly this limitation has been applied. In addition, there are several other lunits 
imposed by principles of common law and equity on the judicamre's involvement in a 
doctrinal dispute. 
1. The civil court cannot decide the tmth or pronounce on the merits of any 
religious doctrine."° In deciding the dispute, a civil judge is to evaluate the issue in 
accordance with the terms of the tmst, contract or parliamentary legislation that binds 
the litigants, and not on the basis of his own personal religious conceptions or 
assessment as to what doctrines or practices are the better. Of course, this limitation 
represents some recognition of the principles of public reason that have so thoroughly 
permeated common law adjudicadon. 
2. The civil court cannot determine the intemal harmony of a religious group's 
doctrinal system.'" 
3. The civil court cannot assess the compatibility of a doctrine or practice with 
'"' (1948) 78 CLR 224 at 275, 276, 280-1 and 291-4. 
'"^  Craigdallie V Aickman (1813) 1 Dow 1 at 16; Smith v Galbraith (1843) 5 D 665 at 
680; Overtoun note 38 supra at 613 and 644-5; Wodell v Potter [1930] 2 DLR 449 at 
458. 
'" Attorney-General v Etheridge (1862) 32 U Ch 161 at 176. 
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the religious group's sacred texts: in the reported cases to date, the Bible."^ In some 
respects this has the potential to be a significant limitation, as in most Protestant 
churches the Bible serves as "the final court of appeal" in doctrinal questions: Luther's 
doctrine of sola scriptura. In those denominations tending to decentralised 
congregational organisation moreover, there might be no doctrinal posidon more 
specific than adherence to "biblical tmth". However, biblical exegesis is an exacting 
and specialised discipline and, in the context of an ecclesiastical dispute, could be 
coloured by unstated assumptions peculiar to a denominadon or congregadon."3 The 
civil court is plainly a forum non conveniens in a quesdon like this."* Given the 
Bible's profound influence on the westem mind, there could be no objection to a 
judge's occasionally illustrating his points by reference to biblical passages and images. 
y 
However, beyond illustration the use of the Bible in adjudication could offend this 
limitation or principles of public reason. For example, in refusing an interlocutory 
injunction in Scandrett v Bowling, Justice Andrew Rogers held that the plaintiffs could 
resort to intemal ecclesiastical processes, and added: "I believe that I am giving effect 
not only to a proper exercise of judicial discretion, but also to a command of the 
Scripmres"."^ This was undoubtedly a reference to Saint Paul's censure of primitive 
^^^Attorney-General v Gould (1860) 28 Beav 485 at 493; cfR v Waddington (1823) 1 
B & C 26 at 29-30; Ragsdall v Church of Christ in Eldora 55 NW 2d 539 at 545 (1952) 
(Iowa). 
"3 See J Barr, The Bible in the Modern World (London 1973) p 89. 
"* Methods of legal reasoning in the common law tradition are more secularised in this 
respect than in Germany. In the Religious Oath Case (1972) 33 BVerfGE, the Federal 
Constimtional Court assumed it had power to decide whether a Lutheran pastor's 
interpretation of the Sermon on the Mount was theologically correct, and able to excuse 
him from taking an oath: DP Kommers, The Constitutional Jurispmdence of the 
Federal Republic of Germany (Durham 1989) pp 456-62. 
"^  Scandrett I note 1 supra at 14. 
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Christians who litigated before civil courts, and another example of Paul's secularising 
theology."^ However, in the exercise of a discretionary jurisdiction the risk is that 
it could be regarded as a consideration the judge took into account in refusing the 
injunction and. therefore, a judicial demand that the plaintiffs act consistendy with a 
biblical command. The Court of Appeal seemed to disapprove of this reference, and 
rightly so.'" 
I 7: The Effect of Free Exercise Clauses 
The voluntary stams of religious groups in Australia has, as I discussed in § 5, 
erected substantive prerequisites to civil jurisdiction that concede to religious groups a 
qualified legal independence. However, as I then discussed in § 6, once jurisdicdon 
y 
is established there are few limits on the nature of the questions then exposed to civil 
adjudicadon. The position can be different once the principle of equal religious liberty 
is included in the political constimtion and operates to limit governmental action. In 
broad terms this is exemplified in the United States, where the free exercise clause 
limits the content of questions involving a religious group that can be decided by the 
civil judicamre. Specifically, it prevents the courts from determining doctrinal disputes, 
and as a corollary casts an equivalent obligation on the religious group to resolve these 
disputes internally or by non-legal means. Inidally, this limitation simply emerged from 
an inmition that these disputes had to be decided by reference to a secular rationale. 
Justice Samuel Miller first expressed this belief in Watson v Jones^^^ in 1872, by 
declaring in grandiloquent language that "[t]he law knows no heresy, and is committed 
"^  I Corinthians vi 1-6; see II: § 2 supra. 
'" Scandrett II note 1 supra at 28-9. 
118 80 US 679 at 728 (1872). 
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to no dogma, the establishment of no sect". In Watson v Jones, the Supreme Court 
held that the civil judicamre could only give effect to religious doctrine when the 
group's property was expressly held on tmst for the advancement of that doctrine. The 
Court rejected the implied tmst approach and, instead, required a civil court to 
recognise and apply the decisions made through the group's democratic processes or in 
its internal ecclesiastical courts."^ The Supreme Court later added, in Gonzalez v 
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila,^-° that ecclesiastical decisions would be 
recognised even when they related to civil interests, so long as the decisions remained 
untainted by procedural irregularity. Since then, the Court has even abandoned any 
requirement that rights of due process be honoured in ecclesiastical processes.'^' 
y 
This position was raised to constimtional stams in the Supreme Court's 
recognition that the free exercise clause guaranteed doctrinal disputes immunity from 
civil adjudication.'^ ^ Its effect on the implied tmst approach was considered in 
Presbyterian Church v Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Church,^^^ where the 
Supreme Court admitted that the civil judicamre had some interest in determining the 
property disputes of religious groups, but held that the free exercise clause "commands 
civil courts to decide [them] without resolving underlying controversies over religious 
''^ Ibid at 122-1. 
'^ ° 280 US 1 at 16-17 (1929). 
'-' Cf Serbian Eastern Orthodox Biocese v Milivojevich 426 US 696 at 713 (1976). 
'^ ^ Kedroff v Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church of North 
America 344 US 94 (1952); Kreshik v Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox 
Church of North America 363 US 190 (1959); see also Bendewald v Ley 168 NW 693 
at 696 (1917) (ND). 
123 393 US 440 (1969). 
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doctrine".'^ * So, adjudication was only permitted in a religious group's property 
dispute if the civil court applied "neutral principles of law".'^ ^ 
The constimtional interpretation in other common law countries does not 
necessarily support the Supreme Court's application of the free exercise clause in these 
disputes. In particular, the Canadian courts have continued to apply the principles of 
common law and equity, despite the right to religious liberty under section 2 (a) of the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, on the theory that the constimtional liberty only 
touches relations between civil government and the citizen, and does not touch legal and 
social relations between citizens.'^ ^ In Australia, the Commonwealth free exercise 
clause could only, at present, apply to a doctrinal dispute that was litigated in a 
y 
Territory. The Tasmanian free exercise clause could apply to a doctrinal dispute 
litigated in that State. However, there is no adjudication to suggest how an Australian 
court would assess the impact, if any, of a free exercise clause on civil jurisdiction in 
a doctrinal dispute. Justice William Pincus seemed to accept the United States Supreme 
Court's decisions on the limits the free exercise clause places on the civil judicamre in 
124 Ibid at 449. 
'^ ^ Maryland and Virginia Eldership of the Churches of God v Church of God at 
Sharpsburg 396 US 367 at 368 (1970); Jones v Wolf 443 US 595 at 602-3 (1979). 
'^ ^ United Church of Canada v Anderson (1991) 2 OR (3d) 304 at 312-13; see also MH 
Ogilvie, "Church Property Disputes: Some Organising Principles" (1992) 42 Univ 
Toronto U 377 at 396. The theory of Anderson arguably devalues the role of the 
judicamre (a branch of government) in civil litigation. This is especially the case where 
a defendant resists any judgment made by the court, and processes of execution and 
enforcement (that ultimately rely on coercive measures like imprisonment) are invoked. 
In this sense, even in civil litigation the powers of government are being exercised, and 
constimtional liberties could be relevant. 
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the Lebanese Moslem Association Case.^^'' The New South Wales Court of Appeal 
was also asked in Scandrett v Bowling to decide whether the plaintiffs' claim offended 
the Commonwealth or Tasmanian free exercise clause. However, it did not answer the 
question, even though, to the extent that the Bishop of Canberra-Goulburn's diocese 
included the Australian Capital Territory, the Commonwealth clause could have been 
relevant to the question of civil jurisdiction.'^* There have been, as we saw in 
chapter VI, some justices who have used section 116 to shape adjudication on matters 
of State law, and it opens the question as to whether the indirect influence of the free 
exercise clause and the general law position obtaining in the United States under Watson 
V Jones could together affect civil adjudication in doctrinal disputes in Australia.'^^ 
In Attorney-General (NSW) v Grant,^^^ Justice Sir Harry Gibbs also identified a 
y 
principle of religious liberty in the common law but endorsed the judicamre's power to 
decide a doctrinal dispute. In that case, only Justice Lionel Murphy applied Watson v 
Jones and refused to decide whether the Presbyterian Church had the power to be 
absorbed in die Uniting Church.'3' There therefore seems little doubt that, in 
Australia, once the equitable jurisdiction to hear and determine a suit involving a 
religious group is established, the civil court can even interpret, define and enforce 
religious doctrine. 
' " Lebanese Moslem Association v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1986) 67 
ALR 195 at 211; see VIII: § 3 supra. 
'^ * Scandrett note 2 supra at 517-18, 519 and 566. 
" ' VI: § 7 supra. 
'^ ° (1976) 135 CLR 587 at 600. 
'^ ^ (1976) 135 CLR 587 at 612-14; see also Attorney-General (Qld) (ex rel Nye) v 
Cathedral Church of Brisbane (1977) 136 CLR 353 at 377. 
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§ 8: Conclusion: Coordinating Legal and Religious Pluralism 
Evidently, there are practical problems with the present principles of law and 
equity allowmg the exercise of civil jurisdiction in the intemal disputes of religious 
groups. The implied tmst approach to determining doctrinal disputes, inasmuch as it 
allows a civil judge to investigate and interpret the settlor's personal religious 
conceptions, to decide which of them are essential and then to enforce them, obviously 
invests too broad a power in the civil judicamre to decide religious questions, and 
recognises too little legal independence for the religious group from the powers of civd 
government. The approach was itself limited in England as early as 1844 when Lord 
Lyndhurst secured the passage of the Nonconformist Chapels Act, by which 25 years 
usage was deemed conclusive of the essential doctrines or practices of a congregation 
of Protestant dissenters. This only addressed the means of proving essential doctrines 
and not the acmal jurisdiction to adjudge them, but still suggests that there were some 
inmitive concems that it is inappropriate that a civil judge decide some doctrinal 
questions. The concem is now expressed more frequently by the civil judges 
themselves, and could suggest that they believe that a civil court might be a forum non 
conveniens to hear and determine a religious dispute. Indeed, the only religious group 
in the English-speaking world which is directly involved in the passage of parliamentary 
legislation has ensured that civil judges do not decide its doctrinal quesdons. The 
Church of England does not even entmst questions of doctrine or rimal to its own 
consistory courts, but only to the specialist Court of Ecclesiastical Causes Reserved. 
This Court is advised by a panel of eminent theologians and limrgiologists.'32 It was 
introduced to prevent a repetition of the rimal prosecutions decided by the Privy 
Council in the nineteenth cenmry, and which in the Church were thought to have arisen 
'^ ^ Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Measure 1963 (UK), ss 1, 10 and 45. 
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from the civd judges' ignorance of the historical and theological context of doctrine and 
rimal.'33 These are now prevented by excluding the Privy Council's jurisdiction in 
doctrine and rimal altogether. 
However, there are more basic problems with civil adjudication in doctrinal 
disputes, whether it is based on an express or implied tmst, or on another ground of 
jurisdiction. These were brought into focus in § 6 when I mentioned the effects of the 
High Court's decision in the Red Book Case, and all involve aspects of the central 
political principle of a secular commonwealth: equal religious liberty.'3* In the first 
place, the principle necessarily limits the judicamre and the executive as branches of 
civil government to the use of secular means and the pursuit of secular objectives. In 
Red Book, the required secular means by which a civil court could entertain the dispute 
was obviously present: the enforcement of charitable tmsts. However, closer 
examinadon of the plaintiffs' real objectives in enforcing the tmsts reveals a purely 
religious dispute. The tmsts were only invoked to have the dispute between the litigants 
over the limrgical practice of the Church of England in New South Wales and the 
exercise of the ius liturgicum decided in a civil court, and by allowing the plaintiff's 
claim the Supreme Court and the High Court therefore gave effect to a religious 
objective.'3=' This objecdve was also achieved by requiring, through the threat of 
coercion, the Bishop of Bathurst to use the Book of Common Prayer. The same 
criticism applies to State Attorney-General Clarence Martin's decision to allow relator 
'" T Briden and B Hanson, Moore's Introduction to English Canon Law 3rd ed (Oxford 
1992)p 123. 
'' ' II: § 6 supra. 
'^ ^ For the plaintiffs' purposes in litigating the Red Book Case, see R Teale note 102 
supra at 77-81. 
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proceedings to enforce the tmsts in the Supreme Court. Until the fiat was issued, civil 
adjudication was not available to the lidgants. The objective of the fiiat was therefore 
also religious: to have a doctrinal and limrgical quesdon decided and enforced by the 
civil judicamre. 
In die second place, it seems that the principles of common law and equity that 
allow litigants who can establish a secular rationale for civil adjudication to have a 
doctrinal dispute decided by a civd judge carmot be reconciled with the political 
principle that the citizen's right to equal religious liberty is inalienable. This, as I also 
discussed in chapter II, is based on the inherent non-negodable character of religion and 
spums any attempt the citizen might make to exchange his religious liberty for political, 
y 
legal, social or economic benefits. However, in recognising that members of a 
religious group can submit the responsibility for deciding purely religious questions to 
a civil judge, the principles of civil jurisdiction over religious groups endorse the 
citizen's power to alienate some responsibility for his religious choices to an agent of 
government. If equal religious liberty is tmly inalienable, the responsibility for 
deciding religious questions cannot extend beyond the religious group itself. 
This does not deny civil jurisdiction in a religious group's property disputes. 
It denies civil jurisdiction when, as in Red Book, the property is only a means by which 
a purely religious question is adjudged. It also denies the use of religious concepdons 
to decide bona fide disputes in religious groups over property, and accordingly requires 
diem to be resolved by secular mles. In consequence, I believe that the United States 
Supreme Court's broad principles prohibidng a civil court's involvement in doctrinal 
disputes are more consistent with the principle of equal religious liberty. That is the 
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case whether the principles are based on Watson v Jones or the free exercise clause, 
although they could be evidence that a free exercise clause is a primary instimtional 
requirement for just and practicable relations between government and religion. These 
recognise a more extensive legal independence for a religious group which assumes that 
the group's religious liberty also carries a coordinate responsibility to provide for the 
resolution of its own doctrinal disputes by internal ecclesiastical processes. There have 
been objections that this makes each religious group an imperium in imperio, a state 
within a state, and creates a sphere of human endeavour in which the group can set its 
own laws and principles of organisation without civil government's being able to 
exercise its sovereignty.'3^ This is tme, but I believe it is better recognised as 
creating a legal pluralism that is roughly coordinate with national patterns of religious 
y 
pluralism, in which each legally independent religious group is empowered and required 
to organise its own common religious life on the understanding that government will 
not help it resolve its own difficulties and controversies in doctrine and practice.'3' 
Undoubtedly, many groups will make ecclesiastical laws that do not conform to 
concepdons of justice that apply to the organisation of civil government. The United 
'3^  C/MH Ogilvie note 126 supra at 393; Z Chafee note 15 supra at 1029. 
'3' The New South Wales Court of Appeal's reluctance to decide the women's 
ordination question in Scandrett III note 2 supra meant it had to be resolved in the 
Anglican Church's own legislamres. The General Synod acmally did reach a 
compromise on the question by delegadng the power to decide whether a bishop could 
ordain a woman to the priesthood to the individual diocesan legislamres, allowing the 
Sydney archdiocese to delay any consideration of the question while most other dioceses 
have accepted women priests. This may have caused, according to the Archbishop of 
Sydney, Dr Donald Robinson, an "impaired communion" within the Church, but it is 
a result achieved by the Church's own legislamres, and not one imposed by a civil 
court: General Synod of the Anglican Church of Australia, Law of the Church of 
England Clarification Canon 1992, s 3; "A Challenge for Church and State" (editorial) 
Australian, 13 July 1992, p 8; "Women's Ordination to Dominate Synod" Australian, 
12 Ocober 1993, p 3; "Ordinadon of Women Off Synod Agenda" Australian, 11 
October 1993, p 3. 
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States Supreme Court has indicated that members of a religious group cannot expect 
that rights of due process will be required of the group's intemal processes.'3* 
Scandrett v Bowling and Bartholomew v Ramage show that even the larger religious 
groups in Australia are undecided whether more recent ideas of gender equality are 
appropriate within the group itself. This is completely acceptable where the citizen's 
association with the group remains voluntary, and it is unable to exercise or appropriate 
government's monopoly on the use of coercion. Ironically, the demands of a political 
conception of justice are that the group be able to act in ways that are unjust if they 
were allowed to civil government.'3^ 
138 Cf Serbian Eastern Orthodox Biocese v Milivojevich 426 US 696 at 713 (1976). 
'^ ^ Cf Canadian Supreme Court Justice Emmett Hall's comments in Hofer v Hofer 
[1970] SCR 958 at 974-5. 
XI. RELIGION IN 
DISCRIMINATION LAW 
§ 1: Introduction 
The implications of the legal independence of a religious group discussed in 
chapter X are also highlighted by the role religion plays in discrimination laws. In 
chapter II, I explained the principle of fair equality of oppormnity that helps to realise 
a concem about equality in social and economic relations between citizens.' This 
principle recognises social and economic inequalities as just if they attach to positions 
and offices open to all citizens who demonstrate the same talents and abilities and the 
same intention to use them, regardless of morally arbitrary "contingencies" that set the 
citizen's initial social and economic stams. The principle is best realised in legislation 
(rather than in the political constimtion) because there is less public agreement on its 
implications and it addresses more complex and volatile social and economic 
considerations. Both presumably suggest the instimtions that realise the principle of fair 
equality of oppormnity must be more amenable to change than constimtional instimtions 
normally would be. 
Even though, throughout the English-speaking world, this question of fair 
II: § 7 supra. 
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equality of oppormnity has been addressed by minority group quotas and funding 
conditions, in this chapter I concentrate on the more common, direct and important 
discrimination laws. To provide background, I explain the basic scheme of 
discrimination laws currently in operadon in Australia (§ 2). Then I focus more 
directly on the laws in operation in parts of Australia that make it unlawful, directly and 
indirectly, to discriminate on the ground of religion (§§ 3 and 4). These, I contend, 
deepen the idea of secular government by applying to social and economic relations the 
idea that, as nearly as practicable, a citizen's religion should be regarded as irrelevant: 
an idea that originally only applied in political and legal relations between government 
and the citizen (§5). 
However, discrimination laws also bring new tensions for secular government. 
It is common for a religious group to hold that some contingencies addressed by 
discrimination laws, like religion itself, are not morally arbitrary, or that inequality or 
unequal treatment is demanded for others, like gender. The practice of these religious 
conceptions has potential to bring the principles of equal religious liberty and fair 
equality of oppormnity into collision: a collision that demands some lexical ordering 
of the two principles. In Rawls' political conception of justice, equal religious liberty 
(as a basic liberty) has priority over fair equality of oppormnity, and accordingly any 
unequal treatment of others required by a citizen's religion must be protected from the 
operation of discrimination laws.^  This should dictate broad exemptions for religious 
practices from the operation of discrimination laws although, as I discuss, it is probably 
impracticable to implement the absolute priority of equal religious liberty widiout 
qualification (§ 6). Indeed, as I investigate some points of collision between religion 
II: §§ 5-6 supra. 
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on the one hand, and racial, sex and religious discrimination laws on the other, it 
becomes evident that parliaments and judicamres have not been prepared to give 
unqualified protecdon to discriminatory religious practices. This invesdgation also 
shows that, on occasion, some adjustment to the current discriminadon laws is needed 
if, in the first place, there is to be a just and practicable prioritising of equal religious 
liberty and fair equality of oppormnity and, in the second, some discrimination laws are 
to survive the operation of religion clauses of constimtional stams (§§ 7 to 9). I 
conclude diat the idea of a secular commonwealth demands broad exemptions from 
discrimination laws for religious groups although, as we wdl see by government's 
obligadon to make the provision of financial assistance to religious educadonal, health 
or welfare instimtions conditional on compliance with equal opportunity policies, this 
y 
need not cripple its ability to realise the principle of fair equality of opportunity (§ 10). 
§ 2: Discrimination Laws in Australia: Overview 
The right not to be discriminated against was bom in the United States in the 
period of social reconstmction after the Civil War. The original Civil Rights Act of 
1866 stated that "there shall be no discrimination in civil rights or immunities ... on 
account of race, color, or previous condition of slavery".3 This was consolidated and 
extended during the mrmoil of the civil rights movement in the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 
which makes it unlawful to discriminate on the grounds of "race, color, religion, sex, 
or nadonal origin" in various social and economic relations. Of these, the most 
important for building and reinforcing equality in social and economic relations has 
been employment, which is regulated by title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Since the 
1960s, discrimination laws have been introduced in Commonwealth countries like 
C/now Constimdon (US), Fourteenth Amendment. 
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Australia, and in some have been elevated to constimtional or quasi-consdmtional 
stams.* Intemational conventions and declarations also address the moral importance 
of eliminating discrimination. In specific relation to religious discrimination, the most 
important of these is the 1981 United Nations Beclaration on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Intolerance and of Biscrimination Based on Religion and Belief.^ 
In Australia, legislation passed since the 1970s has made extensive protection 
against discrunination. However, it is also irregular, and the irregularity stems from 
several sources associated with the federal political constimtion. The first is the limited 
power of the Commonwealth Parliament. On the basis of its power to implement 
intemational conventions, it has passed laws prohibiting discrimination generally on the 
y 
grounds of race, colour, descent, nadonal or ethnic origin, sex, marital stams, 
pregnancy, family responsibilities and disability.^ In Commonwealth industrial 
reladons laws, there is more specific provision making it unlawful to terminate an 
employee's employment on the ground of race, colour, sex, sexual preference, age. 
* C Ronalds, Anti-Biscrimination Legislation in Australia (Sydney 1979) pp 1-2; see eg 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Canada), s 15; European Convention for the 
Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms 1953 (Council of Europe), art 14; Bill 
of Rights Act 1990 (NZ), ss 19 and 20. 
^ See DJ Sullivan, "Advancing the Freedom of Religion or Belief Through the UN 
Declaradon on the Elimination of Religious Intolerance and Discrimination" (1988) 82 
Am Jnl Int Law 486; RS Clark, "The United Nations Declaration On the Elimination 
Of All Forms of Intolerance And Of Discrimination Bases On Religion or Belief" 
(1983) 31 Chitty's Law Jnl 23. 
^ Racial Biscrimination Act 1975 (Cth), s 9 ("RDA"), implemendng the International 
Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Biscrimination 1965 (UN); Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth), ss 5-7 and 14-26 ("SDA"), implementing the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Biscrimination Against Women 1979 (UN); 
Disability Biscrimination Act 1992 (Cth), ss 5-6 and 15-29 ("DDA"), implementing 
the Convention Concerning Biscrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation 
1958 (ILO). See also Constimtion (Cth), s 51 (xxix); Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen 
(1982) 153 CLR 168; Aldridge v Booth (1988) EOC 92-222. 
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disability, family responsibilities, pregnancy, religion, political opinion, national 
extraction or social origin.' There is also more comprehensive (but less effective) 
monitoring of discriminatory practices under the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission Act of 1986 (Cth). This allows the Commission to hear complaints that 
intemational human rights and anti-discrimination instmments have been offended, but 
the Parliament did not give legal operation to any of the intemational instmments 
annexed to the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act. 
The second source of irregularity in the discrimination laws lies in the 
differences amongst the States and Territories as to the contingencies adjudged by 
parliaments to be morally arbitrary, and thus protected from unlawful discrimination. 
y 
The grounds of unlawful discrimination in the States and Territories variously include 
race, colour, national or ethnic origin, sex, marital stams. pregnancy, breastfeeding, 
family responsibilities or stams, physical or intellecmal impairment, parental stams, 
age, sexual orientation, homosexuality, transexuality, religion, political affiliation, 
membership of an employees" or employers' association and an irrelevant medical or 
criminal record.* However, at the one extreme, in New South Wales only some of 
these are grounds of unlawful discriminadon, whereas at the other, in the Australian 
Capital Territory, Northern Territory and Queensland almost all these contingencies are 
grounds of unlawful discrimination. To date, Tasmania has no State discrunination 
laws at all. 
' Industrial Relations Act 1988 (Cth), s 170DF ("IRA"). 
^ Discrimination Act 1991 ("ACT"), ss 4 and 7; Anti-Biscrimination Act 1977 ("NSW"), 
ss 4, 7, 24, 39, 49A, 49P and 49ZG; Anti-Biscrimination Act 1992 ("NT"), s 19; Anti-
Discrimination Act 1991 ("Qld"), s 7; Equal Opportunity Act 1984 ("SA") ss 5, 29, 51, 
66 and 85a; Equal Opportunity Act 1984 ("Vic") ss 4, 17 and 21-32; Equal Opportunity 
Act 1984 ("WA"), ss 4, 8-10, 35A, 36, 53, 66A and 66V. 
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The third possible source of irregularity and a source of uncertainty in the 
discrimination laws emerges from the inconsistencies and potential inconsistencies 
between the Commonwealth laws on the one hand, and some State and Territory laws 
on the other. Some State discriminadon laws have been held invalid because they have 
been inconsistent with paramount Commonwealth discrimination laws or other 
Commonwealth legislation.^ The Commonwealth has since legislated to preserve State 
and Territory discrimination laws beside its Racial, Sex and Bisability Biscrimination 
Acts, but the possibility that inconsistencies could invalidate the State and Territory laws 
still exists.'° 
These laws only apply to particular social and economic relations, but here there 
y 
is more uniformity. The employment concerns that have been so prominent in the 
United States Civil Rights Act are always included in the ambit of operation, and of 
course the relevant Commonwealth industrial relations laws deal exclusively with the 
termination of employment." In most cases, the discrimination laws also operate in 
education, union membership, access to public places and vehicles, the provision of 
goods and services, selling or letting land, accommodation and club membership.'^ 
^ Consdmdon (Cth), s 109; Viskauskas v Niland (1983) 153 CLR 280; University of 
Wollongong v Metwally (1984) 158 CLR 447; Bao v Australian Postal Commission 
(1987) 162 CLR 317; Australian Mutual Provident Society v Goulden (1986) 60 AUR 
368. 
'° RDA, s 6A; SDA, s 10; DDA, s 13; G McCarry, "Landmines Among die 
Landmarks: Constimtional Aspects of Anti-Discrimination Laws" (1989) 63 A U 327 
at 330-41. 
" IRA, s 170DF. 
"RDA, ss 11-15; SDA, ss 14-25; DDA, ss 15-28; ACT, ss 10-22; NSW, ss 8-20A, 
25-34A, 40-48A, 49B-LA, 49Q-ZB and 49ZH-ZR; NT, ss 28-49; Qld, ss 12-102; SA, 
ss 30-43, 52-63, 67-78 and 85b-l; Vic, ss 21-32; WA, ss 11-23, 35B-J, 37-49, 54-65, 
66B-0 and 66V-ZL. 
370 XI: § 2 
There are exemptions in all these laws to the grounds of unlawful discrimination and 
the social and economic relations to which they apply. The broadest and most 
important of these are for religious groups, and are considered in §§ 7 to 9. 
Significandy, the discrimination laws only create civil rights and obligadons. 
Excepting the unusual reliance on conciliation and quasi-judicial tribunals in the initial 
stages of enforcement, unlawful discrimination parallels a modem tort.'3 Thus, once 
unlawful discrimination is proved it is redressed by civil remedies like damages, 
declarations and interdictions, but it rarely constimtes a criminal offence.'* 
§ 3: Unlawful Religious Discrimination I: Religious Discrimination Laws 
The religious discrimination laws clearly exemplify the irregularity in the 
operadon of discrimination laws in Australia. Three States have no religious 
discrimination laws at all, and in those States and Territories that do have them they 
often address different kinds of discrimination. These are discussed in this section, and 
include: direct discrimination, direct accommodation, religious harassment, and indirect 
discrimination. 
'3 RDA, ss 20, 24C-E and 25Q; SDA, ss 48, 55-7 and 73; DDA, ss 67, 74-6 and 93; 
ACT, ss 80 and 82; NSW, ss 92 and 94; NT, ss 78-83 and 87; Qld, ss 158-164; SA, 
ss 27 and 95; Vic, ss 42 and 45; WA, ss 91-3 and 118. 
'* RDA, ss 26 and 25Z; SDA, ss 81 and 85; DDA, ss 41 and 103; ACT, ss 90 and 97; 
NSW, ss 113 and 123; NT, s 88; Qld, s 209; SA, ss 96 and 99; Vic, ss 46 and 60; 
WA, ss 127 and 154. The courts generally have power to review and, if appropriate, 
to enforce these orders: RDA, ss 25ZAA-AC; SDA, ss 82A-C; DDA, ss 104A-C; 
NSW, ss 115 and 118; NT, ss 106-7; Qld, ss 216-18; SA, s 98; Vic, s 49; WA, s 134; 
cf ACT, ss 90, 92 and 94. 
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1. Birect Biscrimination. Throughout Australia, the Commonwealth industrial 
relations laws make it unlawful to terminate employment on the ground of religion. '^  
There is also some protection from discrimination on the ground of religion under the 
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act, which allows investigation into 
complaints that the religious discrimination provisions of intemational instmments, 
including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, have been 
offended.'^  Occasionally, the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Act has been used 
to prevent State governmental agencies' discriminadng on the ground of religion." 
This legislation does not annex the 1981 Beclaration on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Intolerance and of Biscrimination Based on Religion or Belief: an attempt to do so 
was abandoned after various ^ 'Christian denominations raised concems about the 
Declaration's impact on religious liberty.'* 
There are more effective laws expressly making it unlawful to discriminate on 
the ground of religion in more general social and economic relations in the Australian 
Capital Territory, the Northern Territory, Queensland, Victoria and Westem 
'^  IRA, s 170DF. 
'^  See Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth), ss 3 and 11; 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (UN, art 26); Convention 
Concerning Biscrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation 1958 (ILO), art 
1 , Beclaration of the Rights of the Child 1959 (UN), principle 1; Beclaration on the 
Rights ofBisabled Persons 1975 (UN), art 2. 
" Eg Tarumi v Bankstown City Council (1987) EOC 92-214 (77,006). 
'^  J Baldock, "Responses to Religious Pluralism in Australia" (1994) 7 Aust Religion 
Studies Rev 21 at 28. 
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Australia.'^ The concept of religion is never defined in the legislation, but would be 
expected to centre on the meaning the High Court thought it had in Scientology III.'^^ 
This broad objective approach to the concept means that religious discrimination laws 
probably not only make it unlawful to discriminate on the ground of a person's 
identification with a religion, but also on the depth of that person's religious 
commitment, the practice of his religion or the practice of moral conceptions demanded 
by his religion.^' 
In New South Wales, the Anti-Biscrimination Act empowers invesdgation, 
research and inquiry into religious discrimination in the State, but despite a thorough 
report on the position of religion in New South Wales and consequent recommendations 
by State governmental agencies that it be made unlawful to discriminate on the ground 
of religion, the State Parliament has not yet introduced religious discrimination laws.-^ ^ 
"These variously refer to "religious ... conviction" (ACT, s 7; WA, s 53), "religious 
belief or activity" (NT, s 19), "lawful religious ... belief or view ... or ... acdvities" 
(Vic, s 4) or merely "religion" (Qld, s 7). 
°^ Church of the New Faith v Commissioner of Pay-roll Tax (1983) 154 CLR 220; see 
I: § 4 supra. 
'^ Human Rights Commission v The Eric Sides Motors Company Ltd (1981) 2 NZAR 
447 {"Eric Sides"); Larsen v Kirkham 499 F Supp 960 (1980); Amos v Corporation of 
the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Bay Saints 618 F Supp 
1013 (1985). The drawing of distinctions between clergy and laity does not seem to be 
religious discrimination: Fike v United Methodist Children's Home of Virginia 547 F 
Supp 286 at 290-91 (1982); 709 F 2d 284 at 285 (1983); see also Young v Southwestern 
Savings and Loan Association 509 F 2d 140 at 142 and 144 (1975) {"Young"); EEOC 
V Townley Engineering and Manufacturing Company 859 F 2d 610, 620-21 (1988) 
CTownley Engineering"); Re Caldwell and Stuart (1984) 15 DLR (4th) 1; Little v 
Wuerl, Bishop of Pittsburgh 929 F 2d 944 at 950 (1991) {"Little"). 
NSW, s 119; New South Wales Anti-Discrimination Board, Biscrimination and 
Religious Conviction (Sydney 1984) p 508; New South Wales Law Reform 
Commission, Review of the Anti-Biscrimination Act 1977 (NSW) (Discussion Paper No 
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The proposed Tasmanian discrimination laws include prohibitions on religious 
discriminadon." 
Given the current operation of the State and Territory religious discrimination 
laws, they are likely to have their most profound impact on employment relations. 
Here, they impose on employers (by legislation) a similar limitadon to that imposed on 
government (in a constimtion) by a religious test clause.-* Therefore, the prunary 
obligation under the religious discrimination laws is the equal treatment of an applicant 
for employment or of an employee, regardless of his religion. This obligadon also 
attaches to the allocation of benefits and privileges to employees throughout the 
employment relationship, as is shown by the leading Australian case on direct religious 
discrimination: Marett v Petroleum Refineries.^-^ The plaintiff, a pentecostal 
Christian, believed on the basis of his own interpretation of the Bible that the primary 
responsibdity for welfare belonged to the family and, if the family could not carry out 
diat responsibdity, to the church. He therefore refused to pay a $10 weekly levy to his 
union, requested by his co-employees, to support striking members of a union in 
Queensland. His co-employees rejected the plaintiff's proposal to pay the $10 to the 
Queensland unionists personally or through his church, and threatened industrial action 
unless Petroleum Refineries removed him from his position in the company's 
30) (Sydney 1993) pp 146-7; c/PD Young, "Anti-discrimination" (1993) 67 AU 401 
at 402. 
3^ New South Wales Law Reform Commission note 22 supra at 225. 
'* See VIII: § 5 supra. 
^^ Marett v Petroleum Refineries (Australia) Pty Ltd (1987) EOC 92-206 {"Marett I"); 
Petroleum Refineries (Australia) Pty Ltd v Marett (1988) EOC 92-237 {"Marett IF). 
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Maintenance Department. Petroleum Refineries' management bowed to these demands, 
and assigned the plaintiff to confinement in a small hut during working hours. He was 
allowed to have a chair, but was not given a desk or any work. The plaindff was 
dismissed after four months. He subsequently alleged unlawful religious discrimination 
and claimed damages, although for procedural reasons his dismissal could not be 
included in the claim. The Victorian Equal Opportunity Board held that Petroleum 
Refineries had, contrary to the State Equal Opportunity Act, denied the plaintiff 
opportunities for training, promotion and other benefits and had imposed a detriment 
on him, and that his religion was a substantial and operative reason for that 
discrimination.^*' This decision was upheld on appeal to the Supreme Court." It is 
dierefore likely that, in most cases, an employer is under a negadve obligadon not to 
subject an employee direcdy to burdens not equally imposed on other employees as a 
result of the employee's religion, the practice of his religion or, as in Marett, the 
practice of reasonable moral conceptions based on the employee's religion. It also 
follows that, under the State and Territory religious discrimination laws, it is unlawful 
to dismiss an employee on the basis of his religion.'* This is the same obligation 
expressly imposed on employers throughout Australia by Commonwealth industrial 
^^  Marett I note 25 supra at 76,955. 
" Marett II note 25 supra. 
28 
Cf Trans World Airlines Inc v Hardison 432 US 63 (1977); Blalock v Metals Trades 
Inc 775 F 2d 703 (1985); Marett I note 25 supra at 76-947. 
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relations laws. '^' 
2. Birect Accommodation. In the Australian Capital Territory, the Northem 
Tertitory and Westem Australia, religious discriminadon expressly includes an 
employer's refusing to allow an employee to carry out a religious practice during 
working hours. The practice must be regarded as necessary or desirable by the 
employee's co-religionists, it must be reasonable to perform during working hours, and 
it must not impose a "detriment" or, in the Australian Capital Territory, an 
"unreasonable detriment" on the employer.3" These laws largely restate the duty of 
reasonable accommodation, required in the United States by title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act. -^  
These laws recognise that, to have religion regarded as irrelevant in social and 
economic relations, unequal treatment is required in exceptional cases to remove any 
practical impediment to the practice of a religion: in most cases, a minority religion 
outside the social mainstream.3' However, it is ordy a small recognition of the need 
for unequal treatment because, in general, the duty to accommodate does not endde the 
employee to the most beneficent accommodation.3^ In the Northern Territory and 
Western Australia, the duty to accommodate ends at the point where accommodation 
'^ IRA, s 170DF. 
'"ACT, s 11; NT, s 31; WA, s 54. 
'' Anderson v General Bynamics Convair Aerospace Bivision 589 F 2d 397 (1978) 
{"Anderson"); cf Ansonia Board of Education v Philbrook 479 US 60 at 79 (1986) 
{"Ansonia"). 
32 Ansonia note 31 supra at 69. 
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would impose a "detriment" on the employer. This is a greater limitadon than die 
Australian Capital Territory's "unreasonable detriment" and tide VII's requirement of 
"undue hardship". However, the reported decisions suggest that none impose serious 
costs on an employer before the duty to accommodate is discharged. In the United 
States, it has been held that anything exceeding a "de minimus" economic cost on the 
employer is "undue".33 In Canada, the obligation is only slighdy more onerous. The 
courts there have held that the existence of detriment is determined by reference to 
considerations like compliance with a collective bargaining agreement, workplace 
morale, the ability to provide altemative labour or facilities, the size of the business 
and, if safety is an issue, the magnimde of the risks that accommodation to the religious 
practice would raise.3"* Howevet, one consideration the courts have not been prepared 
to count towards a cost that discharges the duty to accommodate is the employer's own 
religious concepdons or practices.3^ This raises a question discussed briefly in § 9: 
how, when in collision, should the employer's right to equal religious liberty and the 
religious discrimination laws be prioritised or adjusted? 
In Queensland and Victoria, the legislation does not expressly include the duty 
33 Trans World Airlines Inc v Hardison 432 US 63 at 84 and 92 (1977); cf Anderson 
note 31 supra at 402. 
^^ Alberta Human Rights Commission v Central Alberta Bairy Pool (1990) 72 DLR (4th) 
417 at 439; cfRe Osborne andInco Ltd (1984) 10 DLR (4th) 239 at 253; Re Office and 
Professional Employees International Union, Local 267 and Bomtar Inc (1992) 89 DLR 
(4di) 305. 
'^  See TD Brierton, "An Unjusdfied Hostility Toward Religion in the Workplace" 
(1991) 34 Catholic Lawyer 289; Minnesota (by McClure) v Sports and Health Club Inc 
370 NW 2d 844 at 855 and 876 (1985) {"Sports and Health"); Townley Engineering 
note 21 supra at 621. 
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of reasonable accommodation. This raises some doubt whether employers in those 
States also carry that obligation. The Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench suggested in 
In Re Osborne and Inco Ltd^^ that the Provincial religious discrimination law imported 
the positive duty to accommodate as it was implicit in the employer's obligation not to 
discriminate against an employee on the ground of religion and, therefore, to have some 
regard for an employee's religious obligations.3' In Canadian National Railway 
Company and Canadian Human Rights Commission^^ the Federal Court of Appeals 
held that it was incorrect to find the duty to accommodate implied where it was not 
clearly and unmistakably expressed.3*^  The latter approach is probably more consistent 
with methods that courts in Australia use to interpret legislation, and the result is that 
a positive duty on the employer to accommodate an employee's religion is less Idcely 
to exist in Queensland and Victoria. 
3. Religious Harassment. In the United States, courts have recognised that 
religious discrimination laws impliedly include a prohibition on religious harassment.*° 
These are of two kinds: "condition of work" harassment, which is an intimidating and 
offensive work environment, and "quidpro quo" harassment, which is pressure imposed 
on an employee to change religious beliefs and practices to secure employment 
' ' (1984) 10 DLR (4th) 239. 
^'' Ibid at 249-51. 
'*(1983) 147 DLR (3d) 312. 
' ' Ibid at 320 and 341; cfibid at 335 and 340. 
'° Weiss V United States 595 F Supp 1050 (1984) {"Weiss"); Vaughn v AG Processing 
Inc 459 NW 2d 627 (1990) {"Vaughn"). 
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privileges and benefits.*' The former was claimed in Weiss v United States,^^ where 
two co-employees exposed the Jewish plaintiff to taunts like "Jew faggot", "rich Jew", 
"Christ killer" and "you killed Christ .. so you'll have to hang from the cross". As a 
result, the plaintiff suffered emotional and psychological instability, his work 
performance deteriorated and he was evenmally dismissed. Holding that this had 
occurted as a direct result of an anti-Semitic work environment which the employer had 
failed to remedy. Judge Richard Williams held that religious discrimination was 
proved.*3 
In the Northem Territory, religious harassment is expressly made unlawful.** 
Otherwise, it is only possible' to infer its urdawfulness. Queensland's religious 
vilification law requires proof that religious hatred or hostility has been encouraged and 
an incitement to breach the Anti-Biscrimination Act.'^^ The offence is sui generis, but 
the law probably encompasses especially bmtal cases of condition of work harassment. 
Furthermore, courts and tribunals in Australia and New Zealand have recognised that 
sexual harassment constimtes unlawful sex discrimination, and this suggests that 
*' Weiss note 40 supra at 1056. 
*' Ibid. 
*3 The Supreme Court of Ohio has held, by analogy to racial and sexual harassment 
laws, that the elements of a claim for religious harassment by an employer are: "(1) 
the plaindff belongs to a protected [religious] class; (2) the plaintiff was subject to 
unwelcome religious harassment; (3) the harassment was based on religion; (4) the 
harassment affected a term, condition or privilege of employment; and (5) the employer 
knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial 
action": Vaughn note 40 supra at 632. 
"" NT, ss 19 and 20. 
' ' Qld, s 126. 
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religious harassment could constimte unlawful religious discrimination.*^ If that is so, 
then employers in the States and Territories that have religious discrimination laws are 
obliged to prevent the development of a hostile anti-religious work environment. 
4. Indirect Biscrimination. The Australian Capital Territory and State religious 
discrimination laws also make religious discrimination unlawful where it is only 
indirect.*' This makes a requirement prima facie unlawful even if it is not intended 
to treat a person unequally on the ground of his religion, where its effect is to treat a 
person who holds to particular religious conceptions differently to those who hold to 
others.** The prohibition on indirect religious discriminadon potentially has an 
extremely extensive operation,'and so the legislation always states that, to constimte 
unlawful indirect religious discrimination, the impugned requirement must also be 
unreasonable. How this is assessed must necessarily depend on all relevant 
circumstances. However, a requirement is likely to be reasonable if the person 
imposing it does not have less discriminatory methods of realising his objectives.*^ 
It would also be expected that requirements directed towards the maintenance of public 
*^  O'Callaghan v Loder [1983] 3 NSWLR 89 at 103-6; R v Equal Opportunity Board 
& Anor; ex parte Burns (1984) EOC 92-212 (76,105) at 76,110; Orr v Liva Tool and 
Diemakers Pty Ltd (1985) EOC 92-126 (76,270) at 76,276; Hill v Water Resources 
Commission (1985) EOC 92-127 (76,277) at 76,288; H v E (1985) EOC (76,349) at 
76,363-5. 
*'ACT, s 8; Qld, s 11; Vic, s 17; WA, s 53; cf NT, s 20. 
** CfMandla v Bowell Lee [1983] 2 AC 548 at 565-6 {"Mandla IF). Here, there are 
obvious parallels between the operation of religious discrimination laws and a "secular 
purpose and effects" interpretation of the free exercise clause: c/VIII: § 3 supra. 
^^Eg Christian Family Schools Association v Public Transport Corporation (1990) EOC 
92-300; cf Marett v Accelerated Christian Education (Australian Christian Academy) 
(1992) EOC 92-481. 
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order, healdi and safety would usually be reasonable.^° 
§ 4: Unlawful Religious Discrimination II: Racial Discrimination Laws 
That indirect discrimination has been made unlawful has also created 
oppormnities for racial discrimination laws to be used, in some cases, to remedy 
discrimination on the ground of religion where the religion concemed has a close 
association with a particular race or ethnic group. The Racial Biscrimination Act and 
all State and Territory discriminadon laws make it unlawful to discriminate on the 
ground of race, colour, descent or, in most cases, national or ethnic origin.^' The 
Commonwealth industrial relations laws make it unlawful to terminate employment on 
the ground of the employee's race, colour or national extraction." It is certainly the 
case in New South Wales that some religious groups have the protection of racial 
discrimination laws, as the Anti-Biscrimination Act was amended in 1994 to provide that 
the term "race" include a group of "ethno-religious" origin." However, this 
amendment was merely declaratory of adjudication that had begun to understand 
ethnicity less as a concept centred on biological origins and more, like religion, as a 
social constmct. The original rationale the English judicamre identified in racial 
discrimination laws was a prohibition on unequal treatment by reference to personal 
°^ But cfPeel Board of Education v Ontario Human Rights Commission (1991) 80 DLR 
(4di) 475. 
'^ RDA, ss 9 and 15; ACT, ss 4 and 7; NSW, ss 4 and 7; NT, ss 4 and 19; Qld, ss 4 
and 7; Vic, ss 4 and 17; WA, ss 4 and 36; Race Relations Act 1976 (UK), s 3; Race 
Relations Act 1971 (NZ), s 25; c/SA, ss 5 and 51. 
^^  IRA, s 170DF. 
" NSW, s 4; see Anti-Biscrimination (Amendment) Act 1994 (NSW), s 3 and Sch 1. 
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characteristics that were unalterable.^* Therefore, the protection they provided could 
not be extended to a group, like a religion, which (excepting the religious 
establishments) in the common law tradidon is an association, membership of which the 
citizen can accept or relinquish voluntarily.^^ Then in the 1970s and 1980s, it was 
accepted that ethnicity was defined by reference to a "combination of shared customs, 
beliefs, traditions and characteristics derived from a common or presumed common 
past".^ ^ In doing so, the protection of racial discrimination laws was broadened to 
some socially defined groups, and in particular to some religious groups. 
The first of these was the Sikhs, which were held to be an ethnic group when 
the English courts shifted to a social definition of ethnicity during the appeals in Mandla 
V Dowell Lee. There, the Court of Appeal held that, despite the British Race Relations 
Act, the principal of a private school (with a Christian ethos) could effectively refuse 
the admission of a Sikh boy, by the principal's mling that the boy could not wear a 
mrban at die school despite the boy's obligation as a Sikh to do so." The Court's 
decision was based on the its conclusion that ethnicity was a biological concept, and that 
the Sikhs, a group originating in India's Punjab, were only a religious group.^* In the 
54 Ealing London Borough Council v Race Relations Board [1972] AC 342 at 368. 
^^ Mandla V Bowell Lee [1983] 1 QB 1 at 16, 19, 20 and 24 {"Mandla /") ; X: §§ 3 and 
5 supra. 
^^ King-Ansell v Police [1979] 2 NZLR 531 at 543. 
" Mandla I note 55 supra. 
Ie "Sikhs and Sikhism do not as such fall within die Race Reladons Act at all, any 
more than the members of the Church of England, Catholics, Muslims, Quakers, or 
Jehovah [sic] Witnesses": ibid at 23. 
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House of Lords, the decision was reversed on both grounds.^ ^ Lord Fraser listed 
several considerations that helped to identify an ethnic group: all add up to a common 
historical and culmral tradition. Importantly, he held that a common but distinctive 
religion might be relevant in identifying ethnicity.^ Thus, even though biologically 
the Sikhs were indistinguishable from other groups in the Punjab, they qualified as an 
ethnic group, because self-consciously they had been a separate community for five 
cenmries. 
The Jews have also been held to be an ethno-religious group protected by racial 
discrimination laws. The need for special protection of the Jews has, in the post-
Holocaust era, been an impo'rtant international concern. However, where this 
protection has been promised through racial discrimination laws it has been problematic, 
because after millenia of diaspora there are no distinctive biological characteristics that 
delineate Jews from other races. English tmsts law did recognise that the Jews were 
a "race". Sdll, Lord Denning thought that, by extending the protection of racial 
discrimination laws to "ethnic groups". Parliament mainly intended to protect the Jews 
because they did not stricdy qualify as a "race".^' In King-Ansell v Police,^^ the 
New Zealand Court of Appeal mled that the Jews were an ethnic group but, unlike 
59 Mandla II note 48 supra. 
^ Ibid at 562. 
'^ Mandla I note 55 supra at 11; see also LG Shemonsky, "The Exclusion of Religion 
from Great Britain's Race Reladons Act: 'Sikh' and Ye Shall Find a Violation of 
Human Rights Obligations" (1984) 14 Cal West Int Law Jnl 87 at 106; Shaare Tefila 
Congregation v Cobb 481 US 615 (1987); Clayton v Ramsden [1943] AC 320 at 328, 
330 and 332-3; Re Tuck's Settlement Trusts [191S] 2 WLR 411 at 420-1. 
62 [1979] 2 NZLR 531. 
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Lord Denning, opted for a social definition of ethnicity in the process. This decision 
helped the Equal Oppormnity Tribunal in New South Wales to prompt the 1994 
amendment to the Anti-Biscrimination Act by deciding that the Jews were an ethnic 
group protected by the State racial discrimination laws.^  63 
§ 5: Unlawful Religious Discrimination III: Evaluation 
In conditions of religious pluralism it is a requirement of a political conception 
of justice, as I argued in chapter II, that religion be regarded, in a political sense, as 
a morally arbitrary contingency and, as a result, addressed by the principle of fair 
equality of oppormnity in social and economic relations. It does, in fact, help to secure 
the religious toleration in social relations between citizens which John Locke advocated 
in his First Letter Concerning Toleration, but which, because of the resulting focus on 
political relations between government and the citizen, has largely been overlooked until 
the latter part of the twentieth cenmry.^ Marett^^ graphically exemplifies how, 
through instimtionalised employer and union power, systematic religious discrimination 
might even be exercised against an employee whose beliefs did not digress markedly 
from the Christian mainstream. For this reason general religious discrimination laws 
have become an even more necessary response to increasing religious pluralism. 
However, in Australia they still require significant consolidation. First, there are no 
enforceable religious discrimination laws, other than the Commonwealth industrial 
relations laws, in operation in New South Wales, South Australia and Tasmania. In 
" Phillips V Aboriginal Legal Service (1993) EOC 92,502. 
"" See II: § 3 supra. 
65 Marett I & II note 25 supra. 
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addition, the industrial relations laws only apply to the termination of employment, 
which means it is lawful in those States to discriminate on the ground of religion in 
other employment decisions and practices, as well as in other social and economic 
relations.^ *' Secondly, as racial discrimination laws now protect ethno-religious 
groups, there is imbalance in the scheme of discrimination laws in those States where 
it is lawful to discriminate on the ground of religion per se and, in particular, against 
religious groups that have no specific connection with a definable ethnic group. Thus, 
the 1994 amendment to the New South Wales discrimination laws, though certainly 
clarifying the protection of religious groups in that State, also reinforces an enforceable 
principle of religious inequality. Mandla v Bowell Lee^^ is an example of religious 
preferences in collision, but the' outcome shows that, where racial discrimination laws 
do not compete with religious discrimination laws, religions closely associated with 
ethnic groups receive a special protection denied to more multi-ethnic religions.^* This 
leads to the perception of social privilege, rather than of a sincere governmental 
commitment to equality in social and economic relations: a perception that dangerously 
undermines the political legitimacy of discrimination laws generally. In this connection, 
religious discrimination laws should be introduced in New South Wales, South Australia 
and (as some ethno-religious groups are probably protected under the Commonwealth 
Racial Biscrimination Act) Tasmania if the enforceable laws in operation in those States 
are more completely to realise the principle of fair equality of oppormnity, and thus the 
idea of a secular commonwealth. 
^C/IRA, s 170DF. 
'^ Mandla I note 55 supra; Mandla II note 48 supra. 
^^ StJ Robilliard, Religion and the Law (Manchester 1984) pp 6-7. 
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§ 6: Discrimination by Religion I: The Priority of Equal Religious Liberty 
It is obvious, as the previous discussion shows, that in one respect religious and 
(to less extent) racial discrimination laws reinforce the idea of a secular commonwealth. 
But in odier respects discrimination laws generally have presented most models of 
secular government with new problems, quite simply because religious groups 
commonly endorse practices that constimte discrimination in social and economic 
relations. This is one of the most serious issues currently touching relations between 
government and religion in Australia, because as I discuss in § 8 there are powerful 
political interests and governmental agencies demanding the extension of sex, marital 
stams and pregnancy discrimination laws to the (predominantly Catholic) religious 
schools. However, a principled approach to the specific issue of gender equality in 
religious schools is best managed within the broader context of a collision between 
equal religious liberty and fair equality of oppormnity, and its just and practicable 
resolution. 
Under the Rawlsian theory that informs the idea of a secular commonwealth, in 
any collision between religious practice and discrimination laws the priority of equal 
religious liberty and, in consequence, the religious practice is almost irresistible. In 
chapter II, we saw that this priority is reached through the use of the impartial 
procedure of the original position, and largely on the basis of the same reasons that lead 
the parties in the original posidon to select the principle of equal religious liberty. 
Foremost among these is the namre of religion generally. Since the parties in the 
original position realise the citizens they represent could hold that the practice of their 
religious conceptions should never be exchanged for social or economic benefits and 
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privileges, they select a principle that secures the citizen's maximum equal religious 
liberty, in priority to demands for fair equality of oppormnity in the distribution of 
social and economic goods.^'' This priority demands that religious practices that are, 
in a political sense, discriminatory be exempted from the operadon of discrimination 
laws. However, as we also saw in chapter II, the parties in the original position also 
select the principle of fair equality of oppormnity as a part of the second principle of 
justice. Therefore, if the minimum conditions needed to implement effectively the 
principle of fair equality of opportunity cannot be reached because the exemptions for 
religious practices impose excessive limits on, say, the social and economic relations 
in which discrimination laws can legitimately operate, just government would remain 
unrealised. Thus, I contend ihat it is both just and practicable that the citizen's 
religious practice can be legitimately burdened by the enforcement of discrimination 
laws where the priority of discrimination laws is required to realise the minimum 
demands of the principle of fair equality of oppormnity.'° This still requires broad 
exemptions for religious practice." Beyond this, how particular collisions between 
^^  See II: § 6 supra. In addition to the reasons that the priority of liberty has in 
common with the selection of equal religious liberty, Rawls also suggests that the 
promotion of the citizen's self-respect is also a reason that supports the priority of all 
basic liberties: J Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York 1993) pp 319-20. 
I believe this qualification is defensible according to Rawlsian criteria. In addition 
to the effect that must be contemplated for the second principle of justice, Rawls 
suggests that a minimum level of economic development is a pre-requisite for the first 
principle of justice and its priority to hold. Similariy, it is arguable that a minimum 
level of social and economic equality is a pre-requisite to the adequate enjoyment of 
equal religious liberty: see ibid at 7; J Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford 1972) pp 
151-2. 
Eg HLA Hart suggested that, given the namre of religion, a better argument exists 
for the priority of religious liberty than for the priority of other basic liberties: "Rawls 
on Liberty and its Priority" in N Daniels (ed), Reading Rawls (Oxford 1975) p 252. 
387 XI: § 6 
religious practice and discrimination laws should be prioridsed is unclear. It is only 
necessary to state that these principles set the parameters of, again in political terms, 
a legitimate solution to the collision. However, I suggest that, in deciding the relevant 
priority, the parliament or the judicamre should take several consideradons into 
account. 
First, the namre of the religious practice and the place in which it its priority 
is being claimed are obviously relevant. Though any classification of religious practices 
will not fit all the possible cases, the legislation and adjudication reveal at least five 
significant classes of discriminatory religious or moral practice: (i) the holding and 
expression of discriminatory religious conceptions; (ii) "intemal religious group 
practice", including issues like clerical training, the ordination and appointment of 
ministers and the performance of religious observances; (iii) employment in and 
admission to an educational instimtion controlled by a religious group; (iv) employment 
in and admission to health, welfare and other instimtions controlled by a religious 
group; and (v) commercial transactions involving a religious group or a religious 
citizen. This classification does not preclude any of these classes of religious practice's 
having priority if in collision with a discrimination law, but the more central the 
practice is to the religion in question, the better its claim to priority.'^ 
'^  Specific applications of this general approach are common in American scholarship: 
see D Abuhoff, "Tide VII and the Appointment of Women Clergy: A Stamtory and 
Constimtional Quagmire" (1977) 13 Col Jnl Law & Soc Probs 257; BN Bagni, 
"Discrimination in the Name of the IjDrd: A Critical Examination of Discrimination by 
Religious Organisations" (1979) 79 Col L Rev 1514; D Laycock "Towards a General 
Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to 
Church Autonomy" (1981) 81 Col L Rev 1373; CH Esbeck, "Establishment Clause 
Limits on Governmental Interference with Religious Organisadons" (1984) 41 Wash & 
Lee L Rev 347; U Lacey, "Gay Rights Coalition v Georgetown University: 
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Secondly, the extent to which the discrimination law involved in the collision 
promotes equality in social and economic relations must improve any claim that it has 
priority over a religious practice. This must be assessed by reference to the expressed 
purpose of the law, and its effect. In most cases, the purposes of Australian 
discriminadon laws acmally do meet this requirement. The Commonwealth 
discrimination laws rely on intemational conventions which emphasise human dignity 
and equality.'3 Some State and the Territory discrimination laws also indicate that the 
objects of the legislation include the promotion within the community of the principle 
of equality.'* However, the effect of the law is as important to the realisation of the 
principle of fair equality of opportunity, and evidence in the terms or application of the 
legislation of its requiring unequal treatment or promodng inequalities probably makes 
any claim to its priority, necessarily based on the maintenance of the second principle 
of justice, less cogent. 
Thirdly, the extent to which the contingency addressed by the discrimination law 
can be legitunately regarded, in a political sense, as morally arbitrary is also relevant. 
Once more, much will depend on whether the purpose and effect of the law is to 
promote equality in social and economic relations. Here, it is also possible to add that, 
in political terms, there could be degrees of moral arbitrariness, particularly when die 
Constimtional Values on Collision Course" (1986) 64 Oregon L Rev 409; SK Wessels, 
"The Collision of Religious Exercise and Governmental Nondiscrimination Policies" 
(1989)41 Stanford L Rev 1201. 
^^  RDA, s 3 and Sch; SDA, ss 3, 4 and Sch; DDA, ss 3 and 4; Human Rights and 
Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth), sch 1. 
74 ACT, s 3; NT, s 3; Qld, s 6; WA, s 3. 
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pariiamentary or judicial decision about the importance of the discrimination law is 
made in the context of a collision or potential collision with a religious practice. In the 
United States especially, there are some interests pursued in discrimination laws, Idee 
racial and gender equality, that seem to be considered more compelling than others, like 
religious equality, when in collision with a religious practice, and which are more likely 
to be given priority.'^ Though no rationale is necessarily given for these rankings, 
they could reflect evolving public consensus about the moral arbitrariness of various 
contingencies addressed in discrimination laws. The adjudication on this issue in the 
United States and Canada also illuminates the exemptions that could be required if the 
principle of equal religious liberty were ever effectively realised in Australia, and that 
even now might be required under the Commonwealth free exercise clause.'^ 
§ 7: Discrimination by Religion II: Race and Ethnicity 
The possibility that a religious group could offend the racial discrimination laws 
is, at present, minimal. In Australia, any theology supporting racial segregation, as is 
found amongst some conservative Protestant laity in the United States, has had litde 
social influence." However, there are religions and religious denominadons closely 
associated with ethnic communities that could, in effect, have racially or ethidcally 
C/claims that all governmental interests in prevendng discrimination are equally 
compelling: Sports and Health note supra at 853; EEOC v Mississippi College 626 F 
2d 477 at 488 (1980) {"Mississippi College"); EEOC v Pacific Press Publishing 
Association 676 F 2d 1272 at 1280 (1982); Ray burn v General Conference of Seventh 
Day Adventists 772 F 2d 1164 at 1168 (1985) {"Rayburn"); EEOC v Fremont Christian 
School 781 F 2d 1362 at 1368 (1986). 
76 
77 
See VIII: §§ 3 and 4 supra. 
C/R Stark and CY Clock, "Prejudice and the Churches" in PH McNamara (ed). 
Religion American Style (New York 1974) p 305. 
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discriminatory practices.'* So, a collision between religious practice and racial 
discriminadon laws is still possible and an important public concern worth investigation. 
Though only being enacted in die 1960s and 1970s, the racial discrunination 
laws in Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom are the oldest of the genre.'''^ 
In the United States they are even older, and a prohibition on racial discrimination and 
segregation has been a central constimtional requirement there since the Supreme 
Court's 1954 decision in Brown v Board of Education.^^ How strong that interest is 
in the other countries is not usually articulated, but the High Court of Australia has 
relied on intemational standards and legal norms to identify a basic principle of anti-
discrimination in the law, most significandy in aboriginal issues.*' 
The Commonwealth Racial Biscrimination Act reflects the importance of this 
interest in that it provides no significant exemptions to its racial discrimination laws.*^ 
The industrial relations laws differ in this respect, as do some State and Territory laws 
'* See JM Yinger, Sociology Looks at Religion (New York 1963) pp 89-90; cf Hazan 
V Victorian Jewish Board of Beputies (1990) EOC 92,298. 
" RDA; Prohibition of Biscrimination Act 1966 (SA), ss 3-8; Race Relations Act 1971 
(NZ); Race Relations Act 1965 (UK). 
*° 347 US 483 (1954). See Cooper v Aaron 358 US 1 at 19 (1958); Bob Jones 
University v United States 461 US 574 at 592, 593, 595, 604, 607, 612 and 622 (1983); 
Brown V Bade Christian Schools Inc 556 F 2d 310 at 323 (1977); Civil Rights Act 1866 
(US). 
*' Mabo V Queensland (1992) 175 CLR 1; cf Eric Sides note 21 supra at 449. 
''C/RDA, s8 . 
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that exempt internal religious group practice.*3 In the Australian Capital Territory and 
some States, employment in and admission to educational instimtions controlled by 
religious groups are also exempted.** The Queensland laws allow racial discrimination 
in the provision of accommodation by religious groups and in dispositions of land of 
religious significance.*^ 
This scheme immediately raises questions whether, by not providing any 
exemption to religious groups, the Racial Biscrimination Act offends the 
Commonwealth free exercise clause. In the United States, it has been held that, on the 
priority of the First Amendment, a religious group can lawfully hold and express racist 
opinions.*^ It has also been held that a religious group can discriminate racially in 
intemal group practices, and on this basis in Simpson v Wells Lament Corporation^^ 
the Fifth Circuit denied it had jurisdiction to hear a claim that a pastor had been 
deposed by a Methodist congregation in Mississippi because he supported racial 
integration.** The courts in the United States have, however, been prepared to give 
83 ACT, s 32; NSW, s 56; NT, s 51; Qld, s 109; Vic, s 38; WA, s 72; c/IRA, s 
170DF. 
** ACT, s 33; Vic, s 38; c/WA, s 73. 
*^  Qld, ss 80 and 90. 
*^  See EEOC v Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary 651 F 2d 277 at 286 (1981) 
{"Southwestern Baptist"); but cfRoss v Moncton Board of School Trustees, Bistrict 15 
(1991) 86 DLR (4th) 748 at 757-8. In Australia, racial vilification laws limit the 
expression of these opinions: see XII: § 8 infra. 
87 494 F 2d 490 (1974). 
^^  C/also Southwestern Baptist note 86 supra at 284; Ray burn note 75 supra at 1168, 
1169 and 1170-1; Kansas v Barclay 708 P 2d 972 (1985). 
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priority to the Civil Rights Act in non-ministerial employment relations or commercial 
transactions entered by religious groups and individual citizens who claim, as a religious 
obligadon, the right to discriminate on the ground of race.*^ It can be argued that, in 
these decisions, the courts have reached a legitimate prioritising of the principles of 
equal religious liberty and fair equality of oppormnity: the interest in promoting racial 
equality is regarded as exceptionally compelling and, therefore, legitimately applied to 
religious practices in commercial relations outside the central concems of the religious 
group's theology and the legal independence of its internal processes and organisadon. 
Though they do limit the priority of equal religious liberty, these decisions suggest that, 
by not exempting any religious practices, the Racial Biscrimination Act could offend 
the free exercise clause. The exemptions given in State and Territory racial 
discrimination laws parallel this adjudication by centring on internal religious group 
practices: as a result, investigations by the Victorian Equal Opportunity Board into 
complaints of racial discrimination have been barred once the Board determined that 
they were being made in relation to the intemal decisions of Jewish religious groups.^ 
How religious practice and racial discrimination laws are to be prioritised in 
quesdons of employment in or admission to educational insdmtions controlled by 
religious groups is more problematic. But a suggestion as to how government can 
legitimately and effectively promote racial equality in these instimtions emerges from 
*' Newman v Piggie Park Enterprises Inc 256 F Supp 941 at 944-5 (1966); Whitney v 
Greater New York Corporation of Seventh-Bay Adventists 401 F Supp 1363 at 1368 
(1975); Southwestern Baptist note 86 supra at 284-5; Rayburn note 75 supra at 1171-2. 
90 Hazan v Victorian Jewish Board of Beputies (1990) EOC 92,298. 
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the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Bob Jones University v United States^^ 
and Goldsboro Christian Schools v United States.^ In Bob Jones, a tax exemption 
ordinarily granted to religious and educational instimtions was denied to a 
fundamentalist Protestant university because it refused admission to smdents (of any 
race) who supported interracial marriages. The exemption was also denied to a 
fundamentalist Protestant school which only admitted children who had at least one 
Caucasian parent. In both cases, the racially discriminatory practice was based on 
interpretations of the Bible. The Supreme Court held that the denial of exemptions was 
valid, and did so openly on the ground that First Amendment rights could be 
legitimately burdened by the "compelling ... fundamental ... overriding interest in 
eradicating racial discrimination in education".^ 3 Since a tax exemption can be 
regarded as an indirect economic subsidy, the result is that government can refuse to 
provide financial assistance to an instimtion which is controlled by a religious group 
that discriminates on the ground of race. It also suggests the means by which 
government might realise equality in social and economic relations more 
comprehensively than might be legitimately possible through the discrimination laws, 
and to this I remrn in § 10. 
§ 8: Discrimination by Religion III: Sex 
Together with the industrial relations laws, the Sex Biscrimination Act is the 
only Commonwealth legislation which expressly accommodates some discriminatory 
'' 461 US 574 (1983) {"Bob Jones"). 
"" Ibid. 
^^ Ibid at 604. 
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religious practices. In section 37, intemal religious group practice is exempted from 
the operation of the sex, marital stams and pregnancy and family responsibilities 
discrimination laws. State and Territory laws largely replicate section 37.^ * These 
exemptions are of great social importance, because practices that are, in a political 
sense, regarded as sex discrimination are the norm in religious groups in Australia. In 
Ordinatio Sacerdotalis, his apostolic letter of May 1994, Pope John Paul II reiterated 
that only men could be ordained as bishops, priests or deacons in the Catholic 
Church.^ ^ In 1974, the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church of Australia 
resolved to admit women to the ministry and, as this was also the posidon in the 
Congregational and Methodist Churches, it was accepted as part of the Uniting 
Church's Basis of Union at its'inception in 1977.^ However, in 1991 the General 
Assembly of the continuing Presbyterian Church reversed the 1974 decision and, in 
1992, the New South Wales Supreme Court refused to assume jurisdiction in litigation 
attempting to have the reversal invalidated.'" Throughout the Anglican Church, 
women are ordained as deaconesses. Its controversy about the ordination of women 
priests, as we saw in chapter X. led to extensive civil litigation in the New South Wales 
Supreme Court in 1992, although ultimately the General Synod reached a compromise 
on the question by leaving the decision to permit the ordination of women to the 
'' ACT, s 32; NSW, s 56; NT, s 51; Qld, s 109; SA, s 50; Vic, s 38; WA, s 72. 
'^  John Paul II, On Reserving Priestly Ordination to Men Alone (Sydney 1994) p 8. 
^Minutes of the Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth General Assembly of the Presbyterian 
Church of Australia (Melbourne 1974) p 8; Uniting Church in Australia, Why Boes the 
Uniting Church in Australia Ordain Women of the Ministry of the Word? (Sydney 1990) 
pp 7-9; I: § 5 supra. 
^^  Letter, Rev Dr P Logan to author, 18 November 1994; Bartholomew v Ramage, 
Unreported, New South Wales Supreme Court, 4 September 1992. 
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priesthood to each individual diocese.^* In most dioceses bishops can now ordain 
women as priests, but the powerful and largely evangelical archdiocese of Sydney stdl 
prohibits it.^ ^ However, the 1992 litigation resulted in some adjudicadon on section 
37. In the earliest proceedings in the New South Wales Supreme Court in Scandrett 
V Dowling,^'^ an application for an interlocutory injunction to restrain the Bishop of 
Canberra-Goulbum from ordaining 11 women as priests was refused by Justice Andrew 
Rogers. But the reasons he gave for refusing to allow the suit to proceed indirectly 
promoted gender equality in intemal religious group practices. Justice Rogers said an 
injunction would effectively enforce the Church's existing ecclesiastical law which 
prohibited the ordination of women as priests and which discriminated on the ground 
of sex. He held the sex discrimination laws made it inappropriate to make such a 
decree.'°' To Justice Rogers, section 37 and its State equivalent only exempted a 
religious group in claims brought under the discrimination laws. It did not enable a 
discriminatory ecclesiastical law to be enforced by the civil judicamre, and in exercising 
his discredon he refused the injunction.'°^ This decision was reversed by the Court 
'* General Synod of the Anglican Church of Australia, Law of the Church of England 
Clarification Canon 1992, s 3: see X: §§ 1 and 8 supra. 
"^ "Ordinadon of Women off Synod Agenda" Australian 11 October 1993, p 3. 
Empowered by the Priests (Ordination of Women) Measure 1993 (UK), the Church of 
England resolved in 1994 to admit women to the priesthood: "Final Synod vote enables 
women to become priests" Church Times, 25 Febmary 1994, p i . The Episcopal 
Church of the United States had made the same resolution in 1976: see D Abuhoff note 
72 supra at 257-9. 
'°° Scandrett v Bowling, Unreported, New South Wales Supreme Court, 28 January 
1992. 
"" Ibid at 10. 
"^ Ibid at 12. 
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of Appeal and an interlocutory injuncdon granted, although ultimately it refused a 
perpemal injunction in the case.'°3 The Court of Appeal held that, in exercising its 
discretion whether or not to grant an injunction, a court could only take into account 
legal consideradons and the public policy expressed in the law. The national and State 
policy was stated in section 37. and that was that the prohibition on sex discrimination 
did not apply to the ordination of priests.'^ Therefore, section 37 and its State and 
Territory equivalents render priority to the group's religious liberty. Indeed, as intemal 
developments in the Presbyterian Church show, it even allows a religious group to 
introduce sex discrimination in it intemal practices. 
The exemptions extend, in section 38 of the Sex Biscrimination Act, to 
employment in and admission to educational instimtions controlled by religious groups, 
which can therefore discriminate on the grounds of sex, marital stams and pregnancy. 
In the Australian Capital Territory and some States, these instimtions are also exempted 
from the sex discrunination laws, and the New South Wales laws do not apply to any 
private schools.'°^ The Queensland laws exempt any health instimtion controlled by 
a religious group and, in accommodadon decisions and the disposition of land of 
religious significance, any other instimtion controlled by a religious group.'°^ In the 
'"3 Scandrett v Bowling, Unreported, New South Wales Court of Appeal, 30 January 
1992 {"Scandrett IF); Scandrett v Bowling (1992) 27 NSWLR 483. 
'°* Scandrett II note 103 supra at 26-7. 
'°' ACT, s 33; Qld, s 29; Vic, s 38; WA, s 73; cf Thompson v Catholic College, 
Wodonga (1988) EOC 92,217; M Thornton, The Liberal Promise: Anti-Biscrimination 
Legislation in Australia (Melbourne 1990) p 117. 
106 Qld, ss 29, 80 and 90. 
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Northem Territory, people can be excluded from land, buildings or places of religious 
significance on the ground of sex.'°' The Commonwealth industrial relations laws 
and the Victorian laws provide a more general exemption for any instimtion controlled 
by a religious group.'°* 
It is unlikely that the Commonwealth Parliament included secdons 37 and 38 to 
maintain the validity of the Sex Biscrimination Act under the Commonwealth free 
exercise clause. In fact, when undertaking reviews of section 38, Sex Discrimination 
Commissioner Quendn Bryce and the Australian I^w Reform Commission seemed 
oblivious to its possible impact."^ It seems instead that the exemptions were included 
as a result of successful political lobbying by the larger Christian churches during the 
drafting and passage of the Sex Biscrimination y4cr."° However, adjudication in the 
United States certainly suggests that, when in collision with sex discrimination laws, 
religious practices must have some priority and, to some extent, these parallel the 
priority over racial discrimination laws.'" Thus, a religious group can lawfully hold 
'°'NT, s43. 
'°* IRA, s 170DF; Vic, s 38. 
109 Law Reform Commission, Equality Before the Law: Justice for Women (Sydney 
1994) p 77; Sex Discrimination Commissioner, Report on Review of Permanent 
Exemptions under the Sex Biscrimination Act 1984 (Canberra 1992). 
"° Sex Discrunination Commissioner note 109 supra at 63-9; M Thornton note 105 
supra at 117-19; cf Scandrett U note 103 supra at 26. 
'" CfOhio Civil Rights Commission v Bayton Christian Schools Inc 477 US 619 at 628 
(1986); see also Maguire v Marquette University 627 F Supp 1499 at 1503 (1986) 
("Marquette University"). 
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and express sexist opinions."- It can also discriminate on the ground of sex in 
intemal group practices: especially in employment decisions relating to pastoral 
ministry or a theological college."3 
But, again as with racial equality, sex discrimination laws have been upheld 
when applied to non-ministerial employment relations."* Significandy, they have also 
been held to be validly applied to religious educational instimtions. In EEOC v 
Mississippi College,^^^ the Fifth Circuit held that the First Amendment could not be 
used to override the governmental interest in gender equality because, if it did, a 
religion-based exemption would seriously undermine government's ability to deter the 
unequal treatment of women in'particular, on the basis of sex. 
The Court's reasoning in Mississippi College is acmally properly centred on the 
need to realise the minimum demands of fair equality of opportunity and, at present, 
can be considered a legitimate prioridsing of the collision between religious practice and 
sex discriminadon laws."^ This has important consequences for recommended 
112 
113 
Southwestern Baptist note 86 supra at 286. 
McClure v Salvation Army 460 F 2d 553 (1972) {"McClure"); Southwestern Baptist 
note 86 supra at 284; Marquette University note HI supra at 1500-1, 1503, 1504 1505 
and 1506. 
"* McClure note 113 supra at 555; Southwestern Baptist note 86 supra at 284-5. 
"^  Mississippi College note 75 supra. 
"^ "If the environment in which such [religious educational] instimtions seek to achieve 
their religious and educational goals reflects unlawful discrimination, those 
discriminatory attimdes will be perpemated with an influenzal segment of society, the 
detrimental effect of which cannot be estimated": ibid at 485; cf Re St Paul's Roman 
Catholic Separate School Bistrict No 20 and Canadian Union of Public Employees 
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amendments to the Sex Biscrimination Act. In some cases, these are just plainly 
untenable. Thus, Justice Elizabeth Evatt and Kirsty Magarey have, in effect, suggested 
that section 37 be repealed."' However, the result of this recommendation, since it 
bears directly on the central concem of internal religious group practice, is that no 
religious practice would ever be exempted from sex discrimination laws. If passed. 
Such a repeal would almost certainly be unconstimtional and, in terms of the priority 
of equal religious liberty required in a secular commonwealth, unjust."* However, 
other recommendations could have some validity. The decision and reasoning of 
Mississippi College suggest that a repeal of section 38 could be more legitimate. In 
1992, Sex Discrimination Commissioner Quentin Bryce recommended the repeal of 
section 38 or, in the altemative, that educational instimdons controlled by religious 
groups be allowed to discriminate on the grounds of sex, marital stams and pregnancy 
if the discrimination were reasonable and in good faith. "^ Two reasons were given 
to support these recommendations. The first was the moral interest involved in 
promoting gender equality. In effect, the second was that, in providing assistance to 
religious schools, government should not indirectly promote gender inequality by 
allowing those schools to be exempted from the sex discrimination laws.'^° 
(1982) 131 DLR (3d) 739. 
' " See K Magarey, "Discrimination and die Church" (1991) 62 Reform 101. 
"* Professor Thornton accepts secdon 37's legitimacy, "on the basis of separation of 
church and state": M Thomton note 105 supra at 119. 
" ' Sex Discrimination Commissioner note 109 supra at 2-3 and 82-3. 
"° Ibid at 73 and 82. 
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The first of Ms Bryce's recommendations was supported by the Australian L^w 
Reform Commission in 1994, but as an alternative it preferred that section 38 only 
exempt these educational instimtions from marital stams discrunination laws. But in 
some respects, the Commission's less accommodating approach is based on reasons 
that, under principles of a secular commonwealth, are inappropriate for government to 
consider. First, not only did the Commission overlook the operation of the free 
exercise clause, it applied a utilitarian method of prioritising religious practice and sex 
discriminadon laws:'-' 
Religious freedom and the right to enjoy culmre and religion must be 
balanced by the right to equality and with the principle of non-
discrunination. [Section 38] preferred one right over another and 
precludes any consideration of where the balance between the rights 
should be. -^  
In saying this, the Commission has denied that the citizen's equal religious liberty in 
the political sphere is inalienable, and has held that government can dictate that it be 
traded, or "balanced" against other citizens' rights in social relations. In any case, the 
Commission's claim to be "balancing" these political and social equalities misrepresents 
the process because, in recommending the repeal of section 38, it too has merely 
"preferred one right over another". Secondly, the Commission based its suggestion that 
section 38 ordy provide an exemption from marital stams discrimination laws on the 
ground that "[tjhere can be no religious basis for discrimination on the grounds of sex 
and pregnancy".'^-^ However, this raises exacdy the same problem which, as we saw 
'^ ' Law Reform Commission note 109 supra at 77. 
'^ ^ Ibid. There could be stronger grounds for providing exemptions from marital stams 
discrimination laws than from sex and pregnancy discrimination laws, as in the United 
States the judicamre has been less inclined to hold diat the former can displace rights 
of religious liberty under the First Amendment and State religion clauses: see 
Minnesota (ex rel Cooper) v French 460 NW 2d 2 (1990); Bonahue v Fair Employment 
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in chapter I, arose in the High Court's decision in Krygger v Williams.^^^ It assumes 
a subjective approach to the concept of religion by which the religious is defined by the 
governmental agent, and by which it disqualifies other practices from the protection 
which secular government requires for religion. The Commission's comment here 
offends principles of public reason. It also contradicts the objective approach to 
religion adopted in Scientology III and, according to that objective approach, is 
empirically untme: even amongst the larger Christian churches, a religious basis for 
sex discriminadon is common. 
Nevertheless, in light of Bob Jones University v United States^^^ Ms Bryce has 
a powerful argument in suggesting that the extension of sex discrimination laws to 
educadonal instimtions controlled by religious groups is required where government 
provides them with financial assistance. The decision illuminates the merits of die 
proposals for the repeal of section 38 specifically, and government's more general 
approach to realising the prmciple of fair equality of oppormnity. To this again I remm 
in § 10. 
§ 9: Discrimination by Religion TV: Religion 
In § 5, I concluded diat religious discrimination laws are an important legal 
and Housing Commission 2 Cal Rptr 2d 32 (1991); Attorney-General v Besilets 418 
Mass 316 (1994); Swanner v Anchorage Equal Rights Commission 874 P 2d 274 (1994); 
and Justice Clarence Thomas' dissent in Swanner v Anchorage Equal Rights 
Commission 130 L Ed 2d 368 (1994). 
"' (1912) 15 CLR 366; I: § 3 supra 
Bob Jones University note 91 supra. 
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instimtion in a secular commonwealth. It is therefore ironic that they also present a 
more direct challenge to the principle of equal religious liberty than other discrimination 
laws and, as we will see, are much less likely to be conceded priority when in collision 
with a religious practice. In § 3, it was seen that there are effective religious 
discrimination laws in operation under Commonwealth industrial reladons laws and in 
the Australian Capital Territory, the Northern Territory, Queensland, Victoria and 
Westem Australia. In all diese States and Territories, a religious group can lawfully 
discriminate on the ground of religion in intemal group practice.'-^ In most cases, 
there are also exemptions for any educadonal instimtions controlled by a religious group 
and, in the Australian Capital Territory and Westem Australia, any health instimtion 
controlled by a religious group'.'^^ In the Northem Territory and Queensland, it can 
be lawful to discriminate on the ground of religion in providing accommodation if the 
accommodation is controlled by a religious group.'^^ In the Northem Territory, there 
is an exemption making it lawful to discriminate on the ground of religion in restricting 
access to land of religious significance, and in Queensland in disposing of land of 
religious significance.'"* 
These all provide the broad exemptions for religious practice that are now 
probably traditional, even though the Commonwealth free exercise clause only directly 
125 
126 
IRA, s 170DF, ACT, s 32; NT, s 51; Qld, s 109; Vic, s 38; WA, s 72. 
IRA, s 170DF; ACT, ss 33, 44 and 46; NT, ss 30 and 40; Qld, ss 29 and 89; Vic. 
s 38; WA, ss 66 and 73. 
" ' NT, s 40; Qld, s 89. 
' ' ' NT, s 43; Qld, s 80. 
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affects the Commonwealth industrial relations laws and the Territory religious 
discrimination laws.'-^ In the United States, it has been held that the governmental 
interest in promoting religious equality in social and economic relations is strong, but 
die adjudication also shows that, in the context of a collision with the protecdon of 
religion recognised by the First Amendment, religious discrimination laws are less 
likely to be conceded priority than the racial or sex discrimination laws.'3° Thus, in 
Little V Wuerl, Bishop of Pittsburgh^^^ the Third Circuit noted: 
Tide VII has been interpreted to bar race and sex discrimination by 
religious organisations towards their non-minister employees. But 
attempting to forbid religious discrimination against non-minister 
employees where the position involved has any religious significance is 
uniformly recognised as constimtionally suspect, if not forbidden.'3^ 
It should therefore be lawful to'hold or express discriminatory opinions about different 
religious conceptions or practices. However, two anomalies should be noted here. The 
first is the New Bmnswick Provincial Court of Queen's Bench's decision in Ross v 
Moncton Board of School Trustees, ^ ^^ which I discussed in chapter VIII and in which 
the Court allowed a teacher to be dismissed by a board of enquiry, in effect, on the 
ground that he was publicly known to hold anti-semitic opinions. This is a hard case, 
and one which I argued made bad law.'3'* The second anomaly exists in the 
'^' Cf King's Garden Inc v Federal Communications Commission 498 F 2d 51 at 54 and 
61 (1974); Rayburn note 75 supra at 1166. 
'3° Cf Little note 21 supra at 949. 
'3' Ibid. 
'^ ^ Ibid at 947-8 (emphasis added). 
'" Ross V Moncton Board of School Trustees, Bistrict No 15 {1991) S6 DLR (4th) 749. 
134 VIII: § 5 supra. 
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blasphemy, profanity and related religious vilification laws, which I discuss and criticise 
in chapter XII. 
The comparative weakness of the religious discrimination laws certainly means 
they could not be legitimately applied to intemal religious group practice.'3^ They 
have even been denied application to employment decisions in educational instimtions 
controlled by religious groups. The posidon is well illustrated by the practice of some 
Catholic schools of dismissing teachers who, contrary to Roman ecclesiastical law, 
remarry after divorce without having obtained an annulment in a Roman ecclesiastical 
court. In Little itself the teacher was acmally a Protestant, but she was aware that the 
employing Catholic parish considered that entry into a marriage not recognised by the 
Church was a just cause for terminating employment. The parish was held to 
discriminate against her by refusing to renew her teaching contract, not because she was 
Protestant but because, by remarrying after divorce, she had violated the Church's 
moral teaching.'3^ The Third Circuit nonetheless held that the parish's discrimination 
was protected by the First Amendment's free exercise clause. In Re Caldwell and 
Stuart,^^^ the teacher was a Catholic, but had married a divorced Methodist in a civil 
ceremony. Though evidence showed that the Catholic school board would not dismiss 
a Protestant teacher who married a divorced person, it required other standards of 
Catholic teachers and had her dismissed. The Supreme Court of Canada upheld a board 
'•'^  See eg the Irish Supreme Court's decision in McGrath and O Ruairc v Maynooth 
College [1979] ILRM 166. 
^^^ Little note 21 supra at 950. 
'"(1984) 15 DLR (4th) 1. 
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of enquiry's finding that the dismissal was lawful under the British Columbia Human 
Rights Code, because the school board was entitled to prefer teachers who practised the 
teaching of the Church.'3^ The Law Reform Commission's second option for the 
amendment of section 38 of the Sex Biscrimination Act - that it only exempt religious 
educational instimtions from marital stams discrimination laws - could respond to the 
same concems, as this proposal still allows Catholic schools not to employ teachers 
who, contrary to die Church's teaching, live in de facto reladonships.'3^ Sunilar 
principles seem to apply to other organisadons controlled by religious groups.'*" 
§ 10: Conclusion 
The previous discussion' does not exhaust the possible collisions that religious 
practices have with discrimination laws. In particular, there is also some adjudication 
on collisions with sexual orientation discrimination laws.'*' However, the racial, sex 
and religious discrimination laws highlight the basic issues involved, and the appropriate 
'3* Ibid at 21; see also Larsen v Kirkham 499 F Supp 960 at 967 (1980); Mississippi 
College note 75 supra at 485: Marquette University note 111 supra at 1505-7. 
'3^  § 12 supra. 
'*° Feldstein v Christian Science Monitor 555 F Supp 974 at 978-9 (1983). 
'*' See GA Grissum, "Church Employment and the First Amendment: The Protected 
Employer and the Vulnerable Employee" (1986) 51 Missouri L Rev 911 at 922-6. 
Sexual orientation discrimination laws are unlikely to rank as highly as racial or sex 
discrimination laws, although they have been ranked more highly in Canada than in the 
United States: cf L'Association ABGQ v Catholic School Commission of Montreal 
(1979) 112 DLR (3d) 230 and Madsen v Erwin 481 NE 2d 1160 (1985). The resuk in 
L'Association ABGQ can be explained in terms of the specific requirements of the 
Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms 1975, but it also correlates with die 
constimtional stams of sexual orientadon equality in Canada: see Haig v Canada (1991) 
86 DLR (4th) 617; cf Bowers v Hardwick 478 US 186 (1986); Under 21 v City of New 
KM 482 NE 2d 1 (1985). 
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solutions. Sdll, it is rare to find a judge explaining why, when pitted against a free 
exercise clause, the treatment of religious discrimination laws differs from that of racial 
and sex discrimination laws. Possibly, the adjudication might only reflect some judicial 
inmition that, in this context, the lower ranking of religious discrimination laws is a 
more sensible or publicly acceptable soludon to the problem. Tme, religious 
discrimination laws, like religion clauses, are uUimately built on the basic assumption 
of equal citizenship: the latter in political relations between government and the cidzen, 
and the former in social relations between citizens.'*^ However, the collisions 
between religious practice and religious discrimination laws only make evident the 
practical reality that equality in both political and social relations in all cases and at all 
times is an impossible goal. The greater priority of equal religious liberty therefore 
means that, regardless of his religion, it is generally more important that the citizen be 
treated as an equal by government than by other private citizens. 
Nevertheless, it would be surprising if the tensions inherent in the demand for 
equality in both political and social relations did not require a more complex solution. 
Thus, as we saw in § 6, the priority of equal religious liberty can be displaced where 
it is required to realise the minimum demands of the principle of fair equality of 
opportunity. On this ground, it is arguable that the direct application of racial or sex 
discrimination laws to educational instimtions controlled by religious groups could be 
jusdfied. However, it is also arguable that government could more comfortably respect 
^^^ Little V St Mary Magdalene Parish 739 F Supp 1003 at 1006 (1990); DE Okamoto, 
"Religious Discrimination and the Title VII Exemption for Religious Organisations: A 
Basic Values Analysis for die Proper Allocation of Conflicdng Rights" (1987) 60 S Cal 
L Rev 1375, 1376, 1409 at 1414. 
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principles of a secular commonwealth if it attempted to promote equality in social and 
economic relations by other means: principally, by setting compliance with equal 
oppormnity policies as terms of assistance for educational, health and welfare 
instimtions. The United States Supreme Court's decision in Bob Jones University^'^^ 
shows that government can require compliance with racial equality policies as a 
condition of its indirect economic assistance for instimtions controlled by religious 
groups. This effectively treats religious groups unequally, by imposing a burden on 
those that, for religious reasons, conscientiously practise racial discrimination. 
Therefore, since other religious groups do not suffer this burden, there could be a 
prima facie violation of the establishment or free exercise clause.'** However, there 
is much to support the conclusion that government has an exceptionally compelling 
interest that legitimises the unequal treatment. First, it is likely that government is 
required to act in accordance with the principle of fair equality of opportunity. It is, 
after all, a branch of government - the parliament - which is primarily responsible for 
implementing the principle through legisladon, so it is reasonable to suggest that 
government must act to promote equality in social and economic relations or, at the 
least, not act to promote inequality.'*^ Secondly, it has been seen that, under the 
principle of equal religious liberty, governmental benefits and privileges generally 
available to non-religious groups should not be denied to a group just because it is 
religious.'*^ However, government can only comply with both requirements by 
'*3 Bob Jones University note 91 supra. 
'** VII: § 6 supra; VIII: §§ 3 and 4 supra. 
'*^  § 1 supra. 
'*MI: ^6 supra; VII: § 6 supra. 
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denying assistance to a group on the basis of its refusal to comply with equal 
oppormnity policies. Thirdly, the promotion of fair equality of opportunity by imposing 
conditions on financial assistance rather than by discrimination laws probably minimises 
the burden on religious practice, and is therefore a more proportionate means of 
realising the minunum conditions of fair equality of opportunity. In Australia at least, 
it is likely that most educational instimdons controlled by religious groups would be 
prepared, perhaps reluctantly but still voluntarily, to accept governmental assistance on 
the condition they comply with, say, racial and gender equality policies in employing 
teachers and admitting smdents. If so, there is a good argument that, at least in 
education, the minimum conditions of fair equality of oppormnity have been reached. 
Since those conditions alone legitimise the priority of discrimination laws over religious 
practice, unassisted instimtions controlled by religious groups can be exempted from, 
say, racial and sex discrimination laws, without thereby qualifying the principle of equal 
religious liberty or, indeed, the principle of fair equality of oppormnity. 
This puts a clearer perspective on the recommendadons to repeal section 38 of 
the Sex Biscrimination /Icr.'*' Sex Discrimination Commissioner Quentin Bryce 
suggested that one reason to have section 38 repealed was that, since religious schools 
received governmental assistance, in effect government was promoting gender inequality 
by allowing them to be exempted from sex discrimination laws. This reason adequately 
explains why assisted educational instimdons should not be exempted, or why 
compliance with gender equality policies should attach to the provision of assistance. 
However, Ms Bryce's recommendadon to repeal section 38 is disproportionate in that 
147 § 8 supra. 
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it then extends sex discrimination laws to all religious schools: assisted and unassisted. 
To repeal section 38 without preserving some exemption for unassisted schools 
therefore seems excessive and, especially when there are so few, unnecessary. 
The proposals to repeal section 38 have been resisted by most large Christian 
churches, including the Catholic and Anglican Churches which control most private 
schools.'** The churches are also likely to resist any proposal to make assistance 
condidonal on compliance with gender equality policies, and particularly any that 
require them not to discriminate on the ground of marital stams. To some extent, these 
responses highlight the responsibility required of a religious group in a secular 
commonwealth. The principle of voluntary engagement allows government to provide 
assistance to an educational instimtion controlled by a religious group, but does not 
oblige the group to accept it.'*"^  Indeed, if it is concemed to maintain the integrity 
of its doctrine and practice, the group should carefully assess how conscientiously it can 
comply with the conditions of assistance and, if it can, how it could still maintain the 
instimtion if the terms of assistance were to become unacceptable at some time in the 
fumre. For the Commonwealth Government, voluntary engagement with religious 
schools since the 1960s has had important national benefits by helping to maintain the 
viability of both private and State educational systems.'^ ° For the churches, the 
position is now more ambiguous. It is possible to suggest that they have become so 
dependent on governmental assistance for their schools that they might, if required not 
'** Sex Discrimination Commissioner note 109 supra at 76. 
"' II: § 6 supra. 
150 See VII: § 2 supra. 
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to discriminate on the ground of marital stams, simply compromise. It is too early to 
conclude that governmental assistance could prove, for the religious schools, to be a 
Fausdan bargain, but assistance is at least likely to become a mixed blessing. 
XII. BLASPHEMY 
I 1: Introduction 
In theology and westem ecclesiastical law blasphemy is a direct criticism of God 
and sacred objects. However, through its incorporation into the common law and three 
cenmries of adjudication blasphemy has been secularised into a religious vilification 
law, sdll only protecting Christian doctrines and susceptibilities. In 1994, the New 
South Wales Law Reform Commission issued a Report on the State blasphemy law.' 
The Report continues a decade of investigation into blasphemy laws, adding to 
recommendations previously made in 1985 by the Law Commission of England and 
Wales and, in 1992, the Australian Law Reform Commission.^ In outlining its 
recommendations for reform, the New South Wales Commission indicated a preference 
that the offence be abolished but that consideration be given to a prohibition on 
incitement to religious hatred or violence.3 This is largely consistent with the other 
Commissions' recommendations. But, despite the questions blasphemy and related 
' New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Blasphemy, Report No 74 (Sydney 1994) 
("NSW Commission"); see also New South Wales Law Reform Commission, 
Blasphemy, Discussion Paper No 24 (Sydney 1992). 
^ Law Commission, Criminal Law - Offences Against Religion and Public Worship 
(London 1985) ("English Commission"); Law Reform Commission, Multiculturalism 
and the Law (Sydney 1992) ("Australian Commission"). 
^ NSW Commission note 1 supra at 57-8. 
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profanity laws raise about relations between religion and government, none of the 
Commissions have considered the effect the principle of equal religious liberty or, for 
that matter, religion clauses might have on them.* I therefore intend in this chapter to 
assess blasphemy and profanity laws in accordance with the principle of equal religious 
liberty. This involves discussion of the development, purpose and content of the 
blasphemy laws (§§ 2 to 5). the possible impact of religion clauses (§ 6), and the more 
general demands that the idea of a secular commonwealth makes to preserve liberty in 
the expression of religious, philosophical and moral conceptions of the good (§§8 and 
9). 
§ 2: Historical Development 
Several offences designed to preserve doctrinal integrity and to suppress or 
discipline dissent existed in the medieval ecclesiastical law. These offences, which the 
ecclesiastical courts could punish by acting unilaterally in ex officio causes, included 
heresy, apostasy, schism and blasphemy but, in most cases, they overlapped.^ To 
Aquinas, blasphemy was "to cast insult or abuse at the dignity of our creator" and 
therefore involved "ill-will towards God" rather than unbelief.^  But, in contrast to the 
other ecclesiastical causes, blasphemy did not presume prior membership of the 
* Traditionally, profanity is a summary public order offence, and seems to address the 
same discourse prohibited by modem blasphemy laws. It may also address 
imprecadons of divine vengeance: see Holcomb v Cornish 8 Conn 375 (1831); Gaines 
V Tennessee 75 Tenn 410 (1881). 
^ RH Helmholz, Roman Canon Law in Reformation England (Cambridge 1990) p 2; 
LW Levy, Treason Against God (New York 1981) p 103; c/FW Maidand, Canon Law 
in the Church of England (London 1898) pp 158 and 173. 
^ Summa Theologies (London 1975) 2a2ae 13 i. 
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Catholic Church. Historically, the offence acmally thrived in early conditions of 
religious pluralism when it served to separate the spheres of orthodox and heterodox 
doctrine, the latter initially being thought to threaten political and social stability. In 
England, the intellecmal and organisational schisms of the Reformation helped to bring 
an increase in ecclesiastical causes for blasphemy and, soon after during the 
Interregnum, it was introduced into the civil law.' 
The transformation of blasphemy into a civil offence also raised its sanctions to 
biblical proportions. In the Interregnum, the dominant Puritans, Presbyterians and 
Independents passed two Blasphemy Ordinances^ and several other measures to contain 
an ever increasing number of Protestant groups, but especially Socinians, Unitarians, 
Quakers and Ranters.'' The death penalty was imposed by the ordinance of 1648 for 
denying the existence of God or the central Christian doctrines of the Trinity, Christ's 
dual namre, resurrection and ascension, biblical inspiration, the resurrection of the dead 
and the last judgment. In Scotland, the Blasphemy Act of 1649 also imposed the death 
penalty on any person convicted of railing upon, cursing or denying God or any person 
of the Trinity.'° However, the reguladon of blasphemy remained controversial and 
' RH Helmholz note 5 supra at 110 and 115-16. In 1605, the irreverent, jesting or 
profane use of God's name in a stage-play or pageant was made punishable by a £10 
fine: 3 Jas I c 21; RH Helmholz note 5 supra at 161; D Lawton, Blasphemy (Hemel 
Hampstead 1993) pp 16, 36, 37 and 118. 
* 2 May 1648; 9 August 1650. 
' LW Levy note 5 supra at 199-208, 224 and 226; Printing Ordinance 30 September 
1647; Printing Ordinance 20 September 1649; Ministers and Schoolmasters Ordinance 
28 August 1654. 
In 1661, the Scots Blasphemy Act was re-enacted although, in 1695, new legislation 
postponed capital execution until the third conviction: G Maher, "Blasphemy in Scots 
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irregular, and confused by Cromwell's policy of toleration. The best-known 
prosecution of the time. James Nayler's Case,^^ was probably even illegal. For a 
deliberate and sensational re-enactment in Bristol of Christ's triumphal entry into 
Jemsalem, the House of Commons had the Quaker Nayler set in the pillory and 
scourged, his tongue bored with a hot iron and his head stigmadsed with the letter "B", 
and then had him scourged a second time and imprisoned. Whether the Commons' 
jurisdicdon to punish Nayler rested on divine, namral or biblical law, legislation or the 
common law was never made apparent: Parliament itself could not agree on reasons 
for the sentence when Cromwell demanded them.'^ 
The Restoration brought most English Interregnum legislation to an end.'3 But, 
more significantly in the perpemation of blasphemy regulation, its restraints on the 
pluralism unleashed in the Interregnum also brought the recognition of the offence at 
common law.'* This would progressively be defined by reference to the emerging 
religious establishment. Sir Edward Coke had recognised that causes for heresy. 
Law" (1977) SLT (News) 257. There were several reported prosecutions under this 
legislation: eg Francis Borthwick (1681) 3 Mer 398n; Patrick Kinninmount (1697) 13 
St Tr 1273, 3 Mer 398n. In Thomas Aickenhead (1696) 13 St Tr 917, 3 Mer 379n, the 
death penalty was acmally unposed. Ecclesiastical penalties for blasphemy in Scodand 
were, in comparison, mild: see eg P Hair (ed). Before the Bawdy Court (London 1972) 
pp 66-7. 
" (1656) 5 St Tr 827; R Bum, Ecclesiastical Law 8th ed (London 1824) iii p 216; D 
Lawton note 7 supra at 68-74. 
'^  LW Levy note 5 supra at 274-96; GD Nokes, A History of the Crime of Blasphemy 
(London 1928) p 42. 
'^  Treason and Sedition /Icr 1661 (13 Ch II c 1), s 3. 
'* C/D Lawton note 7 supra at 36. 
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apostasy, schism and blasphemy should property be dealt with by ex officio proceedings 
under the ecclesiastical law.'^ However, this did not prevent the Star Chamber's 
assuming power to punish heresy if it also had consequences seditious to the civil or 
ecclesiastical government.'^ On the abolition of the Star Chamber in 1641, its 
criminal jurisdiction was transferred to the common law courts and then, early in the 
Restoration, signs of common law jurisdiction to punish heterodox opinions began to 
emerge." In 1663, the Court of King's Bench held that it had inherited the Star 
Chamber's role of custos morum and could punish actions made offended Christian 
notions of decency.'* \nR v Taylor,^'^ it seemed to rely on this jurisdicdon to punish 
a madman who had described Christ as a bastard and whoremaster, and religion as a 
cheat. The I^rd Chief Justice,''Sir Matthew Hale, commented that^ ° 
... to say, religion is a cheat, is to dissolve all those obligations whereby 
the civil societies are preserved, and that Christianity is parcel of the 
laws of England; and therefore to reproach the Christian religion is to 
speak in subversion of the law. 
The rationale for Hale's statement of the "part and parcel" maxim is open to 
conjecmre.^ ' It reflected contemporary polidcal theory, and helped to legitunate the 
'^  Caudrey's Case (1591) 5 Co Rep la at 8b-9a; cfAtwood's Case (1618) Cro Jac 421. 
'* Traske's Case (1618) Hob 236; GD Nokes note 12 supra at 10-12 and 31-5. 
" Star Chamber Abolition Act 1641 (16 Ch I c 10), s 1; R v Field (1661) 1 Keb 175 at 
194, 209 and 233, 1 Sid 69. 
'* /? V Sedley (1663) 1 Sid 168; see C Manchester, "A History of the Crime of Obscene 
Libel" (1991) 12 JLH 36 at 37. 
'^  (1677) 1 Vent 293 {"Taylor"); see G Robertson, Obscenity (London 1979) pp 236-7. 
°^ Taylor note 19 supra. 
'^ See IX: § 3 supra; c/T Jefferson, "Christianity and the Common Law" in Writings 
(New York 1984) pp 1323-4; R v Hetherington (1840) 4 St Tr (NS) 563 at 595; C 
Kenny, "The Evolution of the Law of Blasphemy" (1922) 1 CU 127 at 130-1. 
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assumption of a jurisdiction only previously exercised by the ecclesiastical courts. The 
comments nevertheless reveal that the Court had both religious and social purposes for 
punishing blasphemy in Taylor: the protection of Christianity and the preservation of 
political and social stability. 
Some legacy of these purposes of the blasphemy law underpinned the elements 
of the common law offence until the late 1970s. Inidally, the judicamre made litde 
distinction between its religious and social purposes.^ ^ In the cuius regio principle, 
it was assumed that religion and government together maintained a single society and 
that, separately, each maintained the other.*^ 3 However, the evolution of the 
blasphemy law up to the 1970s shows the progressive demise of these purposes and, 
hence, the secularising of the offence. 
The blasphemy law was clearly intended to protect Christian instimtions, 
conceptions and practices. The primary explanation given for the common law offence 
was the part and parcel maxim and, although Blackstone classified the offence as one 
against God and religion and not, like reviling the ordinances of the Church of England 
and dissent, an offence against the religious establishment, closer examinadon of the 
reported prosecutions does suggest some association between the offence and the 
establishment.^ * In England, the instimtions and opinions the civil blasphemy law 
^^  GD Nokes note 12 supra at 67. 
^^  See III: § 1 supra. 
^^ Rv Taylor (1677) 1 Vent 293; R v Curl (1727) 2 Str 788 at 789-90; R v Woolston 
(1729) Fitz-G 64 at 65; W Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 14th ed 
(London 1803) iv 3 i 4 and iv 3 iv; R v Williams (1797) 26 St Tr 653 at 704 and 715-
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protected have always been co-extensive with the dogmatic theology of the Church of 
England, and thus the offence overlapped concepmally with heresy.^^ It was used to 
protect the doctrines of the Trinity, Christ's virginal conception, divinity, resurrection 
and second coming, biblical inspiration and heaven and hell, and the limrgy and 
organisation of the establishment.^'' This connection between the establishment and 
the blasphemy law was evenmally made explicit in 1838, when one of the barons of the 
Court of Exchequer, Sir Edward Alderson, said that a "person may, without being 
liable to prosecution for it, attack Judaism, or Mahomedanism, or even any sect of the 
Christian Religion {save the established religion of the country)" .^^ 
In this period when the judicamre was refining the sphere of permissible 
religious discourse, it also abandoned the assumption that tme religion was a pre-
requisite to political and social stability. In the seventeenth cenmry, this assumption 
was judicially unquestioned. For example, the substance of the charges laid agauist the 
Bapdst Benjamin Keach and the leading Puritan Richard Baxter was doctrinal deviation, 
but in both cases the indictment alleged sedition.^* The assumption was also 
17; R V Eaton (1812) 31 St Tr 927 at 950; R v Richard Carlile (1819) 4 St Tr (NS) 
1423 at 1423 and 1425; R v Wright (1823) 1 St Tr (NS) 1370; R v Waddington (1823) 
1 B & C 26 at 26 and 29-30; R v Hetherington (1840) 4 St Tr (NS) 563 at 582 and 597; 
cf Thomas Paterson (1843) 1 Broun 629. 
^^  GD Nokes note 12 supra at 70. 
^^ Ibid at 11-4 and. 107-13. 
27 
28 
R V Gathercole (1838) 2 Lew 237 at 254 (emphasis added). 
R V Keach (1665) 6 St Tr 701 at 703; cf G Robertson, "Blasphemy: The Law 
Commission Working Paper" [1981] PL 295 at 296; R v Baxter (1685) 11 St Tr 494 
3 Mod 68. 
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perpemated in the libel law in R v Curl,^^ where the indictment charged obscene libel 
for the publication of Venus in the Cloister, or The Nun in Her Smock, a tale of lesbian 
love in the convent. The jurisdiction of the Court of King's Bench was challenged on 
the ground that an offence contra bonos mores should be determined by an ecclesiastical 
court, raising the question whether the peace could be breached, in the absence of 
physical dismrbance, if the act were directed against the government, religion or 
morality. The Court concluded that merely to offend religion was a breach of the 
peace, establishing R v Curl as a precedent for the principle that a publication was 
indictable if it discredited religion or tended to threaten the peace.3° Thus "the matter 
and not the manner of the publication" made the publication blasphemous,3' 
reinforcing the perceived interconnection of religion and political and social stabdity. 
This is a position that the Court of King's Bench repeatedly affirmed throughout the 
eighteenth cenmry and, through a rash of prosecutions at the time of the French 
Revolution, into the nineteenth cenmry.3^ In this period at least three booksellers were 
prosecuted on sales of Thomas Paine's defence of deism and critique of biblical 
''(1727) I Str 790 ("C«A-/"). 
3° C Manchester note 18 supra at 41. 
3' JF Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England (London 1883) ii p 471. 
^^ Eg Rv Woolston (1729) 2 Str 834, Fitz-G 64 at 65; /? v Hive (1756) referred to by 
JF Stephen note 31 supra at 471; R v Annett (1763) 1 Black W 395; R v Wilkes (1770) 
4 Burr 2527 (an obscene and impious libel); R v Williams (1797) 26 St Tr 653; i? v 
Brothers (1794) referred to by R Bum note 11 supra at 217; R v Eaton (1812) 31 St Tr 
927; R V Richard Carlile (1819) 1 St Tr (NS) 1388; 3 B & Aid 161; 7^  v Mary Carlile 
(1819) 3 B & Aid 167; R v Wedderburn (1820) 1 St Tr (NS) 1370; R v Bavison (1821) 
4 B & Aid 329; /? V Boyle (1822) 1 St Tr (NS) 1370; i? v Tunbridge (1822) 1 St Tr 
(NS) 1368; R v Wright (1823) 1 St Tr (NS) 1370; R v Waddington (1823) 1 B & C 26. 
In 1834, a Remrn to the House of Commons reported 73 convicdons for blasphemous 
libel in England between 1 January 1821 and April 1834: 1 St Tr (NS) 1387-8. 
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infallibility. Age of Reason, and throughout the trials both the prosecutors and the 
judges emphasised the need to preserve the religious and moral conceptions that bound 
civil society together.33 
The 1840s brought an important change to this position in both England and 
Scodand, by recognition that the manner of publication might be an element of the 
blasphemy law.3'* In the Scottish case of Thomas Paterson,^^ the panel was charged 
with blasphemous libel for publishing The Bible an Improper Book for Youth. Lord 
Justice-Clerk Hope noted that the contempmous manner of the publication had been 
included in the charge. He refused to decide whether merely to deny the tmth of the 
Bible or the Christian religion was an offence, but directed the jury to consider the 
manner of publication and, more particularly, whether it vilified the Bible or 
Christianity.3^ In England, it was accepted in 1840 that Christian doctrines might be 
denied in a sober, temperate and decent manner. The blasphemy law then only 
prohibited insult and ridicule: language which did not appeal to rational judgment, but 
33 /? V Williams (1797) 26 St Tr 653 at 664, 665, 701, 703, 704, 706 and 715-17; R v 
Eaton (1812) 31 St Tr 927, 930 and 950; R v Richard Carlile (1819) 3 B & Aid 161. 
See also R v Mary Carlile (1819) 3 B & Aid 167. 
3* GD Nokes note 12 supra at 92-3; RC Post, "Culmral Heterogeneity and Law: 
Pomography, Blasphemy, and the First Amendment" (1988) 76 Cal Law Rev 297 at 
307; G Robertson Obscenity note 19 supra at 238; G Robertson "Blasphemy" note 28 
supra at 297; cfR v Curl (1727) 1 Str 790; R v Waddington (1823) 1 B & C 26 at 29-
30. 
35 
36 
(1843) 1 Broun 629. 
Ibid. See also Henry Robinson (1843) 1 Broun 590 at 643; Thomas Finlay (1843) 1 
Broun 648n. 
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to "the wdd and improper feelings of the human mind".3' In 1883, the Lord Chief 
Justice, Lord Coleridge, consolidated this approach in the common law in R v 
Bradlaugh^^ and R v Ramsay & Foote,'^'^ where he made his celebrated statement of 
the offence:**^  
A wilful intention to pervert, insult, and mislead others, by means of 
licentious and conmmelious abuse applied to sacred objects, or by wilful 
misrepresentations or artful sophistry, calculated to mislead the ignorant 
and unwary, is the criterion and test of guilt. A malicious and 
mischievous intention, or what is equivalent to such an intention, in law, 
as well as moral, - a state of apathy and indifference to the interests of 
society, - is the broad boundary between right and wrong. 
The English judicamre has mosdy endorsed Lord Coleridge's principles since 
Ramsay & Foote, and they now set the broad parameters of the modem blasphemy 
law.*' By the mid-twendeth cenmry, some ventured that the blasphemy law could 
have become obsolete.*3 It is certainly questionable whether, as a criminal offence, 
blasphemy is punishable in Scodand at all.*3 However, any question of desuetude in 
3' /? V Hetherington (1840) 4 St Tr (NS) 563 at 591. See also R v Moxon (1841) 4 St 
Tr (NS) 693; R v Pooley (1857) 8 St Tr (NS) 1089. 
3* (1883) 15 Cox CC 217. 
'^ (1883) 15 Cox CC 231 {"Ramsay & Foote"). 
*° Ibid at 236. 
*' i? V Boulter (1908) 72 JP 188; /? v Gott (1922) 16 Cr App Rep 87 at 89; /? v Lemon 
[1979] 1 QB 10 at 20 and 21-2 {"Gay News /"); Whitehouse v Lemon [1979] AC 617 
at 635, 643-4, 661 and 664 {"Gay News IF); R v Chief Metropolitan Stipendiary 
Magistrate; ex parte Choudhury [1990] 3 WLR 986 at 995 {"Satanic Verses / " ) ; cf 
Pankhurst v Thompson (1886) 3 TLR 199 at 200. 
'^ Rv Murray [1951] 1 KB 391 at 397. 
^^ GH Gordon, The Criminal Law of Scotland 2nd ed (Edinburgh 1978) p 998. 
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England was demolished by the spectacular resurtection of the offence in R v Lemon^ 
and R v Chief Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate; ex parte Choudhury.^^ The 
modem blasphemy law expounded in these cases largely lies within the Ramsay & 
Foote paradigm. But the Lemon litigation especially clarified two important 
characteristics of the modem law introduced by Ramsay & Foote. First, it has 
personalised the offence. The blasphemy law no longer protects the objective 
insdmdons and theology of the English religious establishment, but rather the 
sensidvities of the believing Christian. Secondly, it gives unequal protection to some 
religious groups and, accordingly, no longer seems to realise its original religious and 
social purposes. 
J 
§ 3: The Modern Law 
1. Gay News: The Lemon Proceedings. In 1976, Gay News, a Bridsh 
newspaper for homosexuals, printed Professor James Kirkup's "The Love diat Dares 
to Speak its Name", a poem describing a Roman cenmrion's erotic fantasies about the 
body of Jesus immediately after his death. The text was accompanied by a drawing of 
the cenmrion embracing the cmcified body. The newspaper and its editor, Denis 
Lemon, were subsequently prosecuted privately by Mrs Mary Whitehouse for 
blasphemous libel. Both Gay News and Lemon were convicted, by majority verdicts, 
and these were upheld by the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords. Further 
applications to the European Commission of Human Rights were mled inadmissible. 
Gay News I & II note 41 supra; Gay News Ltd & Lemon v United Kingdom (1982) 
5 EHRR 123 {"Gay News IIF). 
"^  Satanic Verses I note 41 supra; Choudhury v United Kingdom (1991) 12 HRU 172 
{"Satanic Verses IF). 
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The trial in R v Lemon^^ was a cause celebre and has since been dramatised by 
the BBC. However, die legal point the English appellate courts had to resolve in the 
case was a technical one, and only related to the precise intention needed to commit the 
offence. On this issue, by a majority the House of Lords held that the only mental 
element required to commit blasphemy is the intention to publish the blasphemous 
material. It is not necessary that there also be an intention to offend or to vilify by the 
publication.*' 
Guilt of the offence of publishing a blasphemous libel does not depend 
on the accused having an intent to blaspheme but on proof that the 
publication was intentional ... and that the matter published was 
blasphemous. 
The English courts did not question the existence of the blasphemy law, and this was 
y 
only attacked seriously in the European Commission of Human Rights. 
However, more relevant to relations between government and religion are the 
House of Lords' obiter dicta on the personal objects to be protected by the blasphemy 
law. The Ramsay & Foote principles required the criticism to constimte "licentious and 
conmmelious abuse" to render it criminal and, consistently with this requirement, in 
Lemon Lords Diplock and Russell idendfied the illegal criticism of religion in terms of 
material likely to shock and arouse resentment among believing Chrisdans.** To be 
blasphemous, therefore, the tone or method of the communication must be so insolent 
as to be likely to elicit some strong and negative emotional response. The blasphemy 
*^  Gay News I & II note 41 supra; Gay News III note 44 supra. 
''^  Gay News II note 41 supra at 646. 
"** Gay News II note 41 supra at 632 and 656-7; cf Ramsay & Foote note 39 supra at 
236. 
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is even committed if it does not acmally elicit that response and if no believing 
Chrisdan is acmally aware of the publication. If the criticism is sober, temperate and 
decent, the publication cannot be considered blasphemous. This has personalised the 
blasphemy law, in the sense that, although Christian conceptions and practices remain 
relevant, the primary object protected is not so much the Christian religion as the 
Chrisdan citizen.*^ 
2. Satanic Verses: The Choudhury Proceedings. It was confirmed in the 
Divisional Court of the Queen's Bench Division's decision in Choudhury^° that a 
violadon of the blasphemy law requires an attack on Christian doctrines and therefore 
Christian susceptibilities. These proceedings were aimed at suppressing Salman 
Rushdie's Satanic Verses. There has been a notable and acrimonious debate between 
Muslims and literad as to whether Rushdie intended to offend Muslims by the book 
and, the Ayatollah Khomeini having earlier pronounced his/arwa against Rushdie, the 
significance of these proceedings transcended any quesdon of legal blasphemy.^' In 
relation to the modem blasphemy law, however, the relevant issue is that Satanic 
Verses did offend significant Muslim elements. The book painted a critical picmre of 
Islam. It used derogatory names for the prophet Mohammed and denounced Islamic 
moral practices. Throughout, Rushdie made liberal use of coarse language. In 
attempting to invoke the blasphemy law, British Muslims applied to have summonses 
*' G Robertson "Blasphemy" note 28 supra at 298. 
°^ Satanic Verses I note 41 supra. 
'^ D Lawton defends Satanic Verses as a blasphemy which is both "creative and 
necessary" in its critique of Islamic fundamentalism: note 7 supra at 184 and 187-8. 
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issued against Rushdie and his publisher, but the magistrate rejected the application on 
the ground that the offence only punished criticism of Christian doctrine and 
susceptibilities. The Divisional Court upheld this decision and, in its judgment, 
explicidy supported the relationship between the blasphemy law and the Church of 
England:^' 
... no offence is committed if the religious beliefs which are attacked are 
not those of the Church of England ... [A]s the law now stands [the 
protection of the blasphemy law] does not extend to religions other than 
Christianity". 
Choudhury also went to the European Commission of Human Rights, but as I discuss 
in § 8 the complaint there was also unsuccessful.^3 
3. Breach of the Peace. To the extent that they addressed the objects protected 
by the blasphemy law, the Lemon and Choudhury proceedings have upheld and, in 
doing so, clarified the scope of the Ramsay & Foote paradigm. They nevertheless 
failed to resolve some doubt about the old issue, suppressed by R v Curl,^'^ on the need 
for a breach of the peace. In Lemon, Lord Scarman subsumed the issue to that of a 
calculated attempt to outrage and insult the Christian's religious feelings.^^ In 
consequence, he thought that any added requirement for a breach of the peace was "a 
minor contribution to the discussion of the subject".^'' This opinion is incompatible 
" Satanic Verses I note 41 supra at 998-9. 
3^ Satanic Verses II note 44 supra. 
*^ Curl note 29 supra. 
^^ Gay News II note 41 supra at 662. 
'' Ibid. 
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with various dicta stated in the House of Lords in Bowman v Secular Society 
Limited.^'' There the separate requirement for a breach of the peace in the blasphemy 
law was held to exist, although how serious that breach had to be was not resolved. 
Lord Sumner thought it had to be a shaking of "the fabric of society", but Lord Parker 
that it involved any public threat to person or property.^ * Lemon now makes it 
uncertain whether at common law even the latter is an element of the offence. 
§ 4: The Modern Purpose of the Blasphemy Law 
In its origin as a common law offence, the purposes of the blasphemy law, as 
we saw in § 2, were the protection of religion and political and social stability. But 
once in the 1840s the Englisli and Scottish judicamres recognised that sober and 
temperate denial of Christian doctrine was legal and the offence began to reshape into 
a religious vdification law, its religious purpose inevitably disappeared. The controlled 
and critical methods used by a Charles Bradlaugh in attacking the Christian religion, 
which did not offend Lord Coleridge's restatement of the blasphemy law, ironically 
achieved more for the secularist cause than John Gott's scurrilous Rib Ticklers, which 
did. '^ Furthermore, even if the blasphemy law was still to serve a symbolic religious 
purpose. Lord Sumner's decision in Bowman v Secular Society Limited that its proof-
" [1917] AC 406; see IX: § 3 supra. 
*^ Ibid at 446 and 467. 
'^ CfR V Bradlaugh (1883) 15 Cox CC 217 and R v Gott (1922) 16 Cr App Rep 87. 
In i? V Ramsay & Foote, Lord Coleridge was impressed by "a grave and eamest tone, 
a reverent - perhaps I might even say a religious - spirit about the very attacks on 
Christianity itself which we find in the authors referred to, which shows that what they 
aimed at was not insult to the opinions of the majority of mankind nor to Christianity 
itself; but real, quiet, eamest pursuit of the tmth": note 39 supra at 239. 
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text, the part and parcel maxim, was not legal principle but disposable rhetoric, laid it 
to rest.^ 
The social purpose of the offence lasted longer as a legitimation, and was still 
used by Lord Scarman in Lemon.^^ However, it was only when the Bridsh 
Government had to defend the result in Lemon before the European Commission of 
Human Rights that it made an official attempt, based on the substantive content of the 
offence, to state the modem purpose of the English blasphemy law.*'' The 
Commission held that the law undeniably offended the basic liberty of expression in the 
European Convention for the Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms. The 
blasphemy law could therefore 'only legitimately burden liberty of expression under the 
Convention if the Government proved that it served one of the secular rationales 
permitted by the Convention: namely, that it was needed to prevent disorder or to 
protect morals or the rights of others. In Lemon, the Commission found there were no 
public interest limitations since Mrs Whitehouse had prosecuted privately and the 
Government took no part in the proceedings. Still, it upheld the law on the ground that 
it protected the prosecutrix's rights.^3 
The Commission considers that the offence of blasphemous libel as it is 
constmed under the applicable common law in fact has the main purpose 
to protect the rights of citizens not to be offended in their religious 
feelings by publications. 
^ [1917] AC 406 at 464; see IX: § 3 supra. 
'^ Gay News II note 41 supra at 662. 
'^ Gay News Ltd & Lemon v United Kingdom (1982) 5 EHHR 123 {"Gay News"). 
3^ Gay News III note 44 supra at 130. 
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The validity of this conclusion is debatable. The issue before the Commission 
was not who prosecuted, but the legitimacy of the convictions under the Convention. 
It is therefore irrelevant whether the prosecutions were initiated by the executive 
government or by a private citizen enabled by the procedural law to exercise those 
powers in its place because, regardless of how the law was invoked, it would have to 
be jusdfied by the same considerations.^ But the decision does show that the modem 
purpose of the blasphemy law lies in the protecdon of particular religious group rights. 
This conclusion is reinforced by the elements of the offence. To be blasphemous, the 
material has to shock and arouse resentment among believing Christians. If Lord 
Scarman's opinion that no additional tendency towards a breach of the peace is also 
accepted, then polidcal or social consequences to the publication are irrelevant. Thus, 
Lemon recognised the demise of the original religious and social purposes of the 
blasphemy law, thought by Sir Matthew Hale to require the common law's recognition 
of the offence. The offence no longer protects religion and it no longer promotes 
political and social stability. It is now dislodged from its origins, and in that respect 
is a formal archaism. However, in other respects the blasphemy law concedes a 
political and legal preference to practising Christians which, through the protection they 
receive, are still able to define some sphere of orthodox expression recognised by the 
law. 
" See S Leader, "Blasphemy and Human Rights" (1983) 46 MLR 338 at 339. 
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§ 5: Blasphemy Laws in Australia I 
The English blasphemy law has operation in Australia, although on the basis of 
different common law and legislative sources and in several different forms. The 
Federal Court has assumed that the common law meaning of blasphemy dictates its 
meaning in the legislation, and so it is likely that the legislative expressions of 
blasphemy and profanity laws belong to the same genre as the common law offence.^ ^ 
Its possible reception in the Australian colonies as a common law offence is therefore 
an important threshold issue. However, the likely establishment of the Church of 
England in New South Wales until, say, 1842 supports the reception of the blasphemy 
law in that colony and, in practice, it has merely been assumed that the law was 
received m New South Wales''and several British colonies.^ ^ Two prosecutions for 
blasphemous libel at common law are recorded in Australia. In 1871, the Unitarian 
Lorando Jones was convicted in the Parramatta Quarter Sessions for blasphemy, mainly 
because he had claimed that the Bible was cormpt, immoral and a lie.^' In 1919, RS 
Ross was prosecuted for blasphemy in Victoria, but the charges were dropped after he 
had been convicted of blasphemy under Commonwealth postal laws.^ * In neither case 
does it seem the reception point was argued. The blasphemy law has also been 
enforced or recognised at common law in New Zealand and in the United States, 
although in the latter country there are also innumerable prohibitions in federal and 
^' Ogle V Strickland (1987) 71 ALR 41 at 52, 53-4 and 59 {"Ogle"). 
^ See III: § 7 supra. 
^^  P Coleman, Obscenity, Blasphemy, Sedition: 100 Years of Censorship in Australia 
(Brisbane 1974) pp 65-7. 
*^ P Coleman note 67 supra at 72-4. 
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State legislation and municipal ordinances on the use of profane language.^' 
The colonial Parliament introduced legislation to regulate blasphemy into New 
South Wales as early as 1827, by imposing exile on any person twice convicted of 
publishing blasphemous matter "tending to bring into hatred or contempt the 
Government of the Colony as by law established or to excite His Majesty's subjects to 
attempt the alteration of any matter in Church or State as by law established otherwise 
than by lawful means".'" This legisladon was repealed in 1898 although, in the 
meantime, the New South Wales Parliament had passed an upgraded blasphemy law in 
accordance with the Ramsay & Foote principles." It is in the latter form that the State 
blasphemy law exists today.'' '" 
1. The Criminal Law. In South Australia and perhaps the Northem Territory, 
where it not completely certain whether the Criminal Code abolishes common law 
offences, it is necessary to have exclusive recourse to the common law to determine 
whether blasphemy laws are in operation. Otherwise, any problems about the existence 
of blasphemy laws in Australia are resolved by legislation. In Tasmania, the Criminal 
^'^ Rv Glover (1922) GLR 185; Updegraph v Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 11 Serg 
& R 394 (1824); State of Maine v Mockus 113 A 39 at 41 (1921); see also Buncan v 
United States 48 F 2d 128 at 133 (1931); Town ofTorrington v Taylor 137 P 2d 621 
at 623 (1943); Baines v City of Birmingham 240 So 2d 689 (1970). 
70 Blasphemous and Seditious Libels Act 1827 (8 Geo IV No 2) (NSW), s 20. 
'^ SQQ Newspapers Act 1898 (NSW), s 1; Criminal Law Amendment Act 1883 (NSW), 
s483. 
'^ Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 574. 
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Code expressly creates the crime of blasphemous libel.'3 The legislation largely 
replicates the common law offence, although the written consent of the State Attomey-
General is required before any prosecudon can be brought.'* In New South Wales and 
Victoria, legislation does not create a blasphemy law but assumes it exists at common 
law and partially regulates it.'^ The New South Wales blasphemy law also operates 
in the Australian Capital Territory.'^ 
In Queensland and Western Australia, the Criminal Codes have abolished all 
common law offences and do not include blasphemy laws." Still, there are summary 
offences prohibiting the use of profane language or, in some cases, the singing of 
profane songs in public in Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria and 
Westem Australia.'* 
2. Censorship Laws. The Commonwealth Government has powers under 
censorship laws to prevent the importation of some blasphemous material into the 
country under the Customs (Cinematograph Films) Regulations. These provide that 
'3 Criminal Code (Tas), s 119. 
'* Ibid. 
^^ Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 574; Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s 469AA. 
'^  Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), s 574; Seat of Government Acceptance Act 1909 (Cth), s 6. 
" Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld), ss 3 and 5; Criminal Code Act Compilation ^cr 1913 
(WA), s 4. 
'* Vagrants, Gaming and Other Offences Act 1931 (Qld), s 7; Summary Offences Act 
1953 (SA), s 22; Police Offences Act 1935 (Tas), s 12; Summary Offences Act 1966 
(Vic), s 17; Police Act 1892 (WA), s 59. 
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imported cinematograph films, video tapes, video discs and any promotional material 
used in cormection with them may only be released from Customs on being approved 
by the Censorship Board, and one ground on which the Board may withhold approval 
is diat the film or material is blasphemous.''^ These regulations received some 
consideradon in the Full Court of the Federal Court's decision in Ogle v Strickland.^^ 
There, the Court held that Anglican and Catholic priests had standing to challenge the 
Censorship Board's decision to allow the importation of the film Hail Mary. The 
priests believed that the film was blasphemous and therefore an illegal import, but this 
question did not have to be decided in Ogle. In obiter dicta Justice John Lockhart 
assumed diat the term "blasphemous" in the Customs (Cinematograph Films) 
Regulations had a similar meaning to its meaning at common law.*' 
The only State to have separate censorship laws explicidy directed at 
blasphemous literamre is Queensland. The Objectionable Literature Acts of 1954 to 
1967 create the Literamre Board of Review and empower it to prohibit the distribution 
in Queensland of literamre it considers to be objectionable, including blasphemous 
literamre that has a tendency to deprave or cormpt.*3 It is incongmous therefore that 
the Board is also prohibited from examining or reviewing material consisting solely of 
" Customs (Cinematographic Films) Regulations, rr 2A, 4, 9, 11, 12, 13 and 39. 
*° Ogle note 65 supra. 
*' Ibid at 52. Commonwealth legislation relating to the broadcast or posting of 
blasphemous matter has been repealed: see Broadcasting Act 1942 (Cth), s 118; 
Broadcasting Services (Transitional Provisions and Consequential Amendments) Act 
1992 (Cth), s 28; Post and Telegraph Act 1901 (Cth), s 43; Postal and 
Telecommunications Commissions (Transitional Provisions) Act 1975 (Cth), s 4. 
82 Objectionable Literature Acts 1954-67 (Qld), ss 5, 6 and 10. 
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"religious matter, or any remarks or observations therein".*3 To be blasphemous, the 
material must make some comment on religion and could, on occasion, exclusively 
comprise remarks or observations on religion. The qualification is poorly expressed, 
and no guidance is provided by the legislation as to how the Board's inability to review 
religious material is to be balanced against its powers to regulate blasphemous 
literamre. 
3. The Objects Protected by Australian Blasphemy Laws. The close relationship 
between die content of the English blasphemy laws and the English religious 
establishment, recognised as recently as Choudhury. prompts the question whether there 
could be a difference in the blasphemy laws received in colonies in which the Church 
of England was not established or, as was probably the case in New South Wales, 
became disestablished. Specifically, in colonies where all religions were regarded 
legally as equal there is some suggesdon that the instimtions, conceptions and practices 
the blasphemy laws protect extend beyond those of Anglicanism. There were certainly 
suggesdons in Upper Canada that it was some interdenominational expression of the 
Christian religion that was protected by the blasphemy laws.** In addition, cridcisms 
of peculiarly Catholic instimtions were successfully prosecuted under the blasphemy 
laws in South Africa and Quebec, although these laws had civilian and legislative 
bases.*^ In the Quebec case of R v Rahard,^^ the accused was a Church of England 
*^  Objectionable Literature Acts 1954-67 (Qld), s 8. 
^ Pringle v Town of Napanee (1878) 43 UCQBR 285 at 293; cf Boucher v Shewan 
(1864) 14 UCCPR 419. 
*^  /? V Webb [1934] AD 493; R v St Martin (1933) 41 R de Jur 411. 
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minister, and was indicted for pasting on his church walls posters criticising the 
Catholic priesdiood, the mass and Catholic moral practices. He was convicted, despite 
the accused's plea that the common law offence of blasphemy only protected God and 
the Christian religion and that his specific criticisms of the Catholic mass were doctrines 
of the Church of England. Chief Justice Perrault's judgment in Rahard ignored these 
issues. Its effect though was not only to extend the protection of the Canadian 
blasphemy law beyond the doctrines of the Church of England, but possibly even to 
punish the offensive expression of those same doctrines. 
In Ogle V Strickland, Justice Lockhart could only say that the possible extension 
of the blasphemy law in Australia to Judaism and other non-Christian religions was "an 
interesting question".*' There is no indication in the common law tradition that the 
common law offence could protect any conceptions or practices outside those held by 
mainstream Christian churches. Indeed, this posidon was acmally reinforced by the 
Federal Court's decision in Ogle that, if anyone had been aggrieved by the Censorship 
Board's decision that Hail Mary was not blasphemous, it was a Christian priest or a 
committed Christian.** 
§ 6: Blasphemy Laws in Australia II: The Impact of Religion Clauses 
In none of the official investigadons into blasphemy laws undertaken since 
Lemon has any attention been paid to the possible impact of religion clauses on 
*^  [1936] 3 DLR 230. 
^^  Ogle note 65 supra at 52. 
^^/^/^ at 53-4 and 59. 
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governmental powers to support blasphemy laws. This is understandable in Australia. 
The criminal law is predominantly a State and Territory concem, and since there are 
no effective religion clauses in operation in the mainland States the question of the 
validity of blasphemy laws does not generally arise. However, section 116 of the 
Commonwealth Constimtion should have some impact on the relevant Commonwealth 
censorship laws and on the Territory blasphemy laws, and the Tasmanian free exercise 
clause could have some impact on that State's blasphemy law.*^  There are therefore 
several circumstances where the operadon of blasphemy laws might be invalidated by 
religion clauses, and once more adjudication on the question in the United States helps 
to show where this might happen. 
1. The Establishment Clause. The validity or invalidity of blasphemy laws in 
the United States has been affected by changes in establishment clause interpretation, 
aldiough most challenges to State blasphemy laws under the First Amendment's and 
State establishment clauses have been unsuccessful. In the earliest of these cases. 
People V Ruggles,^ the decision reflects establishment clause interpretation in an 
extremely unrefined state of development. There, Chancellor James Kent held that New 
York blasphemy laws did not offend the State establishment clause, on the basis that 
religion was a necessary pre-requisite for political and social stability.^' However, 
more recent approaches to the First Amendment's establishment clause based on the 
*' See VI: § 7 supra; VII: §§ 3 and 4 supra. 
^8 Johns 290 (1811). 
" Ibid at 294; c/also Updegraph v Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 11 Serg & R 394 
(1824); Shover V Arkansas 5 Eng 259 (1850). 
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concept of separadon suggest a different result. In 1967 the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania rejected a challenge to the State blasphemy law under the First 
Amendment's establishment clause, but gave no reason."^ ^ In contrast, the closer 
attention paid to establishment clause interpretation in Maryland v West'^^ led to the 
State's blasphemy law's being invalidated. In that case, the Maryland Court of Special 
Appeals had to apply the principles of establishment clause interpretation set by the 
United States Supreme Court in School Bistrict of Abington Township v Schempp,'^'^ 
to the effect that the law had to be secular in both purpose and primary effect. Holding 
that the Maryland blasphemy law originated in legislation passed in 1649 to protect 
Christian doctrine and that it still had that religious purpose, the Court held that the law 
offended the First Amendment.'' 
The result in Maryland v West was an uncontroversial application of the 
establishment clause principles then obtaining. However, the same result might not be 
required under the First Amendment's establishment clause today, especially if Lee v 
Weisman^^ were the controlling precedent. Nor is it likely that blasphemy laws would 
offend the analogous State Aid^^ approach to section 116's establishment clause. On 
this interpretation, the clause does not prohibit an unequal treatment of religious 
'^ Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (ex rel Brown) v Rundle 227 A 2d 895 (1967). 
'^ 263 A 2d 602 (1970). 
'* 374 US (1963); see V: § 5 supra. 
'^  120 L Ed 2d 467 (1992); see V: § 7 supra. 
^^Attorney-General (Vic) (ex rel Black) v Commonwealth (1981) 146 CLR 559; see VII: 
§ 3 supra. 
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conceptions and practices that does not also create a national church or religion. Thus, 
even though the Customs (Cinematograph Films) Regulations and the Territory offences 
of blasphemous libel protect Christian instimtions, conceptions and practices and 
originate in the English religious establishment, they do not in themselves create the 
prohibited nadonal church. They only create a preference. It is certain in Australia 
that a mere preference to a particular religion is not unconstimtional. But, as we will 
see in § 8, the present operation of blasphemy laws in Australia is likely to be upset by 
a more principled approach to the establishment clause based on the principle of equal 
religious liberty. 
2. The Commonwealth'Free Exercise Clause. In the United States, there has 
also been little success in challenges to blasphemy laws under free exercise clauses. 
In Maryland v West, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that the First 
Amendment's free exercise clause invalidated the State blasphemy law. However, the 
Court relied exclusively on establishment clause principles and, given that a burden on 
religious expression did not arise, this particular conclusion was probably not 
justified.^ Indeed, even a broadly interpreted free exercise clause does not necessarily 
have an impact on blasphemy laws. The free exercise clause only prohibits burdens on 
religion. Blasphemy laws might protect the Christian religion, but they do not 
necessarily burden other religious expression. The personal motivation for scandalising 
religious opinions might have no sincere religious, philosophical or moral source. 
Thus, while it has been suggested that the poem published in Gay News was written to 
show that homosexuals could earn salvation by "embracing" Christ, the European 
97 263 A 2d 602 at 604-5 (1970). 
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Commission of Human Rights held that neither Gay News nor L>emon could rely on the 
right to religious liberty under the European Convention, because neither had proved 
that the publication was made in the practice of religious conceptions.''* 
However, religious conceptions can require criticism of other religions and, 
conceivably, religious expression might then offend the blasphemy law.^^ In this case, 
it is much more likely that a broadly interpreted free exercise clause could invalidate 
the operation of a blasphemy law. There are several characteristics of blasphemy laws 
which, in the light of the limitations to the protection of religion allowed by free 
exercise clauses, indicate that, in this context, they could be unconstimtional."^ 
First, blasphemy laws undoubtedly operate as restraints on expression.'°' The liberty 
to hold (and presumably to express) religious conceptions has, at times, been considered 
absolute where the liberty to practise them has not. Though in chapter VIII I argued 
that this distinction between opinions and actions is both superficial and inconsistent 
with the acmal adjudication, it nevertheless indicates that the judicamre is less likely to 
accept burdens on religious expression than on religious practice.'"' 
*^ Gay News III note 44 supra at 131; c/G Robertson "Blasphemy" note 28 supra at 
295. 
^^Rv Rahard [1936] 3 DLR 230; Oney v Oklahoma City 120 F 2d 861 (1941). 
"^  See VIII: § 4 supra. 
'*" Joseph Burstyn Inc v Wilson 343 US 495 (1952); Gay News III note 44 supra at 126; 
HB Bonner, Penalties Upon Opinion 3rd ed (London 1934) p 137; cf Beauharnais v 
Illinois 343 US 250 (1952). 
'"^ VIII: § 4 supra. 
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Secondly, most other approaches taken by the judicamre to the permissible 
limitations on the protection of religion that I discussed in chapter VIII are unlikely to 
validate any blasphemy law that burdens religious expression.'°3 The "ordinary laws 
limitation" of Scientology Ilf^ and Employment Bivision, Bepartment of Human 
Resources v Smith^°^ is the approach most likely to support blasphemy laws as it 
allows die broadest limitations on the protection of religion. However, even this only 
validates "laws which do not discriminate ... against particular religions".'°^ Since 
the blasphemy law provides special treatment for mainstream Christian religion, it is 
arguable it could even offend this limitation. In any case, I have shown that the 
Scientology III approach to the free exercise clause is incompatible with the High 
Court's more recent interpretation of constimtional liberties, and the compelling interest 
test is more likely to define the extent of the limitations to the protection of religion 
under the free exercise clause. Here, adjudication in the United States confirms that 
government probably has no legitimate interest in protecting religious conceptions, let 
alone in conceding protection to some religious conceptions and not others. Joseph 
Burstyn Inc v Wilson^'^^ involved a New York ban on Roberto Rossellini's film The 
Miracle on the ground it was sacrilegious. The ban was challenged in the Supreme 
Court under the First Amendment's religion and expression clauses, but because it held 
'°^  For the following, see ibid. 
'°* Church of the New Faith v Commissioner of Pay-roll Tax (Vic) (1983) 154 CLR 120 
{"Scientology IIF). 
'°M94US 872 (1990). 
"^  Scientology HI note 105 supra at 136. 
'"' 343 US 495 (1952). 
439 XII: § 6 
that the ban offended the free speech clause the Court did not consider the impact of 
the establishment and free exercise clauses. It nevertheless had to decide whether New 
York had a compelling interest in protecdng religious concepdons from contempt and 
ridicule in testing the validity of the ban under the free speech clause, and held 
conclusively that "[i]t is not the business of government in our nation to suppress real 
or imagined attacks upon a particular religious doctrine".'°* Undoubtedly 
constimdonal and historical traditions peculiar to the United States reinforced this 
conclusion and, though it is unlikely, these might compromise its relevance to the 
Commonwealth free exercise clause.'°^ However, even if government did have a 
compelling interest in the protection of Christian instimtions, conceptions and practices, 
blasphemy laws would not necessarily be the least restrictive method of realising that 
interest. If they only imposed limits on the mode of public religious expression they 
might represent a minimal burden on religion."" But again, the blasphemy laws in 
operation in Australia limit more than the mode of expression, because in limiting the 
protection they provide to the Christian religion alone the object of the cridcism is still 
relevant to determining whether the discourse was illegal. 
3. The Tasmanian Free Exercise Clause. There is no adjudication on the 
Tasmanian free exercise clause, so it can only be assumed that its impact is similar to 
'°*/^/^ at 505. 
'"^  Ibid at 505n. 
"" Commonwealth of Massachusetts v Kneeland 20 Pick 220 (1830); State of Maine v 
Mockus 113 A 39 at 44 (1921). 
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that of the Commonwealth free exercise clause. It could therefore render the 
application of the Tasmanian blasphemy and profanity laws invalid if the blasphemy or 
profanity involved were motivated by religious, philosophical or moral conceptions.'" 
The Tasmanian clause also states expressly that the permissible limitations on the 
protection of religion are measures directed towards "public order and morality". 
However, Gay News & Lemon v United Kingdom established that the convictions under 
the English blasphemy law did not protect public order and morals because the 
prosecutions had been brought by a private citizen.'" The reasoning towards that 
conclusion was, as I argued in § 4, unconvincing. It is also less relevant to the 
Tasmanian blasphemy law because, unlike the English law. it requires the fiat of the 
executive government before a prosecution can be brought."3 Still, the law is in 
substance primarily directed towards protecting the Christian religion, and this is not 
changed by an executive government monopoly on prosecutions. That it protects only 
one particular section of society again might indicate that it does not address the basic 
issue of public order and morals required for validity by the Tasmanian free exercise 
clause. This conclusion is reinforced if, as is likely in the Ramsay & Foote paradigm, 
there is no requirement for a breach of the peace to offend the blasphemy law. 
'" There is less doubt that the Tasmanian free exercise clause protects more than purely 
religious conceptions, because it expressly guarantees " freedom of conscience and die 
free profession and practice of religion": Constitution Act 1934 (Tas), s 46. 
"' Gay News III note 44 supra at 130. 
"^  Criminal Code (Tas), s 119. 
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§ 7: Recommendations for Reform 
The New South Wales, English and Australian Law Reform Commissions agreed 
that the prevailing blasphemy laws are unsuitable in current social conditions, and in 
particular conditions of pluralism."* In the words of the New South Wales 
Commission:"^ 
In a multiculmral, pluralist society, a law which provides discriminatory 
protection to a particular religion cannot be justified. 
However, the Commissions are also agreed in preferring that the blasphemy laws 
should not be extended to protect religions other than Christianity, and this second 
conclusion is probably not required as a response to religious pluralism."^ These 
recommendations resist longstanding liberal opinion in support of the equal protection 
of religious instimtions, conceptions, practices and groups through modified blasphemy 
laws. Lord Macaulay's Indian Penal Code, which prohibited words and actions 
deliberately intended to wound the religious feelings of others, introduced this 
ecumenical approach to the regulation of blasphemy and, in Lemon, Lord Scarman lent 
it his support, stating that his criticism of the English blasphemy law was "not that it 
exists but that it is not sufficiently comprehensive".'" He intimated that the extension 
of blasphemy laws to other religions was required by the emergence of religious 
"* NSW Commission note 1 supra at 57-8; English Commission note 2 supra at 28-9; 
Australian Commission note 2 supra at 167. 
"^  NSW Commission note 1 supra at 43. 
"^ Cfeg the racial and religious group libel law discussed in Beauharnais v Illinois 343 
US 250 at 263, 273, 283 and 303 (1951); RC Post note 34 supra at 302. Two 
dissentients on the English Commission preferred the extension of the blasphemy law 
to other religions instead of its complete abolition: English Commission note 2 supra 
at 41-45. 
117 Gay News II note 41 supra at 658; see Penal Code 1860 (India), s 298. 
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pluralism in the United Kingdom since the Second World War."* Queensland has 
legislation which, in prohibiting racial or religious hatred or hosdlity, initially appears 
to be an extended blasphemy or religious vilification law. However, it has an added 
requirement that there also be incitement to unlawful discrunination or some other 
breach of the Queensland Anti-Biscrimination Act, and this empties the provision of any 
potential to prohibit expression that does not constimte a breach of the normal 
Queensland discrimination laws."^ 
However, the Commissions have raised three specific objections to this 
approach. The first is practical: a suitable definition of the religious objects to be 
protected by ecumenical blasphemy laws is hard to formulate."" Only the New South 
Wales Commission discussed the possible use or adaptation of the High Court's 
definition of religion in Scientology III.^^^ It seems to have been concemed about the 
disagreement on the meaning of the concept of religion in that case, and while I believe 
that the approach adopted by Justices Sir Anthony Mason and Sir Gerard Brennan are 
appropriate for purposes of the civil law, even this does not seem to provide the 
certainty and precision needed in the criminal law.'--
"* Gay News II note 41 supra at 658. 
^^^Anti-Biscrimination Act 1991 (Qld), s 126. 
English Commission note 2 supra at 26-7; Australian Commission note 2 supra at 
167; NSW Commission note 1 supra at 47-8. 
'" Scientology III note 105 supra; NSW Commission note 1 supra at 47-8. 
"' In Satanic Verses I, the Court of Appeal referred to Scientology III, but sub silentio 
did not seem to consider that it provided an adequate definition of religion for the 
blasphemy law: note 41 supra at 1000. 
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Secondly, blasphemy laws already burden expression. Therefore, in extending 
them to other religions, the English and Australian Commissions thought that an 
unreasonable limitation on liberty of expression would also only be enhanced."3 
Thirdly, the English Commission thought there was no significant difference 
between religious conceptions and feeling and the "reverence" citizens pay to national 
symbols, or to eminent philosophers, artists or musicians. Hence, it concluded that 
religion did not deserve special protection, and should be treated the same as the objects 
of secular reverence."* 
This last issue is the only one of the reasons offered by the Commissions that 
directly addresses relations between government and religion specifically. The question 
is intimately related to the namre of religion, and I doubt that, in this respect, the 
Commission's conclusion appreciates the potential that religion has to exercise ultimate 
control over the individual's thought and conduct."^ It is therefore reasonable to 
assume that the Commission's major premise here is, at best, questionable. However, 
even in light of some understanding that religion is a more powerful and comprehensive 
phenomenon than, say, an appreciation of scholarly or artistic genius, the three 
Commissions' conclusion that it is best simply to abolish blasphemy laws can also be 
supported by principles of a secular commonwealth. 
"3 English Commission note 2 supra at 20 and 27; Australian Commission note 2 supra 
at 167. 
"* English Commission note 2 supra at 20-1; c/NSW Commission note 1 supra at 42. 
"^  Eg see the reasoning in II: § 6 supra. 
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§ 8: Blasphemy Laws and Equal Religious Liberty 
There has been some suggestion that blasphemy laws are needed to reinforce the 
citizen's religious liberty, because they prohibit others from imposing on the religious 
individual the burdens of verbal harassment, criticism and annoyance."^ This 
assumption is implicit in Lord Scarman's speech in Lemon and was the substance of the 
complaint brought before the European Commission of Human Rights in 
Choudhury.^^^ It was argued that, since the English blasphemy law did not protect 
Muslims against abuse and criticism, their rights to religious liberty under the European 
Convention were offended. The Commission mled the complaint inadmissible, and the 
decision seems correct. The argument clearly confused the namre of the equal religious 
liberty recognised in the Convention. It is directed towards political relations between 
government and the citizen, and not the social relations between citizens in which one 
individual's criticism of another's religion would be classified. In Choudhury, the 
European Commission of Human Rights indicated that no claim that the British 
Government had burdened the practice of Islam had been made, and therefore any 
offence caused to Muslims by Rushdie and his publisher had no bearing on the liberty 
recognised in the Convention. 
Indeed, the right to religious liberty probably includes a responsibility to meet 
criticism without the benefit or privilege of special governmental protecdon. I have 
"^  S Poulter, "Towards Legislative Reform of the Blasphemy and Racial Hatred Laws" 
[1991] PL 371 at 376; c/JR Spencer, "Blasphemy: The Law Commission's Working 
Paper" [1981] Grim LR 810 at 813. 
127 Satanic Verses II note 45 supra; see also Gay News II note 41 supra at 228-30. 
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argued that the citizen's equal religious liberty is inalienable."* This means that the 
citizen is not only unable to exchange his religious liberty for governmental benefits and 
privdeges, but he also cannot exchange the responsibilities inherent in that liberty for 
governmental protection. Equally, it is hard to argue that a religious group should 
remain largely independent of governmental burdens but, at the same time, be entitled 
to its protection through blasphemy laws. The recognition that the independence of 
religious groups also includes a responsibility not to rely on governmental protection 
would also seem to preclude the extension of blasphemy laws to religions other than 
Christianity. For if Muslims and Chrisdans are to enjoy protection from governmental 
burdens on religious practice, Muslims as well as Christians should also be expected 
to respond to criticism without being able to exercise or appropriate the coercive powers 
of government. 
However, the larger problem m the blasphemy law is its inequality, as this 
presents a direct challenge to the basic assumption in the idea of a secular 
commonwealth that citizens are not only free, but also equal. Choudhury confirmed 
that the existing law deliberately protects Christians only, and therefore effectively 
relegates non-Christians to a lesser stams in political and social life."^ The same 
problem emerges even if the blasphemy law v/ere extended to encompass other 
religions. For, while the implication of Gay News & Lemon v United Kingdom was that 
the religious have legitimate group rights that can support the protection of the criminal 
"* II: § 6 supra. 
"' CfM Bohlander, "Public Peace, Rational Discourse and the Law of Blasphemy" 
(1992) 12 Anglo-American Law Rev 162 at 167. 
446 XII: § 8 
law, once these rights are conceded through ecumenical blasphemy laws, the unequal 
treatment of groups defined on the secular or non-religious lines of race, gender, sexual 
orientation or political affiliation can lead them to demand the same protecdon. This 
is a common objection to the extension of blasphemy laws.'3° "If a majority of 
Christians is allowed to suppress what it finds shocking, so too would a majority of 
Communists, Fascists, conservadves, racists, puritans, etc."'3' But it is also 
complicated by recent legislation which does provide that particular method of legal 
protecdon to groups defined on secular lines. In Australia, vilification laws that 
prohibit the incitement of hatred, contempt and ridicule, without necessarily a 
demonstrable threat to political and social stability, have emerged in the Australian 
Capital Territory, New South Wales and Westem Australia. Thus racial vilification is 
prohibited in the Territory and New South Wales, and narrower legisladon in Westem 
Australia prohibits the publication or possession of material which is intended to create, 
promote or increase racial hatred. The Commonwealth Parliament is also considering 
die enactement of racial vilification legislation.'3^ The Queensland legisladon relating 
to racial or religious hatred is not, as has been seen, a vilificadon law.'33 Tme, there 
might be immediate and serious social problems that make it necessary to bend principle 
temporarily and provide some protection from criticism to especially vulnerable groups. 
'3° Note, "Blasphemy" [1979] Grim LR 311 at 313-14; JR Spencer note 127 supra at 
812 and 816; CL Ten, "Blasphemy and Obscenity" (1978) 5 Brit Jnl Law & Soc 89 at 
90 and 91. 
'^ ' CL Ten note 131 supra at 90. 
^^^ Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT), ss 66-7; Anti-Biscrimination Act 1977 (NSW), ss 
20C-D; Criminal Code (WA), ss 76-80; see also Racial Hatred Bill 1995 (Cth). 
133 Anti-Biscrimination Act 1991 (Qld), s 126; § 7 supra. 
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But the critical point is that, however legitimate the protection from vilification might 
be for, say, a particular race, the basic political assumption of equal citizenship builds 
a case for the extension of that protection to other groups. The process has been 
marked in New South Wales, where the protection of vilification laws has been 
extended to homosexuals and, in 1994, HIV-AIDS infected persons.'3* The 1994 
amendments to the State Anti-Biscrimination Act also clarified that racial groups 
protected by the vilification laws included those of "ethno-religious" origin.'3^ These 
have some unfortunate consequences for the New South Wales Commission's 
recommendations on the abolition of the State blasphemy law. First, it is more difficult 
to argue politically that, what is in effect, the protection from vilification in the 
blasphemy law be relinquished.' Secondly, it strengthens the case for the extension of 
the blasphemy law to other religious groups. Ironically (and probably in ignorance of 
the potendal effect of the State blasphemy law), the newer vilification laws have even 
led to suggesdons in New South Wales that religious vilification laws be introduced to 
prevent homosexual abuse of Christians via the "Sisters of Perpemal Indulgence" and 
the Sydney Gay Mardi Gras!'3^ 
The equal protection of all citizens and groups in generalised vilification laws 
is only one solution to this problem which is possibly consistent with the principle of 
'3* Anti-Biscrimination Act 1977 (NSW), ss 49ZT, 49ZTA and 49ZXB-C. s 49ZT 
provides an exemption from the offence of homosexual vilification for public acts done 
reasonably and in good faith for, inter alia, religious instmcdon purposes. 
^^^Anti-Biscrimination Act 1977 (NSW), s 4; see XI: § 4 supra. 
'^ ^ P McPhee, "Would Nile Get Equal Treatment" Australian, 1 December 1993, p 10; 
A Livingstone, "Licence to Humiliate" Australian, 9 March 1994, p 14; c/S Lee, The 
Cost of Free Speech (London 1990) pp 76, 88-9 and 90-1. 
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equal religious liberty, but is arguably unnecessary. The primary question of the 
maintenance of security rights is already addressed by offences prohibiting the use in 
public of offensive language or threatening, abusive or insulting language intended to 
provoke unlawful violence, and vilification laws are probably superfluous to this 
purpose.'3' These public order offences deal with the criticism of the religious and 
the non-religious when it tends towards a breach of the peace, and thus becomes the 
proper concem of civil government.'3^ The Australian Commission has recommended 
the refinement of these offences, having them refer explicitly to the members of 
religious groups.'3^ If implemented these would add nothing substantive to the 
existing public order offences, and therefore the express reference to religious groups 
would not undermine the requirement of the principle of equal religious liberty that 
religious and non-religious concepdons be treated equally. 
§ 9: Conclusion 
There was an old jurisdictional mle that the common law courts took no 
'3' Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), s 546A; Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW), s 4; 
Vagrants, Gaming and Other Offences Act 1931 (Qld), s 7; Summary Offences Act 1953 
(SA), s 7; Police Offences Act 1935 (Tas), s 12; Summary Offences Act 1966 (Vic), s 
17; Public Order Act 1986 (UK), s 4; cf Police Act 1892 (WA), s 59; c/Spencer note 
127 supra at 812; SJ Robilliard, "Offences Against Religion and Public Worship" 
(1981) 44 MLR 556 at 563; Note, (1979) 129 New U 205; CL Ten note 131 supra at 
76, 88-9 and 90-1; M Bohlander note 130 supra at 169. 
'^ * For example, the English offence has been used to punish people who, as an insult, 
deliberately released a pig into a mosque being used by Muslims: G Robertson 
"Blasphemy" note 28 supra at 300 at 302. 
Australian Commission note 2 supra at 166-7. 
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cognisance of heresy, because in England that was a matter for the ecclesiatical 
courts.'*" This effectively ended in R v Taylor,^^^ unsurprisingly decided during the 
monopoly religious establishment of the Restoration, which ensured that orthodoxy, 
heterodoxy and heresy would not be questions limited to the internal courts and 
processes of religious groups and punished exclusively by censure or excommunication. 
Even today, as a result of Taylor they can be adjudged in the civil judicamre and 
punished by methods of coercion. Thus, while the common law and legislation carries 
die legacy of Taylor in the blasphemy laws, the ringing claim made by United States 
Supreme Court Justice Samuel Miller that "[t]he law knows no heresy, and is 
committed to no dogma, the establishment of no sect" remains more a declaration of 
an unrealised political and legal objective than of positive law.'*' 
The principle of equal religious liberty does not leave it open to Christians, 
Muslims, Hindus or Secular Humanists to define through the coercive powers of 
government spheres of orthodoxy and permissible religious debate. The case for the 
abolition of the blasphemy laws is therefore compelling. However, even in the 1980s 
and 1990s it has had little success, and if the more recent trend towards the extension 
'*" R Bum note 11 supra vol 2 at 305-6; Palmer v Thorpe (1583) 4 Co Rep 20a; 
Nicholson v Lyne (1588) Cro Eliz 94; Specot's Case (1590) 5 Co Rep 57a at 57b and 
58a; Bavis v Gardiner (1593) 4 Co Rep 16b at 17a; Holwood v Hopkins (1594) Cro 
Eliz 787; R v Tymberly (1662) 1 Keb 254 at 254; Bickison v Holcroft (1673) 3 Keb 148 
at 150; Budley v Spencer (1675) 1 Freem 277; Roe v Clargis (1683) 3 Mod 26 at 27, 
Skinner 68 at 88 and 89, 2 Show KB 250 at 251; Marriott v Knightly (1683) Skinner 
111 at 112; Ogden v Turner (1703) 6 Mod 104 at 105; Groves v Blanchett (1704) 6 
Mod 148; and Bowman v Secular Society Limited [1917] AC 406 at 446. 
'*' Taylor note 19 supra. 
'^ ' Watson V Jones 80 US 679 at 728 (1872); see X: § 7 supra. 
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of vdification laws should continue the law will still claim that it can know, designate 
and punish its heresiarchs, of old kinds and new. 
XIII. FINAL JUDGMENT 
"Our society is collectively powerless to repudiate its history, including the 
Christian heritage of the majority", said Canadian Chief Justice Brian Dickson in i? v 
Edwards Books & Art.^ The comment is equally applicable to Australia, but the 
y 
immediate relevance of the Chief Justice's observation for most English-speaking 
countries lies in the fact that this history is reflected in constimtions and the law. Of 
course, the most obvious legal expressions of this religious inheritance are laws that 
civil governments have passed to enforce traditional moral mles. Thus, the Sunday 
closing legislation of Edwards Books & Art was intended to implement the Fourth 
Commandment. However, this Christian culmre has been - and is - a more complicated 
and unpredictable social agent. Its thought and instimtional stmcmre are also, as I 
discussed in chapter II, causes of powerful processes of social secularisation that have 
been operating on constimtional and legal instimtions and which have, over the last 
three cenmries, evolved patterns of secular government. Partly because of a significant 
Protestant heritage and because they have been marked by a more extensive religious 
pluralism, these processes have acmally been most pronounced in English-speaking 
[1986] 2 SCR 713 at 743; see VIII: § 3 supra. 
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countries.' 
The primary instimtions which organise relations between government and 
religion in Australia therefore reflect these processes of secularisation. In fact, most 
of the instimdons of secular government that have evolved within the common law 
tradition over the last three cenmries have some manifestadon in Australia: a probable 
disestablishment in at least New South Wales (including Queensland and Victoria), non-
establishment in other colonies, the unwritten principle of toleration in the mainland 
States and religion clauses applicable to the Commonwealth, the Territories and 
Tasmania. Indeed, of the instimtions of secular government discussed in this thesis, 
only "the separation of church and state" has failed to receive some expression in 
Australia. 3 
This unplanned, irrational mix of instimtions is without parallel in other English-
speaking countries. However, it is arguable that the underlying objective that they all 
have is what I have called the idea of a secular commonwealth: government in which, 
as nearly as practicable, religion is regarded as irrelevant to a citizen's political, legal, 
social and economic stams. Chief Justice Sir John Latham's judgment in Jehovah's 
Witnesses'^ is only one local instance of adjudication in which, as a result of judges' 
grappling with the question of the legitimate relations between government and religion. 
' See especially II: § 2 supra. 
^ See VII: §§4 and 5 supra. 
Adelaide Company of Jehovah's Witnesses Inc v Commonwealth (1943) 67 CLR 116 
at 126. 
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this idea has been recognised as the basic objective of secular government.^ I therefore 
suggest that the idea of a secular commonwealth, rather than the more particular but 
sometimes incomplete or inadequate expressions of it like "separation", "neutrality" and 
"toleration", should be the basic objective of governmental action that deals with 
religion. 
It has been argued in this thesis that this idea is best realised by three prunary 
instimtions, two of which I have suggested require reform or extension in Australia. 
1. Religion Clauses. The first is religion clauses that implement the principle 
of equal religious liberty. These require more principled interpretation than the High 
Court gave to section 116 of the Commonwealth Constimtion in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, but this is possible in light of the Court's earlier approach to section 116 in 
Jehovah's Witnesses, current interpretation of constimtional liberties and religion clause 
adjudication in other common law countries.^ I have suggested that religion clauses 
should be extended to the mainland States, either by amendment of section 116, the 
Australia Act or the separate State constimtions. Though the method by which religion 
clauses can be extended to the States is important, it is the need to limit governmental 
power over the citizen's equal religious liberty which is of more concern. 
2. Religious Biscrimination Laws. The second includes, at least, religious 
^ St Xavier's College v State ofGujurat AIR 1974 SC 1389 at 1414; Lynch v Bonnelly 
465 US 668 at 687 (1984); Lee v Weisman 120 L Ed 2d 467 at 506 (1992). 
^ See VI: § 4 supra; VII: § 6 supra; VIII: § 4 supra. 
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discrimination laws to help implement the principle of fair equality of oppormnity. In 
this connection, the advent of religious discrimination laws in some States and the 
Tertitories has improved the governmental response to the challenge of religious 
pluralism and, as the latest of these was only passed in 1992, these might sdll receive 
further development. There remains a need to introduce some kind of religious 
discrimination laws in New South Wales, South Australia and Tasmania.' 
3. Public Reason. The third is the idea of public reason, especially as a civic, 
official and even legal obligation on judges not to appeal to religious conceptions in 
adjudicadon. Even though they have probably only achieved this position by inmition, 
throughout the common law tradition judges have acmally demonstrated a remarkable 
(if fallible) commitment to the use of public reason in making decisions.* 
The fact that instimtions Idee these are already partly in operation in Australia 
helps to prove that the idea of a secular commonwealth and its principles are not only 
requirements of a political conception of justice. They are also practicable, being 
capable of implementation through familiar constimtional and legal mles. They 
represent a serious commitment to equal citizenship as a basic requirement of justice. 
In the Sermon on the Mount the "law and the prophets" are reduced to one principle: 
"whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them".^ It might 
just be that, in being obliged to treat other citizens as equals regardless of their religion, 
'XI: § 5 supra. 
* IX: § 4 supra. 
' St Matthew 7: 12. 
455 XIII 
each of us might, in our political and social relations, acmally fulfil that golden mle. 
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